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ABSTRACT
Everyone should be concerned when the rule of law 
fragments in international relations. Once this 
phenomenon occurs, international disputes become rife 
and international order is threatened. Understanding why 
the rule of law has such a limited normative impact on 
international behaviour is the subject of this work.
A body of international rules has been selected and 
analyzed in their application by states. The particular 
rules selected are those of the pre-1995 GATT in general 
and the specific rules regulating the use of subsidies, 
countervailing duties and anti-dumping measures in 
particular. This thesis examines these principles and 
how they operated on the international plateau prior to 
the adoption of new rules at the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
Thereafter, the impact of these rules on the trade 
policies and practices of the United States and the 
European Union are examined in rigorous detail. Specific 
attention is paid to the substantive anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty Iwas of the US and the EU as well as 
the administrative practices of the two trading 
entities.
After such a comparison is made, it becomes clear that, 
in this context, both the United States and the European 
Union conduct this aspect of their respective trade 
policies independently of the prescribed rules. This comparison requires an indepth evaluation of the 
policies and administrative practices of both these 
states. Hence, the size of this work is justified by the 
need for close and detailed analysis of the relevant 
laws, regulations and administrative practices.
The final conclusion is that the limited normative 
impact of these rules can then be ascribed to five 
factors; (a) the limited normative efficacy of the 
international trade legal order itself; (b) the degree 
to which substantive rules of law embody an adequate 
consensus in relation to their content; (c) the extent 
to which these international rules are compatible with 
the policy objectives and goals sought by the United 
States and the European Union in this context; (d) the 
ability of the rules to permeate the decision-making 
processes inside states and to prevail over non-legal 
factors and considerations; and (e) the strength of such 
rules in terms of their ability to withstand dilution or 
avoidance when incorporated at the national level.
These conclusions are an unfortunate reflection of the 
limitations of the rule of international law. However, 
perhaps they can provide greater understanding of the 
manner in which international relations are conducted in 
reality.
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VOLUME I
A Statement of the Objectives, Parameters and 
the Methodology for this Study
Any thesis is a proof of the validity of a particular 
statement, assertion, proposition or theory and, at the 
most basic level, this work is an attempt to achieve 
just such an objective. As a preliminary matter, it is 
necessary to set down at the outset the exact nature of 
the proposition which is being presented, together with 
an outline of the broad parameters of the study and the 
methodology adopted in the pursuit of this aim. The 
identification of these elements is the function of this 
introductory chapter.
(1) Statement of Objectives
In very broad terms - perhaps too broad terms - 
international law can be described as a framework of 
principles and rules which prescribe acceptable 
standards of behaviour for the international community. 
These rules are created and, to a certain extent, 
implemented by an institutional superstructure which has 
a decentralised character. This peculiar character has 
even given rise to speculation that the international 
legal system is not a valid legal order because it does 
not fit inside the model of law typified by the domestic 
legal order.^
Those asserting these views confuse two separate issues. 
On the one hand, there is the assimilation of the 
international legal order with the legal processes and 
features of domestic legal systems. On the other hand, 
there is the analytical evaluation of the normative
 ^ For a rebuttal of these assertions, see R.M. 
MacLean, "Does Anyone Still Ask the Question ’Is 
International Law Really Law"*, (1991) Juridical Review 
230.
efficacy present in the international legal order and, 
in particular, the effect of law on the behaviour of 
states. Only debate on the latter can explain the 
relevance of law in the determination of state 
behaviour.
There is no value in generalised statements that 
international law does or does not induce states to act 
in particular patterns of behaviour. Even the most 
vociferous advocates of the rule of international law 
must concede that, in certain circumstances, the 
applicable norms of law are insufficient to prevent 
states from adopting courses of action or policies in 
violation of the international rules. Conversely, in 
other situations, the influence of law is decisive and 
the behaviour of states dictated in terms of its 
precepts. In the equation which formulates state 
behaviour, legal principles and rules collectively 
constitute only one variable competing with other non- 
legal factors in the international decision-making 
processes.
Crudely speaking, the actions of a particular state will 
be dictated by the weight of international rules against 
other non-legal forces compelling non-compliance. To 
determine the eventual patterns of behaviour both sides 
of this equation must be examined. In this competition 
of influences and forces it must be recognised that 
legal principles do not invariably prevail.% Quite 
clearly, this assertion is an oversimplification which 
leaves a number of questions outstanding such as:
(a) Why do states feel compelled to comply with 
rules of international law on some occasions
 ^ See R.M. MacLean, "The Proper Function of 
International Law in the Determination of Global 
Behaviour", (1989) 27 Canadian Yearbook of Int'l Law 57.
and disregard their application in other 
circumstances?
(b) What pressures do legal and non-legal factors 
impose on the decision-making processes inside 
states?
(c) How do states evade their international 
obligations by manipulating their own internal 
legal procedures and administrative 
techniques?
Definitive answers to these questions would go a long 
way to resolving the issue of the efficacy of 
international law and its influence on state behaviour,
A comprehensive and all-embracing study into the whole 
international legal system, in terms of both 
institutions and rules, and into the non-legal factors 
impinging on the decision-making processes within each 
state, or even a major group of states, is obviously not 
a feasible endeavour. Accordingly, this study must be 
narrowed down in terms of both the particular legal 
subject-matter and the specific states to be 
investigated.
In terms of subject-matter, the scope of the 
investigation will be confined to the field of 
international trade regulation. But there exists a 
labyrinth of international agreements to co-ordinate and 
regulate such transactions, ranging from the physical 
transportation of goods to the assessment of duties and 
the payment mechanisms created to facilitate trade. 
Since the diversity of international trade regulation 
still remains too extensive for proper examination, 
attention will be confined to the impact of one 
institution operating in this area, namely the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) which has recently 
transformed itself into the World Trade Organization
(WTO). An analysis of this organisation's institutional 
structure and principles prior to this transformation 
will allow the determination of how, and to what degree, 
these impacted on the trade policies of particular 
states.
However, throughout this work, the focus will be almost 
exclusively on the GATT as it existed prior to the 
transformation which occurred on January 1, 1995. This 
is for two reasons.
First, a reservoir of over 40 years experience in the 
regulation of international trade is embodied in the 
history of the GATT. It has been the most important 
international trade organisation during this period and 
it would be highly artificial to make any judgments in 
this area of law without focusing thoroughly on its 
contribution to the regulation of trade.
Second, since the WTO remains a fledgling institution 
with little organisational history to analyze, it would 
be premature to judge the effectiveness of the 
organisation in regulating trade matters in the present 
context. This thesis is therefore exclusively concerned 
with the pre-Uruguay Round rules of international trade 
law and any reference to the post-Uruguay Round rules is 
made only for the purposes of completeness or comparison 
with the pre-existing regime.
Two dimensions of the GATT's operations merit detailed 
consideration. First, its institutional structure and, 
second, its fundamental substantive principles. Both of 
these exerted, in different ways, a normative influence 
on the behaviour of states.
I shall also examine a number of specific rules within 
this institutional framework for the purposes of
regulating specific activities. In this context, the 
international rules regulating subsidies, dumping and 
countervailing measures have been selected for analysis 
to determine their normative influence on particular 
aspects of the trade policies of certain GATT 
contracting parties.
In terms of the actual states and their trade policies, 
again we must limit the scope of the study to a 
relatively few states. Given the nature of the legal 
subject-matter selected for closer investigation, the 
two most obvious candidates for detailed analysis are 
the United States and the European Union.^ Along with 
Japan and Canada, these two states (or more accurately 
one state and one supranational organisation) are the 
main actors in the international trading system.
Not only do these two states provide a stimulating 
contrast in terms of internal decision-making 
structures, but also their trade policies are the most 
dynamic and, arguably, the most controversial in the 
present system. This study will focus on the impact of 
the international legal norms for the regulation of 
trade, as defined in the terms above, on the respective 
trade policies of the United States and the EU.
Now that the parameters of the investigation have been 
defined, it is appropriate at this juncture to 
pronounce, in as brief a manner as feasible, the exact 
proposition which the following chapters will 
demonstrate. In its most simple terms, this study will 
prove the following proposition:
 ^ While the European Community has only recently 
been transformed into the European Union, for the sake 
of consistency and to avoid confusion, the term 
'European Union' will be used throughout this work to 
refer to the pre-1993 organisation as well as its successor, unless the context otherwise requires.
The institutional and legal framework for the 
regulation of international trading relationships 
as established under the GATT exercised only the 
most superficial normative influence on the present 
trade policies of both the United States and the 
European Union, having regard to both the general 
direction of the trade policies of this state and 
this organisation and the particular rules of 
international trade regulation selected for this 
study.
Naturally, the investigation will not be confined to 
providing evidence that this assertion is correct. An 
endeavour will also be made to explain why this 
situation has come to exist, the reasons behind the 
inefficacy of this particular legal institutional 
structure and its rules, and the departure in the 
behaviour of states from the norms created at the 
international level.
This is not merely an academic exercise. Proof that the 
contemporary trade policies of the United States and the 
European Union operated virtually independently of the 
international rules has a number of significant 
repercussions and consequences. Most prominently, 
recognition of this situation is implicit 
acknowledgement that the international trade order 
established by the GATT de facto fragmented, even if 
this eventuality was not formally recognised. No two 
states of this economic magnitude could be allowed to 
effectively operate outside the international system 
without the whole system itself falling into disrepute 
and losing its essential credibility.
The economic consequences of the fragmentation of the 
international trading system established under the GATT
were almost too frightening to contemplate. It could 
have easily heralded the return to 'beggar-thy- 
neighbour' economic philosophies which brought turmoil 
to the international trade system in the 1930s. These 
policies - which involved increasing protection to 
domestic industries from international competition - 
suffocated international trade. Preventing the return of 
this phenomenon was a principal motivating factor behind 
the discussions on an international trade organisation 
immediately after the Second World War which culminated 
in the negotiation of the General Agreement itself.
Perhaps less dramatically, deviation from the GATT 
multilateral trading system could have resulted in the 
fragmentation of the world trade system into regional 
trading blocks. To a certain extent this has already 
occurred with the creation of the European Economic 
Community in 1957 and the European Free Trade 
Association which was established in response. The 
recent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a 
more sinister manifestation of this spectre as are the 
discussions on the formation of a similar regime among 
Japan and certain states of the Pacific Rim.
But the most damaging consequences of the United States 
and the European Union forsaking the GATT legal order 
fell on the developing states of the world. The greater 
the tendency of these two states to neglect their 
international trade policy obligations, the more serious 
the possibility that the economic development of less 
developed states, struggling to enter the international 
economy, would have been retarded. The creation of a 
system of preferences, the pursuit of unilateral or 
bilateral policy objectives and the raising of tariff 
rates by industrialised countries would have effectively 
closed these markets to their goods. In the final 
analysis this would have had a far more damaging impact
. _ _  ^ ^ ^   _   I
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on their nascent progress towards industrialisation and 
a higher standard of living for their populations/
Finally, from an economic perspective, deviation from 
the principle of multilateralism embodied in the GATT 
trading order could have significantly decreased 
international competition, and hence efficiency, leading 
to an overall decline in global output, growth and 
efficiency.
It is difficult to evaluate to what degree the 
international trading system underpinned by the GATT 
started down the path to these consequences and to what 
extent the journey is irreversible. The fact that the 
present trading system has been overhauled now the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations has 
been brought to a successful conclusion is a positive 
sign of a reversal of this decline. Nevertheless, the 
pressures which have built up within this system under 
the governance of the GATT may prove awkward for the new 
World Trade Organisation to control.
Hopefully, the following will provide guidance to the 
defects which must be remedied to bring the United 
States and the European Union back into the fold of the 
international trade legal system. At a minimum it will 
reaffirm the need, already implictly recognised by the 
creation of the WTO, fundamentally to reorganise the 
international trading system, especially at the 
institutional level, but also by creating norms based on 
a proper consensus among the international community or
Hence it is not surprising that the policies of 
trade liberalisation and the reduction of trade barriers 
have been endorsed by developing countries in other 
legal instruments unconnected with the GATT. See, for 
example. Article 14 of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States. G/A Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 
reproduced at 14 ILM 251 (1975).
____
at least its major players.
(2) The Parameters of the Present Study
To set up the context for the forthcoming investigation, 
it is necessary to define in more detail the parameters 
within which the analysis will be conducted. As 
discussed earlier, the demarcation of the study is 
defined relative to two main parameters, namely:
(a) The institutional structure for international 
trade created by the GATT and the fundamental 
norms of this system together with the 
specific international rules selected for 
examination; and
(b) The state and the regional organisation chosen 
for closer examination of the impact of the 
international norms stated in (a) above, 
namely the United States and the European 
Union.
Without defining these parameters in more detail, the 
present study would be in danger of having a lack of 
focus.
(A) The GATT Institutional Structure, Its Fundamental 
Principles and the Specific International Rules 
Selected for Examination
Quite clearly, the institutional structure created by 
the GATT for imposing international obligations on 
states is critical to any evaluation of the impact of 
the relevant norms on the behaviour of states. 
Logically, therefore, the next chapter of this work is 
devoted, in part, to an examination in detail of the 
nature of this institutional framework.
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similarly, it is equally appropriate to analyze the 
fundamental principles which this institutional 
structure was designed to protect, apply and enforce. 
This linkage helps explains why the normative influence 
of even these fundamental principles was limited in 
terms of substance as well as by the institutional 
framework.
The GATT was a peculiar international organisation even 
in international terms. It was seized of a particularly 
insipid institutional framework which lacked organs to 
effectively supervise the regulation of international 
trade practices. Of course, generalities such as this 
infrequently serve to further any accurate understanding 
of the processes of international decision-making. But, 
organisational deficiencies were the root cause of the 
limited normative impact of the rules created through 
the decision-making processes inside the GATT. There are 
in fact three general themes which will be developed in 
the next chapter in this respect.
First, the theoretical basis for both the organisation 
itself and its fundamental principles will be considered 
with a view to deciding whether these principles, valid 
immediately after the Second World War, had the same 
degree of relevance as the international trading system 
matured over the course of time. The purpose of this 
part of the study will be to decide whether the simple 
economic assumptions on which the system was originally 
conceived continued to apply until December 1994 or 
whether a new form of economic theory - in particular 
that of managed trade - supplanted the original maxims.
Second, I shall concentrate on the institutional fabric 
of the organisation to identify the structural defects 
which existed in the legislative, dispute-settlement and 
enforcement procedures of the GATT. This will require
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taking into account some of the measures to rectify some 
of the deficiencies accepted as part and parcel of the 
Uruguay Round of MTNs because these were implemented in 
advance of the final settlement (ie. the 1989 Dispute 
Settlement Understanding).
I shall then move on to analyze the objectives and 
purposes sought to be achieved through the operation of 
the fundamental principles of the system. To what extent 
did these principles act as restraints on the trade 
policies of contracting parties to the GATT? Further, an 
attempt will be made to evaluate why both the United 
States and the European Union frequently justified their 
actions in terms of these principles and rules. However, 
it is unlikely that a satisfactory answer to this 
question will emerge until I proceed in later chapters 
to examine the objectives and shapes of their respective 
trade policies.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 
investigation is the selection of specific international 
rules for examination to assess their normative impact 
on the trade policies of the United States and the 
European Union. Three sets of rules have been picked for 
this purpose. These are:
(a) the international rules for the identification 
of permissible and impermissible subsidies;
(b) the rules regulating the use of national 
measures to counter the commercial practice of 
dumping; and
(c) the rules governing the use of countervailing 
duty (or anti-subsidy) measures.
An explanation is clearly required to justify the choice
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of these three sets of principles as opposed to the 
rules established to regulate other aspects of trade 
policy such as the setting of tariff rates, the 
reduction of technical barriers to trade or the 
regulation of government procurement practices.
At the most basic level, the three groups of rules 
chosen highlight the reluctance of states properly and 
accurately to transpose international measures into 
their domestic (or supranational) legal systems. Each of 
these three sets required positive action on the part of 
states to alter their pre-existing legislative or 
administrative practices. Therefore, collectively, these 
present the best vehicle for evaluating the degree to 
which international rules influence state behaviour.
The juxtaposition of international rules and national 
(and supranational) rules provides an excellent model 
for comparing and contrasting the parallel rules and 
practices at the international and national levels. We 
can therefore assess the degree to which the two 
subjects selected complied with their international 
obligations.
Consistency between these two levels would indicate a 
high degree of conformity to international obligations 
and that the normative impact of these rules was 
substantial. Conversely, discrepancies, inadequacies and 
inconsistencies are evidence that the international 
rules were being ignored and circumvented.
(B) The Selection of the United States and the European 
Union for Examination
It is not the contention of this thesis that all the 
states, or even a majority of the states, participating 
in the present international trading system ignored the
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legal principles and rules which are the subject of this 
investigation. If this were true then the system of 
rules regulating trade could not be described as a legal 
order. A complete disregard of the existing rules would, 
at least in theory, indicate that international trade 
was conducted in a legal vacuum.
On the contrary, this thesis will not establish that the 
rules of international trade prescribed by the GATT were 
absolutely ineffective but, rather, will demonstrate 
that two important international players - the United 
States and the European Union - were, in certain 
circumstances, flouting these rules in the pursuit of 
their own trade policy agendas.
The trade policies of the United States and the European 
Union have been selected because they were functioning, 
to a significant extent, outside the realm of regulation 
prescribed by the GATT. They treated many of these rules 
with a certain degree of impunity and, when certain 
interests were deemed paramount, considered themselves 
able to act outside the generally-accepted norms.
Why the United States and the European Union behaved in 
this fashion is the essence of this thesis as is the 
identification of the circumstances and non-legal 
factors which the United States and the European Union 
saw as justifying such behaviour. Their reasons for non- 
compliance are at the heart of the present investigation 
as is the internal decision-making processes through 
which this behaviour was fashioned.
Coincidentally, the United States and the European Union 
are also two of the most accessible subjects for 
conducting the present analysis. Both leave a paper 
trail in the form of legislation, administrative 
practice and decisions which can be followed, at least
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to a limited extent, to evaluate the impact of 
international norms on their internal policy-making.
In any event, it is the simple importance of the trade 
policies of the United States and the European Union 
which is much of the raison d'etre for the present work. 
If these two subjects were of less significance in 
economic terms, there would be less concern about the 
impact of their unilateral activities on the world 
trading system. But the economic magnitude of the United 
States and the European Union and the economic 
implications of their respective trade policies on the 
international community raise legitimate concerns for 
the future legal framework for international trade. They 
have both, to different extents, taken advantage of 
their respective economic mights to avoid certain of 
their international obligations.
The impact of these selected rules of the GATT were, on 
occasion, a secondary consideration and the 
international rules often only of use when these 
facilitated the achievement of their own policy 
objectives and goals. When these rules frustrated these 
objectives, or impeded them to such a degree that 
certain self-interests were adversely affected, the 
normative impact of these rules was most limited.
This investigation is not therefore an examination of 
the United States-European Union trade relationship 
although frequent reference will be made to trade 
disputes between these parties since these are 
relatively common. It is a study into the two separate 
and independent trade policies of this state and this 
organisation vis-a-vis all their trading partners 
assessed in terms of the applicable international norms.
Nor is this study intended to be a comparative analysis
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of the respective trade policies of these subjects. When 
useful to serve to further the principal investigative 
aims of the study, limited comparisons will be made. But 
again this is not a primary objective of the work.
The United States and the European Union disregarded the 
accepted norms of international law regulating 
subsidies, anti-dumping measures and countervailing 
duties for different rationales and reasons. This is 
clear from an analysis of the internal decision-making 
processes within each. While the United States is a 
federal sovereign state, the European Union is a 
supranational organisation in which the interests of 
Member States have a discernible influence countered, to 
some extent, by the Union's own institutional framework.
Their respective responses to these international rules 
were also different. Again while both subjects are 
considered together, it should be borne in mind that 
this is not an attempt to assimilate their behaviour in 
any way. Rather, this investigation is an attempt to 
understand why the United States and the European Union 
believed that, in certain circumstances, they could 
shrug off their international responsibilities.
(3) The Methodology Adopted in the Present Study
Since the unique feature of this study is the attempt to 
identify the influence of international norms on the 
behaviour of the United States and the European Union 
towards trade policy matters, it is important to 
concentrate on why deviation from these norms occurred 
and to ascertain the non-legal factors as well as the 
processes which shaped their respective trade policies. 
The methodology adopted in the pursuit of this objective 
must be appropriate to this aim. It is therefore 
necessary at this point to outline briefly the
________ ___________ ________________________________________
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methodological approach which will be employed.
The fundamental question being considered is the 
efficacy of the selected norms of international trade 
regulation. As a preliminary matter it is essential to 
establish the institutional framework and the 
fundamental principles which regulated international 
trade. This will involve an analysis of the GATT legal 
system, focusing on a number of specific issues.
First, the GATT superstructure rested on a number of 
economic assumptions which perpetuated a particular 
economic philosophy, namely that of liberal free trade. 
Historically, this paradigm served the interests of the 
larger, richer and most technologically advanced states 
more than those of others. International society has 
evolved considerably since the GATT's conception. It is 
therefore critical to assess, as a preliminary step, the 
continued relevance during the period of investigation 
(1947-1994) of the economic philosophical basis on which 
the GATT rested to ascertain whether the organisation 
itself represented a model for international trade which 
was superseded by the evolution of the international 
economic system.
After examining the theoretical basis for the GATT, I 
shall proceed to consider the institutional framework 
which was established to achieve this paradigm. Although 
the GATT was the principal organ for the regulation of 
international trade, the legislative, executive and 
judicial processes within the organisation were
primitive. This limitation became more pronounced in
contemporary times and it is clear that the GATT failed 
to evolve in step with the international economic 
community. This is obviously a matter of serious
importance to this study and warrants detailed
examination.
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The overall purpose of the initial part of the study is 
to explain the framework within which the regulation of 
international trade was conducted. There seems little 
point in proceeding to analyze the effects of any 
international rules without having first placed them 
within their proper systematic context. Once an 
examination of the international process has been 
concluded, I shall be in a position to examine the 
nature and content of those substantive rules selected 
for particular attention.
The bulk of the first part of the study - namely 
chapters two and three - will be devoted to a detailed 
study of what, for present purposes, are the most 
important rules, namely those pertaining to subsidies, 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures. The 
rationale for selecting those particular rules is not 
simply because they were the most controversial rules of 
the international trading system although this is 
arguably the case. It is because they embodied 
international standards which impinged directly on the 
trade policies of all states, including those of the 
United States and the European Union.
Four particular themes will be pursued when examining 
these international standards. Most importantly, their 
content will be assessed. Did these rules serve the 
interests of some states more than others? Second, the 
degree of efficacy of these rules will be gauged in 
terms of their detail and comprehensiveness. Third, the 
manner in which these rules were used by states to press 
international claims and to alter policies of other 
states will be considered. Finally, it is also relevant 
to evaluate the degree of consensus which underpinned 
these rules.
This allows me to place the lack of effective control
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imposed by these rules on the laws and policies adopted 
by the United States and the European Union in its 
proper context. It will also help to explain why 
frequently international rules on this topic were of 
insufficient or inadequate detail to enforce effective 
regulation of trade policy.
The second part of the work is devoted to consideration 
during this period of the direction and shape of the 
trade policies of the United States and the European 
Union. This is essentially an account of the interaction 
of the international system with the national and 
supranational trade policies of the subjects, as 
assessed through the formally stated trade objectives of 
both parties measured in terms of their international 
activities.
In the third part of the work I shall analyze the 
internal institutional and decision-making processes 
within the United States and the European Union. Here, 
the analysis will be conducted at two separate levels. 
First, the internal institutional processes which 
facilitated the formulation of trade policy will be 
examined. The second level is the impact of different 
interests groups and other pressure groups on the 
decision-making processes. This will entail an analysis 
of how commercial, political and social interests 
influenced the content of the internal decision-making 
processes. In addition, the means whereby private 
individuals sought redress, or were denied remedies, in 
the event of violation of a norm of international law 
during the formulation of policy, is a matter worthy of 
detailed consideration.
The fourth and final part of the study before reaching 
conclusions will be a review of the trade protection 
laws of the United States and the European Union in
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light of the chosen international rules and obligations. 
This, of course, will require an assessment of the laws, 
administrative procedures and decisions which existed 
prior to the reforms introduced to implement the Uruguay 
Round Final Act. It is at this level that the normative 
value of international obligations can be assessed in 
the starkest terms, namely the application of the black- 
letter substantive international rules versus the black- 
letter laws, decisions and practices of the United 
States and the European Union.
Trade protection laws were acutely relevant to the study 
since they functioned in a pivotal role in the operation 
of the trade policies of the United States and the 
European Union. These measures will be examined for 
compliance with the international standards at three 
separate behaviour levels. First, there is the political 
level which concerned the policy objectives which were 
to be achieved in the enactment and operation of trade 
protection laws. Second, there is the legislative level. 
On this plane, the primary concern was the degree to 
which the internal legislation of these subjects was 
compatible with the international standards.
Even the most rigorous analysis of internal laws would 
not provide a complete picture of the normative impact 
of international standards without taking into account 
the true manner in which these were implemented. 
Administration of national rules frequently allowed 
agencies considerable scope to deviate from the 
established rules or to invent rules where lacunae 
exist. The degree of bias in the administration of these 
standards was directly relevant to determining the 
asymmetry of rights between national and non-national 
producers. Hence, on a third plane, I shall also 
carefully review the administration of the trade 
protection laws of the United States and the European
  _      _ __ _____
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Union in an effort to evaluate their objectivity and 
fairness.
In this assessment, as we shall see, there are three 
shades of compliance where international rules exist to 
regulate counterpart domestic laws. At the highest 
gradient there is compliance. Evidence of total 
compliance, or at least an effort to comply, directly 
translates to proof of the efficacy of the international 
rule. At the medium level there is the situation where 
the international rules are circumvented either because 
these rules are imprecise or because they fail to 
regulate a practice that has developed since the rules 
were negotiated. The lowest level is where international 
rules are ignored or disregarded. Such behaviour is 
indicative of the breakdown in normative value of an 
international rule. It is a manifestation of the 
greatest threat to the preservation of the normative 
efficacy of the legal system serving the international 
trading order.
Of course, it is difficult to assess the overall rate of 
compliance by the United States and the European Union 
with the international rules when some rules were obeyed 
while others were not. Nor is there a balance which can 
be introduced in this assessment. However, two 
statements may be made which, if proved correct, would 
conclusively establish that the United States and the 
European Union were frequently operating their trade 
protection laws during this period outside the ambit of 
the relevant GATT rules.
First, both the United States and the European Union 
unilaterally developed and refined their trade 
protection laws to protect their domestic industries and 
these actions often could not be justified as being 
compatible with the spirit and letter of the law of
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international trade regulation. Second, the trade 
protection laws permitted by the GATT - anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty measures - were not operated with 
the degree of objectivity required to balance the 
interests of domestic and foreign producers. The 
implications of both these statements are self-evident.
(D) The Proposition
After these matters have been deliberated, I will be in 
a position to assess the. normative impact of the 
international legal standards on the trade policies of 
the United States and the European Union. From this it 
can be concluded that the primary reason for the lack of 
compliance by the United States and the European Union 
was self-interest coupled with a fundamental lack of 
consensus behind many of the international rules, 
standards and procedural safeguards.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that there are 
different reasons for the lack of normative influence of 
the rules on the behaviour of the United States and the 
Union. While the United States had relatively efficient 
and consistent procedures for formulating trade policy, 
its motives for non-compliance related to its own 
perception of its economic and trade policy objectives. 
It genuinely believed its national external trade policy 
to be a paragon of how such a policy should be managed. 
This perception ignored the fact that the United States 
had one of the largest economies in the globe and that 
its interest in preserving the liberal trade order often 
was at odds with the objectives of its international 
competitors.
The commercial policy of the European Union, on the 
other hand, was more passive and more defensive than 
that adopted by the United States. This contrast, as we
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shall see, has caused volatile exchanges. But, the 
European Union's rationales for non-compliance were more 
because of its uncertain view of its role in the 
international economic community and its half-hearted 
attempts to formulate a viable trade policy among its 
own Member States.
These uncertainties must also be placed against a 
background where the diversity of Member States' 
interests frequently frustrated the adoption of a 
consistent and realistic trade policy. The policy of the 
European Union was, at the same time, inconsistent, 
confused, fragmented and fragile. It is therefore 
little wonder that implementation and compliance with 
international rules frequently took a secondary role in 
the formulation of the European Union's trade policy.
As observed earlier, it is too early to judge whether or 
not the reforms brought to the international trading 
system by the Uruguay Round Agreement will allow the 
United States and the European Union to continued to 
behave in this manner. However, the radical overhaul of 
the system, and especially the creation of the WTO and 
its institutional structure, offers hope that a new era 
of normative efficacy will be created. The closure of 
the GATT era opens a new chapter in international trade 
relations in which the prospect of the rule of law in 
international trade looks far more promising.
PART A
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS ON THE 
BEHAVIOUR OF STATES
A Defective Mechanism for Regulation: The GATT
System for the Creation and Enforcement of 
International Trade Obligations
Since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)^ 
lay at the heart of the 1947-1994 international trading 
order, it is a logical assumption that the root cause of 
the lack of normative influence of international 
obligations on the behaviour of the United States and 
the European Union during this period lies in the 
functioning of this mechanism.®
An examination of the GATT as a legal institution begs 
the question how the system did not disintegrate given 
the tremendous forces exerted on it especially in recent 
times. It was created to regulate a much smaller 
international society of states within which there 
existed a meagre commonality of interest. International 
society has however undergone a dramatic transformation 
and this commonality of interest has dissipated exposing 
this structure as an ineffective regulatory mechanism.?
This transformation did not occur overnight. Rather, it
® The GATT has force by virtue of the Protocol of 
Provisional Application (PPA), 55 UNTS 194 (1947). The amended version of the GATT is reproduced in the GATT 
BISD, Vol. IV, 1 (1969). On the PPA, see M. Hansen & E. 
Vermulst, "The GATT PPA; A Dying Grandfather?", (1987) 
27 Col. J. Trans. Law 263.
® There are two other important international trade 
organisations: the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD) and the UN Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). However, the OECD is 
mainly composed of Western industrialised states while 
the UNCTAD is a UN subsidiary agency which, in practice, 
is identified most closely with developing countries 
although technically its membership is open to all UN 
members.
? For a view that the GATT even sold out on its 
most fundamental principles, see G.N. Horlick, "How the 
GATT Became Protectionist", (1993) 27:5 JWT 418,
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occurred gradually over the course of the last forty 
years, with spectacular pace over the last fifteen 
years. Unfortunately the GATT contracting parties were, 
until recently, unable - or unwilling - to make the 
necessary adaptations to the system to facilitate its 
evolution. The result was that the GATT no longer 
effectively regulated the international trade 
relationship among its contracting parties and that at 
least two - the United States and the European Union - 
frequently acted outside its control.
This situation arose for a variety of reasons, but there 
are at least five primary defects in the fabric of the 
GATT legal order in terms of both the institutional 
framework and the economic objectives which the 
organisation was originally set up to achieve.
The first is that, bearing in mind its unfortunate 
conception, the organisation failed to evolve in 
relation to the changes in the environment with which it 
interacted. This environment became far more 
sophisticated than that when the organisation was 
conceived. Similarly, the needs of the trading system 
have moved away from the simple requirements of 
regulating basic import/export transactions towards far 
more complex exigencies such as the protection of 
intellectual property, the liberalisation of trade- 
related investment and the necessity of tackling the 
myriad of non-tariff barriers that have come to exist. 
While some of these barriers have now been addressed as 
part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, their impact has required regulation for 
at least a decade and a half.
The second deficiency arose from the failure of the 
organisation adequately to circumscribe the rights of 
contracting parties to interfere with patterns of trade.
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The 'soft law* regime established under the GATT, as 
opposed to a 'fixed-rule* regime, proved inadequate to 
prevent states from ignoring its provisions.* Attempts 
to address this problem by establishing black-letter 
side agreements to regulate some non-tariff barriers 
compounded this problem by being ineffective in 
operation.
Third, and perhaps most obviously, there was a crisis in 
the negotiation of trade obligations. International 
trade obligations impose restraints on the liberty of 
states to conduct economic and monetary policy. States 
have become increasingly unwilling to concede 
concessions in the absence of tangible benefits. At the 
same time, the whole negotiation procedure involves a 
play off of interests among different economic sectors 
within states and those groups which are the losers in 
this process often denigrate any benefits which will 
accrue to other sectors. It is an important point to 
note that non-economic factors have become increasingly 
relevant in the national decision-making processes in 
matters which were traditionally considered to be of 
purely commercial concern.
Fourth, at the root of the system itself there was the
* It is interesting to note that the terms 
'legality* and 'illegality* were rarely used by those 
officials operating within the GATT-system. Somehow, 
GATT-law was seen as a 'soft law* regime where these 
terms were inappropriate. Outside this establishment, 
commentators also seemed awkward with assessing 
practices against GATT rules in black or white legal 
terms. One commentator even claimed that 'the GATT has 
soft and loose rules, riddled with exceptions and 
loopholes'; H. Kitamura, "Japan and the GATT", in R. Rode (ed), GATT and Conflict Management: A Transatlantic 
Strategy for a Stronger Regime (1990), 47, 58. A former 
Director-General also observed that the GATT rules are 
'dynamic and fluctuating' rather than immutable legal 
precepts; O. Long, Law and Its Limitations in the GATT 
Multilateral Trade System (1985), 7.
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issue of the institutional structure of the organisation 
and in particular the processes established for the 
creation and application of obligations. Even although 
the Uruguay Round has been successful in procuring new 
agreements to regulate new subjects, unless there is an 
adequate institutional framework to apply and enforce 
these rules, the whole exercise will have been futile.
Finally, the GATT dispute-settlement procedures were 
notoriously complex, difficult and cumbersome. Even if 
one state was successful in initiating a complaint 
within the GATT, there was no guarantee that the 
decision of the panel would be implemented or, if 
implemented, would provide satisfactory relief. As we 
shall see later, the proposals, first adopted in 1988 
and now contained in the Uruguay Final Act, to amend 
these procedures did not address the main flaws in the 
dispute-resolution system.
When combined, these defects largely account for the 
inability of the GATT to exercise sufficient normative 
influence on the formulation of trade policy by the 
United States and the European Union to require them to 
comply with their obligations in total. Since the 
central institutional mechanism for the application and 
enforcement of obligations was so defective it is hardly 
surprising that the international rules were often 
ignored by the United States and the European Union.
(1) An Imperfect Surrogate for an Effective Regulatory 
Agency: The Origins of the GATT
Negotiations towards the creation of three international 
organisations to regulate the post-war economic order 
were originally undertaken at a series of conferences 
held towards the end of the war at Bretton Woods in New
_ __
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Hampshire.* There are a number of formalistic, and 
rather superficial, reasons advanced for the breakdown 
of negotiations towards an ITO.^° In reality, there was 
a fundamental lack of consensus on the terms of the ITO 
Charter.
The United States acted as the dynamo for a Charter 
embodying the primary objectives of trade liberalisation 
in the form of tariff reductions and the removal of non­
tariff barriers to trade." The U.S. government 
adamantly advocated a return to a liberal trade order 
because of the fear of a depression within its own 
borders if no outlet was found for the country's greatly 
expanded productive capacity. These principles were 
resisted by a broad United Kingdom-France coalition 
favouring import controls and financial controls to 
prevent an undesirable surge of foreign imports."
At the heart of the struggle to draft the ITO Charter 
was the resistance by other states against the possible 
future and irreversible economic hegemony of the United 
States over the international trading system." The 
United States naturally favoured a neo-liberal free 
trade paradigm in which obstacles to trade other than
* For background, see R. Gardiner, Sterling-Dollar 
Diplomacy (1969); C. Wilcox, A Charter For World Trade 
(1949); W. Brown, The United States and the Restoration of World Trade (1950).
J.H. Jackson, The World Trading Svstem (1989),
31.
" See, R.E. Baldwin, Trade Policy in a Changing World Economy (1988), 21-25.
" See D.P. Calleo & B.M. Rowland, "Free Trade and 
the Atlantic Community", in J.A. Frieden & D. Lake, International Political Economy; Perspectives on Global 
Power and Wealth (1987), 340-349, 341-342.
" See A. Cassesse, International Law in a Divided World (1986), 325.
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tariffs would be progressively eliminated. Given the 
relative strength of the United States economy against 
those of even its allies, such a framework obviously 
best served American interests."
In the end the opposition to the United States agenda 
was crushed and the majority of the American proposals 
adopted into the framework of the draft ITO Charter. In 
essence, the system was to be based on four principles:
(a) the creation of an institutional framework to 
facilitate international co-operation in the 
promotion of trade;
(b) the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of 
tariffs;
(c) the progressive elimination of non-tariff barriers 
to trade; and
(d) the multilateral application of the Most-Favoured- 
Nation (MFN) principle.
The content of these principles indicate the fiat with 
which the United States acted during the negotiations. 
Virtually all its proposals on fundamental principles 
were subsumed into the draft Charter and those of the 
United Kingdom and France rejected. Until 1950, when the 
U.S. Congress withdrew its support for an ITO, the 
American State Department aggressively pursued the 
attainment of these objectives within the framework of 
an international institution."
The rationale for reiterating the history of the 
negotiations for an ITO is to reflect on the fact that 
these four fundamental principles eventually found
" See J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (1989), 2-3.
15 The forum for negotiations was initially a 
conference convened for the purposes of drafting an ITO 
Charter after a resolution of UNECOSOC in February 1946.
__
30
expression in the GATT which was adopted as a surrogate 
for an ITO. The GATT was therefore originally conceived 
as an instrument, and to a certain extent an extension, 
of United States trade policy. That the institution 
failed to materialise was merely a matter of the United 
States government cutting off its own nose to spite its 
own face." In any event, to say that the principles 
included in the ITO Charter, or the GATT for that 
matter, embodied any general international consensus is 
wholly inaccurate.
The fact that the United States eventually buried the 
ITO Charter does not imply that these policy objectives 
were abandoned even by subsequent U.S. administrations 
or Congresses. The reasons for the failure to ratify the 
Charter stemmed from division between the Executive and 
Legislative branches of government as to whether the 
Executive had authority to adopt the Charter without the 
approval of the Senate."
The facts surrounding the adoption of the General 
Agreement as a surrogate for an ITO have been elaborated
" Paradoxically, in the 1980s, the same phenomenon 
of internal confusion inside the United States again 
recurred. While the Reagan and Bush administrations were 
protagonists of free trade, the U.S. Congress became 
increasingly protectionist. Each of these arms of 
government continually frustrated the trade policy 
objectives of the other. The result has been chaos not 
only in internal United States trade policy but also on 
the international stage.
" Original authority to engage in the negotiations 
had been conferred on the Executive by the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934. as extended by the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1945. This authority 
extended to the negotiation of tariff concessions. But, 
there were concerns in Congress that the ITO was more of 
an international organisation and membership would have 
required the approval of Congress. This question of 
which internal government agency - the Executive or the 
Legislature - should have control over United States 
trade policy is one to which we shall return.
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too many times to require reiteration in this study." 
Only two points from this period of transition must be 
emphasised.
First, the GATT was intended to be an individual trade 
agreement operating within a broader institutional 
framework, namely the ITO." It was intended to be a 
temporary measure to fill the period until the adoption 
of the ITO Charter. Hence, it was never a true 
international organisation insofar as that term is 
synonymous with agencies with institutional features 
such as plenary organs, executive organs and 
adjudicatory mechanisms. This defect was never 
rectified and was an immediate cause of the collapse in 
the GATT’s effectiveness.^*
Second, as mentioned earlier, the GATT also embodied 
many of the substantive principles forced on the 
international trading community by the United States. 
These did not necessarily represent any consensus among 
the original signatories as to the manner in which the 
international trading system should really be 
structured. This lack of consensus became increasingly
" See J.H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the 
GATT (1969) ; K.W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International 
Economic Organisation (1970); R.E. Hudec, The GATT Legal 
Svstem and World Trade Diplomacy (1988); and T. Flory, 
Le GATT; Droit International Et Commerce Mondial (1968).
" Former Director-General of the GATT, Arthur 
Dunkel, as part of the Uruguay Round, introduced a draft 
Charter for a Multilateral Trade Organisation (MTO) 
based on largely the same principles as the ITO. This 
envisaged an umbrella organisation, endowed with legal 
personality, to provide a common institutional framework 
for facilitate the conducting of international trading 
relations. This became the basis for the final text of 
the WTO Agreement.
J.H. Jackson, "The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: 
A Constitutional Appraisal", (1980) 12 Law & Pol'y Int'l 
Bus 21.
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apparent as the international economic environment has 
evolved into its present, exceedingly complex, form.
(2) Defect 1: The Failure of the GATT to Evolve
Relative to the international Environment
Over the last twenty-five years, the international 
environment in which the GATT functioned has become 
increasingly sophisticated. It must now be recognised 
that the regulation of trade cannot be divorced from 
other variables such as national economic and monetary 
policies. The fact that the international trading order 
itself became much more sophisticated is also evidence 
that the GATT became increasingly obsolete especially in 
the regulation of the trade policies of the United 
States and the European Union.
(A) Changes in the International Economic Environment
The dynamics of the international economic community 
have fundamentally altered over the course of the last 
forty five years and the GATT failed to keep pace with 
its evolution. Herein lies some of the most damming 
criticism of the GATT's ability to exercise a normative 
influence on the behaviour of states. Consider briefly 
some of these fundamental changes.
The structure of the international economy has 
dramatically changed. Instead of one single economic 
superpower driving the international economy, there are 
at least two, and arguably three, economic superpowers - 
the United States, the European Union and Japan. Power 
to control the shape of the international economy, and
See J. Bhagwati, "Multilateralism At Risk; The 
GATT Is Dead - Long Live the GATT", (1990) 13:2 World
Economy 149.
 : : _      '  : :
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the legal structure which regulates it, has passed from 
the exclusive control of the United States and has been 
dispersed with the principal beneficiaries being the 
Union, Japan and possibly Canada.
The United States has recognised this phenomenon and 
adjusted its trade policy in an endeavour to prevent 
further haemorrhaging. The European Union still has not 
decided how this power should be exercised. Japan has 
learned that the perpetuation of the existing system for 
international trade now serves its interest best and 
uses the tools within the system accordingly. Hence, the 
topography of the international trading system has 
fundamentally altered since the GATT was conceived.
National economic policy remains essentially within the 
sovereign prerogatives of most states^ and hence the 
international economic system has no coherent or 
immutable basic policy objectives." This lack of co­
ordination in macro-economic policies is particularly 
acute among developed nations and hence the emergence of 
elitist institutions for co-operation such as the Group 
of 7 and the growing significance of measures adopted 
within the OECD.
The Group of 7 (often referred to as the Group of 8 when 
Russia participates) is a loose arrangement with no 
permanent structure but the economic policy issues which 
are considered in this forum are invariably important.
" The notable exception to this statement is, of 
course, the Member States of the European Union which 
have transferred considerable sovereign authority to the 
control for these matters in terms of both the Treaty of 
Rome and the Treaty on European Union 1992.
" O n e  exception to this general proposition is the 
objectives stated in the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF which contain general economic policy goals such as 
stability in exchange rates.
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Its main purpose is to introduce an element of co­
ordination among each of the economic policies of the 
participants. Hence, for example, in the London Summit 
of the Group held in July 1991, issues on the agenda 
included interest rates, price stability, the need to 
tackle recession, inflation, the creation of conditions 
for sustainable growth and greater employment. The 
Members of the Group committed themselves to implement 
fiscal and monetary policies which would provide a basis 
for lowering interest rates and closely to co-operate in 
exchange markets.^
The same group of developed countries also use the OECD 
to formulate other economic commitments. To some extent, 
these rules form a second tier of international economic 
and commercial obligations which would be unattainable 
at the truly international level. The organisation is 
presently engaged in the negotiation of a number of 
proposals which will greatly affect the international 
economic environment including agreements or 
understandings on international competition and anti­
trust policy", as well as greater disciplines for the 
use of subsidies", private and public investment and 
the protection of the environment. In the very existence 
of this organisation, the real separation of interests 
between the developed countries and the rest of the 
international trading system is most obvious.
Even during the Uruguay Round negotiations themselves, 
the influence of this inner sanctum of industrialised 
states was manifest as the negotiations headed towards
" See Economic Declaration of the London Economic 
Summit 1991: Building World Partnership, Points 4-7,
25 See the OECD Draft Competition Code.
" See for example the OECD Guidelines on Export 
Credit Finance 1982.
35
oblivion between December 1990 and mid-1992. The 
conclusion of the Round became a subject repeatedly 
placed on the agenda of the Group of Seven, first at the 
London meeting held in June 1991 and latterly at the 
Tokyo meeting in July 1993. At these meetings, and the 
intervening summits, repeated exhortations were made in 
the final declarations to ensure a successful conclusion 
of the Round and the resolution of outstanding matters. 
Indeed, at the Tokyo summit, the Group organised a sub­
meeting of the four main trading groups - the United 
States, the European Union, Japan and Canada - during 
which a tariff-cutting deal largely outside the main 
negotiations was secured (known as the quadrilateral 
agreement of July 13, 1993) to maintain momentum in the 
negotiations."
Increasingly towards the signing of the Final Act, the 
same quadrumvirate conducted closed sessions generally 
ignoring the fact that there were other participants in 
the process with equally legitimate interests in the 
negotiations." These four states were able to 
effectively ignore these other interests which 
acknowledges that realpolitik exists in the negotiation 
of international trade obligations. In effect, these 
states conducted virtually independent negotiations with 
the tacit understanding that only a final compromise 
among this group would lead to a successful conclusion 
of the Round.
In this context, there is also the important issue of 
the recent industrialisation of the states described as 
newly industrialised which are able to produce goods at
" See, Sir Peter Marshall, 'Another Chance or Last 
Chance?; Will 1993 See the Completion of the Uruguay 
Round', (1993) 328 Round Table 385.
" See also EC Commission, Press Briefing. April 
14, 1994.
_____ _____________________________
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prices considerably cheaper than their Western 
competitors. Here the terrain is less certain. On the 
one hand, some economists would argue that producers in 
these states are able to achieve this degree of 
competitiveness through low labour costs, the avoidance 
of expenditure required to comply with health, safety 
and environmental protection legislation, and cheaper 
supplies. On the other hand, other economists would 
point to the principles of comparative advantage and 
economies of scale to justify this competitiveness.
The truth is not particularly relevant. It is more 
significant to note what the effect of the presence of 
these producers has been to the trade policies of 
developed states. In general, their impact has been to 
cause these states to employ measures of administered 
protection and quotas to limit imports. In turn, the 
imposition of such measures alters the penetration 
strategies of producers from these countries which 
affects patterns of international investment, 
particularly foreign investment.
Finally, it is impossible to ignore that other aspects 
of the international economy have increasingly impinged 
on the trading system. Once, exchange rates were 
determined largely in response to balance of trade in 
goods profiles. In modern times, interest rates are an 
important factor determining exchange rates. If 
exchange rates are artificially distorted by interest 
rates, trade relationships are similarly affected. 
Foreign imports become cheaper or more expensive not 
because goods are more or less efficiently produced but 
because of factors unrelated to the costs of production 
or the comparative advantage of a country.
Any sudden movement in exchange rates between two 
states, even if caused by unrelated factors such as
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declining foreign investment or recession, will leave at 
least one state claiming that the cheaper imports from 
the other state amount to unfair trade. The link between 
exchange rates and the flow of goods was in fact the 
basis of the so-called Plaza Accord understanding 
negotiated in 1985 between the United States, Germany 
and Japan." This understanding introduced an element of 
co-ordination between the macro-economic policies of 
both states with a view to achieving some degree of 
stability in their respective exchange rates and their 
balances of trade with each other.
(B) Changes in the Nature of the International Trading 
Order
There are presently more international agreements 
creating bilateral trade relationships and free trade 
areas or groups than ever before. This has led some 
commentators to speculate on the demise of the 
multilateral trade system in favour of a more fragmented 
and compartmentalised system of regional trading 
blocs.^
Bilateral trade agreements outside the GATT system
" The Plaza Accord originated from a meeting of the 
major industrialised nations held at the Plaza Hotel in 
New York in September 1985. At this meeting, the U.S. 
government decided that the U.S. dollar was too strong, 
a view also held by the other delegates. An agreement 
was reached to allow the central banks of these states 
to intervene in the foreign currency markets to depress 
the value of the dollar vis-a-vis both the Japanese yen 
and the German mark. It was anticipated that this 
effective devaluation would act as a catalyst to 
promoting the attractiveness of U.S. exports by making 
them relatively more competitive. Further meetings under 
this framework have occurred.
See J.H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT Svstem 
(1990); and F.M. Abbott, "GATT and the European 
Community: A Formula for Peaceful Co-existence", (1990) 12 Mich J. Int'l Law 1.
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became a common means of resolving international trade 
problems. These trade policy measures took many forms 
such as unilateral private or public voluntary export 
restraints (VERs) administered in the country of export, 
voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) and multilateral 
orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs)Commonly, such 
arrangements involve a bilateral understanding to limit 
exports from one country to another with the consent of 
both states. Their existence was an anathema to the 
GATT“system for a variety of reasons but mainly because 
they fundamentally undermined the principle of 
multilateralism which lay at the heart of the GATT- 
system.^
However, trade in some sectors of the international 
economy is conducted largely in terms of these types of 
arrangements. For example, the steel industry", the 
textiles industry^, the agricultural sector", the
See GATT, Review of Developments in the Trading 
Svstem (1989), 99.
" See E-U. Petersmann, "Grey Area Trade Policy and 
the Rule of Law", (1988) 22:2 JWT 23; and I. Pogany,
"Steel Wars v Star Wars: The Impact of Voluntary Export 
Restraints on the GATT", in D.L. Perrott & I. Pogany, 
Current Issues in International Law (1988), 68-88.
" See, for example, the Exchange of letters Between 
the Government of the United States and the EEC 
Concerning Trade in Certain Steel Products. O.J. L215/2 
(1983) .
" In this sector, arrangements outside the GATT 
were virtually institutionalised through the MultiFibre 
Arrangement (MFA), GATT BISD, 33rd Supplement 7 (1987). 
See H.R. Zheng, Legal Structure of the International 
Textile Trade (1988) and X. Tang, "Textiles and the 
Uruguay Round of MTNs", (1989) 23:3 JWT 51.
" This was due to the waiver granted to the United 
States in 1955 by the GATT on which other countries have 
relied for the de facto protection of their agricultural 
sectors. See Waiver Granted to the U.S. in Connection 
with Import Restrictions Imposed under Section 22 of the 
Agricultural Assistance Act. GATT BISD, 3rd Supplement
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footwear industry, motor vehicles" and much of the 
consumer electrical goods industry are heavily regulated 
by these arrangements. Many of them serve as barriers to 
trade for goods entering the markets of the developed 
countries, particularly the United States and the 
European Union.
The second dramatic transformation in the shape of the 
international trading system has been the tendency 
towards regional groups." Naturally, the European Union 
is the most obvious - and successful - example of 
economic and commercial integration, but other groupings 
have been created for this purpose. The point is that, 
since the 1980s, the tendency has become more marked. 
The most significant recent development has been the 
negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) among the United States, Canada and Mexico.
At the most basic level, this arrangement was a reaction 
by the United States to the intransigency within the 
international trading system towards agreeing new rules 
and a belief that the principle of reciprocity is now 
defunct." The agreement itself is relatively 
comprehensive covering tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
investment and services. It is therefore an
32 (1955).
" See the Exchange of Letters Between the United 
States and Japan on Auto-Exoorts 1985, reproduced in 
J.H. Jackson & W.J. Davey, Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations (Second edition, 1986), 
619-622.
" See generally, N. Hopkinson, Completing the GATT 
Uruguay Round; Renewed Multilateralism or a World of 
Regional Trading Blocks (1992); and D. Lai, 'Trade Blocs 
and Multilateral Free Trade*, (1993) 31:3 J. Comm.
Market Studies 349,
" See J.H. Jackson, "Reflections on the 
Implications of NAFTA for the World Trading System", 
(1993) 30:3 Col. J. Trans. Law 501.
_____
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unsatisfactory precedent for the international trading 
system since the agreement was not completely consistent 
with the terms of the GATT and the arrangement was not 
integrated into the GATT structure."
A fragmentation of this kind may produce two results. 
First, the existing regional organisations will increase 
their protectionist tendencies in response to the 
creation of new trading blocs. Second, other groups of 
states, such as the Pacific Rim states, will be 
encouraged to form such groups, further stifling 
international trade.
The dramatic increase in the significance of trade in 
services has also changed the face of the international 
economy. In 1947, it was not considered appropriate to 
include trade in services within the terms of the GATT. 
According to recent statistics, as much as twenty 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of some 
states is derived solely from the provision of services 
as opposed to goods.Trade in services is therefore an 
important, but neglected element in the international 
economy.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) agreed 
at the Uruguay Round attempts to bring trade in services 
within the remit of the WTO-system.^ This agreement is
" The participating states are presently seeking a 
waiver, or some other form of GATT approval to 
legitimise the arrangement.
Note also the newly rejuvenated Organisation For 
Pacific Co-operation embracing the United States and the 
Pacific Rim states in an institutionalised forum for 
conducting negotiations.
Eurostat, Structural Data Report to the European 
Commission (1992), 6.
Final Act of the Uruguay Round MTNs. GATT Doc. 
MTN/FA II AIB (December 1993).
 :
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based on the need progressively to liberalise trade in 
services on the basis of the principle of national 
treatment. The supply of services is also subject to the 
principles of MFN and non-discrimination insofar as 
these concepts can be applied to trade in services. 
However, there remains problems in the text of the 
agreement relating to the operation of the concepts, 
principles and rules themselves as well as the mechanics 
of liberalisation. In addition there are institutional 
problems to resolve as well as the problem of 
accommodating the interests of developing countries.^
Finally, the international trading system has been 
penetrated by notions which essentially lie in the field 
of competition policy or anti-trust law. Reference to 
unfair trade practices, abuse of positions, counterfeit 
goods, and similar concepts have effectively introduced 
notions which relate not to international trade practice 
but the maintenance of a fair competitive environment. 
Nevertheless, in trade disputes such terminology is 
frequently replete.
This penetration has engendered two main problems. 
First, the application of essentially national (or 
supranational) competition rules may in itself create 
inequitable barriers to trade. This is particularly so 
as regards the extraterritorial application of national 
competition law which has the effect of imposing alien 
anti-trust concepts on companies which may be subject to 
quite different r e g i m e s . ' W  Bilateral agreements between 
states on anti-trust enforcement do not go enough of the
See generally J. Bagwati, The World Trading 
Svstem at Risk (1990).
^ See In Re Woodoulo Cartel Case 89/85 [1988] 4
CMLR 901; and United States v Aluminium Company of 
America. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Circuit 1945).
___ ___  _ ___ ________________________
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way towards settling this issue."
Second, the absence of an international framework for 
the regulation of anti-trust matters exacerbates this 
problem," Discussions for the negotiation of an 
international agreement within the context of the OECD 
have been conducted in recent years and a draft code 
established but not yet published. However, even such an 
agreement would have a limited scope and may even take 
the form of a guideline or recommendations.
A preferred solution is for an agreement of anti-trust 
to be reached in a multilateral context. The European 
Commissioner responsible for trade matters, Leon 
Brittan, has called for such an agreement. The 
Commissioner called for world-wide competition rules 
covering subsidies, cartels, merger policy and public 
monopolies at the GATT level." However, he also 
acknowledged that an effective mechanism to impose 
controls was not feasible at this stage bearing in mind 
the pressures on the then existing GATT system."
Even from a brief overview of these developments, it is 
clear that the international trading system itself has 
evolved from the simple system which operated at the 
time the GATT was conceived. The fact that the Uruguay 
Round Final Act takes a much more comprehensive approach
" See for example. Agreement Between the United 
States and the European Community Regarding the
Application of Competition Law, Counc il
95/145/EC, ECSC, O.J. L95/45 (1995).
Decision
" See M.M. Mendes, Anti-Trust in a World of 
Interrelated Economies (1991), 33-53.
" Speech by Sir Leon Brittan, World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland, January 30, 1993.
" See also B.M. Hoekman & P.C. Mavroidis, 
"Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT", (1994) 
17:2 World Economy 121.
________
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to the regulation of many of the changes which have 
occurred to the international trading system is itself 
confirmation of the need to radically overhaul the pre­
existing system. It is in itself proof that the GATT 
became obsolete in relation to the shifting 
international economic background against which it 
operated.
(3) Defect 2: The Failure Adequately to Circumscribe 
the Authority of States to Interfere with Patterns 
of Trade
From a legal perspective, the central function of the 
various obligations contained in the GATT obligations 
was to circumscribe the degree to which national 
governments were permitted to interfere in commercial 
transactions between private individuals situated in 
different states." Contracting parties should only 
increase 'bound* tariffs if particular criteria were met 
and should not impose quantitative restrictions on 
foreign imports unless a number of conditions were 
satisfied. Nor should they engage in arbitrary 
discrimination between foreign and domestic goods. The 
substantive principles of the GATT tried to draw a 
distinction between permissible and prohibited 
government intervention.^ Unfortunately, the vagueness
" On the economic theory behind the GATT, see P. 
Moser, The Political Economy of the GATT (1990), 
especially 61-86; and R.E. Baldwin, "The Economics of 
the GATT", in P. Oppenheimer (ed), Issues in
International Economics (1978), 82-93.
On the role of legal principles within the GATT 
structure, see J.H. Jackson, "Strengthening the 
International Legal Framework of the GATT-MTN System: 
Reform Proposals for the New GATT Round", in E-U 
Petersmann & M. Hilf (eds) , The New GATT Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1988), 3-23. In
contrast, see also O. Long, Law and Its Limitations in
the GATT Multilateral Trade Svstem (1985).
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of many of these rules often did not allow a clear cut 
distinction to be drawn.
The establishment of this environment, in which states 
were under a legal obligation to refrain from 
particularly disruptive forms of governmental 
interference was frequently referred to, in policy 
terms, as the 'level playing field'.^ This referred to 
the mutually agreed limitation of government 
interference in commercial transactions to certain 
levels and, in particular, to the requirement that 
states should refrain from indulging in, or permitting, 
trading practices which created disharmony.
During the first twenty years of its operation, the 
multilateral trade system achieved limited success in 
limiting government interventions by reducing average 
global tariff levels.^ Although in the subsequent two 
decades significant tariff reductions continued^, this 
success was eroded by the proliferation of 
interventionist measures, mainly in the form of non­
tariff barriers introduced by developed nations, the 
existence of which undermined the liberalisation of 
trade brought about by tariff reductions.*
* J.H. Jackson, The World Trading Svstem: The Law 
and Policv of International Economic Relations (1989), 
217-247.
See R. Pomfret, Unegual Trade; The Economics of 
Discriminatorv International Trade Policies (1988), 68- 
74.
See, Supplementary Report of the Director-General 
of the GATT on the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (1980), 3-7.
* See generally D. Salvatore (ed), The New 
Protectionist Threat to World Welfare (1987); and R.E. 
Baldwin, Trade Policv in a Changing World Economy 
(1988), 32-35.
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The failure of the GATT to respond to the dramatic 
growth in non-tariff barriers was primarily responsible 
for the growth in the use of measures of administered 
protection by contracting parties, most notably the 
United States and the European Union." Such measures 
allowed powerful states to respond immediately to 
particular forms of conduct deemed undesirable without 
resorting to the cumbersome and inefficient multilateral 
dispute resolution procedures created by the GATT. For 
example, the United States administration acknowledged 
that section 301 of its trade legislation was an 
explicit attempt to create an effective remedy in order 
to avoid using the current GATT dispute settlement 
procedures."
The GATT attempted to respond to the challenges of the 
myriad forms of non-tariff barriers by negotiating side- 
agreements or protocols dealing with these issues. " 
But these agreements suffer from too many short-comings. 
They did not cover the majority of types of non-tariff 
barriers in existence and they were of insufficient 
depth, in terms of the detail provided in their 
provisions, to exert sufficient normative influence on 
the behaviour of states."
No consensus was forthcoming at the Tokyo Round on a 
plethora of subjects for which regulation at the
" D. Greenaway, International Trade Policv; From 
Tariffs to the New Protectionism (1983).
" GATT Focus, No. 63, 6-8 (July 1989).
" Report of the Group on Quantitative Restrictions
and Other Non-Tariff Barriers. GATT BISD, 31st
Supplement, 211 (1985).
" On this point, see the excellent article, P.B. 
Edelman, "Japanese Product Standards as Non-Tariff 
Barriers: When Regulatory Policy Becomes a Trade Issue", 
(1988) 24:2 Stan. J. Int'l Law 389.
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international level was prescribed. No multilateral 
framework was established to integrate agricultural 
policies, particularly as regards subsidies (other than 
those contained in the Subsidies C o d e ) N o  agreement 
was reached on the means of treating imports from non- 
market economy states. The issue of safeguard measures 
was left unresolved. The memorandum prepared embodying 
the understanding reached on dispute settlement was 
little more than a public relations exercise/"
The agreements which materialised from the Tokyo MTNs 
were merely a veneer to maintain the appearance of a 
successful consensus. In reality, virtually by the time 
the agreements had been signed, states were already 
developing laws and procedures outpacing the terms of 
the agreements, particularly the Subsidies and Anti- 
Dumping Codes. The repercussions of this deception were 
felt for the subsequent fifteen years.
More fundamentally, the negotiation of these agreements 
outside the central GATT system created a fundamental 
inconsistency within the whole order. These protocols 
represented a regression from the unconditional MFN 
principle since each agreement was an independent treaty 
in its own right and did not involve amendments or 
modifications of the GATT, Many of these agreements 
established reporting or surveillance procedures which 
function autonomously, free from the institutional 
structure of the GATT in all but coordination 
requirements.
" GATT, Les Négociations Commerciales 
Multilatérales Du Tokyo Round (Rapport Additionnel) 
(1980).
" See J. Steenbergen, "Trade Regulation After the 
Tokyo Round", in J.H.J. Bourgeois, Protectionism and the 
European Community (1983), 181.
___
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The shift in focus therefore moved away from 
unconditional MFN towards conditional MFN.^ Contracting 
parties which did not sign these agreements were not 
entitled to the benefits that they conferred. Since 
participation was required in order to obtain benefits, 
it can hardly be said that the obligations imposed on 
the contracting parties to extend any advantage, favour 
or privilege as regards charges imposed in connection 
with importation was absolute.
At least at a formal level, the Uruguay Round Agreement 
does not suffer from the same shortcomings since the 
whole package of agreements has been approved as a 
single treaty." But, the issue remains whether the 
Final Act embodies an adequate international consensus 
to ensure the effectiveness of the new measures. This 
may be possible subject to one lingering doubt.
The negotiating parties engaged in a host of trade-offs 
in interests to secure certain trade objectives. The 
United States, for example, conceded concessions on 
stricter industrial subsidy guidelines in return for 
agreement on trade in services, the protection of 
intellectual property rights and trade-related 
investment measures." The European Union gave tariff 
concessions in a number of areas in order to avoid
" G.C. Hufbauer, J.S. Erb & H.P. Starr, "The GATT 
Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favoured-Nation 
Principle", (1980) 12 Law 1 Pol'y Int'l Bus., 59.
62 Final Act makes a distinction between
'Multilateral Trade Agreements' and 'Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements'; see Article II(2)9-(3) WTO Charter. 
Multilateral Trade Agreements are those to which all 
members of the WTO have adhered. These are not optional. 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements are optional agreements 
and it is open to all Members to decide whether or not 
to participate in them.
" See J.H. Bello & A.F. Holmer, "The Uruguay Round: 
Where Are We Now?", (1991) 25 Int'l Lawyer 72 3.
_________________________
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tighter disciplines on agricultural subsidies.* The 
Cairns Group had the reduction of agricultural subsidies 
as its primary interest and was prepared to sacrifice 
other concessions in pursuit of this objective. Japan 
pursued stricter controls on anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures in order to protect its 
industries from the threat of administered 
protectionism. The newly industrialised countries, the 
Caribbean states, the Latin American group and the rest 
of the developing world each pursued separate policy 
agendas. Many subjects have been covered in the 
negotiations in many fields which raises the question 
whether a true consensus on some of the most important 
issues has been engendered.
(4) Defect 3: The Competing Forces Impinging on the 
Negotiation of International Trade Rules
In the implementation of trade commitments, it is 
impossible to exclude the influence of non-economic 
variables (or externalities) in the equation that 
ultimately determines behaviour because these factors 
influence the formation of national economic and 
commercial policy.
For instance, a state may consciously and deliberately 
adopt policies which increase employment by protecting 
certain industries for social reasons or in the 
interests of national security. The Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the European Union is a clear 
illustration of such a preference." Often such non­
economic interests cannot be completely reconciled with
* European Commission, Background Report on GATT 
Negotiation Objectives. Doc ISEC/B6/91 (1991), 3.
" Article 39, EC Treaty.
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adherence to a genuine policy of complying with trade 
obligations."
In reality, the accommodation of non-economic factors 
into the formulation of national economic policy is a 
fact of political life. Governments are continuously 
subject to political pressures exerted by interest 
groups representing particular industries, sectors, 
regions or consumers." These groups are generally 
unreceptive to arguments that, by refraining from 
measures of protectionism, absolute global welfare is 
increased."
While multilateral trade agreements may limit the 
choices of behaviour available to a state they do not 
remove the pressure on a government to provide a 
solution to the economic problems of ailing industries. 
Rather, they merely change the nature of the remedy 
sought by struggling industries. Hence the reason that 
intervention in the form of administered protection has 
become more frequent.
Other aspects of national policy also interact - or 
interfere - with a state's ability to comply with its 
international trade obligations. For example, most 
states have adopted industrial policies which are at 
odds with international obligations. At least one
" See GATT, Trade Policy Review Mechanism for the 
European Community (1989).
" See generally, G. Lembruch, "Interest Groups, 
Government and the Politics of Protectionism", in H. Hauser (ed), Protectionism and Structural Adjustment 
(1986); and B. Frey, "The Political Economy of 
Protection", in D. Greenaway (ed). Current Issues in 
International Trade (1985), 139.
" See K.W. Abbott, "The Trading Nation's Dilemma; 
The Functions of the Law of International Trade", (1985) 
26:2 Harvard Int'l Law Journal, 501.
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respected international economist has argued that, 
within the United States, the dictates of pursuing an 
industrial policy are fundamentally inconsistent with 
the laissez-faire principles of free trade." The 
promotion of high-technology industries within that 
country requires selective investment and, accordingly, 
the pursuit of industrial policy is not so much a 
'matter of natural endowments as it is a matter of 
chosen investment'. This is a rejection of the basic 
principle of comparative advantage which underpinned the 
laissez-faire trade system of the GATT.
Another illustration of an area in which the policy 
objectives of governments were frequently inconsistent 
with the trade obligations contained in the GATT is 
environmental protection laws. Again using the United 
States as an example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
of 1972 imposes an embargo on imported tuna from any 
nation which uses nets of a mesh size which trap 
dolphins and porpoises/^ This embargo is absolute and 
was imposed in response to legitimate environmental 
protection concerns.
Mexico challenged this statute as being inconsistent 
with Article XI of the GATT and the panel report on the 
matter concluded that the measures could not be 
justified under the GATT exceptions.The United States 
refused to repeal the measure and instead offered to 
resolve the matter within the context of the NAFTA 
discussions which, to a degree, implements international
" R. Reich, "Beyond Free Trade". (1983) 61 Foreign 
Affairs 773.
70 86 stat. 1027 (1972).
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna. 30 
ILM 1594 (1991).
________________________ __________
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measures to protect these species. However, the 
dispute aptly illustrates that the normative effect of 
international trade commitments can be circumscribed by 
internal national domestic policy considerations 
unrelated to trade.^
Other national policy matters which can come into 
conflict with trade-related obligations include monetary 
policy, employment policy, protection of infant 
industries, foreign investment policy and the protection 
and safety of workers and the consumer. In each of these 
cases, national officials may be required to make a 
trade-off between these interests and international 
trade obligations.
International commitments under the GATT were therefore 
not the single factor in determining the behaviour of 
states. The importance of non-economic factors was also 
significant and the spectrum of such factors remains 
extensive. Political, social, cultural and ideological 
factors influence the shape and content of national 
trade policy/* The international trading system is now 
composed of states which vary immensely in terms of 
geographical size, wealth of resources, political 
constitution, social stratification and economic 
development.
72 See A.F. Holmer & J.H. Bello, "Trade and the 
Environment: A Snapshot From Tuna/Dolphins to the NAFTA
and Beyond", (1993) 27:1 Int'l Lawyer 169.
* See also T. Lang & C. Hines, The New
Protectionism: Protecting the Future Against Free Trade
(1993).
* See J.M. Culbertson, "A Realist View of 
International trade and National Policy", (1986) 18 New 
York University Journal of Int'l Law & Politics, 1119.
_____
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(5) Defect 4: Compounding the Problems: The Reliance on 
an Inadequate Institutional Structure
(A) The Pre-1995 GATT Structure
The pre-1995 GATT was a highly pragmatic instrument with 
little formal organisational structure. The sole 
original provision expressly dealing with institutional 
framework was Article XXV(l) which allowed for the 
periodic convening of representatives from the 
contracting parties to give effect to those provisions 
of the agreement that required joint action and 
generally to facilitate the functioning of the 
organisation. This provision was supplemented by a 
decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES establishing a 
Council to coordinate the work of the GATT committees, 
which later extended to those created under the Tokyo 
Round Codes.
In 1975 the institutional framework of the organisation 
was supplemented by the creation of the so-called 
'Consultative Group of Eighteen' which acquired 
permanent status in 1979. It was an advisory body with 
a representative membership drawn from both developed 
and developing countries and was composed of senior
GATT BISD, 9th Supplement 8 (1961) . The Council 
had authority: (a) to consider questions arising between 
sessions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES which may require 
urgent attention and to report on these questions with 
an appropriate recommendation for action; (b) to 
establish and supervise subsidiary bodied such as 
committees and panels; (c) to prepare for sessions of 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES; (d) to deal with such other 
matters as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may deal with and to 
exercise such functions as may be delegated to it by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
___
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government officials of these states.^ In addition, 
there were various committees set up throughout the 
history of the organisation.^
Notwithstanding the creation of this organ and its 
related committees, there was no executive, legislative 
of effective judicial agencies to regulate international 
trade relations. Consequently, the GATT could not claim 
to provide a constitution for an efficacious legal order 
to regulate trade insofar as that concept is synonymous 
with a system that enacts rules to regulate the
behaviour of its subjects, that provides objective 
methods for identifying applicable rules and applying 
these to the relevant facts, and which enforces 
decisions against subjects found to have violated the 
prescribed rules.
If effective rules were to be established to stem 
deviation by contracting parties - particularly the 
United States and the European Union - from the accepted 
norms of conduct in international trade relations, the
efficacy of these procedures had to be radically
improved. These procedures had to be reinforced to
permit the imposition of penalties, sanctions, 
compensation or redress in order properly to regulate 
international behaviour.
This Group was charged with: (a) keeping trade
developments under review and, where possible, to 
anticipate disturbances in the multilateral trading 
system; and (b) giving advice on the co-ordination of 
GATT policies with those of the IMF.
The most important of these were: (a) a Balance- 
of-Payments Committee; (b) a Budget, Finance and 
Administration Committee; (c) a Quantitative 
Restrictions and Non-Tariff Measures Group; (d) a 
Safeguards Committee; (e) a Tariff Concessions 
Committee; (f) a Trade in Agriculture Committee; and (g) 
a Trade and Development Committee
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The rule-making function of the GATT was largely 
performed within the context of the multilateral trade 
negotiations mechanism.^ There was no express 
institutional framework stated in the GATT for the 
holding of such rule-making sessions. Each Round was 
conducted on an ad hoc basis where rules of procedure 
and organisation were made up as the negotiations 
progressed.^
The GATT initially responded to the deficiencies in its 
institutional structure by developing a more horizontal 
structure revolving around the use of subject-matter 
committees to regulate particular issues. This 
horizontal decentralisation of institutional 
responsibilities was almost invariably unsuccessful. 
This can be demonstrated from closer examination of one 
of these committees, namely the Subsidies Committee.
The 1979 Subsidies Code was intended to create a more 
effective structure for the scrutiny and supervision of 
international obligations relating to subsidies. A 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was 
established with a number of responsibilities. Its 
membership was therefore confined to a subset of the 
Contracting Parties and, in reality, was largely 
composed of the Western industrialised nations.
See generally, GATT, The Tokvo Round of Trade 
negotiations. Report of the Director-General (1980); and 
D. McRae & J. Thomas, "The GATT and Multilateral Treaty- 
Making: The Tokyo Round", (1983) 77 AJIL 51.
At the Uruguay Round discussions, for example, 
individual negotiation groups were made up on the basis 
of subject-matter with separate groups for issues such 
as Trade in Services, Trade in Goods, Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property (TRIPs) and the Functioning of the GATT system 
(FOGS). Originally fifteen individual negotiating groups 
were established. This was reduced to seven after the 
failure of the Brussels Ministerial meeting in December 
1990.
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This Committee was given three main responsibilities:
(a) surveillance responsibilities; (b) rule-making 
capacities; (c) dispute settlement functions. In none of 
these roles did the Committee demonstrate conspicuous 
effectiveness.
The surveillance responsibility revolved around the 
requirement that signatories submitted periodical 
reports on their subsidisation programmes for scrutiny 
by the other committee members.^ But, signatories 
tended to refrain from submitting reports because of the 
self-incriminating effect of these in any subsequent 
litigation.^ This practice culminated in a breakdown of 
the reporting procedure because the Committee decided 
that it was unable to proceed with detailed examination 
of individual notifications until all signatories had 
fulfilled their obligations.^ Thereafter, there was a 
noticeable deterioration in notifications, and despite 
an attempt to establish to draft guidelines for 
notification procedures^, there existed no clear 
political will to strengthen these obligations.
This obligation was originally created through a 
Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. See GATT BISD, 11th 
Supplement, 58 (1963). The form of the questionnaire is 
reproduced at GATT BISD, 9th Supplement, 193-194 (1961) .
In the DISC Case, the Community alleged that the 
United States had violated the obligation of 
notification by failing to register information relating 
to U.S. tax legislation which was alleged to confer 
export subsidies; GATT BISD, 23rd Supplement, 98 (1977). 
Although the investigating panel held that the 
legislation in question conferred a prohibited subsidy 
on manufactured products in violation of Article XVI, 
the panel was sympathetic to the argument that the 
notification of a subsidy constitutes an admission that 
a particular practice might fall within the scope of 
more restrictive obligations.
Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT 
BISD, 31st Supplement, 259, 262 (1985).
Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT 
BISD, 33rd Supplement, 197, 200 (1987).
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The Subsidies Committee was also conferred with rule- 
making duties to regulate both subsidies and the 
application of countervailing duties.^ The procedure 
adopted by the Committee to discharge this function was 
to set up Groups of Experts to examine particular 
topics, to report to the Committee with recommendations 
and for these recommendations to form the basis of 
additional obligations. The first such group constituted 
was the Group of Experts on the Calculation of the 
Amount of a Subsidy^ which was followed by one other 
similar group.^ Some guidelines were adopted by the 
Committee on the basis of reports and proposals 
submitted but these were very few.^ In fact, in 1987, 
the Group of Experts on the Calculation of the Amount of 
a Subsidy notified the Committee that it intended to 
suspend its work temporarily which later became a 
permanent decision.®*
The rule-making function of the Subsidies Committee was 
therefore a disaster, a phenomenon which was repeated in 
a number of other Committees with the notable exception 
of the Anti-Dumping Committee which was successful in 
procuring a considerable number of reports, guidelines 
and recommendations.*® But even the Anti-Dumping
84 Article 4(2), 1979 Subsidies Code.
** Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT 
BISD, 29th Supplement 42 (1983).
*® The Group of Experts on the Definition of the 
Word 'Related*.
*"^ See Guidelines on Amortization and Depreciation, 
GATT Doc. SCM/64 (1980); and Guidelines on Physical 
Incorporation. GATT Doc. SCM/68 (1980).
** Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT 
BISD, 34th Supplement, 185, 189 (1988).
*® (1) Report on the Definition of the Term
'Related' as Employed in the Code, GATT BISD, 28th 
Supplement 33 (1982); (2) Understanding on the
__________ ____ ___________________________________
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Committee's measures were merely recommendations and 
not binding on signatories. Implementation of 
recommendations was achieved on a voluntary basis. On 
the whole, there was no positive reaction to these 
recommendations and signatories were reluctant to 
incorporate these guidelines into their national laws. 
Hence, rule-making through this process had become 
inherently defective.
The Subsidies Committee was also primarily responsible 
for conciliation and dispute resolution in the event of 
disagreements among the signatories and was authorised 
to impose countermeasures for violations of the terms Of 
the Agreement.®® The primary defect in the dispute 
resolution procedure was that it was not enforcement- 
oriented. The procedures were designed to promote 
'mutually satisfactory solutions' to conflicts between 
signatories. Thus, the four stage dispute settlement 
process of the Code - consultations, conciliation, 
dispute settlement, and countermeasures - emphasised 
negotiation as opposed to adjudication. Time and time 
again this technique had proven insufficient for 
resolving international trade disputes, yet contracting 
parties were reluctant to abandon it in favour of more 
vigorous procedures.
Application of Article 8(4) of the Agreement, GATT BISD, 
28th Supplement 52 (1982); (3) Recommendation Concerning 
the Transparency of Anti-Dumping Procedures, GATT BISD, 
30th Supplement 24 (1984); (4) Recommendation Concerning 
Procedures for On-the-Spot Investigations, GATT BISD, 
30th Supplement 28 (1984); (5) Recommendation Concerning 
Time-Limits Given to Respondents to Anti-Dumping 
Questionnaires, GATT BISD, 30th Supplement 30 (1984);
(6) Recommendation on the Application of the Best 
Information Principle in Article 6(8), GATT BISD, 31st 
Supplement 283 (1985); (7) Recommendation Concerning
Determinations of Threat of Material Injury, GATT BISD, 
32nd Supplement 182 (1986).
90 Article 13, 1979 Subsidies Code.
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Even the dispute settlement aspect of the process 
required panels to seek 'mutually satisfactory 
solutions', stressing the influence of negotiation. This 
non-litigious procedure aggravated trade disputes, 
delayed reconciliation, perpetuated frustration and 
substantially contributed to the erosion of the 
confidence of contracting parties in the viability of 
the Code itself.
Further, the absence of a mechanism to facilitate the 
automatic adoption of panel reports allowed signatories 
to block the adoption of adverse reports. Since the Code 
did not specify any rules of procedure for the Subsidies 
Committee, decisions were taken by consensus. This 
allowed any one of the four main trading signatories to 
prevent the adoption of panel reports. Initially, the 
European Union impeded the adoption of panel reports on 
subsidies on exports of wheat flour and exports of pasta 
products.^ A subsequent panel report on the United 
States definition of industry for the purpose of 
imposing duties on wine and grape products was blocked 
by the United States on the ground that the Union had 
obstructed the adoption of the earlier reports.^ Canada 
then refused to allow an adverse panel report relating 
to its countervailing duty law to be adopted unless the 
other two signatories refrained from this behaviour.^ 
None of these reports has yet been adopted and only two 
disputes, both settled on a bilateral basis, were 
resolved under the dispute settlement procedure of the
Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT 
BISD, 32nd Supplement, 158, 162 (1986).
Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT 
BISD, 33rd supplement, 201 (1987).
Report of the Panel on the Imposition by Canada 
of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Boneless 
Manufactured Beef From the EEC. GATT Doc. SCM/85.
_  _______
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1979 Subsidies Code.®^
To summarize, the experiment involved in the movement 
towards decentralisation through subject-matter 
committees proved disastrous in its first stage, the 
Tokyo Round arrangements. While the Anti-Dumping 
Committee was slightly more successful in its activities 
that the other Code Committees, the committees were 
unable to contain the forces of national interest 
exerted predominantly by the United States and the 
European Union.
The surveillance mechanism was a failure as was the 
dispute settlement process. Only a few cases were ever 
submitted to the Committee for resolution.®^ Of these, 
a considerable number of reports on complaints remain 
unadopted.
(B) The Birth of the World Trade Organisation: Phoenix 
or Phantom?
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of MTNs 
in December 1993 raises the question whether or not the 
demise of the GATT and the resurrection of a World Trade 
Organisation (first mooted in 1946 as the International 
Trade Organisation) will provide the much needed 
institutional framework for the international trading 
order. In this context, the main question is whether the
®^ Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee, GATT 
BISD, 36th Supplement 451, 454 (1990).
®^ European Community Subsidies on Exports of Wheat 
Flour. GATT Doc SCM/42 (1983); European Community 
Subsidies on Exports of Pasta Products, GATT Doc. SCM/43 
(1983); United States Definition of Industry Concerning 
Wine and Grape Products. GATT Doc. SCM/71; United States 
Countervailing Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear FromBrazi GATT Doc. SCM/94 (1989); United States
Countervailing Duties on Fresh. Chilled and Frozen Pork
from Canada, GATT Doc. DS7/R (1990).
  -___
60
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the substantive rules 
contained in the Uruguay Round Final Act will solve the 
institutional deficiencies of its predecessor.®*
The Final Act®^ contains an Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation intended, among other things, 
to take over the institutional functions of the GATT,®*
The WTO will provide a common institutional framework
for the conduct of trade relations among its members.®® 
Whether this equates to the creation of analogous
executive, legislative (plenary) or judicial organs, 
such as those required for a truly effective 
organisation, can only be ascertained from an
examination of the terms of the Agreement itself.
(1) Ministerial Conference
This is the intended plenary organ of the organisation 
and is composed of representatives (presumably ministers 
for trade) of the Members of the WTO. The Ministerial 
Conference is empowered with two responsibilities: (a)
to carry out the functions of the WTO; and (b) to take 
action necessary to achieve the functions referred to in
(a). The Conference has authority to take decisions on 
all matters under any other Multilateral Trade Agreement 
in accordance with the specific requirements for 
decision-making in the WTO Agreement and the
®* On the Uruguay Round negotiations in general, see 
N. Hopkinson, The Uruguay Round and Prospects for World 
Trade (1990) ; W*F. Avery, World Agriculture and the GATT 
(1993); M.H. Davenport, The GATT and the Uruguay Round: 
Effects of Developing Countries (1992); N. Hopkinson, 
Completing the GATT Uruguay Round (1992); and T. Lang, The New Protectionism (1993).
^ GATT Doc, MTN/FA (15/12/93).
®* The Final Act was signed by 121 countries at 
Marrakesh, Morocco on April 17, 1994.
®® Article 11(2), WTO Agreement.
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Multilateral Trade Agreement in question.
The Final Act draws a distinction between Multilateral 
Trade Agreements^®®, which are integral parts of the WTO 
Agreement and bind all Members, and Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements which are part of the WTO Agreement only for 
those Members which have expressly agreed to their 
t e r m s . T h e  authority of the Ministerial Conference 
does not extend to making decisions under the 
Plurilateral Agreements for which separate, and as yet 
unidentified, arrangements will be made.
(2) General Council
The General Council is composed of representatives of 
all the Members and will convene 'as appropriate'. It is 
conferred with four functions and the power to achieve 
these functions: (a) to perform the functions of the
Ministerial Conference between meetings of that organ;
(b) to carry out its own functions as assigned under the
*®® The Multilateral Trade Agreements are as follows:
(a) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; (b) 
the Uruguay Round Protocol GATT 1994; (c) the Agreement 
on Agriculture; (d) the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Photosanitary Measures; (e) the Agreement on textiles 
and Clothing; (f) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade; (g) the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures; (h) the Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI; (i) the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII; 
(j) the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; (k) the 
Agreement on Rules of Origin; (1) the Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures; (k) the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; (1) the Agreement 
on safeguards; (m) the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services; (n) the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights; (o) the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes; (p) the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
*®^ The Plurilateral Trade Agreements are: (a) the
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; (b) the Agreement 
on Government Procurement; (c) the International Dairy 
Arrangement; and (d) the Arrangement Regarding Bovine 
Meat.
- ■_
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WTO Agreement; (c) to discharge its responsibilities in 
relation to the Dispute Settlement Body as ascribed 
under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes; and (d) to 
discharge the responsibilities under the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism.
The General Council is instructed to supervise the 
operations of three different types of agencies: 
specialised councils, special committees and 
plurilateral trade agreement bodies.
Specialized councils are established to regulate trade 
in goods (and the Agreements in Annex lA of the Final 
Act), trade in services (Annex IB of the Final Act) and 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(Annex 1C of the Final Act). The Ministerial Conference 
is instructed to establish committees on trade and 
development, balance of payments relationships and 
budget, finance and administration. In addition, the 
General Council is authorised to establish ad hoc bodies 
for particular purposes.
(3) Panel Procedure
The basic panel procedure operated under the original 
GATT is retained in the new Agreement as the means of 
adjudicating disputes between Members. This Agreement is 
considered in detail later in the text.
(4) Observations
The main criticism of the institutional framework of the 
GATT was that it lacked effective legislative, executive
102 Articles VI (2)-(4) WTO Agreement 
See text, infra, pp.70-74
______________________ _______________________ _
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or judicial agencies. The same criticism cannot be 
sustained against the revised organisation. These 
revisions represent a major move away from the soft law 
regime of the GATT and are, at the very least, a step in 
the right direction towards the creation of a 
constitutional framework for an efective legal order for 
the regulation of international trade relationships.
(6) Defect 5: The Deficiencies of the Dispute
Resolution Processes
(A) The Substance; Unnecessarv Complications
The substantive requirements for initiating a trade 
complaint through the central GATT structure were 
contained in Article XXIII. This allowed a contracting 
party to initiate a complaint if it considered that a 
benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, was 
being 'nullified or impaired', or, alternatively, if the 
contracting party believed that an objective of the GATT 
was being impeded as a consequence of any one of three 
circumstances.
In GATT practice, the concept of 'nullification or 
impairment' became central. A party initiating a 
complaint had to demonstrate the existence of this 
condition if the complaint was to be successful. Since 
this was the central concept in the functioning of the 
GATT-system, it is not surprising that it was adopted in 
most of the dispute-settlement provisions of the 1979
(1) the failure of another contracting party to 
fulfil its GATT obligations; (2) the continued 
application by another contracting party of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts with the terms of the GATT; 
or (3) the existence of any other situation.
    _ _____________ ___
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Codes. 1®*
Unfortunately, not only was this concept both vague and 
ambiguous but its application was particularly complex. 
The nullification or impairment concept was largely 
responsible for the blurring of the distinction between 
legal and illegal conduct, and compliance or violation 
of the GATT. The concept was not limited to instances 
of violations of legal obligations, leading one 
commentator to label the term as 'non-violation 
nullification and impairment'.^®* In other words, the 
principle behind the concept was not that of legal 
obligation but rather that of 'mutual and reciprocal 
benefit'.
Since 1979 there were three important measures designed 
to clarify the operation of the GATT dispute resolution 
process, yet none of these attempted to clarify the key 
concept of nullification and impairment.^?
It should also be noted that regional arrangements for 
conducting trading relations enshew any reference to 
such a concept as a means of settling disputes and, for 
that matter, similarly vague notions. For example, the 
European Union, when functioning as the European
105—  See for example. Article 8(3) 1979 Subsidies Code 
and Article 15(2) 1979 Anti-Dumping Code.
®^* See R.E. Hudec, "Regulation of Domestic Subsidies 
Under the MTN Subsidies Code", in D. Wallace (ed), Legal 
Treatment of Domestic Subsidies (1984), 1-18.
These instruments were; Understanding Regarding 
Notification. Consultations. Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance 1979. GATT BISD, 26th Supplement, 216 
(1980); Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement. 
GATT BISD, 29th Supplement, 13 (1982); and Decision
Relating to Improvements to the Dispute Settlement Rules 
and Procedures. GATT BISD, 36th Supplement (1990), 61. 
See also the Mid-Term Review Agreements of April 21, 
1989, reproduced in K.R. Simmonds & B.H. Hill, Law and 
Practice Under the GATT (1989), Release 89-1, 23-30.
i
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Community, contained four freedoms which had the 
objective of liberalising trade framed in strict legal 
terms and these obligations were imposed directly on the 
Member States to restrict interference in commercial 
activities. Similarly, in the NAFTA, this principle was 
passed over in favour of a more workable legalistic 
formula for dispute resolution. Panels convened under 
the NAFTA are instructed to apply the black letter law 
of that agreement to ascertain v i o l a t i o n s . ^ *
(B) The Procedure: Passive Dispute Resolution Versus
Active Dispute Resolution
There was no single comprehensive provision in the GATT 
for the processing of complaints other than Article 
XXIII which concerned referral of complaints to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.^®® Instead, the organisation relied 
more on the process of consultation rather than 
adjudication. Only when these processes were exhausted 
did the need for a procedural remedy arise.“®
Contracting parties were implored to engage in 
consultations in the event of a conflict, providing 
•adequate opportunity' for such consultations and 
affording 'sympathetic consideration' to such overtures. 
Nineteen separate clauses of the agreement obliged
®^* See generally, G.N. Horlick & F.A. DeBusk, 
'Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA', (1993) 27:1 JWT21 .
®^® See generally, I. V. Bael, "The GATT Dispute 
Settlement Procedure", (1988) 22:4 JWT 67; R. Plank, "An 
Unofficial Description of How A GATT Panel Works and 
Does Not", (1987) J. Int'l Arbitration 53; and P. 
Pescatore, "The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanisms", 
(1993) 27:1 JWT 5.
"® See S.A. Ingersoll, "Current Efficacy of the GATT Dispute Settlement Process", (1986) Texas Int'l Law 
Journal, 87.
__________________
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contracting parties to enter into dialogue given the 
existence of particular circumstances. Similar 
requirements were contained in many of the 1979 Codes.
This emphasis on the mechanism of consultations, while 
appropriate for the resolution of disputes among a small 
group of states with similar interests, was wholly 
inappropriate for the conduct of modern economic 
relationships and constituted a primary deficiency in 
the regulatory system. While an argument may be 
sustained to the effect that these clauses encourage 
communication and dialogue, thereby promoting diplomatic 
solutions to trade problems, they were an inefficient 
means of resolving disputes when diplomacy f a i l e d .
In the absence of explicit provisions concerning the 
procedure to investigate a complaint, the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES established an informal procedure which 
gradually acquired greater customary significance. A 
contracting party which failed to achieve a suitable 
solution to a trade problem could request the 
appointment of a panel to investigate the i s s u e . i f  
the Council decided to investigate the matter, terms of 
reference were given to a panel, the composition of 
which was determined by the Director-General. 
Contracting parties involved in the dispute had a right 
to be consulted regarding the composition of the panel
For two rare examples of settlements through 
consultations, see Panel Report on the Investigation 
into Softwood Lumber Products From Canada. GATT BISD, 
34th Supplement 194 (1988) and Panel Report on the
Investigation into Japanese Measures on Imports of 
Leather. GATT BISD, 27th Supplement 118 (1981).
R.E. Hudec, "Reforming GATT Adjudication 
Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case", (1988) 72
Minnesota Law Review 1443, 1506-1508.
113 This procedure is fully described in W.J. Davey, 
"Dispute Settlement in the GATT", (1987) 11 Fordham
Int'l Law Journal, 51.
_______________________________
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and could reject appointments if compelling reasons for 
doing so could be p r o v e n .
The non-legal nature of this process is evident once the 
composition of such panels is c o n s i d e r e d . I n  the 
first place, panel members were generally national 
officials and rarely independent experts. While in 
theory panel members acted in their own individual 
capacity and not as representatives of their 
governments, it is irrefutable that national allegiances 
played a significant role in final determinations.
In one case concerning European Union subsidies on 
exports of pasta products, the Union-appointed panel 
member went to the unprecedented length of issuing a 
dissenting opinion defending the Union position in the 
dispute.u* Nor were panel members generally legally 
qualified, usually being career diplomats, civil 
servants or economists. This was a major handicap when 
a panel was engaged in investigations involving legal 
issues, such as the interpretation of a provision or the 
application of principles to facts.
The inefficacy of the panel procedure is further 
underlined by the fact that, while a panel could
Article 6, Annex to the Understanding Regarding Notification. Consultations. Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance. GATT BISD, 26th Supplement, 216 (1980).
Regarding criticism of the present system, see 
generally, GATT, Report of Eminent Persons on the Problems Facing the International Trading System (1984) , 
reproduced in 24 ILM 716 (1985); E-U. Petersmann,
"Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement System", in 
M. Hilf (ed), The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (1988), 323; and R.S. Whitt, "The Politics 
of Procedure", (1987) 21:3 JWTL, 603.
European Economic Community - Subsidies on 
Exports of Pasta Products. GATT Doc. SCM/43 (May 1983), 
not yet adopted.
____
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recommend retaliation as an ultimate sanction, this 
course of action was not, in reality, a feasible 
o p t i o n . I n  fact, the only example of the GATT 
approving retaliation occurred when the Netherlands was 
authorised to retaliate against certain United States 
agricultural products in response to a violation of the 
GATT. Practically speaking, this remedy became no 
longer available since the Council adopted panel 
reports, not on the basis of a formal vote, but by 
consensus and a major trading state could prevent the 
formation of such a consensus. This substantially 
undermined the credibility of the whole dispute- 
resolution process.
The requirement that a report had to be adopted to have 
effect also permitted the major trading nations to 
obstruct the adoption of adverse reports."® If a party 
obstructed the formation of a consensus, the adoption of 
the report could be delayed indefinitely. Despite the 
Ministerial Declaration of 1982 which acknowledges that 
such obstruction was contrary to the spirit of the GATT, 
certain states, including the United States and the 
European Union, continued to engage in such 
practices.
But see the panel decision in European Community 
Production Aids to Oilseed Producers (No.2^. infra.
Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations 
to the United States. GATT BISD, 1st Supplement, 32 
(1953).
"® P. Pescatore, "The GATT Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism: Its Present Situation and Its Prospects",
(1993) 27:1 JWT 5.
Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement. 
GATT BISD, 29th Supplement, 13 (1982).
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(C) The Future of International Trade Dispute 
Resolution
Much has been written on the subject of whether the GATT 
dispute resolution process should have been based on the 
notions of adjudication, arbitration or negotiation, and 
there is little need for re-elaboration of the basic 
points behind each of these views given the widespread 
academic publicity they have enjoyed."^ For present 
purposes, however, it is necessary to consider how 
effective the GATT system of dispute resolution was and 
whether the reforms to the system made by the WTO 
Agreement will create a more efficacious process.
A gradual recognition of the limitations of the 
diplomacy-based GATT dispute settlement process had in 
fact materialised even before the WTO reforms. The Punta 
del Este Ministerial Declaration of September 15, 1986, 
included a passage concerning the improvement and 
strengthening of the rules and procedures of the 
GATT.
The crisis in international trade relations demonstrated 
that the processes of diplomacy and negotiation were 
insufficient to effectively regulate the behaviour of 
states. The lack of effective means to settle
Among the most significant contributions are the 
following: R.E. Hudec, Adjudication of International
Trade Disputes (1978); R.E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System 
and World Trade Diplomacy (Second edition, 1990); E. 
McGovern, "Dispute Settlement in the GATT - Adjudication 
or Negotiation", in M. Hilf (ed), The European Community 
and the GATT (1986), 73; J-G. Castel, "The Uruguay Round 
and the Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement 
Rules and Procedures", (1989) 38 ICLQ, 835; and R.
Ostrihansky, "The Future of Dispute Settlement Within 
the GATT", (1990) 3:3 Leiden Journal of Int'l Law, 125.
GATT Activities Report 1986. 15 (1987) .
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international trade disputes greatly contributed to the 
chilling of trade relations between the European Union, 
the United States and Japan in the 1980s.
The improvements brought to the international trade 
dispute settlement process by the WTO Agreement 
represent a step towards a more legal formula for the 
resolution of disputes. These arrangements were adopted 
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, on a trial basis, by a 
Council Decision taken on April 12, 1989."^ This
decision implemented a number of changes in the pre­
existing panel procedure such as: (a) the fixing of time 
limits for consultations; (b) pre-set time limits for 
panel investigations; (c) the introduction of standard 
terms of reference for panels; (d) the limitation of 
delays caused by disagreement regarding the appointment 
of panels; (e) surveillance procedures to ensure the 
implementation of panel decisions; and (f) express 
acknowledgment of arbitration as an alternative means of 
dispute settlement.^*
The Understanding on the Interpretation and Application 
of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT (the Dispute 
Settlement Protocol), part of the Uruguay Round Final 
Act, continues the process of augmentation by 
elaborating some formal rules for the settlement of 
disputes.^* For example, the Protocol established a
*23 GATT Doc. L/6489 (April 1989) ; reproduced in GATT 
BISD, 36th Supplement 61 (1990). See also MVM. Mora, "A 
GATT With Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the 
Resolution of International Trade Disputes", (1993) 
Columbia J. Trans Law 103.
E-U Petersmann, "The Mid-Term Review Agreements 
of the Uruguay Round and the 1989 improvements to the 
GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures", (1989) 32 German
Yearbook of Int'l Law, 280.
Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations. GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/35.
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standing appellate body to review the decisions of panel 
cases sitting at first instance. This suggests the 
dispute settlement process is evolving into a 
hierarchical structure similar to those existing in the 
domestic legal systems of states.
Unfortunately a number of matters were not resolved 
during the Uruguay Round as regards dispute settlement. 
The procedure for Council decisions relating to the 
adoption of panel reports, the adoption of appellate 
reports and the authorization of retaliation have not 
been adequately addressed. Equally, the proposed 
inclusion of passages requiring contracting parties 'not 
to resort to unilateral measures or the threat of 
unilateral measures inconsistent with the GATT rules and 
procedures' and 'to adapt their domestic trade 
legislation and enforcement procedures in a manner 
ensuring the conformity of all measures with GATT 
dispute settlement procedures' was rejected.
In the final analysis, the Protocol may not be the 
'quantum leap forward for effective and expeditious 
resolution of international trade disputes' proclaimed 
by some commentators. it seeks to remedy a defective 
system by building on the same foundations and relying 
on the same institutional framework. Further, although 
the mechanism came into force in 1990, there was no 
noticeable increase in the use of the GATT dispute- 
settlement procedures by contracting parties.*^
However, regardless of the alterations made by the 
Dispute Settlement Protocol, individuals and private 
persons will continue to be denied direct access to the
126 J.H. Bello & A.F. Holmer, "GATT Dispute 
Settlement Agreement; Internationalisation or 
Elimination of Section 3 01", (1992) 26 Int'l Lawyer 795.
127 GATT, Activities Report 1991 (1992), 51.
__   _ _______
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dispute resolution processes of the WTO. Traditionally 
the GATT did not provide an effective remedy for 
individuals aggrieved by the trade practices of foreign 
states for a number of reasons."*
First, the pre-1995 GATT was an international treaty 
between states and therefore private complaints were 
inadmissible in the absence of a state-sponsored 
official complaint. It was necessary for the aggrieved 
individual to persuade its national government to 
initiate a complaint on its behalf. But the merits of an 
individual's claim were never the sole consideration in 
raising a complaint. A government may have been 
reluctant to initiate a complaint because of political 
reasons, or the general desire of states to maintain 
friendly international economic relations.
Even when a government could be persuaded to initiate a 
complaint, the requirement of engaging in consultations 
prior to the lodging of a complaint meant that it could 
take two or three years before an investigation was 
conducted. A favourable decision by a panel did not, of 
course, automatically ensure that the state would 
accommodate the interests of the individual behind the 
complaint. Finally, even after a favourable decision, a 
panel could not award compensation to an individual or 
company for losses sustained as a result of conduct 
incompatible with the GATT.
Then, of course, there was no guarantee that a decision 
of a panel, duly passed by the Council, would be fully 
implemented by the recalcitrant contracting party. In 
fact, the history of the process indicates that
"* See E-U. Petersmann, "Strengthening the Domestic 
Legal Framework of the GATT", in E-U. Petersmann (ed), 
The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(1988), 345.
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countries used partial implementation as a pretext for 
avoiding compliance with adopted panel reports.
For example, in the DISC Case"® involving tax relief 
for companies setting up subsidiaries for exportation 
purposes, the repealing legislation was drafted in 
accordance with the findings of the panel in such a 
manner as to come as close as possible to the permitted 
rules and, some would say, overstepped this mark."®
When the GATT ruled against the United States in the 
Customs Users' Fees Case"*, the United States did 
abandon proposals to extend the imposition of the 
charges for the use of customs services. Nevertheless, 
the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, which actually 
terminated the system - which incidentally was a gross 
violation of the terms of the GATT - did not authorise 
the return or reimbursement of users' fees charged prior 
to the panel ruling.*"
These were only a few of the most obvious cases where 
contracting parties ducked their obligations under the 
GATT. As a general observation, it can readily be said 
that in the overwhelming majority of cases, an 
unsatisfactory resolution of the dispute is obtained 
even after panel investigation from the perspective of 
the complaining contracting party. The GATT quite simply 
failed complaining countries even when the basis of the
"® GATT BISD, 23rd Supplement 98 (1977). Adopted
with reservations, GATT BISD, 28th Supplement 114 (1982) .
"® B. Caplan & M. Chametzky, "DISCs and Foreign 
Sales Corporations", (1986) 12:1 Brooklyn J. Int'l Law 
1, 7-14.
GATT BISD, 35th Supplement 245 (1989).
132 See GATT, Focus, No. 74, 3 (1990),
________ _________ _____________________________
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complaints were well-founded.*"
(7) Observations
Cumulatively, each of these deficiencies contributed 
towards emasculating the normative efficacy of the GATT 
in the regulation of international trade. Not only did 
the GATT fail to evolve relative to the economic 
environment in which it operated but, in addition, it 
failed to grapple with some of the major problems facing 
the international trade system at that time.
Responsibility for this ineffective mechanism does not 
however lie with the GATT as an institution. The GATT 
was simply an organisation composed of individual state 
contracting parties which collectively contributed 
towards the failure to realign the organisation to 
correspond with the policy objectives which were set 
before it. It was the member states which rejected the 
attempt to rectify the institutional deficiencies of the 
organisation and it was the same states who consistently 
failed to negotiate effective imperative substantive 
legal obligations.
The experiment at the Tokyo Round discussions into the 
negotiation of protocols to regulate non-tariff barriers 
demonstrates the half-hearted approach adopted by many 
of the contracting parties towards the effective 
regulation of international trade. Neither the United 
States nor the European Union really desired to place 
fetters on their discretion to regulate their respective 
trade policies. This message was one of the most obvious
Whether the WTO suffers from the same short­
comings is examined in P.T.B. Kohona, "Dispute 
Resolution Under the WTO - An Overview", (1994) 28:2 JWT 
23.
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conclusions from an analysis of the attempt to create 
new regulatory mechanisms.
Therefore, in conclusion, the GATT system of trade 
regulation started from an inappropriate premise and 
failed to evolve relative to its circumstances. In part 
this was due to the fundamental lack of consensus 
between the major trading nations responsible for the 
drafting of its terms. However, once the organisation 
had been constituted, it also failed in its task of true 
and effective trade liberalisation which was the central 
objective of the agency.
As a consequence, the international legal regime for the 
regulation of trade became fragmented and non-responsive 
to even the most pressing problems presented to the 
international community.
Whether or not the new system put in place by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Protocol depends on the willingness 
of the international trading community - and in 
particular, the United States, the European Union and 
Japan - to respond positively to the new framework 
introduced and to the new substantive obligations 
imposed.
The WTO dispute settlement must find a means to prevent 
these nations from manipulating the new international 
rules to perpetuate the continuation of their existing 
trade policies, certainly as far as primary objectives 
are concerned. At this stage, it is impossible to 
determine if the alterations made to the institutional 
mechanisms of the organisation will allow the system to 
respond to this challenge and the fundamental problems 
will remain. The struggle to contain the pressures 
exerted by the competition of interests among the major 
players will therefore continue.
The Evolution of International Legal Restraints 
on the Use of Subsidies
Prohibitions on the right of states to grant financial 
assistance to national industries directly trespass on 
the sovereign right of states to conduct national 
economic policy. Trade complaints against subsidisation 
programmes involve intense diplomatic activity at the 
government-to-government level. The same element of 
interest has plagued attempts to establish an 
international regime for the regulation of subsidies.
An analysis of the pre-1995 GATT regime for the 
regulation of subsidies discloses two interesting 
revelations. First, there is little evidence that any 
state, including the United States and the European 
Union, has ever curbed its use of subsidies in light of 
the GATT rules. Second, no sanction has ever been 
applied for a violation of the rules prohibiting or 
restricting the use of subsidies.
In the context of the present discussion, the rules 
regulating subsidies provide an extremely useful model 
for examining some of the intricacies of the breakdown 
in the normative influence of GATT rules on state 
behaviour. While the focus of the following discussion 
remains firmly on the conduct of the United States and 
the European Union, the total breakdown in this system 
has interesting and profound repercussions for the rest 
of the international trading system. Here we have an 
ideal subject to examine: a system of rules with
virtually no normative efficacy.
In this chapter, the following questions will be 
considered. What has happened in the formulation and 
evolution of these rules to render these rules so 
ineffective? How have the United States, the European 
Union and other contracting parties responded to
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attempts to enforce these rules? Why do the United 
States and the European Union effectively ignore the 
GATT rules on subsidies when setting up the parameters 
of their policies in this field? How do these players 
use the GATT rules in their dialogue and negotiations?
The fact that the Second Subsidies Code has now been 
adopted as part of the Uruguay Round Final Act also 
provides an opportunity to examine the rules contained 
in that understanding with a view to comparing and 
contrasting the efficacy of the earlier rules. The 
contents of many of the new rules are recognition that 
the pre-existing system was fundamentally flawed. 
However, it is not possible to say at this point how 
effective the new rules will be because of their 
relative recent nature.
(1) The Root of the Problem of Negotiating Restraints: 
A Conflict of Economic Ideology
A deep rift exists between the positions of the United 
States, the European Union and many other states as 
regards permissible and impermissible government 
assistance to industry and agriculture.
The United States' position is broadly that the majority 
of subsidies are inequitable because they confer an 
unfair advantage and distort the natural equilibrium 
established by the principle of comparative advantage. 
On the whole, this argument has substantial support in 
economic theory.^* The economic argument runs as 
follows. Subsidies constitute governmental interference
G. Denton, Trade Effects of Public Subsidies to 
Private Enterprise (1970), 96-120; R.E. Baldwin, Non-
Tariff Distortions of International Trade (1970); and 
H.B. MaImgren, International Order for Public Subsidies 
(1977) .
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in the self-regulating processes which allocate global 
resources on the basis of supply and d e m a n d . T h i s  
interference diverts resources into relatively less 
efficient sectors of production which causes a decline 
in absolute global welfare.^* Since most types of 
subsidies distort patterns of trade and upset the 
principle of comparative advantage, the United States 
has been relatively successful in stigmatising the 
granting of subsidies as an unfair trade practice which 
can, in certain circumstances, justify the appropriate 
unilateral response.
This radical view of the function of subsidies is not, 
however, shared by all industrialised trading nations, 
and in particular the European Union and Canada.^? 
Although the United States can rely on economic theory 
to support its argument that the preponderance of 
subsidies contravene the basic economic assumptions 
behind the present global trading system, the issue of 
regulation is not one solely of economics. Nations 
assist industrial, agricultural and commercial 
activities for a number of reasons, many of which fall 
within the scope of national economic policy. Claims 
that all subsidies are ioso facto inequitable ignore the 
importance of the many legitimate non-economic purposes 
of subsidies. Quite clearly, rules based solely on 
economic principles inevitably will be over-simplified
See generally, G.C. Hufbauer & J.S. Erb, 
Subsidies in International Trade (1984).
See G. Denton & S. O'Cleireacain, Subsidy Issues 
in International Commerce (1972), 5-22.
See R.R. Rivers & J.D. Greenwald, "The 
Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences",
(1979) 11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 1447, 1448-1449, and 
R. dec. Grey, "Some Notes on Subsidies and the 
International Rules", in D. Wallace, Interface III; 
Legal Treatment of Domestic Subsidies (1984), 61-70.
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which can be demonstrated by considering this 
theoretical basis for a moment.
Economic theory quantifies the misallocation of 
resources caused by subsidisation, not by taking into 
account the relative social value of the alternative 
deployment of resources, but according to the 
opportunity costs, in monetary terms, of alternative 
choices in the decision-making process. The relative 
social value of a subsidy differs from the opportunity 
costs according to the volume and quantity of the 
externalities involved in the decision to subsidise a 
particular economic activity.^*
It is therefore feasible that an individual nation, or 
group of nations, might opt to calculate the material 
value of a particular programme, not by reference to the 
monetary costs of the scheme, but on the basis of the 
social advantages which may accrue.^* However, it is 
notoriously difficult to quantify such advantages. In 
any event, since states are permitted under 
international law to introduce non-economic 
considerations into negotiations, discussions on 
limitations for the use of subsidies are artificial when 
confined to the parameters of economic theory.
Nevertheless, the United States has, especially in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, consistently advocated 
drastic reductions in levels of subsidies, particularly 
in the agricultural sector, to allow substitutable goods
W.F. Schwartz & E.W. Harper, "The Regulation of 
Subsidies Affecting International Trade", (1970) 70
Michigan Law Review, 831; and J.J, Barcelo, "Subsidies 
and Countervailing Duties - An Analysis and Proposal", 
(1977) 9 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 779, 786-794.
See E.J. Rowbpttom, "Dumping and Subsidies - 
Their Potential for Achieving Sustainable Development in 
North America", (1993) 27:6 JWT 145.
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to compete in the international market-place. This 
explains why at the Brussels Ministerial meeting in 
December 1990, the United States maintained the position 
that a 75% reduction in domestic subsidies and a 90% in 
export subsidies were required in the agricultural 
sector as a precondition to the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round.
Prior to agreement at the Uruguay Round, the United 
States adopted a two-pronged strategy for tackling 
foreign subsidies. First, the United States attempted to 
persuade trading partners to remove subsidies through 
negotiations at both multilateral and bilateral levels. 
Increasingly, emphasis was placed on bilateral 
discussions. For example, the Canada-United States Free 
Trade Agreement established a bilateral Working Group on 
Subsidies to negotiate a mutually acceptable catalogue 
of permissible subsidies.Failure to reach agreement 
on this matter gave grounds for either the United States 
or Canada to terminate the application of the 
Agreement.
Similarly, the bilateral agreement between the United 
States and Mexico to end the problem of American 
countervailing duties on certain Mexican products 
eliminated subsidies on certain types of manufactured
GATT Activities Report 1990. 35 (July 1991) .
141 2 7  ilM 281 (1988).
According to Article 1906 of the Canada - United 
States Free Trade Agreement, the countervailing laws 
that pre-existed the agreement will continue for a 
period of five years, and if necessary for seven years. 
During this period, mutually agreed trade rules are to be developed including a definition of subsidy. If no 
system of rules has been agreed within this period, 
either party may terminate the agreement on six month 
notice.
OR:;
81
products flowing between the two countries.The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is, of course, the 
most recent illustration of this bilateral approach.^*
The second prong of this strategy is an active policy of 
imposing countervailing duties which, if properly 
calculated, are designed unilaterally to restore the 
competitive position, in strictly economic terms at 
least, between domestic and foreign goods prior to the 
introduction of a subsidy.
No state or group of states has employed its 
countervailing legislation to the same degree as the 
United States. Indeed, in the decade prior to 1990, the 
United States initiated more than three hundred 
countervailing duty investigations, a considerable rise 
on the figure of less than one hundred for the previous 
ten year period. In contrast, the European Union 
initiated less than ten such investigations between 1980 
and 1990, while Canada and Japan together commenced less 
than thirty. But there are more sinister objectives of 
the United States countervailing duty policy than this.
Examining the statistics for United States 
countervailing investigations, there should be a degree 
of proportionality between the volume of trade between 
the United States and countries on the one hand and the 
number of investigations brought against those countries 
on the other hand. However, as one recent study has 
pointed out, the incidence of countervailing duty 
actions against the European Union is substantially
143 Understanding Between the United States and 
Mexico Regarding Subsidies and Countervailing Duties of 
April 23. 1985. See Smith, "The United StateS-Mexico
Framework Agreement: Implications for Bilateral Trade",
(1989) 20:4 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 655.
144 32 ILM 289 (1993).
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disproportionate to the volume of its trade with the 
United States.Between 1980 and 1988, a total of 177 
countervailing actions were brought against products 
originating in the European Union which translates to 
almost fifty percent of the total number of 
investigations initiated by the United States 
authorities. Trade with the European Union only 
constituted twenty percent of merchandise imports.
Trade with Japan accounted for a similar share of 
imports, yet only five cases were initiated against 
Japanese goods. Trade with Canada constituted eighteen 
percent of imports into the United States, but only 
fourteen countervailing investigations were conducted. 
These figures reflect, to a large degree. United States 
reaction to the liberal subsidisation regime within the 
European Union and the growing intolerance of the United 
States government towards its policies.
In contrast to the U.S. position, the European Union 
views the subsidisation of production, most notably 
agricultural production through the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), as an indispensable tool for achieving 
social and economic objectives. Article 39 of the EC 
Treaty cites the growth of productivity, the guarantee 
of a fair standard of living among the farming 
community, and the assurance of adequate supplies at 
reasonable prices, as the main underlying tenets of the
policy.WG
Equally, while Article 92 of the Treaty restricts the
J.M. Finger & T. Murray, "Policing Unfair 
Imports: The United States Example", (1990) 24:4 JWT, 
39.
On the CAP, see generally, J. Usher, The Common 
Agricultural Policv of the European Economic Community 
(1988) .
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freedom of Member States to provide assistance to 
national industries, the impact of this general 
provision is substantially eroded by the considerable 
number of exceptions to the rule together with the 
evolution of a centralised aid policy at the European 
Union l e v e l . S t a t e  aid is not incompatible with the 
principles behind the common market if the aid has a 
social character and is granted without 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . similarly, aid to promote economic 
development in regions where the standard of living is 
abnormally low may also be permissible.
In legal terms, the conflict over the issue of subsidies 
illustrates the clash between the right of states to 
regulate their own domestic economic development, 
subject to the rules of international law, and the 
legitimate interest of other states to mitigate, or 
avoid, injury which might be sustained as a consequence 
of other states exercising their rights to formulate 
such policies. Clearly, these conflicting principles are 
best reconciled by negotiating a series of rules which 
would delimit the respective boundaries of these rights. 
This regime must preserve the rights of individual 
states to determine internal commercial policy while at 
the same time restricting practices which cause injury 
disproportionate to the benefits which accrue.
Such a framework would allow a distinction to be drawn 
between justifiable economic development policies and
J. Steenbergen, "Trade Regulation After the Tokyo 
Round", in J.H.J. Bourgeois (ed), Protectionism and the 
European Community (1983), 181, 189-190; and C, Norall, 
'State Aid in the European Community*, a paper presented 
at the Colloquim on Community Competition Law at the 
University of Glasgow, 5 November, 1991.
Article 92(2) (a), EC Treaty.
Article 92(3) (a), EC Treaty.
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practices which amount to little more than improper 
attempts to export economic problems at the expense of 
other nations. Of course, a significant grey area 
between these two polars exists which has to be settled. 
In addition, effective surveillance and supervision of 
implemented rules are required to ensure that 
infringements are minimised and international harmony 
maintained.
Article XVI of the GATT, as amended, was the first 
attempt to draft international rules to accommodate 
these opposing forces and failed because it did not 
strike the correct b a l a n c e . I n  many respects the 
Subsidies Code 1979^ ^^  compounded this error by building 
a new regime on the basis of these misaligned 
principles. The result was an ineffective international 
agreement that contained too many vague obligations and 
not enough imperatives.
Whether or not the renegotiated Subsidies Code repeats 
or aggravates these deficiencies can be partially 
determined by examining the shortcomings of the 
Subsidies Code 1979 and contrasting its provisions with 
the new Agreement to see if mistakes have been repeated.
On the nature of the opposing positions, see W.H. 
Boger III, "The US-EC Agricultural Export Dispute", 
(1984) 16 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 173.
The Subsidies Code 1979 is properly termed the 
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles 
VI. XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1979.
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(2) Stage One: Scepticism Whether Restraints Were
Necessary
(A) The Original Article XVI Regime
Article XVI of the General Agreement, in its original 
form, consisted of one paragraph which required 
contracting parties to notify the GATT of the 
introduction of any subsidies which operated, directly 
or indirectly, to increase exports of any product from, 
or to reduce imports of any products into, its 
territory. If programmes having these effects were set 
up, the contracting party was obliged to provide 
information relating to the extent, nature and purpose 
of the subsidy, together with the estimated effect of 
the programme on the volume of affected products and the 
circumstances which necessitated the subsidy.
In other words, the original obligation was little more 
than a reporting requirement. It was not a prohibition 
or even a duty to curtail subsidisation activities; the 
sole duty was to consult with the other contracting 
parties in the event that a potentially injurious 
subsidy was to be introduced.
No actual restraints were therefore imposed on the 
rights of parties to introduce subsidies. In this form, 
the normative effect of the provision is clearly finite 
and indeed the obligation to report constituted nothing 
more than an acknowledgment that other states may have 
an interest in subsidisation programmes that cause them
The CONTRACTING PARTIES subsequently issued a 
decision which required contracting parties to submit, 
every three years, questionnaires concerning 
notification and to update these reports for the 
intervening years. See GATT BISD, 11th Supplement, 58 
(1963).
’■ :ï;.
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'serious prejudice'
Neither the notification obligation nor the consultation 
mechanism of Article XVI proved successful. 
Contracting parties have not made general use of the 
consultation process and in at least one study the 
authors concluded that there is no recorded example of 
any state ever having altered a subsidisation measure as 
a result of consultations.^* Consequently, the self­
notification and consultation procedure, so typical of 
the original GATT dispute resolution process, has proved 
to be no inhibition on the increasing use of subsidies.
This brief history illustrates two points. First, rules 
regulating subsidies which do not have some form of 
compulsion or the benefit of reciprocal advantage do not 
induce any effective form of compliance. Second, states 
cannot be relied on to refrain from taking advantage of 
the vagueness in rules to avoid their obligations no 
matter how weak these obligations might be.
Two factors help explain the inclusion of such weak 
normative provisions. First, when the GATT was being 
negotiated the contracting parties were under the 
impression that the Charter for the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) would eventually succeed the GATT. 
Since the Charter contained detailed obligations 
regarding the use of subsidies, repetition of these 
provisions seemed unnecessary and might have conceivably 
resulted in confusion in interpretation.
See K. Dam, The GATT: Law and International
Economic Organisation (1970), 146-147.
154 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 137, 1459-1460,
Working Party Report, GATT BISD, Vol. II, 44(1952).
 ' __ ___ _ _
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Second, in the immediate post-war era, a number of 
factors obscured both the range and effect of subsidies. 
Quantitative restrictions were widely maintained 
especially throughout Europe for balance of payments 
purposes and constituted the major limitation to the 
free exchange of goods. In contrast, subsidies were 
considered an integral element for economic 
reconstruction and, more importantly, were believed to 
be self-limiting. Competitive spirals of subsidisation 
and counter-subsidisation were considered inconceivable.
As states have progressively reduced average levels of 
tariff protection, the permanence and pervasiveness of 
non-tariff barriers, including subsidies, have been 
exposed.
(B) Recognition of the Emerging Problem; The 1955 
Amendments to Article XVI
The original single paragraph of Article XVI was 
subsequently amended, in 1955, by the addition of a 
further three paragraphs in an attempt to impose more 
rigorous controls over the use of subsidies. The 
amendments were the consequence of a growing awareness 
of the disruption to the international trading order 
caused by the widespread use of subsidies.
The 1979 Subsidies Code codifies and elaborates on these 
obligations without radically departing from the basic 
formula contained in these a m e n d m e n t s . Hence, the 
amendments made in 1955 are largely of historical 
interest only and need not be considered in any detail.
I
GATT BISD, 26th Supplement, 56 (1980) ,
■■ I
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(3) Stage Two: Restraints Based on a Failure to Reach 
a True International Consensus
(A) The Fallacy of Establishing International 
Restraints Based on Rigid Adherence to Economic 
Theory
At the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, 
the United States apparently succeeded in persuading 
states that export subsidies caused the most grievous 
forms of injury to other states. On the other hand, 
there was absolutely no genuine agreement reached on the 
effects of domestic (or production) subsidies. 
Therefore, while the 1979 Subsidies Code contains 
elaborate substantive provisions for the regulation of 
export subsidies, the problem of domestic subsidies was 
essentially unresolved by the Code.
The terms of the Code relating to the use of domestic 
subsidies reflect the total absence of any consensus 
between those contracting parties advocating the 
imposition of restraints on such subsidies and those 
states which took the view that the social and political 
benefits of many domestic subsidies outweigh the adverse 
economic repercussions. As a result, the provisions 
relating to domestic subsidies add little to the terms 
of Article XVI as amended and in fact perpetuate, 
perhaps even exacerbate, the ambiguities of the original
GATT provisions.
At the risk of sounding repetitive, it seems clear that 
the failure to negotiate effective rules is a direct 
consequence of the polarised negotiating positions of
G.R. Winham, International Trade and the Tokvo 
Round Negotiation (1986), 170.
See R.H. Snape, "International Regulation of 
Subsidies", (1991) 14 World Economy 139.
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the United States on the one hand and the European Union 
and, to a lesser extent, Canada and other non-Union 
European countries on the other hand. The Unites States 
position in the negotiations, and the one that at least 
superficially prevailed, was to draw up rules based on 
controversial assumptions and, in particular, a 
distinction between the economic impact of domestic and 
export subsidies.
The economic rationale for distinguishing between 
domestic and export subsidies is derived from the 
perception that domestic subsidies create less 
distortion in the patterns of trade than export 
subsidies, which are intentionally designed artificially 
to stimulate the commercial competitiveness of specific 
products.^* The effect of domestic subsidies is not to 
promote one product or group of products over 
alternative products, but to encourage economic 
efficiency in general. The major macroeconomic effect of 
such subsidies is on the national balance of payments 
and not individual merchandise accounts.
In contrast, export subsidies are grants provided to 
individual industries in proportion to, and conditional 
on, export performance. The economic justification most 
frequently rendered for such programmes is the 
generation of a favourable balance of payments 
equilibrium by increasing foreign income earnings.
The Code provides a number of illustrations of
See B. Balassa, "Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures; Economic Considerations", (1989) 23:3 JWT, 63; 
and L. Dally, "The Impact of Export Subsidies on 
International Trade", (1981) New Zealand Law Journal, 
490.
At least in theory, a balance of payments surplus 
caused by the use of such subsidies will be adjusted by 
the appropriate change in exchange rates.
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particular types of domestic subsidies but no specific 
definition of domestic subsidies is included in the 
Code. Although a number of examples of domestic 
subsidies are identified, they are clearly intended to 
be non-exhaustive. No criteria were established to allow 
a distinction to be drawn between export and domestic 
subsidies. The Code does contain an illustrative list of 
export subsidies, the use of which is regulated by the 
Code provisions on export subsidies, but in general 
these examples are vague and often overlap and are of 
little guidance in ascertaining which programmes are 
domestic subsidies.
In order to be effective, rules which function on the 
basis of such a distinction must be accompanied by a 
formula to allow differentiation. Such a formula could 
have been established on the basis of any one of a 
number of criteria. For example, classification could be 
achieved according to the intentions or motives of the 
government conferring the subsidy. Alternatively, a 
determination may be made on the basis of marketing 
strategies or the accounting practices of the industries 
receiving the assistance. Another proposed basis might 
be the ultimate destination of a particular proportion 
of production manufactured with the benefit of the 
assistance. In any event, no such rules were established 
and an assessment of the nature of an individual 
programme remains a matter to be inferred from the 
circumstances surrounding the case.
Even if the economic rationale for distinguishing 
between these two types of subsidies is sound, which 
arguably it is not, such a distinction is virtually 
unworkable in practice. The two types of subsidies are
______________________________ ____
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not mutually exclusive.^* Equally, a production subsidy 
may provide an incentive for increased output which 
allows an industry, over a period of time, to increase 
its share of the world market through increased 
productivity stimulated by the domestic subsidy. This 
distinction also fails to take into account 'hybrid 
subsidies' which are composed of both types. The 
European Union, for example, has traditionally granted 
subsidies for the production of the primary components 
for manufactured products which are eventually 
exported.
(B) Recognition of the Right to Provide Domestic 
Subsidies
Under the 1979 Subsidies Code, domestic subsidies, 
whether general or specific, are simply not actionable 
at the international level. Article 8(3) pathetically 
implores signatories to 'seek to avoid' causing certain 
injurious effects through the use of any type of 
subsidy. Closer examination of the terms of Article 8(3) 
reveals that in fact no actual obligation is imposed on 
signatories to refrain from introducing such subsidies. 
They are merely required to try to avoid using subsidies 
that create these effects. The consequences of such a 
norm-formulation are predictable: no state can be
challenged by another for failing to attempt to prevent 
injury through the introduction of a subsidy. This 
interpretation has been substantiated by the fact that 
Article 8(3) has never provided the basis for a 
complaint by one signatory against another.
See S.J. Marcuss, "Understanding Direct and 
Indirect Subsidies: Are the Problems Negotiable or
Incurable", in D. Wallace (ed). Interface Three: Legal 
Treatment of Domestic Subsidies (1984), 51-60, 52-53.
See European Economic Communitv Subsidies on 
Exports of Pasta Products. GATT Doc. SCM/43 (1983), not 
yet reported.
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The imperative nature of Article 11(2) is equally
diluted to the following terms:
"Signatories recognize...that subsidies other 
than export subsidies...may cause or threaten 
to cause injury to a domestic industry of 
another signatory or serious prejudice to the 
interests of another signatory or may nullify 
or impair benefits accruing to another 
signatory under the General Agreement, in 
particular where such subsidies would
adversely affect the conditions of normal
competition."
Notwithstanding the detailed elaboration of these forms 
of injury there are no guidelines for assessing
injurious effects. Yet, there is little doubt that the 
nature of these effects is essential in the 
determination of the kinds of subsidies that are subject 
to the disciplines of the Agreement.
One cannot help but wonder why these concepts have been 
elaborated in such detail when Articles 8(3) and 11(2) 
merely require states to 'seek to avoid' causing these 
effects. As one commentator has already observed, by 
employing the 'seek to avoid' terminology, the
negotiators opted for a system of 'regulation without 
observation '. Yet this was the only compromise 
acceptable to both the United States and the European 
Union delegations. The provisions are too vague to be 
genuine and effective legal obligations and it is
See also, J.H.J. Bourgeois, "The GATT Rules for 
Industrial Subsidies and Countervailing Duties", in E-U 
Petersmann & M, Hilf (eds) , The New GATT Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1988), 219, 230-231,
R.E. Hudec, "Regulation of Domestic Subsidies 
Under the MTN Subsidies Code", in D. Wallace, Legal 
Treatment of Domestic Subsidies (1984), 1-18, 2.
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doubtful whether they clarify or expand upon the 
functioning of the nullification or impairment formula 
originally incorporated into the Agreement.
The limited normative effect of the Code provisions on 
domestic subsidies is underscored by the fact that 
parties alleging the use of injurious domestic subsidies 
have opted to use the general dispute settlement 
procedures in their quest for a remedy. One of the most 
explicit examples of this was the United States 
complaint, supported by Australia, that production aids 
granted by the European Union on the manufacture of 
certain types of canned fruit were inconsistent with the 
GATT.*®^ The European Union issued a number of 
regulations which established a common organisation for 
these products, consisting of, inter alia, a common 
tariff and levy structure.*^ According to these
regulations, processors of these fruit products became
eligible for a 'production aid', which was in effect a
domestic subsidy, if they bought fresh produce from 
Union producers at the minimum specified grower price.
The United States challenged these regulations, not on 
the basis of Article 8 of the 1979 Code which requires 
signatories to 'seek to avoid' causing nullification or 
impairment, but under Article XXIII of the GATT. In 
particular, the United States claimed that the
production aids given to the canned fruit products 
nullified or impaired tariff concessions granted by the 
Union in 1962, 1967, 1973 and 1979.*'^ '^
European Communitv - Production Aids Granted on 
Canned Peaches. Canned Pears. Canned Fruit Cocktail and 
Dried Grapes. GATT Doc L/5778 (1985),
Council Regulation 516/77 fl977). OJ L73/1 (1977) 
and Council Regulation 1152778 fl9781. OJ L144/2 (1978).
167 Panel Report, supra note 165, Para. 14.
.a
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In an intensely legalistic argument, the United States 
representative alleged that the Australian Subsidv on 
Ammonium Sulphate Case established a precedent according 
to which the introduction of domestic subsidies 
established a prima facie case of nullification or 
impairment of tariff bindings.*®^ Responding, the 
European Union offered rather weak arguments to the 
effect that the mere granting of an internal subsidy did 
not constitute prima facie nullification or impairment, 
and that the United States had been unable to prove that 
the production aids had distorted conditions of 
competition between the Union products and imported 
products,
The panel eventually held that nullification or 
impairment of concessions would exist if two 
preconditions were met: (a) that the offending measure
could not have been reasonably anticipated by the party 
bringing the complaint at the time of the negotiation of 
the concession; and (b) that the measure upset the 
competitive position of the imported products 
concerned. 0^ These conditions were satisfied for a 
number of products, including canned peaches and canned 
pears. The panel therefore ruled that the European Union 
production aids were contrary to the General Agreement 
because they nullified and impaired tariff concessions. 
In arriving at this conclusion, the sole reference to 
the Code was an assertion on the part of the Union that 
its terms should be taken into account for the purposes 
of 'interpreting' the concept of nullification or 
impairment.^*
168 Ibid, Para. 15. 
Ibid, Para. 24. 
Ibid, Para. 51. 
Ibid, Para. 29.
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In a more recent case, the United States again 
challenged the use of domestic subsidies by the European 
Union, this time payments made to Union processors of 
oilseeds and related animal-feed p r o t e i n s . O n c e  
again, the complaint was lodged under the relevant 
provisions of the General Agreement, this time Article 
III, and not Article 8 of the Code.
The common marketing regime for oilseeds was adopted in 
September 1966 by the Union and was subsequently 
supplemented by a vast range of support measures for the 
commodity.Under the scheme, where prevailing world 
prices were below a predetermined target price, a 
subsidy was payable to processors of oilseeds as 
compensation for purchasing generally higher priced 
domestic oilseeds. The United States claimed that these 
afforded less favourable treatment to imported oilseeds 
than to products of national origin, contrary to Article 
111(4). European Union purchasers and producers of 
domestic oilseeds benefitted from subsidies paid only 
when they purchased oilseeds grown in the Union. 
Further, the calculation of the level of the subsidy was 
such as to provide an incentive to purchase domestic 
rather than imported oilseeds.
The United States further contended that the benefits 
conferred in the Dillon Round of tariff concessions from 
the European Union had been nullified and impaired by 
the producer and processor subsidies and that, in 1962, 
when the concession was negotiated, it could not 
reasonably have anticipated such impairment. In recent
to
European Community - Payments and Subsidies Paid 
Processors of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed
Proteins. GATT Doc. L/6627 (1989), also reproduced in
(1990) 2:2 WTM, 5.
Council Regulation 136/66 (1966K OJ L172/30(1966).
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years the higher support levels had resulted in a large 
surge in domestic production with a consequent decline 
in imports. If these allegations were proved correct, 
quite clearly the European Union had failed to 'seek to 
avoid* causing injury as required by Article 8(3).
The European Union relied on Article 111(8)(b) which 
declares that the principle of non-discrimination does 
not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to 
domestic producers.
The panel accepted that the calculation of the level of 
subsidy payments could over-compensate processors for 
purchasing domestically produced oilseeds, and was 
therefore capable of giving rise to discrimination 
against imported products contrary to Article 111(4). 
The panel also took the view that the risk of such 
discrimination was tantamount to discrimination itself.
Nor did the panel accept the contention that the subsidy 
payments were covered by Article 111(8)(b) since that 
particular exception applied only to payments made 
exclusively to domestic producers and not, as in this 
case, to processors.This finding should hardly have 
been surprising since, in 1959, a reporting panel had 
previously held that, if payments were made to 
purchasers of domestic industrial equipment but not for 
purchases of similar imported equipment, a violation of 
the principle of non-discrimination could be upheld a 
fact which the European Union can be deemed to have been 
aware when introducing the scheme.^®
Ibid, Paras 136-140.
Ibid, Para. 137.
*^® Italian Discrimination Against Imported 
Agricultural Machinery, GATT BISD, 7th Supplement, 60 
(1959).
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It is also instructive to see how the dispute was in 
fact eventually resolved. In response to the United 
States request that the GATT Council adopt the report, 
the European Union expressed the view that it would not 
stand in the way of its adoption if a consensus in 
favour materialised. This position was, however, 
qualified by the statement that the European Union would 
only fulfil the panel's finding 'in the context of the 
implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round'.*^ 
The European Union also maintained that the panel's 
findings raised many fundamental problems relating to 
the interpretation of Articles II, III, XVI and XXIV, 
the interrelationship among which were the subject of 
discussions at the trade negotiations. Ultimately, 
compliance by the European Union with the decision was 
not brought about by the findings of the investigating 
panel, but as part of a negotiated package agreed 
between the European Union and the United States.*^*
The tendency of certain signatories to challenge 
domestic subsidies through the general provisions of the 
GATT rather than Article 8 of the Code reflects general 
dissatisfaction with both the substantive and procedural 
provisions of the agreement.^* The general consensus 
among the negotiators of the new subsidies agreement was 
to abandon this structure in favour of a completely 
revised, and more comprehensive, scheme.
177 GATT Activities Report 1989 (1990), 83-86.
Memorandum of Understanding on Certain Oilseeds 
Between the EEC and the USA within the Framework of the 
GATT. O.J. L147/26 (1993).
See generally, R.A. Brand, "Competing 
Philosophies of GATT Dispute Resolution in the Oilseeds 
Case and the Draft Understanding on Dispute Settlement", 
(1993) 27:6 JWT 117.
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(C) Obligations to Restrict the Use of Export Subsidies
(1) The Artificial Distinction Between 
Agricultural Subsidies and Industrial 
Subsidies
Export subsidies are payments made by governments in 
proportion to the quality, volume or value of goods 
exported. 0^ From a theoretical economic perspective, 
export subsidies are considered to distort international 
competition. The use of alternative measures, such as 
currency devaluations, which are necessary to correct 
payment imbalances, are not considered to have the same 
effect.*®* Since alternative, and less distorting, 
solutions can be found to the problems that export 
subsidies are alleged to remedy, there is an economic 
argument, in principle, that export subsidies, as a 
general category, should be regulated.*®^
Despite the difficulties of distinguishing between 
export and domestic subsidies, which have been alluded 
to earlier, the 1979 Subsidies Code retained the 
division between these two forms of subsidies. The fatal 
sub-classification between export subsidies on primary 
products and those on non-primary products, also 
introduced by the 1955 amendments, was also retained in
*®** See, P. Low, "The Definition of Export Subsidy", 
(1982) 16 JWTL, 375; and J.J. Barcelo, "Subsidies,
Countervailing Duties and Anti-Dumping After the Tokyo 
Round", (1980) Cornell Int'l Law Journal 257, 261-262.
*8* This explains why countries do not usually impose 
countervailing duties on goods which originate in a 
country that has recently undergone a currency 
devaluation, despite the fact that both general export 
subsidy schemes and currency devaluation have broadly 
similar economic effects.
*®^ J.J, Barcelo, "Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties - An Analysis and A Proposal", (1977) 9 Law &Pol'y Int'l Bus., 779, 795-796.
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the Code.
While an argument can be made for differentiating 
between domestic and export subsidies, there is no 
viable economic rationale for maintaining a distinction 
between the agricultural and industrial sectors. The 
real reason for the separate treatment of these two 
areas is political and not economic.*®^ Before the 
Second World War, the United States maintained export 
subsidies on agricultural products as part of its 
agricultural adjustment programme.*®^ During the 
negotiation of the Havana Charter, the U.S. Congress 
repeatedly insisted that the final agreement would not 
be ratified if its terms were inconsistent with those of 
the agricultural adjustment programme. The putative 
provisions of the Charter therefore imposed less onerous 
obligations on primary products, which are agricultural 
products, than on non-primary products. This formula 
therefore arose as an attempt to reconcile the 
formulation of restraints on the use of export subsidies 
with the internal policies of the United States.*®®
When the CONTRACTING PARTIES amended Article XVI of the 
GATT to include limited restrictions on the use of 
export subsidies, the United States successfully pressed
*®^ See B. Balassa, "Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures: Economic Considerations", (1989) 23:2 JWT, 63, 
67.
*®^ J.W. Evans, The Kennedy Round in American Trade 
Policv (1971), 66-69.
*®® A GATT Panel recently examined the consistency of 
certain aspects of the U.S. Agricultural Adjustments Act 
which remains the basis of U.S. agricultural policy for 
consistency with Articles II and XI of the GATT. The 
findings were that the statute, and indirectly the 
policy, was not inconsistent with the obligations of the 
United States towards the GATT. See United States 
Assistance for Sugar and Sugar Products. GATT Doc. 
L/6631, reproduced at [1991] 1 CMLR 120.
*®® T.B. Curtis & R.J. Vastine, The Kennedy Round and 
the Future of American Trade (1971), 47-49.
See generally, D.T, Fitch, "No Winners - US 
Agricultural Export Subsidies", (1988) Geo. Wash. J, 
Int'1 Law & Econs 4,
:|3
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for the maintenance of this distinction. During the 
1950s and early 1960s, the United States, in absolute 
terms, undoubtedly provided substantial assistance to 
its farming community and the preservation of this 
assistance was the predominant motive for the United 
States negotiating position during the discussions for 
the 1955 amendment.
While the United States was the principal protagonist 
for this separation during the negotiation of the 1955 
amendments, the European Union has gradually acceded to 
this role as the grotesque subsidisation requirements of 
the Common Agricultural Policy have escalated. By the 
early 1970s, the levels of agricultural support given by 
the European Union to its farmers had outstripped those 
given by the United States to its farmers,**®
It must nevertheless be noted that United States 
financial assistance to its farming sector is far from 
insignificant but it has managed to down-play this 
assistance by comparing relative levels of export 
assistance to highlight the issue as a European Union- 
caused problem. The principal mechanism of agricultural 
support in the United States for exports is the Export 
Enhancement Programme set up in 1986. This programme 
offers government-owned commodities as bonuses to 
agricultural exporters to encourage the sale of 
agricultural products in international markets.**? 
Approximate estimated expenditure by the U.S. government 
on this programme was projected at US$ 5 billion over
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the period from 1991-1996.***
At the same time, the Food Security Act of 1985**^ 
provides income support to American farmers. Under this 
scheme, a farmer is given a government loan for his 
annual income and the government obtains a pledge of the 
forthcoming crop as security. When the loan matures, the 
farmer has the option of repaying the loan or of 
delivering the crop to the government as repayment.
The United States also sets target prices to serve as 
benchmarks for determining deficiency payments. These 
payments equal the difference between the target price 
and the market price. In order to qualify under this 
scheme, a farmer must participate in supply management 
programmes and also becomes eligible to receive 
deficiency payments.
The effect of these programmes is to raise production 
independently of actual demand. Faced with the costs of 
continued price support, over-production and a static 
market, the U.S. government also engages in ad hoc 
export promotion programmes.
Nevertheless, the European Union negotiators have been 
unable to take advantage of this situation because of 
the overriding concerns of certain Member States to a 
continued Common Agricultural Policy. During both the 
Tokyo and the Uruguay Rounds of multilateral 
negotiations, the European Union negotiators have 
continuously repeated the view that the CAP is an 
inviolable cornerstone of the Union and would be 
protected at all costs during the negotiations.
*** US Congressional Quarterly, February 23, 1991, p.466.
189 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
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However, even from an economic perspective, it is 
difficult to defend the position that the agricultural 
community should have greater levels of support than the 
industrial sector or that foreign farmers should 
tolerate greater export competition than foreign 
manufacturers, unless political considerations are taken 
into account. Despite the artificial nature of this 
differentiation, the 1979 Subsidies Code places great 
emphasis on the separate treatment of subsidies on 
primary and non-primary products,
(2) Export Subsidies on Agricultural Products
Article 10(1) of the 1979 Subsidies Code reiterates the 
obligation of Article XVI(3) of the GATT, as amended, by 
stating:
•'[S] ignatories agree not to grant directly or 
indirectly any export subsidy on certain 
primary products in a manner which results in 
the signatory granting such subsidy having 
more than an equitable share of world export 
trade in such product, account being taken of 
the shares of the signatories in trade in the 
product concerned during a previous 
representative period, and any special factors 
which may have affected or may be affecting 
trade in such products."
According to Article 10(1), the test of * equitable 
share' is to be applied by reference to 'the shares of 
signatories in trade in the product concerned' during a 
previous representative period. This terminology is 
adapted from Article XVI(3), which makes it clear that 
equitable share is to be determined by reference to the
_____________________________________________
@Article 10.
No account need be taken of the shares of non* 
contracting parties.
191 ITO Charter, Article 28(4).
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relative shares of other contracting parties. The 
concepts of 'more than an equitable share' and 'a 
previous representative period' are elaborated in
The fundamental defect in the application of the concept 
of 'equitable share' is that insufficient guidelines or 
assistance has been agreed - either in Article XVI(3) or 
Article 10 - to facilitate its operation. When the
concept was originally conceived in the Havana Charter, 
it was accompanied by a number of economic and factual 
criteria designed to facilitate its application.Not 
surprisingly, the few panels required to apply Article 
XVI(3) have been required to fill the lacunae left by 
this omission and have relied extensively on the draft 
text of the Havana Charter.
Article 10 of the Code attempts to clarify the 
application of 'more than an equitable share' by moving 
the concept closer towards that of ' d i s p l a c e m e n t ' . ^ ^  
The notion of displacement was derived from an attempt 
by the United States to concentrate on the more tangible 
concepts of the displacement of non-subsidised exports 
by subsidised competition, and 'price undercutting'. The 
phenomenon of displacement has been considered by panels 
in two separate investigations dealing with the pre-Code 
law of Article XVI. In one case in particular, a :ïi
■
French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat 
Flour Case. GATT BISD, 7th Supplement, 46 (1959).
193 Article 10(2) (a), 1979 Subsidies Code.
IEuropean Community Refunds on Exports of Sugar 
(No. 1). GATT BISD, 26th Supplement 69 (1979); and
European Communitv Refunds on Exports of Sugar (No. 2).
GATT BISD, 26th Supplement 290 (1979). For an analysis
"f
' ' : - __________
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panel, elaborating on displacement, stated that 
'equitable share' should include situations in which the 
effect of an export subsidy granted by one contracting 
party was to displace the exports of another contracting 
party, bearing in mind developments in world markets.
The Code also does not incorporate any provision dealing 
with the need to establish a causal connection. Elements 
other than a subsidisation programme may have caused an 
increase in share. Factors which affect market shares, 
and which operate independently of subsidisation, 
include the inadequacy or inefficiency of supplies from 
alternative sources, the imposition of voluntary 
restrains, climatic conditions, such as crop failure or 
drought, or advantages in transportation, both in speed 
and in relative cost. Nor is the issue of cumulation 
of the effect of subsidised products from a number of 
different countries considered.
Another basic problem in the functioning of the 
'equitable share' system of Article 10 arises because 
the concept is integrally connected with the movement 
away from an absolute prohibition on export subsidies 
towards judging prohibited subsidies according to vague 
economic criteria which are intended to separate 
permissible from impermissible subsidies according to 
their effects. Article 10, and for that matter Article 
XVI(3), fails to identify the forms and degree of 
interference with established trade patterns. This
of these rulings, see J.S. Estabrook, "EC Resistance to 
the Enforcement of GATT Panel Decisions on Sugar Export 
Subsidies", (1982) 15 Cornell Int'l Law Journal 397,
European Community Refunds on Exports of Sugar 
(No. 2), ibid.
See generally, C. Phegan, "GATT Article XVI:3: 
Subsidies and 'Equitable Shares'", (1982) 16Export 
JWTL, 251, 259.
_ _____________
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criticism was evident in one panel report into the use 
of export subsidies on primary products which declared 
itself incapable of applying the formula because it was;
"...unable to conclude as to whether the 
increased share has resulted in the Union 
'having more than an equitable share* in terms 
of Article 10, in light of the highly 
artificial levels and conditions of trade in 
wheat flour, the complexity of developments in 
the markets, including the interplay of a 
number of special factors, the relative 
importance of which it is impossible to
assess, and, most importantly, the 
difficulties inherent in the concept of 'more 
than an equitable share
This is a clear endorsement of the view that the test 
itself is unworkable in light of the complex interplay 
of economic factors in the international market­
place.^*
In fact, this panel made a number of recommendations for 
the revision of the terms of Article 10 itself. After
consideration of the artificial levels and conditions of
trade in wheat products, the panel suggested that 
certain of these problems could be reduced by improving 
the transparency of the provision and through 
cooperation in international trade circles.Further, 
it was deemed necessary to establish a clearer and more
European Communitv Subsidies on Exports of Wheat 
Flour. GATT Doc. SCM/42, Para. 5.3 (1983).
On this report, see M. Coccia, "Settlement of 
Disputes in GATT Under the Subsidies Code; Two Panel 
Reports on EEC Export Subsidies", (1986) 16 Geo. J.
Int'l & Comp. Law 1.
199 Supra note 197, Para. 5.9.
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comprehensive understanding of the concept of 'more than 
an equitable share' in order to render the operation of 
the test feasible. Neither of these proposals was ever 
adopted.
(3) Export Subsidies on Industrial Products
Article 9(1) of the 1979 Subsidies Code declares the 
deceptively simple principle that "Signatories shall not 
grant export subsidies on products other than certain 
primary products." The Code does not define the concept 
of an export subsidy, but contains an Illustrative List 
in Annex I to the Code as a source of reference.^^ It 
must be conceded that Article 9(1) is a marked 
improvement on Article XVI(4) of the GATT, as amended, 
which merely forbid contracting parties from introducing 
export subsidies on non-primary products when they 
resulted in the sale of export products at a price lower 
than that charged for the same product in the domestic 
market. This standard was generally referred to as the 
'bi-level price' or the 'dual pricing' requirement.^*
The legal consequences of the prohibition on these 
export subsidies should be the obligation not to grant 
such subsidies and, in the case of a violation, to 
remove the offending measure. If, after being found in 
violation, a subsidising state refuses to remove a
200 Article 9(2), 1979 Subsidies Code.
On the difficulties of applying dual pricing, see United States Tax Legislation on Domestic International 
Sales Corporations. GATT BISD, 23rd Supplement, 98, 
Para. 72 (1977); French Indirect Taxation Practices.
GATT BISD, 2 3rd Supplement, 114 (1977); Belgian Indirect 
Taxation Practices. GATT BISD, 23rd Supplement, 127 
(1977); and Netherlands Indirect Taxation Practices. 
GATT BISD, 23rd Supplement, 137 (1977). See also the
Report of the Panel on Export Inflation Insurance 
Schemes. GATT BISD, 26th Supplement, 330 (1980),
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measure, compensation should be provided, or, 
alternatively, the state should be the subject of 
retaliation authorised under the GATT. Since the use of 
a prohibited subsidy would be a violation of the express 
terms of the GATT, a orima facie case of nullification 
and impairment arises, and no proof of injury is 
necessary.
Not surprisingly, the normal consequences of a legal 
obligation have not followed from this prohibition. The 
normative influence of this rule has been completely 
undermined in its application. This is best illustrated 
by considering the jurisprudence of the GATT panels on 
the application of the rule. However, it should also be 
noted that despite the absolute nature of the 
prohibition, few investigations have been conducted into 
allegations of export subsidies on manufacturing goods 
under the Code.
In the most significant case to date - the European 
Union Subsidies on Exports of Pasta Case^^ - the United 
States alleged that European Union refunds on pasta 
products violated the commitments made in Article 9. The 
panel concluded that the Union regulations in question, 
which created a system for granting refunds to exporters 
of pasta, conferred an export subsidy. This was due not 
only to the fact that the system was financed from 
public revenue, but also because the system operated to 
increase exports of this product from the European 
Union. In making its final determination, the panel was 
of the opinion that the application of the legal 
obligation under Article 9 was clear and capable of 
unambiguous application. As a result, the European Union 
was found in violation of its commitments under the 1979 
Code.
202 GATT Doc. SCM/43 (1983), not yet reported.
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One might think that this was a successful application 
of the prohibition. In fact the procedural mechanism 
accompanying the application of the rule demonstrates 
how the decision was devalued in terms of normative 
efficacy. The European Union immediately adopted a 
hostile approach to the findings of the panel. It 
blocked the adoption of the report in the Council, which 
ultimately led to complete blockage of panel reports in 
the Subsidies Committee. The matter was only resolved 
through a bilateral arrangement between the United 
States and the European Union.
A second complaint against European Union subsidies was 
also lodged by the United States in 1991 against the 
financial assistance provided to Airbus Industrie.^* 
The programme is an example of the kind of cooperation 
that the European Union seeks to foster and has created 
an aerospace company with the potential to break the 
near-monopoly presently held by American companies in 
the production of medium and long-haul civil 
aircraft.Nevertheless the success of the Airbus 
programme has been achieved only with substantial 
financial assistance for the governments of the
See Settlement in the Form of an Exchange of 
Letters Between the EEC and the USA on Communitv Exports 
of Pasta Products to the United States. OJ L275/37
(1987) .
2^  The Airbus programme involves a consortium of 
four separate aircraft manufacturers from different 
Member States of the European Union: Deutsche Airbus
(Germany), a subsidiary of Daimler-Benz; Aerospatiale 
(France), a state-owned corporation; British Aerospace (United Kingdom), and Alenia (Italy), also a state-owned 
enterprise. The project was launched in 1968, originally 
in an attempt to coordinate the commercial activities of 
the various European aeronautics industries and to 
stimulate cooperation.
See Commission Proposal, C0M(88) 294 (1988) and 
Resolution of the European Parliament, 16 November 1987, 
OJ C 305 (1987).
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participating states. This so-called 'launch aid' was 
required to defray the costs incurred in the research 
and development of suitable aircraft models.^*
It is the provision of launch aid that has give rise to 
the dispute between the United States and the European 
Union. The United States argued that the quantity and 
form of launch aid given to the Airbus programme 
amounted to subsidies because the repayment terms were 
too liberal.^? In reply, the European Union argued 
that, without launch aid, no aeronautical endeavour 
would be viable since the costs of such programmes are 
prohibitive and the payback periods too long to finance 
the development of new aircraft from the private sector 
or the capital markets.
The complaint stemmed from a failure to negotiate a 
limit on the amount of direct subsidies to assist in the 
development of aerospace programmes. The United States 
proposed a ceiling of twenty-five percent on government 
launch aid for new aircraft programmes, but this was 
rejected by the European Union which argued for a limit 
of forty-five percent.^*
Throughout the history of the Airbus programme, the 
provision of state assistance has been regularly 
scrutinised by the Commission and indeed substantial
206 the background to the programme, see D.
Stevens, "Industrial Cooperation: The Take-Off of
Airbus", (1986) 1 Schuman Journal, 43.
According to a recent United States Department of 
Commerce Report, the Airbus project has received $13.5 
billion in financial assistance, the interest on which 
would amount to more than $25 billion had the funds been 
derived from commercial private sources; see The 
Economist, June 15, 1991, 76.
Oxford Analytica. Report No. 910513 (August1991).
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consideration was given by the European Commission to 
the German government assistance to Deutsche Airbus^*^, 
the principal cause of the complaint lodged by the 
United States with the Subsidies Committee. Although 
the European Commission has no mandate to review state 
assistance against international standards, the 
Commission review raised a number of interesting points.
First, the aid awarded to the firm formed part of the 
German government's policy of ending direct public aid 
for the Airbus programme and was intended to promote the 
restructuring of the German civil aviation industry in 
order to improve its efficiency and international 
competitiveness. Second, the governmental assistance in 
the programme was tied to the Airbus programme and could 
not be used for any other purpose. Third, in view of the 
economic and technical importance of the aviation 
industry to the Union, cooperation in this sector was to 
be encouraged, particularly as the project itself 
involved production and marketing in cooperation with 
several Member States. As a result, the Commission 
concluded that the German aids qualified for exemption 
under Article 92(3)(b), as being an important project of 
common European interest.
In contrast, in the United States complaint, it was 
alleged that the German exchange rate insurance scheme 
for Deutsche Airbus violated the GATT Subsidies Code. 
From the nature of the complaint, the United States
See, for example. First Commission Report on 
Competition Policv (1971), points 176-178; Second 
Commission Report on Competition (1972), points 100-103; 
and Fifth Commission Report on Competition Rolicv 
(1975), points 113-115.
Nineteenth Commission Report on Competition 
Policv (1990), point 172.
211 GATT Focus No. 80, 8 (April 1991).
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government clearly perceives that the subsidies in 
question constitute export subsidies since the complaint 
itself refers to item (j) in the Illustrative List of 
export subsidies which identifies as an export subsidy, 
'the provision by governments... of exchange risk 
programmes, at premium rates, which are manifestly 
inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and 
losses of the programme'.
A dispute-settlement panel was established by the 
Subsidies Committee to investigate the complaint which 
alleged that the German exchange rate insurance scheme 
for Deutsche Airbus violated certain provisions of the 
Subsidies Code, The panel eventually concluded that the 
programme was an exchange-risk scheme within the meaning 
of Item (j) of the Illustrative List as it conferred a 
net benefit on the company since not all costs and 
losses were recouped by the reimbursement mechanisms 
included in the p r o g r a m m e . I t  also considered that 
the components delivered by the German company to Airbus 
Industries were exported from Germany to France. 
Therefore the scheme applied to exports and was 
prohibited by Article 9 of the Subsidies Code. The 
panel's conclusion was that the exchange rate guarantee 
scheme 'should be brought into conformity with Article 
9 of the Subsidies Code'.
The panel report was considered at a Committee meeting 
in April 1992. The European Union was highly critical of 
the legal argumentation in the report; in particular, 
the European Union asserted that the panel had applied 
incorrect notions of what constituted exports and export 
subsidies. 3^ While the European Union opposed the
European Economic Community - German Exchange 
Rate Scheme for Deutsche Airbus. GATT Doc, SCM/142 
(1992), not yet reported.
GATT Activities Report 1992. 39 (1993) .
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adoption of the report, measures had already been taken 
on the future financial structure of the scheme. In 
fact, the German government had concluded negotiations 
with the company for the refinancing of the programme.
This episode illustrates the clash of principles behind 
the European Union's own policy objectives, in the form 
of industrial and economic strategic planning and its
international obligations. It also demonstrates the
impotency of the whole structure for regulation of 
subsidies. In fact the dispute, not surprisingly, was
again settled by a bilateral accord between the European 
Union and the United States. In July 1992, the European 
Commission and the U.S. government reached agreement on 
a bilateral accord on trade in aircraft.^* This
agreement set a ceiling on direct support for production 
at 33% of the total development costs and an indirect 
support limit of 3% of turnover for the project and 4% 
for individual manufacturers.
(D) An Obituarv for the Subsidies Code 1979
The 1979 Subsidies Code, and the organisational 
structure that it established, sufferred from a form of 
paralysis brought about mainly by a lack of consensus in 
the formulation of its rules. The text of the agreement 
incorporated too many compromises during its negotiation 
and as a result its obligations had a limited normative 
effect. The complex formula which were negotiated, 
particularly in relation to export subsidies, relied too
European Commission, Press Briefing. July 23rd, 
1992; European Commission, Press Briefing. April 2, 
1992.
Agreement Between the EEC and the USA Concerning 
the Application of the GATT Agreement on Civil Aircraft. 
O.J. L301/32 (1992).
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heavily on the inchoate and underdeveloped principles 
contained in Article XVI of the GATT.
The Subsidies Committee was unsuccessful in resolving 
fundamental issues, particularly concerning the uniform 
interpretation and application of the Agreement. Indeed, 
no uniform approach was conceived to evolve, develop or 
interpret the principles behind the Code in the 
Subsidies Committee. This led to a divergence in 
opinions as to the role of the Committee in the 
evolution of the obligations under the Code.
Some signatories contended that the Committee had both 
the right and competence to undertake work to clarify 
the existing provisions of the Code and to make those 
provisions more effective.^* Those signatories took the 
view that the committee had well-defined 
responsibilities regarding the regulation of subsidies 
and that other signatories had an obligation to ensure 
that those responsibilities were effectively discharged 
by it.
This view was denounced by both the United States and 
the European Union which maintained that the Committee 
had no competence to expand upon the original 
obligations contained in the Code and that it was an 
inappropriate forum for the negotiation of additional 
obligations. The ensuing debate ensured that the second 
view prevailed.
A number of technical deficiencies also plagued the 
functioning of the Agreement. The omission of a 
definition of 'subsidy' and the perplexities caused by 
retaining the distinction between export subsidies on 
agricultural and manufactured products are both obvious
Report of the Subsidies Committee, GATT BISD, 
33rd Supplement, 197, 202 (1987).
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shortcomings. Neither of these problems was resolved by 
the inclusion of the Illustrative List as an annex to 
the Code. Nor did the Code establish rules to quantify 
the amount of a subsidy, or to exclude de minimis 
subsidies from its scope.
The Chairman of the Subsidies Committee himself also 
pointed to a list of problems which had not been settled 
in the working groups established under the authority of 
the Committee. These included: the improvement of the 
notification process; the application of the Article 8 
disciplines to prevent subsidies causing serious 
prejudice; the failure to establish increased 
disciplines under Article 10, including greater 
definition of 'more than an equitable share*, 'special 
factors' and a 'previous representative period'; and the 
application of Article 9 to primary components of 
processed products.
All these problems were compounded by the failure of the 
notification and consultation procedure to establish a 
more friendly environment. Clearly the four stage 
process of consultations, conciliation, dispute 
resolution and countermeasures did not provide an 
effective procedure to remedy violations of the 
substantive rules. Both the dearth of complaints and the 
failure to prevent the obstruction of adverse reports 
support this view.
In fact, the agreement seems to have served to highlight 
the divisions between the United States and the European 
Union rather than to have encouraged reconciliation, 
cooperation, dialogue and integration between them. 
Complaints alleging violations of the Code were 
regularly met with counterclaims accusing the
Report of the Subsidies Committee, GATT BISD, 
33rd Supplement, 197, 203 (1987).
5-Î
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complaining state of equivalent practices in different 
guises. For example, the United States complaint against 
Union subsidies on wheat flour was immediately followed 
by a Union complaint against the United States alleging 
unlawful subsidisation of wheat sales to Egypt. 
Another illustration is the complaint by the United 
States against the Airbus programme which was met by a 
counterclaim that American companies receive equal 
indirect support through government-financed military 
and space research p r o g r a m m e s . These tactics caused 
a stalemate within the consultation scheme of the Code, 
a condition which has been aggravated by the prevention 
of the adoption of reports.
I
The impact of this failure on the increased use of 
unilateral measures of administered protection was 
considerable. The negation of these rules encouraged a 
more vigorous use of national countervailing duty 
measures. Certain states, particularly the United 
States, demonstrated a propensity to resort to such 
procedures in accordance with Track I of the Code 
(countervailing measures) at the expense of recourse to 
the forums for dispute settlement established under 
Track II. A greater willingness to counter subsidies 
with countervailing duties has emerged because Track II 
failed to define those subsidies against which remedial 
action could taken and because it imposed the burden of 
proof on the complaining party.
Report of the Subsidies Committee, GATT BISD, 
30th Supplement, 39, 42 (1984).
Report of the Subsidies Committee, GATT BISD, 
35th Supplement 185 (1991).
220 See J. Terry, "Sovereignty, Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties in the Canada-United States 
Trading Relationship", (1988) 46 University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law Review, 48.
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After 1990, efforts to amend the failures and 
ambiguities in the 1979 Code were abandoned as the 
emphasis of negotiations shifted to the Negotiating 
Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures at the 
Uruguay Round discussions.Indeed, the European Union 
expressed the view that it considers the continuation of 
the status quo established under the 1979 Code as 
'unhealthy for the multilateral system' Clearly, the 
lack of precision in the existing rules raises the 
spectre of continuing tensions and harassment through 
unilateral measures.
Whether or not the negotiators at the Uruguay Round 
discussions learned through the mistakes made in the 
1979 Code can only be ascertained by an extensive 
examination of the terms of the new Agreement on 
Subsidies.
(4) Stage Three: Starting Again After Learning From
Past Misconceptions and Mistakes?
(A) The Scale of the Difficulties in Reaching a Viable 
Consensus on Restraints on Subsidies at the Uruguay 
MTNs
Almost immediately after the publication of the text of 
the 1979 Subsidies Code, there was widespread criticism 
that its provisions would be insufficient to tackle the 
problem of subsidies at the international level.
GATT Activities Report 1989 (1990), 119.
Communication of the Permanent Representative of 
the European Community to the GATT Director-General, 
GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/36 (November 26, 1990).
22^ See, J.H. Jackson, "The Constitutional Problems 
of the International Economic System and the MTN 
Results", (1979) Proc. ASIL, 56-64; and J. Tarullo, "The
___________________________________________
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Gradually, as signatories sought alternative means to 
resolve their grievances, the complete absence of any 
working consensus behind the operation of the agreement 
became apparent.^* The GATT contracting parties 
therefore displayed little hesitation in placing the 
issue of the international regulation of subsidies, only 
six years after the Code's conclusion, on the agenda for 
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
The task facing these negotiators was immense in light 
of the volume of subsidies provided by developed nations 
to both the agricultural and industrial sectors. In June 
1991, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) estimated that subsidies to the 
agricultural sector in the developed nations amounted to 
$US 176 billion, equivalent to forty-four percent of the 
value of the crops and livestock produced in these 
countries.
At the same time, despite the prohibitions on export 
subsidies in the 1979 Code on non-primary goods, 
subsidies to encourage industrial production were common 
particularly in the United States and the European 
Union. The steel industry, the motor vehicle industry 
and ship-building were a few of many examples where 
international competition was artificially maintained by 
government intervention. Between 1986 and 1988, the
MTN Subsidies Code: Agreement without Consensus", in S. 
Rubin & G. Hufbauer (eds), Emerging Standards of 
International Trade and Investment (1984), 63-99.
224 This rift was particularly noticeable in the area 
of agriculture. See M.A. Echolos, "The United States - 
EEC Agricultural Export Stand-Off", (1983) 77 Proc.
ASIL, 119.
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruauav Round. 
GATT BISD, 33rd Supplement, 19 (1987),
22® OECD, Agricultural Policies. Markets and Trade: 
Monitoring Outlook (1991).
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European Commission estimated that approximately four 
percent of the gross value of manufactured goods made in 
the European Union consisted of state aid.^ ^^  This 
average increased according to the sector under 
consideration, and in many instances, the Member States. 
For example, in the shipbuilding sector, the percentage 
of gross value added by subsidies in this period 
averaged 68% for France, 28% for Italy, 25% for the 
United Kingdom, 17.5% for Spain and 16.6% for Germany.
After more than four years of intensive negotiations, 
the Trade Negotiation Group on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures produced an Agreement on the 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of the GATT, which was submitted for adoption at 
the Brussels meeting in December 1990.^*
The main source of disagreement at the negotiations 
related to reductions in agricultural subsidies, a 
related matter, but one which was discussed in the Trade 
Negotiation Group on Agriculture, not the Group on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.^* Originally, at 
the Brussels Ministerial meeting in December 1990, the 
European Union was prepared to offer a 30% cut in 
agricultural support over a ten year period, using 1986 
as the base year for computing reductions^*®, while the
Second Survey on State Aids in the European 
Communitv in the Manufacturing and Certain Other Sectors 
(July 1990), 10.
Draft Final Act on the Uruguay Round Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations. GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/35 (November 
1990).
229 GATT Activities 1989. 49-52 (1990).
220 Notably, the European Parliament differed from 
the Commission on negotiating strategy. The External 
Affairs Committee of the Parliament observed that;
"The European Parliament supports the
Commission's proposal for a 30% reduction in
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United States and the Cairns Group wished cuts of 75% in 
domestic support and 90% in export subsidies, using 1990 
as the base year.^^
The European Union proposals were rejected, resulting in 
the suspension of discussions. After the negotiations 
were recommenced, the European Union expressed the 
intention of significantly revising the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The decision by Commissioner 
MacSharry to advance 'complete and detailed proposals' 
on reforming the Common Agricultural Policy, although 
ostensibly unrelated to the negotiations in Geneva, 
publicised the fact that the European Union was prepared 
to reorganise the policy in line with its obligations 
under the GATT.^*^
While the reform of the CAP was ostensibly proposed as 
a European Union own-initiative, the momentum for change 
also came from the multilateral trade negotiations 
themselves.*** Quite clearly, the European Commission 
was placed in a difficult position; it was required to 
agree to new international rules on agricultural 
subsidies while at the same time accommodating the 
interests of the Member States when reforming the shape
agricultural subsidies in order to help make 
a success of the Uruguay Round, but believes 
that consideration should also be given to 
phasing out export subsidies."
Stavrou Report on the Stage Reached in the MTSs Within 
the Uruguay Round of GATT, point 56 (September 1990).
**^ See C. Yeutter, "The U.S. Negotiating Proposal on 
Agriculture in the Uruguay Round",in Petersmann & HiIf, 
supra. On the economic impact of these proposals, see 
B.J. McDonald, "Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay 
Round", (1990) 13:3 World Economy, 299-327.
*** See European Commission Press Briefings - Council 
of Agricultural Ministers. 15 July 1991.
23* European Commission, The Development and Future 
of the Common Agricultural Policv. COM(91) 100 (1991).
120
of the Common Agricultural Policy. The consistency of 
the reformed CAP and the international rules will be 
considered in detail later in this work.***
(B) The Key Concepts Behind the New Restraints on 
Subsidies Negotiated in the Uruguay Round Agreement
The Second Subsidies Agreement is a more legalistic 
document than its predecessor.*** It contains complex 
formula for determining whether subsidies are 
prohibited, actionable or non-actionable. Detailed rules 
are also established for identifying those subsidies 
that fall within the scope of the agreement, for 
assessing the effects of subsidisation programmes and 
for quantifying subsidies. Different remedies are also 
specified, depending on the nature of the subsidy that 
forms the basis of the complaint. More importantly, many 
of the inherently defective and artificial distinctions 
embodied in the 1979 Subsidies Code have been discarded.
No distinction is made in the Second Subsidies Agreement 
between export subsidies on agricultural commodities and 
subsidies on industrial products. Nor does the Agreement 
place as much emphasis on the distinction between 
domestic and export subsidies for the purpose of 
imposing restrictions. It contains a more flexible and 
adaptable structure to regulate the treatment of 
different categories of subsidies.
The Second Subsidies Agreement represents a significant 
movement towards the promotion of legalism and 
adjudication in international economic affairs and a
234 See text infra, pp.442-451
*** Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, GATT Doc MTN/FA II-AlA-4 (December 1993).
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regression from the diplomacy-oriented system that 
characterised the first three decades of the 
functioning of the GATT.*** Whether this is sufficient 
is another matter and one that can only be ascertained 
by examining the content of the Agreement itself.
(1) Defining the Concept of Subsidy
No definition of subsidy was provided in the original 
text of the GATT, despite the fact that the term was 
employed in both Articles VI and XVI.*** Nor was any 
definition added by the amendments to Article XVI. 
Agreement on the nature and concept of a subsidy was 
unattainable during the Tokyo Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations and hence the 1979 Code did not 
remedy this defect.**®
The absence of a definition was originally portrayed as 
not presenting an insurmountable obstacle to the
*** GATT Secretariat, Final Act of the Uruguay Round 
- Press Summary, reproduced at [1994] 17:3 World Economy 
365.
237 Further, it is not clear whether this term is 
used interchangeably in these two provisions. See G. 
Horlick, R. Quick & E. Vermulst, "Government Action 
Against Domestic Subsidies", (1986) 1 Legal Issues of
European Integration, 1, 9-10.
238 Mote 22 to Article 7 of the 1979 Code merely 
states:
"In this Agreement, the term •subsidies' shall be deemed to 
include subsidies granted by any 
government or any public body within 
the territory of a signatory."
This statement merely reaffirms that subsidies are 
creatures of government intervention rather than 
clarifies the nature of a subsidy for the purpose of the 
Code.
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regulation of subsidies.**^ In retrospect, it is 
reasonably clear that the omission of a definition in 
the 1979 Code was a substantial contributing factor to 
the demise of the codification and progressive 
development of the terms of that Agreement. The 
inability of the signatories to agree on the essential 
elements of this concept also retarded progress towards 
the negotiation of obligations concerning the 
application of the terms of the Code itself.**®
At the Uruguay negotiations, there was general consensus 
among the participants that a definition of subsidy was 
required as a foundation for regulation. Hence the 
Second Subsidies Agreement contains a detailed formula 
for identifying those subsidies that fall within the 
scope of the agreement. Article 1(1) of the agreement 
contains the following definition:
"[A] subsidy shall be deemed to exist if there 
is a financial contribution by a government or 
any public body within the territory of a 
Member...or there is any form of income or 
price support in the sense of Article XVI of 
the GATT 1994 and a benefit is thereby 
conferred. "**^
The definition itself concentrates on the factual 
aspects of a particular measure. Unlike many of the
**^ GATT Report on the Use of Subsidies. GATT BISD, 
10th Supplement, 201, 208 (1962). More recently, see the
views of the GATT Secretariat in Tokvo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Report bv the Director- 
General (1979), 53-54.
**® J.H.J. Bourgeois, "The GATT Rules for Industrial 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties", in E-U. Petersmann & M. Hilf, The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (1988), 219, 228.
241 Emphasis added.
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earlier proposed definitions, in both the Havana Charter *** 
and the suggestions of experts*** , no reference is made 
in the definition to the macro-economic or micro- 
economic effects of a particular practice as a means of 
identifying it as a subsidy. This avoids the 
undesirability of creating rules based on economic data. 
In addition, this formulation also evades reference to 
the intentions or motives of the government in providing 
the assistance.
Instead, Article 1(a)(1) of the Second Subsidies 
Agreement identifies several forms, or types, of 
practices which are deemed to constitute subsidies, 
although this is clearly an non-exhaustive list. First, 
direct transfers of funds from governments in the form 
of grants, loans or equity infusions, as well as 
potential direct transfers or liabilities, such as loan 
guarantees, are considered subsidies. Second, government 
revenues that are due, but which have been forgiven or 
remain uncollected such as, for example, tax credits, 
fall within the scope of the definition.*** Third, the 
supply of goods and services by the government, other 
than by way of establishing a general infrastructure, is 
specifically included. Fourth, and finally, any direct 
or indirect payments made by a government to private
*** Reproduced in W.A. Brown, The United States and 
the Restoration of World Trade (1950), 516-517.
*** For example, compare the two academic definitions in the following textbooks; H. Malmgren, International 
Order for Public Subsidies (1977), 22; and E. McGovern, 
International Trade Regulation (2nd edition, 1986), 
Para. 11.12.
*** In accordance with the Interpretive Note to 
Article XVI of the GATT, the exemption of an exported 
product from duties or taxes borne by the like product 
when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission 
of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of 
those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a 
subsidy.
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bodies for the purposes of providing the functions 
elaborated in these other three illustrations constitute 
subsidies. In addition to these four types of subsidies, 
any form of income or price support in the sense of 
Article XVI of the GATT 1994 is deemed a subsidy.
These illustrations are examples of the formal 
transactions which constitute subsidies according to 
the Agreement, and do not relate to the purpose for 
which these forms of assistance are granted. The purpose 
of a measure is relevant only for classifying a subsidy 
as prohibited, actionable or non-actionable.
These measures do not fall within the scope of the 
agreement unless they satisfy two additional 
requirements. First, they must confer a benefit on a 
recipient and, second, they must be specific within the 
meaning of Article 2 of the Agreement.
(2) Financial Contribution/Transfer of 
a Benefit
Article 1(b) of the Second Subsidies Agreement requires 
that a benefit must be conferred upon a recipient before 
financial assistance qualifies as a subsidy for the 
purpose of the Agreement. The existence of a benefit is 
the sine qua non of a regulated subsidy, since the 
rationale for disciplining subsidies is the artificial 
competitive advantage that such assistance confers on 
the beneficiary. However, unlike the related provisions 
for assessing the quantum of a subsidy for the purposes 
of defining serious prejudice under Article 6(1)(a), the 
Agreement does not provide means to quantify a subsidy. 
Obviously, where the subsidy takes the form of a direct 
grant, it is relatively simple to quantify the benefit. 
Equally, the benefit of a tax credit can be ascertained 
by means of a simple calculation. But loan guarantees.
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for example, cause greater problems because of the 
difficulties of calculating the cost for providing the 
service.
The requirement that a benefit is bestowed by the 
subsidy does not indicate whether the benefit is to be 
calculated on the basis of the value to the recipient or 
the cost to the government.*** Since there is no 
reference in the provision to the 'cost' of a programme, 
a strong case may be made supporting the proposition 
that the cost to the government is not the critical 
consideration.*** It is more likely that this 
requirement will be construed to mean that a commercial 
enterprise must be in a more advantageous economic 
position compared to its situation prior to the grant of 
the benefit.
(3) The Specificity Standard
The origins of the specificity test, as it applies to 
the differentiation between actionable and non- 
actionable subsidies, lies in the administration of 
United States countervailing legislation.*** 
Nevertheless, since its conception, the principle has 
been increasingly embraced by other GATT contracting
*** Submissions bv the European Communitv on the 
Elements of the Negotiating Framework [hereinafter the 
European Community Submissions], GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG/W/31, 4-5 (1990).
*** See J.H. Jackson, The World Trading Svstem: Law 
and Policy of International Economic Relations (1989), 
264-265.
*** The specificity test was first applied by the United States in the Certain Steel Products from Belgium 
Case. Appendix 4, 47 Federal Register 39,304 (1982). See 
also Cabot Corporation v United states 620 F. Supp. 722 
(1986). :
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parties, including the European Union.**® The Union has 
in fact been an enthusiastic convert to the standard, 
and during the Uruguay Round discussions, actively 
promoted the need for such a test to distinguish between 
general measures designed to stimulate economic activity 
as a whole and specific programmes that are designed to 
assist identifiable beneficiaries.**® This would, of 
course, assist the European Union to protect most Union- 
wide programmes of assistance.
The fundamental purpose of the specificity test is to 
isolate those practices which are prohibited or 
actionable under the Agreement from those which, 
although qualifying as subsidies in terms of Article 1, 
do not fall within the regulatory provisions of the 
Agreement.**® The specificity test does not relate to 
the definition of subsidies per se. but is an additional 
criterion for identifying those subsidies that are 
regulated by the imperative parts of the Agreement.***
In practice, the application of the specificity test is 
confined to distinguishing between specific and non­
specific domestic subsidies, since all export subsidies 
- both direct and indirect - are deemed specific by 
express terms in the Agreement.***
**® See Imports of Sova Meal Originating in Brazil. 
Decision of the European Commission, Decision 85/223, OJ 
L/106/19 (1985); and Fediol v EC Commission. Case 188/85
[1988] ECR 4193.
**® Communication from the Permanent Representative 
of the European Communitv to the Director-General. GATT 
Doc. MTN.TNC/W/36 (1990).
250 Article 1(2), Second Subsidies Code.
*** Namely, Parts II, III and V of the Second 
Subsidies Code.
*** Article 2(3), Second Subsidies Code. See K. 
Adamantopoulos, "Subsidies in External Trade of the EEC; 
Towards a Stricter Legal Discipline", (1990) 15:6
127
Four rules have been established to assist in the 
determination of whether a domestic subsidy is specific 
to an enterprise or industry, or a group of enterprises 
or industries.
Rule 1: A subsidy is not specific if the government
authority or the legislation introducing or 
maintaining the programme establishes 
objective criteria or conditions governing the 
eligibility for such programmes, provided that 
the eligibility is automatic and these 
criteria and conditions are respected by the 
administering authorities.
Rule 2: Specificity shall not be deemed to exist if a
programme which is prima facie discretionary 
has in fact been administered in such a 
fashion as not to limit access to the subsidy 
to certain enterprises nor to award amounts of 
subsidies so as to direct the subsidy to 
particular enterprises.^^
Rule 3: If access to a subsidisation programme is
limited to certain enterprises, either by the 
implementing legislation or the administering 
agency, such a programme is deemed to be 
specific.
European Law Review, 427.
Article 2(1) (b). Second Subsidies Code, In 
addition, the criteria or conditions regulating the 
programme must be set out in law, or must be capable of 
verification.
Article 2(1)(c). Second Subsidies Code. Such an 
assertion must be supported by a clear indication, 
substantiated on the basis of positive evidence, that 
the programme has not in fact been administered in a 
restrictive manner.
Article 2(1) (a). Second Subsidies Code.
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Rule 4; A subsidy which is available to all 
enterprises located within a designated 
geographical region is deemed specific, 
irrespective of the nature of the granting 
authority.^*
In the past, one of the major concerns, certainly of the 
European Union, is that subsidies that are de jure 
generally available may in fact be distributed in a 
selective manner and in effect constitute de facto 
specific subsidies.Both rules one and two recognise 
this possibility and establish anti-circumvention 
provisions that, in the event that a de jure generally 
available subsidy is administered in such a 
discriminatory manner as to constitute a specific 
subsidy, this will be sufficient to identify the subsidy 
in question as specific.
Numerous factors are relevant to establishing the 
existence of de facto specificity, including the degree 
of discretion enjoyed by the administering agency and 
the presence, or absence, or * objective criteria' or 
conditions for exercising this discretion. Objective 
criteria implies standards that are neutral, which do 
not favour particular enterprises, and which are 
economic in nature and horizontal in application. 
Examples of such factors include levels of unemployment, 
average per capita income, the number of employees, and 
the size of individual enterprises.
Article 2(1) (d) , Second Subsidies Code. However, 
this provision is inapplicable to regional subsidies 
which are non-actionable under Article 8 of the 
Agreement. The conditions for differentiating these two 
categories are not expressly stated.
See European Community Submissions, supra note
249, 5.
Interpretative note 1 to Article 2(1) (b) , Second 
Subsidies Code.
___________________________________________________________
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The specificity test does, however, fail to give 
detailed consideration to the problem of the treatment 
of products which have been constructed or manufactured 
from components or inputs that have been manufactured 
with the benefit of subsidies. These 'input* or 
'upstream' subsidies constitute indirect forms of 
financial assistance to finished products, and create 
problems when the final product enters the international 
market.^* Should the specificity test apply to the 
final product as well as the component product, or 
should products that have merely indirectly, and even 
unintentionally, benefitted from such assistance be 
exempt from the scope of the test? The Code itself is 
silent on this matter, although logic suggests that 
action should only be taken against products on which a 
demonstrable specific subsidy has been conferred.
A related matter is the issue of the pricing of natural 
resources, particularly fuels. Many countries provide 
natural resources to their own domestic industries at 
prices lower than those made available, if ever, to 
foreign industries or purchasers. For example, in 1982, 
the Mexican government used its nationalised oil 
industry to sell carbon black feed-stock to Mexican 
producers of carbon black at a fraction of the world 
p r i c e . M e x i c a n  producers could therefore sell their 
final product at a substantially reduced price, thereby 
undercutting foreign competition.^' Frequently, natural 
resources are maintained at a low price for domestic
See generally, S-L. Hsu, "Input Dumping and 
Upstream Subsidies: Trade Loopholes Which Need Closing", 
(1986) 25 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 137.
260 This issue was considered in Cabot Corporation v 
United States, 620 F.Supp 722 (1985).
See J.M. Bradham, "The Natural Resources Subsidy 
Bills: Should They Be Adopted?", (1987) 20 Cornell Int'l 
Law Journal, 197.
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producers to provide indirect assistance. Such 
subsidisation benefits both domestic producers and 
exported goods. How does the specificity test handle 
products that have benefitted for such advantages 
without specific provisions?
(4) Assessment of the Viability of the Subsidy 
Definition
The definition of subsidy contained in the Second 
Subsidy Code is no doubt a considerable improvement on 
the pre-existing situation. The absence of a definition 
naturally retarded the ability of the Subsidies 
Committee in the progressive interpretation of the 
international rules relating to subsidies.
At the same time, the definition itself and its related 
provisions are neither unambiguous nor completely 
precise. For example, the definition does not answer the 
question whether or not a failure or an omission on the 
part of a government to regulate a particular activity 
would constitute a subsidy for the purposes of the 
Agreement. If, for example, one state refuses to 
impose minimum standards of acceptable pollution 
control, while all others enter into an international 
obligation to do so, is the failure to regulate the 
country's industries a subsidy conferring a competitive 
advantage to domestic producers?^*^
Similarly, is the failure of a government to impose 
minimum safety, employment conditions, social security
See K.S. Komoroski, "The Failure of Governments 
to Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under the GATT?", (1988) 
10:2 Houston Journal Int'l Law, 189.
See T.K. Plofchou, "Recognising and 
Countervailing Environmental Subsidies", (1992) 26 Int'l 
Lawyer 763.
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benefits, or minimum wage conditions, a subsidy? 
Clearly, from the definition provided, it would be 
difficult to establish that such omissions satisfied the 
test of specificity.
(C) The New Restraints on Subsidies Under the Second 
Subsidies Agreement
Fortunately the new Agreement abandons many of the 
artificial distinctions which served to retard the 
proper functioning of the regime established under the 
1979 Subsidies Code. The distinction between domestic 
and export subsidies is continued, but it no longer 
serves a pivotal role in the new order. Similarly, the 
distinction between export subsidies on primary products 
and non-primary products passes into history.
Instead, a more workable formula has been proposed 
whereby subsidies are classified, according to their 
form or effect, into one of three categories: prohibited 
subsidies, actionable subsidies, and non-actionable 
subsidies. This classification creates three 
distinguishable 'baskets' of subsidies and is more 
generally known as the 'red, yellow and green light* 
approach.^
Prohibited subsidies are subsidies that cause 
international concern and in addition to being the 
subjects of prohibitions on use also justify the 
imposition of countervailing duties (red light). 
Actionable subsidies are subsidies that cause 
international concern only when they produce certain 
economic effects, such as serious prejudice or
See J.H. Jackson, The World Trading System; Law 
and Policy of International Economic Relations (1989), 
262.
: Y
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nullification and impairment (yellow light). Finally, 
non-actionable subsidies are subsidies which rarely give 
rise to international apprehension and which do not 
appreciably distort the natural patterns of 
international trade (green light)
Naturally, the success or failure of this scheme depends 
on whether the international community is able to agree 
on the classification of the broad spectrum of subsidies 
that exist in international trade. Indeed, at present, 
there is no consensus as regards the classification of 
subsidisation practices.
Separate remedies have been provided for complaints 
alleging each of these three different types of 
subsidies. These remedies are graduated in intensity 
depending on the seriousness of the alleged practice. 
But on the whole, the Agreement maintains the theme of 
requiring signatories to engage in consultations prior 
to dispute resolution, although stricter time limits 
have been placed on these efforts.
(1) Prohibited subsidies
Two types of subsidies are prohibited by Article 3(1) of 
the Agreement. These are:
(a) Subsidies contingent, in law or in fact 
whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon export performance, including 
those enumerated in the illustrative list of 
export subsidies; and
(b) Subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one
See generaly, G. Klienfeld & D. Kaye, "Red Light, 
Green Light? The 1994 Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duty Measures, Research and Development Assistance and U.S. Policy", (1994) 28:6 JWT 43.
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of several other conditions, on a preference 
for domestic goods over domestic goods.
Signatories are absolutely prohibited from granting 
subsidies which fall within the scope of either of these 
rules.
The relationship between the prohibition of Article 
3(1)(a) and practices that are specifically excluded in 
the illustrative list from being export subsidies is 
clarified by an interpretative note which declares that 
measures referred to in the list as not constituting 
export subsidies are not prohibited under Article 3.2*?
Article 3(1)(a) of the Agreement is the counterpart 
provision of Article 9 of the 1979 Subsidies Code. The 
prohibition applies to all export subsidies - on both 
agricultural products and non-agricultural (ie. 
manufactured) products - if they confer a benefit to a 
firm or industry contingent on export performance.
The provision also distinguishes between de iure and de 
facto export subsidies. A de jure export subsidy occurs 
when a signatory enacts legislation or regulations 
specifically intended to confer a subsidy. A de facto 
export subsidy is created when the legislation or 
regulation under which the programme is maintained was 
not prima facie designed to confer an export subsidy, 
but which has this effect when the legislation is 
implemented or administered in a particular manner.^*
266 Article 3(2), Second Subsidies Code.
Interpretative Note 2, Article 3(1) (a). Second Subsidies Code.
Numerous examples of the distinction between de 
jure and de facto non-tariff barriers exist in the 
jurisprudence of GATT panels. An example of a de jure 
non-tariff barrier is the enactment of standards for the
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The extension of the prohibition to government practices 
that are in fact subsidies is an anti-circumvention
device designed to discourage the introduction of 
disguised export subsidies and therefore promotes the 
principle of transparency.
Unfortunately, the Agreement does not establish clear 
guidelines for identifying de facto export subsidies. In 
its submissions during the negotiation of the Agreement, 
the European Union offered the following proposal:
"De facto export subsidies are those where 
facts which are known - or should clearly have 
been known - to the government when granting
the subsidy demonstrate that the subsidy,
without having been made expressly contingent 
upon export performance, was indeed intended 
to increase exports"^*
But, introducing the element of intention on the part of 
governments conferring subsidies would itself require 
placing reliance on uncertain and indeterminate factors. 
The process would involve imputing intentions to
governments which may differ from the stated intentions 
of the same authorities, given either in public or when
manufacturing or sale of products intended to 
discriminate between foreign and domestic goods contrary 
to Article III of the GATT; Canadian Import, 
Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks bv Provincial 
Marketing Agencies. BISD, 35th Supplement, 37 (1989). In 
contrast, an example of a de facto non-tariff barrier is where, without express statutory authority, a government 
agency adopts a policy of requiring foreign companies to 
purchase minimum quantities of domestic goods in order 
to secure permission for direct investment; Canadian 
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, 
BISD, 30th Supplement, 140 (1984).
Elements of the Negotiating Framework. 
Submissions by the European Community. GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NGlO/W/31 (November 1989).
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notifying a programme to the Subsidies Committee under 
the notification obligation. This would inevitably 
foster diplomatic tension and ill-will.
A more constructive proposal would be to place greater 
emphasis on the factual circumstances surrounding the 
administration and application of the programme. 
Evidence of a de facto subsidy could include, for 
example, increases in the volume of exports attributable 
to the programme, the proportion of production exported 
by recipient undertakings, the eligibility criteria upon 
which the subsidy was administered, the existence of 
conditions relating to export performance and the 
policies pursued by the administering agencies.
Article 3(1)(b) of the Code addresses the problem of 
programmes that perpetuate or increase discrimination 
between imported and domestic products. It will be 
recalled that Article 111(4) of the GATT requires that 
contracting parties shall accord 'treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. ' 
However, this otherwise comprehensive obligation is 
subject to the proviso that it 'shall not prevent the 
payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic 
producers'.^™ The terms of Article 3(1)(b) appears to 
be an attempt to close this loophole as far as subsidies 
which favour domestic products over imported products is 
concerned.
Yet it is unclear how much further this provision 
extends the existing obligations of the contracting 
parties under the terms of the GATT, particularly in
270 Article Ill(b), GATT.
__________________________________________ ___
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light of recent panel decisions. In two cases, domestic 
subsidies which favoured nationally-produced goods over 
imports were held contrary to the general obligations of 
the GATT.
A proposal from the U.S. delegation to clarify which 
domestic subsidies would be subject to the prohibition 
was rejected by the negotiating group on subsidies. The 
United States had proposed to identify such subsidies by 
form and suggested the following list; grants to cover 
operating losses by businesses; the direct forgiveness 
of debt; loans at subsidised rates; the provision of 
equity capital where the expected rate of return was 
negative; subsidised loan guarantee programmes; and 
subsidies contingent upon production performance.The 
adoption of this proposal would have facilitated 
identification of prohibited domestic subsidies by form. 
But it was rejected by those delegations emphasising the 
importance of domestic subsidies in the development of 
national economies.
Whenever a signatory believes that a prohibited subsidy 
is being granted or maintained by another signatory, 
that signatory may request consultations which are to be 
held as quickly as p o s s i b l e . The purpose of these 
consultations is to clarify the facts of the situation 
and to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution to the 
problem. The signatories have thirty days to reach a 
settlement through consultations, after which either
European Communitv - Production Aids Granted on 
Canned Peaches. Canned Pears. Canned Fruit Cocktail and 
Dried Grapes, GATT Doc. L/5778 (1985), not yet reported. 
See also the earlier panel report in Italian 
Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery  ^
BISD, 7th Supplement 60 (1959).
GATT Focus No. 75, 9 (October 1990).
Article 4(1), Second Subsidies Code.
137
party may refer the matter to the Committee on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures for review.
If the matter is referred to the Committee on Subsidies, 
that body is authorised to conduct a review of the 
evidence presented to support the allegation of the use 
of a prohibited subsidy, but must provide an opportunity 
to the accused signatory to explain the measure in terms 
of the Code. In deciding whether or not a measures is a 
prohibited subsidy, the Committee on Subsidies may refer 
the matter to the Permanent Group of Experts which is 
instructed to review the matter and to report back to 
the Committee on Subsidies.
In the event that an affirmative decision is rendered on 
the issue of prohibited subsidy, the Committee is 
empowered to 'recommend* that the subsidising signatory 
immediately withdraw the offending subsidy.^* 
Signatories found to be indulging in the use of 
prohibited subsidies are obliged to 'promptly comply 
with the recommendation'. If the signatory fails to 
comply with the recommendation, the Committee can 
authorise any signatory affected by the offending 
subsidy to take appropriate countermeasures. It will be 
interesting to see how willing the Committee is to 
authorise this ultimate sanction.
(2) Actionable Subsidies
A subsidy is actionable if it produces adverse effects 
to the interests of other signatories. Actionable 
subsidies are not therefore defined according to either 
their purpose or form. Article 5 of the Agreement 
instructs signatories to refrain from causing, through 
the use of a regulated subsidy, 'adverse effects' to the
274 Article 4(6), Second Subsidies Code.
______________________________________________________________
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interests to another signatory. Three examples of 
adverse effects are provided:
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another 
signatory;
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits 
accruing directly or indirectly to other 
signatories under the GATT, including, in 
particular, the benefits of concessions bound 
under Article II of the GATT; and
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another 
signatory.
Each of these concepts is elaborated upon, to a certain 
degree, in the Agreement with varying degrees of 
specification and precision.
Injury to the domestic industry of another signatory is 
defined as 'material injury to a domestic industry, 
threat of material injury to a domestic industry, or 
material retardation of the establishment of such an 
industry', and is to be interpreted in accordance with 
Article 15 of the Agreement. The transposition of the 
concept of material injury from the regime governing the 
application of national countervailing measures was a 
principle supported mainly by the European U n i o n . T h e  
belief was that the concept should be developed in the 
subsequent jurisprudence of the GATT, and that the 
failure of such a development in the past was more 
attributable to the defects of the dispute settlement 
procedures than a flaw in the concept itself.
The concept of nullification or impairment of benefits
Interpretative Note 1 to Article 5, Second 
Subsidies Code.
See European Communitv Submissions, supra note
245, 7.
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under the GATT is, of course, not new to GATT regulatory 
structures.^? While Article 5(b) specifically alludes 
to nullification or impairment of benefits under Article 
II of the GATT, this effect could, in theory, be caused 
by eroding any of the benefits negotiated under the 
GATT, including the obligations relating to the 
reduction on non-tariff barriers. The nullification or 
impairment standard is generally recognised as ambiguous 
and has been the subject of considerable criticism.^*
In contrast to both these, the principle of 'serious 
prejudice' has been defined in considerable detail in 
the Agreement which suggests that this principle will 
play a more active role in the identification of adverse 
effects than the two other standards.??®
The remedies prescribed by the Subsidies Agreement for 
redress against actionable subsidies are broadly similar 
to those established to counter prohibited subsidies. 
First, the parties concerned are required to engage in 
consultations.?™ Any request for consultations must 
include a statement outlining any available evidence to 
support the existence of an actionable subsidy, as well 
as proof of injury, nullification or impairment, or 
serious prejudice. Second, if a mutually acceptable 
solution has not been achieved through consultations 
within sixty days, the matter may be referred to the
??? See Australian Ammonium Sulphate Case, BISD, Vol. 
II, 188 (1952), and more recently, European Community - 
Production Aids Granted on Canned Fruits. GATT Doc. 
L/5778 (1985), not yet reported.
??® See R.E. Hudec, "Regulation of Domestic Subsidies 
Under the MTN Subsidies Code", in D. Wallace, Legal 
Treatment of Domestic Subsidies (1984), 1-18.
??® Articles 6(1) and Annex IV, Second Subsidies
Code.
?™ Article 7(1), Second Subsidies Code.
___________________
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Subsidies Committee.?*' However, there are no detailed 
provisions in the Code specifying the procedure which 
the Committee is to adopt for deciding that actionable 
subsidies exist.
If the Committee determines that a subsidy has resulted 
in adverse effects to the interests of another signatory 
within the meaning of Article 5, the signatory granting 
or maintaining the subsidy is required to take 
•appropriate steps' to remove the offending subsidy.?*? 
If no such steps are taken within the prescribed 
period?*^, and in the absence of agreement on 
compensation, the Committee may authorise the affected 
party to take 'countermeasures', commensurate with the 
degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to 
exist.
Although no elaboration on the concept of 
countermeasures is made in the Agreement, it is 
reasonable to assume that such action will take the form 
of retaliation by way of the suspension of concessions 
granted. The major guiding principle is that 
countermeasures must remain in proportion to the 
original offence.
(3) Non-actionable Subsidies
The primary reason for classifying certain types of 
domestic subsidies as non-actionable is because often 
such practices do not distort international trade, or 
because their effects, if any, are so negligible as to 
be insignificant. If the effects of a programme are 
minimal, naturally the injury that it will cause is
?*' Articles 7(4) and 7(5), Second Subsidies Code. 
?*? Article 7(6), Second Subsidies Code.
283 Presently set at six months.
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nominal. However, of course the main problem in defining 
non-actionable subsidies is to separate subsidies that 
cause harm from those that do not, and to derive 
acceptable general principles for implementing rules 
based on this rationale.
Article 8(1) of the Agreement is of such significant 
importance in this connection as to warrant 
reproduction;
"Signatories agree that the following shall be 
considered non-actionable:
(a) subsidies which are, within the meaning of 
Article 2, de jure generally available and 
which are not deemed to be specific in fact;
(b) subsidies which are specific within the 
meaning of Article 2 but which meet all of the 
conditions provided [for exemption]."
This scheme clearly envisages two categories of non- 
actionable subsidies: (a) generally available, or non­
specific, domestic subsidies; and (b) domestic subsidies 
that are specific, but which satisfy the conditions 
expressly provided for exemption.
(a) Subsidies outside the scope of the 
definition provided in the Agreement
Naturally, measures which fail to satisfy the conditions 
established in Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement for 
identifying regulated subsidies, for example, because a 
practice does not involve a financial contribution from 
a public source, do not fall within its scope and are 
not considered to fall within any of the three 
categories, including non-actionable subsidies. Action 
on the part of public authorities which does not involve
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the expenditure of public funds or a charge to the 
public account cannot be considered subsidies and 
therefore a fortiori cannot be subject to the 
disciplines set out in the Agreement.
Similarly, if a measure is a non-trade related 
government activity, it is unlikely that it will qualify 
as a specific subsidy for the purpose of Article 2, Such 
measures are frequently of a general nature and concern, 
for example, education, culture, health, social welfare 
and the general infrastructure of a state. Action taken 
in these fields may have an indirect effect on the 
economy of a country, and ultimately on the 
international economy, but they are not regulated 
subsidies because they merely contribute to setting the 
framework for a nation's economic and business 
environment. They do not directly affect the competitive 
position of firms.
(b) Exempt Non-actionable specific subsidies
Specific domestic subsidies are deemed to be non- 
actionable if they have been granted for any one of four 
purposes: to assist research and development; to
facilitate structural adjustment; to encourage the 
adaptation of existing facilities to stricter 
environmental protection standards; and to provide 
assistance to disadvantaged regions.?*^ Individual and 
rigorous conditions are specified in the agreement to 
regulate each of these exemptions.
284 Article 8(2), Second Subsidies Code.
143
(5) Evaluation and Assessment of the Second Subsidies 
Agreement
The most difficult area, which is also extremely 
complex, is the relationship between the Second 
Subsidies Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture,?*^ 
The Agriculture Agreement distinguishes between 
'domestic support commitments' (essentially domestic 
subsidies) and 'export subsidy commitments'(essentially 
export subsidies) ,?*® Parties to the Agreement are 
required to reduce their domestic support commitments in 
favour of agricultural producers in accordance with a 
schedule negotiated as an Annex to the Agreement. The 
commitments are expressed in terms of Total Aggregate 
Measurements of Support?*? and Annual and Final Bound 
Commitment Levels. For both the United States and the 
European Union the commitment is to a reduction of 20% 
of each agricultural product falling within the terms of 
the Agreement over a period of six years.
The Agreement on Agriculture then goes on to regulate 
agricultural export subsidies. The regulated export 
subsidies are specified in the Agreement without any 
reference to the Annex to the Second Subsidies Code 
which defines export subsidies and quite clearly is not 
as exhaustive as the Annex itself.?** In other words.
?*^ Agreement on Agriculture. GATT Doc. MTN/FA II AlA-3 (December 1993).
286 Articles 6 and 9, Agreement on Agriculture.
?*? Aggregate Measurement of Support is defined as 
'the annual level of support, expressed in monetary 
terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of 
the producers of the basic agricultural 
Article 1(a), Agreement on Agriculture. product';
288 The Agreement defines the following as export 
subsidies; (a) the provision by governments or their 
agencies of direct subsidies, including payments-in- 
kind, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural
•-V.. _______ ___ ______________
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agricultural export subsidies not caught under the 
Agricultural Agreement will be regulated by the Second 
Subsidies Code which is an unsatisfactory position. 
Again each party has a schedule containing an annex 
which quantified the maximum permissable levels of 
export subsidies each year. For both the United States 
and the European Union export subsidies are to be 
reduced by 36% over a six-year period and the actual 
volume of subsidised exports by 21% over the same 
period.
From this analysis, it is clear that agricultural export 
subsidies clearly fall into the prohibited category, but 
once the reductions are complete, it appears that they 
will remain in this category even although a 
considerable volume of export subsidisation will 
continue to exist. In some ways, therefore, the 
Agreement on Agriculture legitimises these subsidies 
whereas the Second Subsidies Code would prohibit them. 
This cross-over problem has placed these subsidies in a 
twilight area of regulation which will eventually lead
product, to a co-operative or other association of 
producers, or to a marketing board, contingent on export 
performance; (b) the sale or disposal for export by 
governments or their agencies of non-commercial stocks 
of agricultural products as a price lower than the 
comparable price charged for the like product to buyers 
in the domestic market; (c) payments on the export of an 
agricultural product that are financed by virtue of 
government action, whether or not a charge on the public 
account is involved, including payments that are 
financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the 
agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural 
product from which the exported product is derived.; (d) 
the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of 
marketing exports of agricultural products including 
handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the 
costs of international transport and freight; (e) 
internal transport and freight charges on export 
shipments, provided or mandated by governments, on terms 
more favourable than for domestic shipments; and (f) 
subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their 
incorporation in exported products.
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to de facto recognition of their legitimacy.
The problems regarding domestic subsidies have been 
alluded to earlier but the Agriculture Agreement also 
legitimises those domestic subsidies which might have 
otherwise fallen into the actionable category. Quite 
clearly the result is confusing. The failure to link the 
two Agreements is the cause of this problem and this 
failure may eventually appear as a crack in the 
structure.
A number of technical deficiencies will also plague the 
operation of the Agreement. First, the Subsidies 
Committee, or a subsidiary organ, should have been given 
explicit authority to elaborate on the existing 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, particularly in 
light of the modern developments in this sphere. Second, 
the product coverage of the Agreement remains to be 
decided, taking into consideration other work being 
carried out in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Third, no 
general de minimus rule has been established, below 
which the effect of a subsidy may be deemed non- 
actionable.
However, the main technical source of contention is the 
types of subsidies which will be included in the so- 
called 'green box' and which will therefore be non- 
actionable. There is little doubt that this issue has 
not been satisfactory resolved and the vagueness of the 
category has allowed both the European Union and the 
United States to take unilateral interpretations of this 
category.
The European Union vigorously lobbied for direct 
payments to its farming community to be placed in this 
category. The position of these negotiators was that
■jut
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such assistance did not distort trade.?*® Only if this 
proposal was accepted could the European Union introduce 
the necessary cuts in its farm price support system 
through which it could meet the targets for dismantling 
subsidies agreed in the Agriculture Negotiation Group. 
However, the Agreement does not expressly confirm that 
this position was accepted by the other parties.
(6) Observations
From a global perspective, there are a number of genuine 
grounds why rules regulating subsidies are desirable. It 
was legitimate that certain states, including the United 
States, has reacted to the waste of global resources 
which accompanied the proliferation of subsidies which 
served little social or economic purpose. The gross 
excesses of production, particularly in agricultural 
products, penalised developing countries which have a 
legitimate expectation in the establishment of an 
equitable environment for conducting trade.
At the same time, the motives of countries supporting 
the reduction of levels of subsidisation were not 
altruistic. Their negotiating positions were extensions 
of their domestic policies and were designed to achieve 
political objectives. No developed state advocated the 
reduction of subsidies for the benefit of developing 
countries. In fact, in much of the negotiations, the 
predicament of developing states was largely ignored and 
their delegations excluded from the negotiations.
More fundamentally, perhaps, rules of international law 
must be based on a minimum degree of consensus. If 
states cannot reach this minimum consensus, the result
?*® European Commission, Press Briefing. January 16,1992 .
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will be an ineffective rule. In other words, the
subjects of the legal system must at least passively
acknowledge or agree that compliance with the rule is in 
their long-term strategic interests. This provides the 
primary motivation for abiding by the terms of the rule.
The evolution of the international rules for the use of 
subsidies, at least until the Second Subsidies
Agreement, illustrates that this consensus was non­
existent. The rules contained in the 1979 Subsidies Code 
embodied too much compromise and not enough genuine 
agreement among the parties. The United States, on the 
one hand, clearly believed that the rules could be 
employed to attack subsidisation policies of many 
states, most notably the European Union, when these were 
not in line with its perception of proper forms of 
international behaviour. The European Union on the other 
hand entered into negotiations with the overall 
objective of diluting the ability of other states to 
attack its subsidisation policies. It was therefore no 
surprise that the 1979 rules fragmented within a few 
years of their coming into effect.
It was also a mistake to base international rules 
regulating subsidies on economic theory. Such an 
approach ignored the profound non-economic interests
which remain a legitimate factor in this formulation. It 
was highly unlikely that a state would be willing to 
abandon a proposed programme of financial assistance 
when national interests were involved solely in 
deference to international rules. Quite simply, the 
degree of compunction imposed by such a body of rules 
was insufficient to override the pressures imposed from 
inside that state by the various diverse national 
interest groups and even the government itself to grant 
such assistance.
Î
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The failure of the Subsidies Code 1979 at the technical 
level can also be attributed to the artificial nature of 
the concepts on which its principles were based. For 
example, the distinction between export and import 
subsidies and between agricultural and industrial 
subsidies cannot be implemented without effective 
guidelines to classify a particular programme into a 
specific category. The result was that there was always 
grey areas between these categories.
Similarly, the non-actionable/actionable/prohibited 
classification being introduced by the Second Subsidies 
Agreement was a primary weakness in this structure. 
There were insufficient rules to categorise particular 
programmes into each of these baskets. This situation 
was not alleviated by an effective organisational 
structure to develop rules over time to classify these 
programmes. This forum became a battle ground for a 
number of developed states. It was here that we saw the 
fragmentation of the system when there existed no 
international consensus underpinning the formulation of 
the rules.
On the other hand, the ditching of the various 
unworkable formula contained in the 1979 Code is to be 
welcomed in the Second Subsidies Agreement. For example, 
the 1979 Code relied too heavily on the archaic concept 
of nullification and impairment. This formulation was 
never effective and substantially contributed to the 
'soft law' perception of the GATT. It is welcome that 
the new Agreement moves away from these vague notions to 
a more black and white legalistic model since it is a 
necessary quality in an effective rule that there is a 
distinction between legal and illegal conduct. Certainly 
the Second Subsidies Agreement formulations improve on 
the pre-existing structure; the question remains whether 
or not these improvements are enough.
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It is also a welcome development that the concept of 
subsidy itself has been more clearly defined in the 
Second Subsidies Agreement. This was a recurring 
deficiency in the regulation of subsidies since the 
conception of the GATT. It has been a factor which has 
allowed the system to be opened to ridicule. At the same 
time, the specificity standard will be a critical aspect 
in the functioning of an effective definition of 
subsidies. The present writer has reservations as to 
whether or not the rules as formulated in the Second 
Subsidies Code will be sufficient to allow the proper 
identification of specificity.
It must also be questioned whether or not the 
international community has learned from the problems in 
the resolution of disputes which emerged in the very 
early stages of the operation of the 1979 Code. The 
panel process should have been abandoned in favour of 
direct arbitration or adjudication and failure to have 
done so will have consequences in the future. The 
desirability too of having a more effective enforcement 
mechanism is obvious.
The litmus test of the effectiveness of the new rules 
can be judged when we turn to examine at a later stage 
the internal decision-making processes within the United 
States and the European Union. If, for example, the 
European Union decides that the formulation of the 
future Common Agricultural Policy will be determined 
with a view to adhering to the new international rules 
then this would be an overwhelming endorsement of these 
rules. Conversely, if the European Union is bombarded by 
complaints to reform the CAP by states such as the 
United States or the Cairns Group, we shall quickly see 
a revulsion manifested by the European Union for future 
compliance with the international rules. The same 
perspective can be applied to industrial subsidies such
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as those in ship-building and aerospace sectors.
If the new Subsidies Code is effective, we shall see a 
progressive change in patterns of subsidisation from the 
use of illegal measures introduced without reference to 
the international rules towards more carefully 
formulated policies drafted in terms of the 
international rules. This may not necessary mean a 
progressive reduction in the present global levels of 
subsidies but rather a trend towards the use of domestic 
subsidies instead of export subsidies.
The Negotiation of International Restraints on 
Measures of Administered Protectionism
One of the most important observations from the last 
chapter was that international rules appear to increase 
in normative efficacy in proportion to the degree of 
consensus underpinning the content of such rules. This 
consensus materialises as a consequence of a perception 
of mutual or reciprocal benefit among the states 
formulating the rule. Unfortunately, when the 
international restraints on measures of administered 
protectionism are reviewed it is apparent that this 
consensus evaporates especially when the interests of 
the United States and the European Union conflict. Why 
this phenomenon occurs will be examined in detail in 
this chapter.
In this chapter three specific questions will be 
addressed. To what degree have effective international 
disciplines to regulate this type of behaviour been 
negotiated? What has been the influence of the United 
States and the European Union in the negotiation of 
these rules? How effective are these rules at 
restraining unilateral interpretations and applications 
by the United States and the European Union of their 
terms?
Measures of administered protection consist of national 
laws and regulations which allow domestic producers to 
seek protection from the effects of foreign competition 
by establishing procedures which permit national 
officials to grant relief against foreign imports, 
generally in the form of temporary increased duties. The 
GATT expressly permits mechanisms of administered 
protection to counter dumping and to neutralise foreign 
subsidies.?®® These two forms of protection provide
290 Article VI, General Agreement.
___
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relief against certain trading practices on the part of 
foreign manufacturers, producers or exporters.
Although measures of administered protection take 
different guises, and are designed to counter different 
forms of behaviour, they do have a number of important 
features in common. First, they are creatures of
national (or supranational) law and function on the 
basis of national (or supranational) legislative 
authority. Although international rules have, in the 
past, been agreed under the auspices of the GATT to 
limit the most disruptive forms of administered 
protectionism, each of these devices is applied by 
national officials and is primarily subject to review by 
national or supranational courts.
Of course, any over-compensation in the application of 
these measures attributable either to the illegal 
application of these measures (ie. in a manner not in
conformity with the international standards) or the
liberal provision of relief, would penalise foreign 
producers and manufacturers. It is this discrimination 
that raises the spectre of the prejudicial application 
of administered protection.
Second, these measures influence the behaviour of
foreign manufacturers or producers either by 
neutralising any competitive advantage which might have 
accrued or by requiring them to refrain from certain 
practices.
Third, each of these measures can be directed against a 
specific country, product, or even, under certain 
circumstances, against a single foreign producer. Thus, 
administered protection allows states to circumvent the 
general prohibitions against national discrimination
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contained in many GATT provisions These measures are 
ideal for private companies to harass foreign 
competitors a fact which has even been acknowledged in 
governmental circles. For example, a recent report by 
the U.S. Congressional Budget Office concluded:
'Many of the legal provisions and procedures that 
have evolved (in anti-dumping and subsidy laws) - 
especially those used for calculating dumping 
margins - are biased against foreign exporters and 
against U.S. consumers of foreign goods,
Finally, and most significantly, all forms of 
administered protection involve the pursuit of 
unilateral solutions to international problems at the 
expense of the multilateral dispute resolution 
processes. Seeking unilateral solutions to trade 
problems is fundamentally inconsistent with both the 
spirit and many of the principles of the GATT which is 
designed to encourage the use of multilateral trade 
diplomacy and, when the states involved are the United 
States and the European Union, places the international 
trading system under immense pressures.
The scope and volume of instances where administered 
protection has been granted, especially in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, strongly suggest that these devices now 
play a significant role in influencing the shape and 
content of United States and European Union trade
C.H. Nam, "Export-Promoting Subsidies, 
Countervailing Threats and the GATT", (1987) 1:4 World Bank Economic Review, 727,
U.S. Congressional Office, Report on Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duty Laws (June 1994), 5.
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p o l i c y . T h e  number of petitions lodged in the United 
States and the European Union seeking such protection is 
prima facie powerful evidence that commercial 
transactions are now substantially affected by such 
measures.^
Throughout the 1970s, the United States was the 
principal protagonist of the development and use of 
measures of administered protection. While American 
anti-dumping and countervailing legislation predates 
the coming into force of the GATT, investigations were 
infrequently conducted into practices alleged to violate 
these rules prior to 1 9 7 0 In contrast, since the 
late 1970s, there has been a progressive increase in the 
use of such measures - particularly anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty actions. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
use of such mechanisms has become commonplace.^^
The European Union has in fact followed a parallel 
course and since the early 1980s has increasingly 
resorted to administered protection - particularly anti­
dumping actions - as a means of limiting imports. 
However, the use of anti-subsidy measures by the Union
See J.M. Finger & J. Nogues, "International 
Control of Subsidies and Countervailing Duties", (1987) 
1:4 World Bank Economic Review, 707,
Substantial evidence supporting this proposition 
has existed since the early 1980s, See J.M. Finger, H.K. 
Hall & D.R. Nelson, "The Political Economy of 
Administered Protection", (1982) 72 American Economic
Review, 452.
See E.B. Butler, "Countervailing Duties and 
Export Subsidisation: A Reemerging Issue", (1968) 9
Virginia Journal of International Law, 82; and for 
earlier, P.D. Ehrenhaft, "Protection Against 
International Price Discrimination: United States
Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties", (1958) 58Columbia Law Review, 44.
P. Van Phi, "A European View of the GATT", (1986) 
Int'l Business Lawyer 152.
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has been considerably more restrained compared to 
similar action by the United States.
In reality, the phenomenal growth in the number of anti­
dumping investigations initiated by developed states 
poses a greater problem to international trade than the 
growth in countervailing duties. Unlike countervailing 
duties, in which the United States is the greatest 
advocate, there is a greater proliferation in the 
adoption of anti-dumping measures by countries such as 
Australia and Canada as well as the European Union.
For example, between July 1991 and June 1992, the United 
States commenced 45 investigations, while between 
January 1992 and December 1992, the European Union 
opened 39 new cases. However, during the same period 
there were over 200 anti-dumping orders in force in the 
United States and over 150 in the European Union.
Another disturbing phenomenon is that there is also 
substantial evidence that anti-dumping measures are 
being used both by the European Union and the United 
States as a substitute for the legitimate safeguards 
procedure authorised by Article XIX of the GATT.^^® The 
decline in resort to safeguard measures stems from the 
fact that these actions require applicants to establish 
serious injury while anti-dumping actions require the 
lesser standard of material injury.^^ Since material 
injury is easier to prove, there has been a noticeable 
shift in applications from safeguard actions to anti­
dumping actions.
Annual Report of the Anti-Dumping Committee. GATT 
BISD, 38th Supplement 297, 301 (1993).
298 See J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (1989), 44-53.
B.M. Hoekman & M.P. Leidy, "Dumping, Anti-Dumping and Emergency Protection", (1989) 23:5 JWT 27.
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Further, there is little doubt that the use of anti­
dumping measures has become a serious threat to the 
continued process of trade liberalisation and 
international attempts to arrest this growth have been 
relatively ineffective. It seems pointless to continue 
the process of binding tariffs and reducing tariff 
levels if the liberalisation being brought about by such 
reductions is being undermined by allowing states to 
unilaterally impose additional tariffs in the form of 
anti-dumping duties.
But the trade distorting effect of measures of 
administered protection is not confined to the actual 
imposition of duties. Even the very lodging of a 
complaint requesting measures of administered protection 
has a significant harassment effect. Although such 
complaints may eventually be dismissed, the expense of 
answering allegations of subsidies in terms of legal 
expenses, translation costs, costs for analyzing, 
collating and providing the necessary information, means 
that many exporters are deterred from continuing to 
export either because of the uncertainty created by the 
existence of the allegation or because the costs of 
defending the action outweigh any possible profit.
Although it is true that lodging a complaint also incurs 
expense for producers, it is unlikely that these will be 
equal to those incurred by foreign suppliers fighting 
allegations of subsidies. First, generally, imports 
account for a smaller proportion of domestic consumption 
than national production and therefore the additional
300 legal costs alone in defending an allegation 
of anti-dumping in the United States is estimated 
between $60,000 and several million dollars by the GATT 
Secretariat, The average costs in defending such cases 
range from between $151,000 and $553,000; Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism of the United States 1989 (March 1990), 
289.
______
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expense will often be distributed over a greater number 
of production units for domestic firms than foreign 
companies. Second, foreign exporters will generally have 
to instruct lawyers in the country in which the 
allegation is made which, more often than not, requires 
instructions from lawyers in the home country, thereby 
multiplying costs.
At least one study by an economist in this field has 
provided evidence that the econometric identification of 
the element of harassment caused by the lodging of such 
complaints proves that the rate of growth of imports 
into the United States was significantly reduced in the 
case of products that had been subject to contingent 
protection investigations.
(1) The Theoretical Basis for Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Measures and Conceptual 
Problems in Their Application
(A) Anti-Dumping and the Concept of Dumping
The concept of dumping is deceptively straight-forward. 
The Anti-Dumping Code 1979 provides the following 
definition:
"[A] product is to be considered as being dumped, 
ie. introduced into the commerce of another country 
at less than its normal value, if the export price 
of the product exported from one country to 
another, is less than the comparable price, in the
J.M. Finger, "The Industry-Country Incidence of 
Less-Than-Fair Value Case in United States Import 
Trade", (1981) 21:2 Quarterly Review of Economics and
Business, 21.
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ordinary course of trade, for the like product when 
destined for consumption in the exporting country."
If products are deemed to have been dumped, the 
importing state is entitled to impose a duty equal to 
the difference in prices. This is known as an anti­
dumping duty, and is measured in terms of the margin of 
dumping, which is merely the difference in price.^
Dumping has been characterised as an 'unfair commercial 
practice' since the early twentieth century, despite the 
fact that it occurs as a purely private commercial 
phenomenon and that the hand of the state is not present 
in the process. Many economic rationales have been 
advanced to justify counter-measures.^®^ The following 
are the most common justifications for the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties and yet the persuasiveness of none 
of these is compelling.
(1) International price discrimination
A frequently voiced justification for anti-dumping 
measures is that dumping causes price discrimination.^* 
Within a national market, price discrimination occurs 
when suppliers of goods charge different prices to 
different customers for the same goods. For a variety of 
reasons, one customer may be willing to pay more for a 
particular item than another. Suppliers often take 
advantage of this distinction to charge the consumer in
302 Article VI(2), General Agreement.
G. Yarrow, "Economic Aspects of Anti-Dumping 
Policies", (1987) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 66.
®^* This was one of the main arguments adduced by Mr 
Neumann, Director-General DGICl, European Commission, in 
his presentation entitled "The Justification for Anti- 
Dumping", unpublished manuscript, April 1993.
159
greater need more than the consumer who needs the 
products less.
On the other side of the equation, purchasers charged 
higher prices are placed at a disadvantage compared to 
those charged lower prices when the goods are either 
resold or incorporated into another product and then 
sold. At the same time, price discrimination fragments 
markets, a phenomenon discouraged in most states by 
competition or anti-trust law,^ ®^  In the absence of such 
segmentation, a customer could merely purchase the 
products at a lower price and sell them to customers 
prepared to pay the higher price.
Dumping is deemed to cause price discrimination at the 
international level and therefore anti-dumping measures 
are justified to prevent inequitable trading 
conditions.^®** Since this practice is prohibited at the 
national level, the international consensus among 
developed states is that it should be discouraged at the 
international level. ^®^ If producers in one country 
acquire goods at prices less than those paid in another, 
they will acquire a competitive advantage in the 
manufacture or distribution of products incorporating 
those g o o d s . T h e r e  are two main flaws in this 
justification.
®^^ B.S. Fisher, "The Anti-Dumping Law of the United 
States: A Legal and Economic Analysis", (1973) 5 Law & 
Pol'y Int'l Bus., 85-93.
See A.V. Deardorff, "Economic Perspectives on 
Anti-Dumping Law", in J.H. Jackson & E.A. Vermulst, 
Anti-Dumping Law and Practice (1990), 23-39.
®^^ P.D. Ehrenhaft, "Protection Against International 
Price Discrimination: United States Countervailing and 
Anti-Dumping Duties", (1958) 58 Columbia Law Review, 43.
308 M.S. Knoll, "United States Anti-Dumping Law; 
The Case for Reconsideration", (1987) 22 Texas Int'l Law Journal, 265-290.
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First, even within national markets there are rarely 
uniform price levels for specific products.^* Why 
should such market conditions be assumed in the 
international market-place, and in particular between 
importing and exporting countries in anti-dumping 
investigations? Economic analysis suggests that uniform 
pricing of products only exists when four conditions are 
present:
the products are perfectly interchangeable and 
consumers have no reason, other than personal 
preference, to prefer one product over 
another;
there is no large scale purchasing of the 
products in question that could disturb the 
supply and demand relationship for the 
products;
- both buyers and sellers have sufficient 
knowledge of pricing and conditions of sale in 
order to respond quickly to price changes by 
competitors; and
there are no permanent barriers to entry and 
export of the products in question.
Since these conditions rarely, if ever, exist in a 
domestic market, they are unlikely to exist in the 
international market, other than perhaps for trade in 
commodities.
The second major inconsistency is that the country 
imposing the anti-dumping duty is the one that would 
otherwise benefit from the price discrimination.^® It
®^^ J. Hagelstam, "Some Shortcomings of International 
Anti-Dumping Provisions", (1991) 25:5 JWT 99, 100-101.
^^® See M.D. Rowat, "Protectionist Tilts in Anti- 
Dumping Legislation of Developed Countries and the LDC Response", (1990) 24:5 JWT 5.
I
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is the country of origin that would suffer loss as a 
result of its firms dumping goods in foreign markets. If 
a domestic manufacturer sells goods to foreign companies 
at a price less than to domestic customers, then, all 
things being equal, the foreign company will be able to 
undercut the prices of the domestic company.
Realistically, states imposing anti-dumping duties 
infrequently, if ever, do so to redress the imbalance 
between domestic and foreign manufacturers caused by 
their producers acquiring a competitive advantage.
(2) Disposal of surplus production
Plants and manufacturing facilities are designed for 
certain levels of production. During periods of economic 
stagnation within one country, it may be economically 
viable for an industry to continue to manufacture at a 
particular level and to dispose of its surplus 
production at a reduced price in another state.
The economic explanation for this phenomenon is complex, 
but basically, according to economic theory, in the 
short term, a firm can continue to function economically 
as long as the prices charged cover the variable costs 
of manufacturing the g o o d s . I n  the calculation of the 
cost of producing a particular good, there are two types 
of costs. Fixed costs are charges that do not vary with 
output, for example normally rent, interest on capital, 
etc. These costs are fixed because no matter the volume 
of output, these charges must be met. Variable costs are 
charges that alter relative to production, and commonly 
include labour, raw materials, power, etc.
During periods of slack demand, a company can continue
J.H. Barton & B.S. Fisher, International Trade 
and Investment (1986), 276-277.
162
production if it can sell its goods at a price that will 
cover its variable costs. This is because, any amount 
obtained over the variable costs will contribute towards 
the fixed costs that have to be paid in any event. 
The point is that, the production of goods in such 
circumstances requires the disposal of excess surplus in 
markets that are separate from that in which the 
production takes place. Otherwise the manufacturer would 
not be able to sell any goods at all other than at a 
price to cover variable costs. The result is that 
dumping, in the technical sense of the term, occurs. 
Yet, it arises as nothing more than an accepted form of 
commercial practice that is often necessitated by the 
economic climate in which a producer finds itself.
(3) Promotional pricing
Promotional pricing arises when a manufacturer or 
exporter is introducing a product onto the foreign 
market for the first time. In order to compete with 
existing products, the goods are sold at a loss to 
encourage changes in consumer preferences.^*
Obviously, this form of dumping is a short-term strategy 
since its utility diminishes as customers experience the 
product. If the manufacturer has not managed to attract 
a sizeable volume of consumers during the promotional 
campaign, it is unlikely that he will be able to
See C.T. Horngren, Cost Accounting; A Managerial 
Emphasis (Fourth edition, 1977), 259-293.
See J.H. Jackson, "Dumping in International 
Trade; Its Meaning and Context", in Jackson et al, supra 
note , 1-22, 20-22; J.H. Jackson, The World Trading
System (1989), 218-221; and J.H. Jackson & W.J. Davey, 
International Legal Relations (Second edition, 1986), 650-653.
^^* See R. Boltuck, "An Economic Analysis of 
Dumping", (1987) 21 JWTL, 45.
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continue to charge such prices over the long-term. 
Again, it would seem that this reason for dumping is not 
particularly injurious to the domestic economies of the 
countries in which the products are destined.
(4) Predatory for target) pricing
Together with price discrimination, predatory pricing is 
most frequently offered as a justification for the 
maintenance of anti-dumping m e a s u r e s . P r e d a t o r y  
pricing is a strategy by which the foreign producer 
intends to eliminate all domestic competitors 
manufacturing identical or similar products. Products 
are sold on the foreign market-place below the prices 
charged by the domestic manufacturers until all 
competition is eradicated. Thereafter, in the absence of 
other similar products to substitute, the foreign 
manufacturer can reap the profits from monopoly 
pricing.^* Companies already in a dominant position in 
a market can also abuse that position by charging lower 
prices to discourage potential rivals from entering that 
market.
Economic analysis does not, however, support the 
proposition that predatory pricing is an efficient 
marketing strategy.^* The profits that are acquired
See Deardorff, supra note 306, 35-3 6.
See P. Smith, "The Wolf in Wolf's Clothing; The Problem With Predatory Pricing", (1989) 18 EL Rev., 209, 211-214.
See S. Davies & A. McGuinness, "Dumping at less 
Than Marginal Cost", (1982) 12 Journal of Int'lEconomics, 169-182.
See O.E. Williamson, "Predatory Pricing; A 
Strategic and Welfare Analysis", (1977) 87 Yale Law
Journal, 284; P.L. Joskow & A.K. Klevorick, "A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy", (1979) 89 Yale 
Law Journal, 213; and J.L. Goldstein, "Single Firm
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once the domestic competition has been removed will 
infrequently cover the costs of sustaining low prices 
until all competition is removed. Equally, unless the 
product is one of a particularly high specification, 
once prices are increased to an artificially high level 
to recoup the costs of eliminating the competition, it 
is likely that new domestic manufacturers will reenter 
the market.
The proposition that predatory pricing is economically 
unviable is supported by the evidence gathered from 
investigations into such alleged practices. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged "...predatory 
pricing schemes are rarely tried and (are) even more 
rarely successful."^* It therefore seems that the fear 
of predatory pricing is considerably greater than the 
possibility or reality of it actually occurring.
Even if the contention was accepted that predatory 
pricing is economically viable, the statistical 
evidence does not support the proposition that foreign 
enterprises engaging in dumping in fact possess a 
sufficient share of the market to exercise the dominance 
required to exploit their market position. More than 
half the anti-dumping actions brought in the European 
Union are against exporters with less than 5% of the 
Union market for the product in question. In 90% of 
cases, the total share of the countries whose exporters 
are targeted for anti-dumping measures is less than 25%.
Predatory Pricing in Anti-Trust Law", (1991) 91 Col. Law 
Rev 1757.
Matsushita Electric Industry Co. v Zenith Radio 
Corporation. 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
165
(5) Exploitation of a domestic monopoly
The final justification for the imposition of anti­
dumping duties is to prevent foreign firms abusing 
dominant positions in their own markets by charging 
excessive profit margins in the home market and using 
these sales to subsidise lower prices in export 
markets.^® The foreign manufacturer in this situation 
leverages the lower priced export sales with the high 
profit margins made through domestic market sales.
But, three conditions must exist before this practice is 
feasible. First, there must be barriers to prevent the 
reimportation of the cheaper goods into the home market 
(this process is known as arbitrage) Second, the 
foreign manufacturer must exercise substantial control 
in the home market. Third, the manufacturer must face a 
more elastic demand curve in the export market than in 
the home market. If these conditions exist, long run 
dumping can occur.
Yet, there is nothing novel about the proposition that 
a company enjoying a dominant position in a protected 
market can maximise profits by charging different prices 
in foreign markets. The selling price of a particular 
good in such a case is equal to the marginal revenue 
which, naturally varies in each market according to the
^^® S.J. Powell et al., "Current Administration of 
U.S. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws", (1990) 
11 Northwestern Journal of Int'l Law & Bus., 177.
This is one of the reasons that dumping is, in 
theory, considered infeasible in the European Community 
where technically barriers to trade have been 
eliminated, or at least substantially reduced.
See M. Knoll, "An Economic Approach to the 
Determination of Injury Under the United States Anti­
dumping and Countervailing Duty Law", (1989) 22 Int'lLaw & Politics 39, 43.
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elasticity of supply and demand in the particular 
market.
In any event, the relative economic strengths of some of 
the countries against which charges of dumping have been 
levelled against that of the European Union belie this 
argument. For example, in 1991, anti-dumping 
investigations were initiated against products from 
countries such as Macao, Albania, Indonesia, Trinidad 
and Tobago. To say that producers in these small 
countries are using their domestic profits to subsidise 
exports to the European Union is quite simply 
ridiculous.
Further, in such a situation, dumping inevitably raises 
the welfare level of the importing country. Nevertheless 
there is no trade off between these factors in imposing 
anti-dumping duties.
Since dumping under these conditions is likely to be 
long-term, this may effectively suppress the domestic 
industry. But even in this case, the benefits to 
consumers may outweigh the injury caused, although long­
term supplies may be unreliable.
(6) The true purpose of anti-dumoina legislation
The economic reasons advanced for the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties in fact mask the real purpose of 
these mechanisms - to protect domestic industries from 
foreign competition. Dumping rarely results in any 
economic malfeasance since, in the vast majority of 
cases, the injury caused to domestic industries is
323 European Commission, Tenth Annual Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament on the Community's 
Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidv Activities. SEC (92) 716 
Final,
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almost invariably outweighed by the benefits that accrue 
to consumers in the form of cheaper goods.
If a foreign manufacturer deliberately set out with the 
objective of permanently destroying a particular 
domestic industry, and subsequently dominating that 
sector of the economy, protection may be justified. But 
it is rare that any such intention on the part of 
foreign manufacturers can be proven. Indeed, no state 
operates a system of anti-dumping laws that require 
evidence of an intention on the part of a supplier to 
indulge in predatory pricing.
Yet, in applying anti-dumping levies, the motives of 
manufacturers or exporters are rarely taken into 
consideration. At least one commentator is prepared to 
state that in none of the more than 750 affirmative 
determinations reached in the United States, Canada, the 
Union and Australia between 1980 and 1986 was the 
element of predatory pricing remotely present.^* All 
that is required is the factual existence of a series of 
circumstances that amount to dumping. The fact that 
these price differentials may arise through perfectly 
legitimate and fair pricing behaviour is effectively 
ignored.
Given the relative economic sizes of the European Union 
and the United States, it is even more difficult to see 
how such measures can be economically justified. Perhaps 
it is more accurate to say that anti-dumping measures 
are being used to maintain an economic status quo that 
has not been truly in existence since the 1960s. More
N.D. Palmeter, "The Anti-Dumping Emperor", (1988) 22:4 JWT 5, 6.
See J. Hagelstam, "Some Shortcomings of 
International Anti-Dumping Provisions", (1991) 25:5 JWT, 
99, 99-100.
------------
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and more developing states are manufacturing commodities 
and products that compete with those made in the basic 
manufacturing industries in the European Union and the 
United States. Often these products are of a quality 
equal to that produced in the Union or the United 
States. Yet both the Union and the United States 
stubbornly refuse to allow these products unimpeded 
access to their markets.
In doing so, both nations set themselves against the 
fundamental tenets of trade liberalisation. Instead of 
investing in research and development and more 
efficiently creating hi-tech products, both have created 
artificial barriers to trade liberalisation through the 
excessive use of anti-dumping measures.^*
(B) Countervailing Dutv Measures
A countervailing duty is simply a monetary levy imposed 
on a foreign product that has been identified by 
national officials as having acquired a competitive 
advantage over identical or similar domestic products as 
a result of financial assistance from a foreign 
government in the manufacture, production or exportation 
of the goods.
In theory, by imposing a countervailing duty equal to 
the benefit conferred by the subsidy, any element of 
unfair competition that might have accrued because of
For a possible viable model, see J, Brander & P. 
Kengman, "A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International 
Trade", (1983) Journal of International Economics 313.
Article VI, Paragraph 3, GATT.
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the subsidy is r e m o v e d . commerce may thereafter be 
conducted in an environment free of any economic 
distortions caused by the subsidisation policies of 
individual governments,^^*
Achieving a 'level playing field' through the use of 
countervailing measures is not, however, as simple as 
this. Countervailing duties are applied against 
subsidies based on the type of assistance and not their 
purpose. Further, over-estimation of the countervailable 
subsidy will prejudice the respective competitive 
positions of the foreign and domestic producers. There 
are also strong economic arguments against the 
proposition that countervailing duties can effectively 
neutralise foreign subsidies without prejudicing foreign 
competitors.^®
<2) Article VI of the GATT; Too Few Rules to Prevent 
Abuse
(A) Anti-Dumping Measures
In a curious use of phraseology, the GATT condemns 
dumping without prohibiting such practices and, in 
common with countervailing duties, acknowledges that 
anti-dumping duties are legitimate measures when applied
See, R. Diamond, "Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law", (1989) 29 Virginia Journal of 
Int'l Law 767.
^^* See generally, B. Balassa, "Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures: Economic Considerations",(1989) 23:2 JWT, 63-79.
^^® See J.D. Gaisford & D.L. McLachlan, "Domestic 
Subsidies and Countervail: The Treacherous Ground of the Level Playing Field", (1990) 24:4 JWT 55.
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consistently with Article VI.Contracting parties are 
therefore not obliged to prevent companies or firms 
operating within their territories from dumping products 
on the markets of other states.
The draughtsmen of the General Agreement were aware of 
the broad similarities between countervailing duties and 
anti-dumping actions as measures of administered 
protectionism and it is not surprising that both devices 
are dealt with in the same article. Thus, under Article 
VI(4) contracting parties are required to refrain from 
imposing anti-dumping duties on products that have had 
countervailing duties imposed on them.^^^
Contracting parties may not levy an anti-dumping duty 
greater than the amount of the margin of dumping found 
to e x i s t . T h e  margin of dumping is simply the 
difference between the price of the goods in the country 
of origin and the equivalent price on the foreign 
market. In other words, the object of anti-dumping 
duties should be compensatory and not penal.
Duties can only be imposed if the imports cause or 
threaten to cause material injury to an established 
industry in the territory of a contracting party or 
materially retard the establishment of a domestic
See generally. Working Party Report on Barriers 
to Trade. GATT BISD, 3rd Supplement 222, 222-224 (1955).
Examining this provision more closely, in fact 
the prohibition on the imposition of both duties extends 
only to the application of countervailing duties to 
'export subsidisation'. Presumably, therefore 
contracting parties are free to impose both types of 
duties against a product that has been dumped and also 
found to have benefitted from a domestic subsidy, 
because Article VI imposes no requirement on contracting 
parties to limit the application of countervailing duties to export subsidies.
333 Article VI(2), GATT.
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i n d u s t r y . T h e  material injury standard is identical 
to that established for the imposition of countervailing 
duties.
Even as early as 1960, a number of states believed that 
anti-dumping procedures were being manipulated for 
protectionist m o t i v e s . E x p l o i t a t i o n  of the 
shortcomings of Article VI of the General Agreement was 
widely perceived to be the source of this problem.^* In 
these circumstances, it is not surprising that anti­
dumping measures were the first non-tariff barriers to 
be tackled by a GATT Protocol, namely the Agreement on 
the Interpretation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (the Anti-Dumping Code 
1967) Along with the United States, seventeen other 
contracting parties signed the Anti-Dumping Code 1967 
including Canada, Japan, the Member States of the 
European Union and certain other European countries.^* 
If the countries of the European Union at that time are 
considered one party, in fact there were only thirteen 
signatories.
In retrospect, the agreement was widely viewed as
Article VI(6), GATT.
See P. Lloyd, Anti^Dumoing Actions and the GATT 
Svstem (1977), 42.
See the First Report of the Group of Experts on 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (May 1959), GATT 
BISD, 8th Supplement 145 (1960) ; Second Report of the 
Group of Experts on Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (May i960), GATT BISD, 9th Supplement 194 (1961).
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement. GATT BISD, 15th Supplement, 74 
(1968).
On the implementation of these obligations in the 
European Community, see J.F Beseler, "EEC Protection 
Against Dumping and Market Subsidies From Third 
Countries", in (1968) 6 CML Rev., 327.
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embodying the interests of the Western world to the 
exclusion of the third world and, despite original 
membership in the GATT of a number of major developing 
nations, such as India and Brazil, none was prepared to 
sign the Agreement.^* This was a major setback for the 
Code as far as it embodied an attempt to establish truly 
international rules.
The other point of failure was the refusal of the U.S. 
Executive branch to reconcile its participation in this 
system with its own constitutional law. The main problem 
stemmed from the conflict between the Executive and 
Congress in the formulation of trade policy and the 
negotiation of trade agreements, a recurring theme 
throughout this s t u d y . T h e  Agreement was incorporated 
into United States law through the Presidential 
authority to negotiate Executive Agreements, but the 
constitutional position of this method of incorporation 
was the subject of much controversy.^^ A conflict 
therefore arose between the earlier Congressional 
statute - the Anti-Dumping Act of 1921^  ^- and the 1967 
Executive Agreement.
So determined was the Congressional opposition to the 
purported exercise of Executive authority in this matter
3^® On the details of membership, see GATT, 
Activities Report 1993 (1994), Annex I*
3*® See S.A. Lorenzen, "Technical Analysis of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Trade Agreements Act", 
(1979) 11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 1405, 1414-1415.
3*^ J.J. Barcelo, "Anti-Dumping Laws as Barriers to 
Trade - The United States and the International Anti- 
Dumping Code", (1972) 57 Cornell Law Review, 491-560,533.
3*2 42 Stat. 11 (1921) .
3*3 See R.B. Long. "U.S. Law and the Anti-Dumping 
Code", (1969) 3 Int'l Lawyer 464.
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that the Congress enacted the Renegotiation Amendments 
Act of 1968. which instructed the Treasury and Tariff 
Commission (the predecessor of the ITC) to 'resolve any 
conflict between the International Dumping Code and the 
Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 in favour of the Act as applied 
by the agency administering the Act. '3**. The de facto 
non-participation of the United States in this agreement 
ensured that it would have only limited success.
For these reasons, and many others relating to the 
substantive obligations contained in the text of the 
agreement, the 1967 Code was a spectacular failure. 
Within the first five years of its operation, its 
signatories were already engaging in negotiations as 
part of the Tokyo Round for its radical revisi o n . T h e  
final result of these negotiations was the Anti-Dumping 
Code 1979.
(B) Countervailing Dutv Measures
Under the original framework established by the GATT, 
Article VI, the customary right of states to impose 
countervailing duties to counter the adverse economic 
effects of direct or indirect subsidies granted on the 
manufacture, production or export of goods was preserved 
with only minor modifications. A number of restraints 
were imposed, but on the whole, these obligations were 
agreed to prevent countervailing duties being employed 
in a penal manner, or when no economic justification 
could be adduced for their use, as opposed to the 
introduction of controls to prevent abuse inspired by
3** 82 Stat. 1347 (1968).
3*3 Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting. Tokvo. 
12-14 September 1973. 12 ILM 1533 (1973).
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protectionist motives.^*
According to the same article, countervailing duties 
could not be levied on any product in excess of the 
•estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been 
granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, 
production or export of such products'.^? The object of 
this rule was obviously to prevent countervailing duties 
being utilised as a means of levying duties in excess of 
the true level of subsidy received by a producer.
No attempt was made to link Article VI concerning 
countervailing duties with Article XVI which, as 
amended, regulated s u b s i d i e s . Therefore, the fact 
that Article XVI of the GATT permitted certain types of 
subsidies, particularly domestic subsidies, was no 
guarantee that contracting parties would refrain from 
imposing duties on such subsidies despite the fact that 
they were not prohibited.^*
3*® R.R. Rivers & J.D. Greenwald, "The Negotiation of 
a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties", (1979) 
11 Law & Pol'y & Int'l Bus., 1447-1495, 1455-1459.
3*^ Article VI, Paragraph 3, GATT.
3** The lack of coordination between Article VI and
XVI, particularly as regards the permissibility of
domestic subsidisation schemes, was an issue raised by
the European Union at the Tokyo Round of trade 
negotiations. A proposal was submitted that duties could 
only be levied against products receiving subsidies 
specifically prohibited by Article XVI, as interpreted 
by the 1979 Subsidies Code. But the opposition of the 
United States to the assimilation of treatment between 
domestic and export subsidies obstructed the 
introduction of measures to coordinate the treatment of specific types of subsidies.
3** As the Group of Experts reported:
"The fact that the granting of certain 
subsidies was authorised by the provisions of 
Article XVI of the General Agreement clearly 
did not debar importing countries from 
imposing, under the terms of Article VI, a 
countervailing duty on the products on which
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The GATT specifically acknowledges that the existence of 
subsidised products is sufficient to justify 
countervailing duties.^® No economic criteria are 
expressly provided in the GATT for interpreting and 
applying the concept of material injury, which 
incidentally is an equivalent standard to that 
applicable in anti-dumping investigations 
Nevertheless, contracting parties have had to satisfy 
panels that their standards were GATT-consistent.
The United States again took advantage of the PPA to 
grandfather its countervailing laws to the extent that 
it did not require proof of material injury prior to the 
imposition of duties. This created a serious imbalance 
in the application of the test as other nations 
gradually amended their laws to comply with the GATT. 
The United States also refused to amend its legislation 
to conform to Article VI when it introduced statutory 
amendments to its countervailing laws in the form of the
Trade Act of 1 9 7 4
subsidies had been paid."
Report of the Group of Experts, supra note 336, Para. 
32.
350 gQg E, McGovern, International Trade Regulation 
(Second edition, 1986), Para 11.41.
351 See text supra, pp.178-180.
332 New Zealand - Imports of Electrical Transformers 
From Finland. GATT BISD, 32nd Supplement, 32, Para. 44 
(1984-85).
353 There is little doubt that this refusal was 
contrary to the GATT. Although no complaint was ever 
lodged against this refusal, in the United States 
Manufacturing Clause Case, an attempt to re-enact and 
amend legislation relating to the limitation of copyright protection on imported English language books 
was condemned by the investigating panel on the grounds 
that the codification amounted to re-enactment; GATT 
BISD, 31st Supplement 74-94 (1985).
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The incorporation of an effective injury test into the 
domestic law of the United States was a major goal of 
many industrialised nations, including the European 
Union, at the Tokyo Round of negotiations.^* As a quid 
pro quo for the assumption of an injury test, the United 
States demanded stricter and more precise rules 
governing the misuse of subsidies. However, while the 
United States eventually agreed to the incorporation of 
such a test into its laws, its application was limited 
to signatories to the 1979 Subsidies Code and could not 
be applied to countervailing orders in force prior to 
the coming into force of the Code. *35
While these provisions outline, in broad strokes, a 
general international policy towards the application of 
countervailing duties, they have been overtaken by 
developments. The technical nature of countervailing 
duties, together with a general recognition of their 
growing importance in world trade, created a movement 
towards drafting detailed rules for the administration 
of countervailing duties. This was first attempted in 
the 1979 Subsidies Code and the negotiations undertaken 
at the Uruguay Round have built upon many of the rules 
originally conceived in this instrument.
33* See J.F. Beseler & A.N. Williams, Anti-Dumping 
and Anti-Subsidv Law of the European Community (1986), 
16.
333 United States - Countervailing Duties on Non- 
Rubber Footwear From Brazil. GATT Doc. SCM/94 (October
1989), not yet adopted.
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(3) The Tokyo Round Codes: The Charade of Attempting to 
Impose Normative Regulation on State Behaviour
(A) The Anti-Dumping Code 1979
(1) Brief outline of content
(a) Procedure
An anti-dumping complaint must take the form of a 
written petition from an * affected industry* and must 
include sufficient evidence of: (a) dumping; (b)
material injury; and (c) the existence of a causal link 
between the imports and the alleged material injury.
Standing to bring a complaint to the competent 
authorities is reserved to 'affected industries* under 
Article 5(1) of the Code. A degree of clarity is, 
however, added by specific reference in this provision 
to the definition of 'industry* stipulated in Article
4.*^ This is a parallel definition to that provided in 
the Subsidies Code.^^®
The Code lacked specific detail on the obligations of 
national authorities when gathering evidence during 
investigations to verify the accuracy of information
Article 5(1), 1979 Anti-Dumping Code. These
obligations were clarified by guidelines published by 
the Anti-Dumping Committee in Recommendation Concerning 
Transparencv of Anti-Dumoino Proceedings, GATT Doc 
ADP/17 (November 1983), adopted by the Committee on November 15, 1983,
Interpretative Footnote 9 to Article 5, 1979
Anti-Dumping Code.
See text, infra pp.205-206.
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submitted in a complaint.^* Abuse of this deficiency in 
the Code subsequently materialised into a major 
international concern in the application of the Code by 
the United States and the European Union.
(b) Definition of Dumping
Article 2 of the Code defines dumping as the 
introduction of a product into the commerce of a country 
at less than the price paid in the country of 
manufacture. In the event that a product is so 
introduced, then depending on the satisfaction of a 
number of other conditions, anti-dumping duties can be 
imposed.
There are two main variables in the quantification of 
dumping: (a) 'normal value* of the product; and (b)
* export price'. The adjustments, deductions and methods 
of calculating these two figures are therefore critical 
in determining if dumping has occurred and in the 
quantification of the amount of duties that may be 
imposed on imports.
(c) Material injury
Again, the provisions relating to material injury 
closely follow those contained in Article 6 of the 1979 
Subsidies Code. Injury can take one of three forms: (a) 
actual injury; (b) threat of material injury; and (c) 
material retardation of the establishment of a domestic
This lacuna was not rectified by the two Anti- 
Dumping Committee guidelines adopted in November 1983 
namely, Recommendation Concerning Procedures for an On- 
the-Spot Investicfation. GATT Doc ADP/18 (November 1983) , 
Recommendation Concerning the Time-Limits Given to 
Respondents to Anti-Dumpinc Questionnaires. GATT Doc 
ADP/19 (November 1983). See also Draft Recommendation 
Concerning Best Information Available in Terms of 
Article 6:8. GATT Doc ADP/W/59/Rev.5 (May 1984).
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industry.
A determination of actual injury can only be made after 
an objective examination of two economic indicators: (a) 
the volume of the dumped imports and their effect on 
prices in the domestic market for like products; and (b) 
the impact of these imports on the domestic producers of 
such goods.
On the whole, it is true to say that the Code failed to 
establish a common standard for the application of an 
injury test, even between two nations such as the United 
States and the European Union. The significance of the 
term 'material' has largely become irrelevant because 
the most important indicator is the actual standard 
applied by signatories in practice, but there is little 
doubt that there are few similarities in the legislation 
of signatories concerning injury.
For example, the United States legislation defines the 
term 'material injury' as 'harm which is not 
inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant'.^'*^ This 
definition entails a higher degree of harm than that 
imposed by previous legislation.The International 
Trade Commission (ITC) evaluates injury but there are 
considerable differences in its interpretation of the 
concept from that of its European counterparts.^*
Article VI(6)(a), 1979 Subsidies Code.
Article 3(1), 1979 Anti-Dumping Code.
Section 771(7) , Tariff Act of 1930. as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
P.D. Staple, "Implementing the Tokyo Round 
Commitments: The New Injury Standard in Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws", (1980) 32 Stanford Law Review 1183.
R.M. Bierwagen, GATT Article VI and the 
Protectionist Bias in Anti-Dumoing Laws (1990), 91.
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Indeed, there is significant divergence of opinion among 
the ITC Commissioners themselves whose findings are made
public.
The European Union legislation does not define the term 
material injury. Instead it merely enumerates a number 
of factual elements that must be examined to determine 
whether or not material injury is present. The important 
point is that the European Union legislation in fact 
makes specific reference to the need to isolate injury 
caused through the direct effects of dumped products 
from injury that is caused from imports of similar 
products that are not d u m p e d , Y e t ,  in practice, the 
Commission tends to combine all imports that affect a 
specific industry in its assessment of injury. This has 
the obvious effect of exaggerating the injury caused to 
the relevant domestic industry.^?
(d) Domestic industry
Article 4(1) of the Code defines the relevant domestic 
industry as 'the domestic producers as a whole of the 
like products or to those of them whose collective 
output of the products constitutes a major proportion of 
the total domestic production of those products'.^* 
This definition is identical to that contained in the 
Subsidies Code. The term 'like product' is therefore 
essential to the determination of the relevant domestic 
industry.
See M.D. Rowat, "Protectionist Tilts in Anti- 
Dumping Legislation of Developed Countries and the LDC 
Response", (1990) 24:5 JWT 5, 15.
366 Article 4(1) , Council Regulation 2423/88 fl988) .
See Rowat, supra note 3 65, 18.
Article 4(1), 1979 Anti-Dumping Code.
Article 6(5), 1979 Subsidies Code,
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Article 4(2) defines the term 'like product' as 'a 
product which is identical, ie. alike in all respects to 
the product under consideration, or in the absence of 
such a product, another product which, although not 
alike in all respects, has characteristics closely 
resembling those of the product under consideration'. 
This definition is not only prescribed for the 
determination of standing or to assist identify the 
relevant industry but applies whenever that term is 
used.
The United States has merely adopted the phraseology of 
the Code and its legislation follows the wording of 
Article 4(1).^^ The definition of like product is, 
however, slightly wider than that of the Code and 
provides that a like product is ' a product which is 
like, or in the absence of like, most similar in 
characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an 
investigation.According to this definition, a 
product is like another when either its physical 
appearance or its uses resemble that of the product 
under investigation. This is generally accepted to be a 
more expansive definition than that authorised under the 
Code.
The European Union definitions of domestic industry and
This definition is identical to that contained in 
Interpretative Note 18 to Article 6(2), 1979 Subsidies Code.
Section 771(4) (A) , Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
Ibid, Section 771(10).
373 Yor example, in one case concerning 64K DRAM 
components, the United States authorities included in 
the definition of like products both finished DRAMs and 
components of DRAMs, even although the components have 
sharply different uses and markets; 64K Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Components. USITC Inv. No. 1862 (1986), 8- 
9.
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like product are identical to those of the Code. The 
Union's definitions have not, however, been interpreted 
in practice in a matter generally consistent with the 
Code.
(e) Causation
Both Article VI of the GATT and Article 3(4) of the 
Anti-Dumping Code require that the dumped goods cause 
injury to a domestic industry before anti-dumping duties 
can be imposed. Extraneous factors may contribute to the 
economic difficulties of an industry, but these cannot 
be taken into account in assessing the causal link 
between the dumped products and the injury to the 
domestic industry. This leads to the difficult task of 
isolating those economic factors that identify injury 
caused by dumping from those factors that relate to the 
general economic climate within the country. This is not 
a clear cut distinction.
The Code provides limited assistance by identifying a 
number of factors that cannot be taken into
consideration by investigating agencies in determining 
whether injury has been caused by the dumped
p r o d u c t s . s i n c e  these factors are not in any way
related to the effect of the dumped products on the
domestic industry, they must be excluded from
Articles 2(12) and 4(5), Council Regulation 2324/88 (1988).
375 See text, infra Chapter 10.
These include: (a) the volume and prices of
imports that are not sold within the territory at dumped 
prices; (b) contraction in demand or changes in patterns of consumption;(c) restrictive trade practices and 
competition between foreign and domestic producers; (d) 
developments in technology; and (e) the export 
performance and productivity of the domestic industry; Interpretative Note 5 to Article 3(4), 1979 Anti-Dumping Code.
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evaluations of injury.
(2) Issues not regulated
(a) Indirect Dumping - Input and Sub-Assembly 
Dumping
Input dumping occurs when parts or raw material that are 
sold below their home market price are incorporated into 
finished products and exported to another country.^? 
Depending on the point at which these dumped products 
are incorporated into the finished product, this process 
is known also as prior-stage, secondary, downstream or 
upstream dumping.
Sub-assembly dumping occurs when components of an end 
product, such as semi-conductors or circuit boards, 
which need only minor assembly, are dumped in a country 
and subsequently a s s e m b l e d . it is to prevent this 
practice that anti-circumvention laws have been 
introduced by many states.
Both practices raise difficult issues for the 
application of anti-dumping measures in a manner 
consistent with the 1979 Code. In both cases, the actual 
dumped products are in fact components of the final 
product. Therefore, in neither case can the industries 
competing with the finished products be said to be 
manufacturing products like those that are actually 
dumped. If the domestic manufacturers are not producing 
like products, they have no standing to raise an anti-
See generally, R. Bierwagen, "Input, Downstream, 
Upstream, Secondary, Diversionary and Components of Sub- Assembly Dumping", (1988) 22:3 JWT 27.
See Yanowitch, "Foreign Assembly and Outsourcing: 
New Challenges to the Anti-Dumping Law", (1986) 18 Law 
& Pol'y Int'l Bus., 815.
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dumping petition nor are they the relevant domestic 
industry for the purposes of establishing material 
injury for the dumped parts.
The only solution to the problems caused by input 
dumping and sub-assembly dumping is to amend Article 5 
of the Code. This could either be done by creating 
specific mechanisms to tackle the problem, or by 
extending the definition of domestic industries. In 
light of the imbalance that could be caused by altering 
the definition of domestic industry, the more 
appropriate course of action is to create new 
mechanisms.^^^
(b) Cumulation and Cross-Cumulation of Injury
The Code does not address the issue of injury cumulation 
and cross-cumulation. Cumulation involves the 
aggregation of the effects of dumped imports from more 
than one source in one country, or from sources in 
several countries. Cross-cumulation refers to assessing 
the injurious effects of both dumped and subsidised 
imports on a particular domestic industry. Rules are 
required to regulate this practice because most 
signatories have adopted laws permitting both cumulation
and cross-cumulation.
Both cumulation and cross-cumulation are doctrines that 
can be manipulated to produce greater findings of injury 
than would be the case where only one product from one 
country was involved and international rules are
See S.L. Hsu, "Input Dumping and Upstream 
Subsidies; Trade Loopholes Which Need Closing", (1986) 
25 Col. J. Trans. Law 137.
On this point and the WTO Agreement on Anti- 
Dumping, see A. Pangratis & E. Vermulst, "Injury in 
Anti-Dumping Proceedings - The Need to Look Beyond the 
Uruguay Round Rules", (1994) 28:5 JWT 61.
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required to provide guidelines to prevent any possible 
a b u s e . F o r  example, petitioners in the United States 
are increasingly adopting the strategy of filing 
multiple complaints against a number of countries. 
During an investigation the ITC, in reaching its injury 
determination, is required to consider the cumulative 
effect of the total volume of imports from all sources 
rather than considering each exporter as an individual 
source. The consequence is that the element of injury is 
magnified,
(c) Exchange rate fluctuations
In order to compare export price with normal value, the 
two values must be stated in the same currency. Although 
occasionally both prices are stated in the same 
currency, more often than not a currency conversion is
required. The Code does not indicate a method of
selecting an appropriate rate, despite the fact that the 
rule for selecting such a rate can have a significant 
impact on the quantification of a dumping margin. For 
example, if the official rate of exchange is 
considerably lower than the actual rate used in
transactions, a dumping margin may be found even
although one does not exist.
Equally, in commercial transactions, different rates may 
be applicable to different parts of the transaction. 
Elements of the export price such as insurance and 
freight are often contracted and paid for in advance of 
the completion of the sales contract. If the rates that 
are used at the time of the actual shipment are used, a 
distortion will occur since the value at the time the
See N.D. Palmeter, "The Anti^Dumping Emperor", (1988) 22:4 JWT 5, 7.
See generally, M. Salchizadeh, "Dumping: The
Influence of Currency Movements", (1994) 28:1 JWT 181.
186
sales contract was concluded may be more appropriate.
(d) Anti-circumvention
Anti-dumping duties are imposed on particular goods 
originating from a specific country. Foreign 
manufacturers can therefore avoid the imposition of such 
duties if they break the product down into its component 
parts and export these for assembly inside the country 
imposing the duties, or, alternatively, export the parts 
for assembly in a third country, the exports from which 
are not subject to anti-dumping measures.
The 1979 Code did not envisage such a development and no 
provision of that Agreement tackles the problem of 
manufacturers deliberately setting out to evade anti­
dumping measures. This has lead to a considerable number 
of countries, including the United States and the 
European Union, resorting to unilateral me a s u r e s . T h e  
main point is, that by creating mechanisms to counter 
the possibility of anti-circumvention, states may 
produce even greater distortion than those caused by the 
avoidance of duties.^* This was the essence of the 
complaint lodged by Japan against the European Union, 
and the anti-circumvention laws of other signatories may 
be equally susceptible to such a challenge.
The original Community Legislation dealing with this issue was Council Regulation 1761/87 (1987). which 
has been superseded by Council Regulation 2423/88 
(1988) . The counterpart provision in United States law 
is Section 781 of the Tariff Act of 1930. as amended by 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
S. A. Baker, "'Like' Products and Commercial 
Reality", in Jackson & Vermulst, supra note 313, 287- 
301.
385 See text, infra, pp.189-192.
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(e) Anti-absorption
The European Union anti-dumping legislation requires 
that all anti-dumping duties must be borne by the 
importers and/or their customers. If these duties are 
absorbed by exporters, an additional duty may be imposed 
to compensate for the amount of expense borne by the 
exporter.
The Code itself contains no explicit term prohibiting 
the use of anti-absorption techniques but the Union 
regulation does not sit comfortably alongside a number 
of Code provisions. For example, under Article 5 of the 
Code, no anti-dumping duties can be imposed without an 
examination into the existence of dumping, injury and 
causation. The imposition of additional anti-dumping 
duties without an investigation into these factors would 
therefore appear prima facie inconsistent with the Code.
(3) Dispute settlement and implementation
The disputes which have arise between the various 
signatories to the Code provide insight into how 
effectively it has operated. In this section, the main 
cases which have arisen in this context among the 
signatories are considered with particular emphasis on 
the subject-matter of the dispute, the arguments 
submitted by the parties, the methodology of the panel 
and implementation of the final panel ruling.
This rule was introduced as Article 13(11) of 
Council Regulation 2423/88 on the ground that the 
Commission believed that it was necessary to prevent the 
effectiveness of anti-dumping duties being eroded by the 
duty being borne by exporters.
 :
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United States A/D Duties on Imports of Seamless Steel 
Products From Sweden
Sweden lodged a complaint with the Anti-Dumping 
Committee about the standing of United States 
petitioners in an investigation which culminated in the 
imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on certain 
Swedish steel products.^? The United States had imposed 
the duties after an investigation based on a complaint 
filed in 1986 by the 'Speciality Tubing Group' and a 
number of companies manufacturing stainless steel 
products.^*
Sweden alleged that the petition was inconsistent with 
the Agreement because the Department of Commerce had 
failed to verify that the petition represented a request 
by or on behalf of 'an affected industry' as required by 
Article 5(1) of the Code. Only 2 of the 13 producers of 
the product were among the petitioners.
The Panel considered that Articles 4 and 5(1) of the 
Code imposed an obligation on the administering 
authorities of a signatory to investigate the relevant 
domestic industry prior to initiating proceedings in 
order to determine whether or not the petitioners 
represented the relevant domestic industry. The panel 
found that such an investigation had not been conducted 
by the U.S. authorities.^*
United States A/D Duties on Imports of Seamless 
Steel Products From Sweden. GATT Doc. ADP/47 (July
1990).
Stainless Steel Pipes And Tubes From Sweden, 
USITC Inv. No. 731-TA-354 (November 1987); (1988) 22:2JWT 127-136.
See E-U Petersmann, «GATT Dispute Settlement 
Proceedings in the Field of Anti-Dumping Law", (1991) 28:1 CML Rev., 69, 90.
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The United States was found in violation of its 
obligations under the Code and the panel recommended 
that it should revoke the anti-dumping duties and 
reimburse all duties already paid. The United States 
vigorously opposed the panel recommending a remedy that 
it should adopt, even although this was clearly the most 
logical course of action.
As a result, the adoption of the panel report was 
suspended pending the resolution of this matter despite 
repeated calls from Sweden for adoption of the panel's 
recommendations.^! In other words, the United States 
was successful in blocking the adoption of the report on 
the grounds of a legal technicality. x t  has therefore 
not amended its laws or administrative practices to 
accord with the decision of the panel.
European Union Anti-Circumvention Measures Imposed on 
Components and Parts From Japan
This complaint was the first ever lodged by the Japanese 
government against another contracting party and was 
based on arguments that Article 13(10) of Council 
Regulation 2423/88 (1988) violated Articles I, II,
III, X and was inconsistent with Article VI of the 
GATT. The complaint was based on the general
provisions of the GATT, and not the Code, because the
GATT, Activities Report 1990 (1991), 70-71.
GATT, Activities Report 1991 (1992), 63-64.
See also. Annual Report of the Anti-Dumpina 
Committee. GATT BISD,, 38th Supplement (1992), 82, 85.
0. J. L209/1 (1988) .
European Community Anti-Circumvention Measures 
Imposed on Components and Parts From Japan, GATT Doc. 
L/6657 (March 1990), reproduced at [1990] 2 CMLR 639; 
(1990) 2:3 WTM 5.
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Code contains few directly relevant provisions, although 
both parties agreed that Article VI of the GATT 'had to 
be interpreted in light of the provisions' of the Anti- 
Dumping Code. 3*^
Article 13(10) of the Regulation permitted the 
imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties on products 
introduced into the commerce of the Union if certain 
conditions were met. Between June 1987 and October 1988, 
the European Union initiated investigations into the 
assembly of five products - all Japanese - assembled in 
the Union: electronic typewriters^*, electronic
weighing sales^ *^ , hydraulic excavators^*®, plain paper 
photocopiers^** and ball bearings*®®. These 
investigations resulted in duties against eight 
companies for infringement of the Regulation and the 
acceptance of price revision undertakings in four cases.
The critical question in determining the validity of the 
Union Regulation related to the characterisation of the 
duties imposed. The Union alleged that the duties were 
anti-dumping duties and were consistently applied in 
accordance with Article VI and the Code. In reply, Japan 
argued that Article VI defined dumping as a situation in 
which 'products of one country are introduced into the
*^^ Ibid Para. 3.4.
*^* Investigation initiated O.J. C235/2 (1987), and terminated O.J. LlOl/4 (1988).
*^^ Investigation initiated O.J. C235/2 (1987) and
terminated O.J. LlOl/1 (1988).
*^® Investigation initiated O.J. C285/4 (1987) andterminated O.J. LlOl/24 (1988).
*^* Investigation initiated O.J. 044/3 (1988) and
terminated L248/36 (1988).
*00 Investigation initiated O.J. 0150/4 (1988) and
terminated O.J. L25/90 (1988).
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commerce of another country' at prices less than the 
normal value of such products.*®! The duties imposed by 
the Union were not therefore, strictly speaking, anti­
dumping duties since they had been imposed on products 
once they had already entered into the Union.
The panel agreed with the Japanese representative. The 
duties were imposed on finished products and therefore 
constituted either import duties or internal charges. 
This distinction is however critical insofar as import 
duties are regulated by Article 11(1) of the GATT while 
internal charges are governed by Article 111(2). Both 
these provisions imposed different regimes on charges.
The European Union argued that, if the measures were not 
governed by Article VI of the GATT, then they fell to be 
regulated by Article II as customs duties.*®^ The panel 
dismissed these propositions and found that the duties 
were internal charges and regulated by Article III of 
the GATT. This conclusion was derived from the terms of 
Article 13 of the Union Regulation, according to which 
'the amount of duty collected shall be proportional to 
that resulting from the application of the rate of the 
anti-dumping duty applicable to the exporter of the 
complete product on the cif value of the parts or 
materials imported'. The panel noted that like products 
of domestic origin were not subject to a corresponding 
charge. Therefore, the anti-circumvention duties 
subjected imported parts and materials indirectly to an 
internal charge in excess of that applied to like 
products and consequently they were declared contrary to 
Article 111(2).^3
*®! Ibid, Para. 3.30. 
*®^ Ibid Para. 3,34. 
*®^ Ibid, Para. 5.9.
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The European Union was intensely hostile to the panel's 
findings and the panel members were in fact required to 
defend their decision in the GATT Council.*®* The main 
point of contention was the finding that the charges 
were internal charges rather than customs duties, or 
charges imposed in connection with the administration of 
customs duties. But the opposition of the Union was 
insufficient to prevent the adoption of the report in 
the Council. In the face of opposition from a number of 
countries, including the United States, the Union had 
little choice but to allow the Council to adopt the 
report. *®^
The European Union did not, however, immediately amend 
its internal legislation to comply with the terms of the 
panel report. It merely gave an undertaking not to 
impose further duties on the basis of this provision. 
Hence, the measure remained on the European Union's 
statute-books although the Union declined to accept 
complaints from private parties requesting the 
imposition of anti-circumvention duties.
New Zealand Anti-Dumping Proceedings Against Electrical 
Transformers From Finland
In this case, one of the few not to involve either the 
United States or the European Union, the panel was 
instructed to decide the legality of anti-dumping duties 
imposed on a Finnish exporter which had allegedly dumped 
two transformers under a tender from a New Zealand 
electrical power board. The subject-matter of the 
dispute concerned identification of the relevant 
domestic industry for electric transformers and whether
*®* The extract minutes of these proceedings are 
reproduced at [1990] 2 CMLR 639, 641-644.
*05 q aTT, Activities Report 1990 (1990) , 55-57.
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the domestic industry had suffered material injury due 
to the 2.4% of the market share acquired by the Finnish 
imports.*®*
The Finnish government claimed that the relevant
industry was the electric transformer industry as a 
whole, and that no differentiation could be made within 
that industry on the basis of the size of the units. The 
New Zealand authorities held otherwise. Four separate 
industries were identified for the purposes of the
injury test based on the output of the units.
The panel rejected the existence of four separate
industries and declared that New Zealand was in
violation of Article VI of the GATT. This decision was 
based on the ground that the national company 
complaining in fact accounted for 92 percent of total 
domestic production of all transformers and it produced 
transformers with capacity throughout all four 
ranges.*®^
The panel also concluded that while the domestic
transformer industry might have suffered injury from the
increased imports, the cause of this injury was not the 
imports from Finland which 'constituted an almost 
insignificant part' of the overall sales in the relevant 
product.
The panel decision was rendered on the basis of Article
VI of the GATT and not the Code provisions. The
explanation for this is while simple; while Finland was 
an original signatory to the Code, New Zealand did not 
accept the obligations contained in the Code until 1988.
*®* New Zealand Anti-Dumpina Proceedings Against 
Electrical Transformers From Finland. GATT BISD, 32nd 
Supplement 55 (1986).
407 Ibid, Para, 4(6).
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Hence, since New Zealand was the subject of the 
complaint, proceedings could not be brought under the 
Code.
Interestingly, the panel made none but the most 
superficial reference to the terms of the 1979 Code in 
reaching its conclusions. This is slightly unusual in 
that such a reference could have been justified on the 
basis that the Code provided customary guidelines as to 
the applicable law.
The report of the panel was adopted by the Council in 
1985 without objection.*®® This is not surprising since 
neither of the disputants exercised sufficient authority 
to block the adoption of the report. The case itself 
therefore provides an example of how the dispute- 
settlement procedure can work when neither the interests 
of the United States or the European Union are involved.
Australian Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Electric 
Transformers From Finland
This case concerns electrical equipment designed to 
specification for Australian power companies.*®* The 
main legal point was the question whether the domestic 
industry which had lodged the complaint produced like 
products for the purposes of establishing standing and 
to identify the necessary degree of injury.^®
A panel was established on 25th September 1990 to
*®® GATT BISD, 32nd Supplement 55 (1986) .
*®* Australian Anti-Dumnina Duties on Imports of 
Electric Transformers From Finland. GATT Doc. L/6609 
(1992) .
*!® See E-U. Petersmann, "GATT Dispute Settlement 
Proceedings in the Field of Anti-Dumping Law", (1991) 
28:1 CMLR 69, 93.
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investigate this matter, but to date its findings have 
not been made public.*“
United States Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cement 
From Mexico
At a special meeting of the Anti-Dumping Committee in 
July 1991, Mexico lodged a complaint against U.S. anti­
dumping duties of almost 60% on imports of Mexican 
c e m e n t . F o u r  allegations were made by the Mexican 
authorities, namely that the United States authorities 
had failed to verify the standing of petitioners, that 
the injury determination finding did not meet the 
requirements of the Code, that the authorities had 
erroneously cumulated the volume and price effects of 
cement imports from Mexico and Japan, and that no causal 
link had been established between injury to the domestic 
industry and the allegedly dumped imports.*!®
The United States vigorously opposed the establishment 
of a panel into this matter but eventually a panel was 
established with terms of reference in January 1992.*** 
The panel's findings were reported to the Anti-Dumping 
Committee in October 1992.*!®
Once again, the panel found against the United States 
interpretation of its obligations under the Code. The 
investigation was held to be inconsistent with Article 
5(1) of the Code because the U.S. authorities had not
*!^ Annual Report of the Anti-Dumpina Committee. GATT 
BISD, 37th Supplement 297, 300 (1991).
412 GATT Doc. ADP/51 (1991).
*!® GATT, Activities Report 1991 (1992), 64.
*^* Annual Report of the Anti-Dumping Committee. GATT 
BISD, 38th Supplement 82 (1992).
4!5 q aTT, Activities Report 1992 (1993), 34.
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satisfied themselves prior to initiation that the 
petition had been made on behalf of producers of all or 
almost all of the producers in the regional market. The 
panel further concluded that imposition of the duties 
was inconsistent with Article 1 of the Code and 
'recommended* that the Committee request the United 
States to revoke that anti-dumping duty order and 
reimburse any duties paid or deposited under this order. 
In view of these findings, the panel stated that it was 
not necessary to issue findings on the other issues 
raised by Mexico.
The matter has not yet been resolved.*!* certainly the 
United States has not yet revoked the order and the 
disputants have advised the Anti-Dumping Committee that 
they are 'seeking a mutually satisfactory solution' to 
the dispute.*!^ In other words, the dispute will not be 
resolved on the basis of the findings of the panel but 
on a bilateral settlement of the matter.
United States Anti-Circumvention Measures Imposed on 
Colour Picture Tubes From Canada and Mexico
Both Canada and Mexico initiated consultations within 
the Anti-Dumping Committee with the United States in 
respect of anti-circumvention investigations conducted 
against imports of colour picture t u b e s . I n  fact, no 
panel was established to review this matter since the 
final determination of the United States authorities was
4!6 GATT, Focus. No. 109, 4 (1994).
*!^ Annual Report of the Anti-Dumoinq Committee. GATT 
BISD, 39th Supplement 391.
*!® United States Anti-Circumvention Measures on 
Colour Picture Tubes from Canada and Mexico. GATT Docs. 
ADP/50 and ADP/52 (1990).
197
that no circumvention had occurred.*!* The matter was 
therefore removed from the agenda of the Committee prior 
to any investigation.
This particular dispute is, however, of interest because 
the pressure placed on the United States authorities by 
the mere raising of the complaint may have been a 
significant factor in the final negative determination 
in the investigation. It is clear from other panel 
investigations, and in particular the panel report in 
European Union Regulation on Imports of Parts and 
Components From Japan, that the United States is acutely 
sensitive of its anti-circumvention legislation.*^® In 
its own submissions in that case, the United States 
argued strenuously to distinguish its own laws from 
those of the European Union even although its own laws 
were not being scrutinized.*^! The desire to avoid a 
negative finding in a panel investigation may have been 
sufficient to persuade the American authorities to alter 
their findings in order to secure this objective.
European Union Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Audio Cassettes From Japan
In October 1992, Japan continued its attack on the 
European Union's anti-dumping legislation, this time by 
requesting the establishment of a panel to investigate 
the imposition of anti-dumping duties on the importation 
of audio cassettes originating in J a p a n . T h e  case
*^* Annual Report of the Anti-Dumpina Committee. GATT 
BISD, 38th Supplement 82 (1992).
420 GATT Doc. L/6657.
*^! Ibid, Paras 4.34-4,41.
*22 GATT, EEC - Imposition of Anti-Dumpina Duties on 
Imports of Audio Cassettes From Japan. GATT Doc. ADP/85 
(October 1992).
_____________
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followed the imposition of provisional anti-dumping 
duties ranging between 0.4% and 80.20% on imports of 
audio tapes in cassettes in November 1990*^ ® followed by 
definitive duties in May 1991 ranging between 2.6% and 
25.5%.*^*
The essence of the Japanese complaint was the concern 
that the European Union had failed to comply with the 
terms of the Code as regards the determination of 
dumping, the determination of injury and the finding of 
a causal connection between both of these elements. In 
other words, the Japanese complaint went to the very 
heart of European Union substantive anti-dumping law. 
Violations of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Code were
alleged by Japan.
The views of the European Commission on the nature of 
the complaint are of note at this point. After reporting 
the emergence of the dispute, the Commission expressed 
the view that its findings:
*...were made after the investigation, carried out 
according to Community legislation which is in full 
conformity with the substantive and procedural 
requirements of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code, had 
shown clear and conclusive evidence of both dumping 
and injury.
Nevertheless, the Japanese complaint contained 
potentially damaging allegations. It contended that the 
methodology employed by the European Union in the
*^® O.J. L313/5 (13/11/90).
*2* O.J. L119/35 (14/5/91).
425 European Commission, Eleventh Annual Report From 
the Commission to the European Parliament on the 
Community's Anti-Dumoino and Anti-Subsidv Activities. 
COM (93) 516 Final (1993), 94.
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calculation of dumping margins is biased against 
exporters and that the investigation failed to establish 
that it was these goods which had caused injury. 
Although the European Commission had found injury in 
only one state, it had applied the anti-dumping duty on 
a European Union-wide basis.
The panel report, issued in May 1995, upheld many of 
these criticisms including the claim that EU anti­
dumping calculations manufactured dumping margins by 
making asymmetrical adjustments for indirect selling 
e x p e n s e s . T h e  European Union has indicated that it 
will oppose the adoption of this report and can block 
its adoption by the Council indefinitely since the 
complaint was initiated under the GATT procedure and not 
the revised WTO system.^*
European Union Anti-Dumping Procedures for Establishing 
Duty as a Cost
In October 1992, Japan requested consultations on the 
methodology whereby the European Commission appropriates 
duties as a cost of production in constructing export 
prices.^* The interesting point is that the European 
Court was asked earlier to adjudicate the same points 
being brought at the international level.
In NMB (Deutschland] and Ors v EC Commission. The Court
426 GATT, Activities Report 1992 (1993), 29.
427 GATT Secretariat Press Release, EEC - Anti- 
Dumning Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes From Japan 
(May 1995).
*28 Statement by Dr Hans-Adolf Neumann, Chef de 
Unité, DGIC, European Commission made at the 8th 
European Trade Law Association Conference, Brussels, 
November 11, 1995.
429 See text, infra Chapter 10.
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was requested to consider applications made by three 
European Union subsidiaries of a Japanese company.*®® 
These companies had requested refunds of anti-dumping 
duties which had been partially rejected by the 
Commission which had inflated the dumping margins by 
deducting the anti-dumping duties paid from the resale 
prices of each subsidiary to first independent buyers. 
This practice, it was claimed, caused discrimination 
since independent importers (mostly domestic) and 
related importers (mostly foreign subsidiaries) were 
treated differently for the purposes of refunds without 
objective justification.
The Court rejected these arguments by applying 
Community/Union law and, in particular, recognised that 
although violations of the Code may be invoked as an 
argument that the European Union's anti-dumping 
regulation had not been correctly applied, this was not 
the case on the facts presented. Hence, the applications 
were dismissed in their entirety.
Again we must await to see if a panel will be 
constituted on this matter. If so, an interesting clash 
of legal interpretation may develop between the judgment 
of the Court on the one hand and the findings of the 
panel on the other hand.
United States Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh 
and Chilled Atlantic Salmon From Norway
In July 1991, Norway requested the establishment of a 
panel to review the compatibility of definitive duties 
on imports of fresh and chilled Atlantic Salmon into the
430 Case C188/88 [1992] ECR I 1689.
201
United states.*®! The panel ruled on the matter in 
November 1992.*®^
The dispute centred on the selection of third country 
surrogates when there are no sales of like products in 
the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of 
an exporting country and the adjustments made to the 
export price and the domestic price to establish the 
same level of trade. In both cases, the panel found 
against the United States.*®®
The report was submitted to the Anti-Dumping Committee 
in February 1993 but was only adopted in April 1994 due 
to the opposition of the United States.*®* The United 
States has not yet amended its laws at this point to 
comply with the ruling of the panel.
Canadian Anti-Dumping Duties on Beer From the United 
States
The final dispute which can be considered in this 
context concerns the establishment of a panel to 
investigate anti-dumping duties imposed by the Canadian 
International Trade Tribunal on imports of American beer 
into British Columbia.
The United States challenged the validity of the 
regional industry analysis which was conducted. 
Specifically, the United States contended that, as a
4®! GATT, United States Anti-Dumpina Measures on 
Fresh and Chilled Salmon From Norway. GATT Doc. ADP/61 
(October 1991).
*32 GATT, Annual Report of the Anti-Dumoina 
Committee. GATT BISD, 38th Supplement 82, 85 (1992).
*®® GATT, Activities Report 1992 (1993), 37.
*®* GATT, Focus No. 109, 4 (1994).
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legal matter under the express terms of the Gode, there 
was no concentration of dumping imports into the 
province of British C o l u m b i a . N o  panel report has yet 
been published on this matter.^*
(4) Tentative Conclusions
It is distressing that after more than thirty years and 
numerous rounds of trade negotiations, the issues that 
first arose in 19 60 continue to plague the international 
system for the regulation of anti-dumping measures. 
Although it cannot be denied that anti-dumping 
mechanisms have become more sophisticated over the 
course of the last three decades, the international 
rules have not evolved in response.
There are a number of reasons for the failure of the 
international system to impose a normative effect on the 
anti-dumping activities of states, particularly, as we 
have seen, those of the United States and the European 
Union. From a legal perspective, one could point to the 
inherent vagueness of the rule that allow two states to 
interpret the same rules in completely différent ways, 
neither being fully consistent with the Code 
obligations. Experience shows that, given any discretion 
unilaterally to decide their obligations, the United 
States and the Union will opt for the interpretation 
which allows for expansion in the scope and volume of 
anti-dumping measures.
Most of the legal loopholes that have been exploited by 
the United States and the European Union will be 
discussed in Chapters 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the present
435 GATT, Activities Report 1992 (1993), 30.
Annual Report of the Anti-Dumping Committee. GATT 
BISD, 39th Supplement 391.
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work. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that, if any 
subsequent agreement is to meet with any degree of 
success, it must tackle these issues head on, and 
establish rules that deal squarely with the matter 
rather that obscure the issue. Undoubtedly this is 
easier said than done, and the present discussions on 
anti-dumping at the Uruguay Round prove this to be true. 
But if the international consensus is that abuses of 
anti-dumping measures must cease, such a system is 
absolutely essential.
One strange phenomenon of the Code has been, until 
recently at least, the relative lack of international 
litigation that has been aroused by its existence. Given 
that the existence of wide-spread violations is common 
knowledge within the international trade fraternity, it 
is strange that more signatories have not challenged 
measures believed to be inconsistent with the Code.
At the same time, it is clear that Japan has recently 
learned of the value of using this apparatus but it is 
not clear to what extent this strategy has been adopted 
in order to put leverage on the European Union on the 
anti-dumping negotiations which took place in the 
context of the Uruguay Round.
(B) The Subsidies Code 1979
The scheme followed by the 1979 Code built upon the 
existing obligations imposed by the relevant terms of 
the GATT; a contracting party continued to be at liberty 
to impose countervailing duties on products benefitting 
from subsidies, provided that such products caused, or 
were likely to cause, injury to a domestic industry.^?
See C.H. Cosgrove, "Technical Analysis of the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement", (1979) 
11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 1497; and Evans, "Subsidies
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To fortify the earlier obligations, a number of 
additional procedural duties were introduced in an 
unsuccessful attempt to ensure the objective and proper 
adminstration of countervailing actions and to mitigate 
the possibility of the perversion of this mechanism for 
protectionist motives.
(1) Brief outline of content
(a) Countervailable subsidies
The 1979 Subsidies Code does not define a 
countervailable subsidy but, Article 4(2) of the Code 
reformulates the requirement of Article VI(3) of the 
GATT that contracting parties confine their assessment 
to the 'estimated amount of the subsidy or bounty'.
The same article declares that it is desirable that the 
imposition of the duty is permissive, and that in cases 
where a duty less than the amount of the subsidy will 
suffice to remove the injury to a domestic industry, the 
lesser amount should be applied.^* Unfortunately, this 
mitigating rule has not been widely adopted by 
signatories and, for example, the United States 
authorities are prevented by statute from employing this 
rule in the calculation of countervailable subsidies.
Signatories are also urged to develop an understanding 
setting out the criteria for the calculation of the
and Countervailing Duties in GATT: Present Law and
Future Prospects", (1977) 3 Int'l Trade Law Journal,211.
438 Article 4(1), 1979 Subsidies Code.
Section 101, Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 
amending section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 93 Stat. 
144 (1979).
205
amount of a s u b s i d y . in fact, the Group of Experts 
established by the Subsidies Committee did arrive at a 
set of rules on the Application of the Concept of 
Specificity in the Calculation of the Amount of a 
Subsidy^S but these were never adopted due to the 
opposition of the United States. The absence of 
rules on this point encouraged the development of 
quantification rules on a state-by^state basis.
The result is that no detailed rules are specified for 
the measurement of a countervailable subsidy, although 
it is clear that both export and domestic subsidies 
remained susceptible to countervailing duties.
(b) Material injury
Administering authorities are instructed to examine, on 
an objective basis, two main economic trends in 
assessing injury; (a) the volume of subsidised imports 
and their effect on prices in the domestic market; and
(b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic 
producers of such products.
An analysis of the impact of subsidized imports on the 
relevant domestic industry must include an 'evaluation 
of all relevant economic factors and indices having a 
bearing on the state of the industry*. These indices 
include: (a) actual and potential decline in output,
sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on 
investment, or utilization of capacity; factors
Interpretative note 15 to Article 4(2), 1979
Subsidies Code.
GATT Doc. SCM/W/89 (1986).
Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT 
BISD, 34th Supplement, 186, 188 (1988).
443 Article 6(1), 1979 Subsidies Code.
___ ________
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affecting domestic prices; (b) actual and potential 
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, 
wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investment; 
and (c) in the case of agriculture, whether there has 
been an increased burden on governmental support.^*
(c) Domestic industry
Identification of the relevant domestic industry is 
important for the demarcation of a specific group of 
producers or manufacturers that can be singled out for 
the application of the injury test. The general rule is 
that the domestic industry is constituted by:
"...the domestic producers as a whole of the like 
products or those of them whose collective output 
of the product constitutes a major proportion of 
total domestic production of those products.
The relevant domestic industry therefore consists of the 
producers of the identical product, together with 
producers of 'like products'.
(d) Causation
A nexus must exist between the subsidy and material 
injury to a domestic industry before countervailing 
duties can be imposed.^* Further, a countervailing duty 
can only remain in force for as long as, and to the 
extent necessary, to counteract the subsidisation that
444 Article 6(3), 1979 Subsidies Code.
Article 6(5) , 1979 Subsidies Code; Article 16(1) , 
Second Subsidies Code.
446 Articles 2(1) and 4(4), 1979 Subsidies Code
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is causing the injury.
(2) Issues not regulated
The main issue not covered by the 1979 Code must be the 
question of anti-circumvention measures. This allowed 
both the United States and the European Union to 
unilaterally develop such measures. The legality of both 
of these mechanisms have been questioned in a GATT 
context although only the laws of the European Union 
have been declared incompatible with the terms of the 
General Agreement not, it should be noted, the terms of 
the Subsidies Code.
(3) Dispute settlement and implementation
The function of the Subsidies Committee has been 
considered in sufficient detail earlier in this work'*^ *, 
and it is not proposed to consider its work further at 
this point. The limits of its ability effectively to 
control the behaviour of the signatories has been 
considered too often to merit further discussion. It 
only remains to consider some of the major cases which 
have involved issues within the scope of the Subsidies 
Code and to decide what degree of normative influence 
was exercised by the substantive provisions of the Code 
as applied by the Subsidies Committee itself.
United States Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Pork From Canada
A panel was established to investigate a complaint by 
Canada that the United States' assessment of
Article 4(9) , 1979 Subsidies Code; Article 20(1) ,Second Subsidies Code.
448 See text supra, pp.54-59.
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countervailing duties on pork products exceeded the 
subsidy conferred by the Canadian government.** The 
United States had initiated an investigation into 
imports of live swine and fresh, chilled and frozen pork 
from Canada after a complaint was lodged by the American 
National Pork Producers' Council. Although affirmative 
decisions were rendered by the DOC, the US Court of 
International Trade only upheld the findings against 
live swine.
After the publication of this ruling, the US Congress 
amended the Tariff Act of 1930. in 1988 through the 
Trade and Competitiveness Act. This added a new 
provision intended to allow the possibility that a 
countervailing duty could be levied on agricultural 
products in excess of any direct subsidies granted if 
subsidies on inputs could be attributed to the finished 
final product.*0 Another complaint was filed and this 
time the DOC made affirmative final determinations of 
subsidisation.** Pork producers were therefore held 
liable for subsidies that had been granted, not directly 
to them, but to producers of their inputs.
** United States - Countervailing Duties on Fresh. 
Chilled and Frozen Pork From Canada. GATT Doc. DS7/R 
(September 1990); GATT BISD, 38th Supplement 30 (1991).
Section 77IB, to the statute, which read;
"In the case of an agricultural product processed 
from a raw agricultural product in which
(a) the demand for the prior stage product is 
substantially dependent on the demand for the 
latter stage product, and
(b) the processing operation adds only limited 
value to the raw commodity,
subsidies found to be provided to either producers 
or processors of the product shall be deemed to be 
provided with respect to the manufacture, 
production, or exportation of the processed 
product."
** Fresh. Chilled and Frozen Pork From Canada. 
Federal Register, Vol. 54, 30,774 (1989).
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Canada brought a complaint requesting the panel to find 
that the United States, by levying a countervailing duty 
in excess of the amount of the subsidy determined to 
have been granted on the production of pork products, 
had failed to comply with the terms of Article VI (3) of 
the GATT.*^ In effect, the panel was asked to rule on 
the consistency of Section 77IB with Article VI(3) of 
the GATT.
The panel interpreted Article VI(3) strictly, on the 
ground that it constituted an exception to the general 
rule that imports must not be subject to charges other 
than ordinary customs duties.*^ This finding had two 
main consequences. First, the onus was on the United 
States, as the party invoking the exception, to 
demonstrate that it had met the requirements of Article 
VI(3). Secondly, in any case, the terms of Article VI(3) 
were to be construed contra oroferentum. Applying these 
tests, the panel found that:
"According to this clear wording, the United States 
may impose a countervailing duty on pork only if a 
subsidy has been determined to have been bestowed 
on the production of pork; the mere fact that trade 
in pork is affected by the subsidies granted to 
producers of swine is not sufficient."**
■il.
The panel also dismissed the policy arguments put 
forward by the United States that the agricultural 
sector was entitled to special treatment, a status 
recognised in the provisions of the Subsidies Code for
*2 Ibid, Para. 3.1.
*^  Article 11(1)(b), General Agreement.
** Supra note 451, Para, 4.8.
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the treatment of subsidies in general.**
Although the panel's decision was introduced into the 
Council in November 1990, the United States has 
successfully resisted its adoption. The United States 
has argued that the issues raised in the report were the 
subject of discussions between the parties in the 
context of the Canada-U.S. FTA, a position that Canada 
strenuously rejected.** Canada has adopted the position 
that the binational settlement panels are unrelated to 
the GATT proceedings and hence the report should be 
adopted.
However, the United States was resilient in blocking the 
adoption of the report and initially refused to amend 
its legislation or return the cash deposits taken on 
Canadian pork imports. Eventually, the United States 
allowed the adoption of the report after the two 
bilateral panels established to investigate broadly 
similar matters found against the United States as 
well. *37
Canadian Countervailing Duties on Imports on 
Manufacturing Beef From the EEC
The facts of this case, briefly stated, were that the 
CCA submitted a complaint under the Canadian Special 
Import Measures Act requiring the Canadian Import 
Tribunal to investigate allegations of subsidies on 
European imports of boneless manufacturing beef.** The
*33 Ibid, Para. 4.7.
*56 GATT, Activities Report 1990 (1991), 58-59.
*37 GATT, Activities Report 1991 (1992) , 51.
*3® Canadian Countervailing Duties on Imports on 
Manufacturing Beef From the EEC. GATT Doc SCM/85(October 1987), not yet adopted.
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CCA was an association of producers of live cattle.** 
The group was one of many supplying the industry 
manufacturing boneless beef. After an investigation, the 
Canadian authorities held that the CCA had standing to 
lodge a complaint on the ground that the organisation 
was one of a number involved in the 'continuous 
sequential process' of manufacturing boneless beef.***
The European Union brought this decision before the 
Subsidies Committee on the ground that, by allowing the 
CCA standing to bring a complaint, Canada was in 
violation of its obligations under the 1979 Code and in 
particular Article 2(1). During the course of the 
investigation, both Australia and the United States 
lodged memoranda in support of the Canadian position.**
Both parties were agreed that Article 2(1) of the 1979 
Code defined the standing of petitioners to lodge a 
complaint. However, while the Union maintained that the 
concept was to be construed in narrow terms, and 
consistent with Article 6(5) of the Code, Canada argued 
that there was no specific definition of 'affected 
industries' and that, in these circumstances, 
signatories were free to define the scope of the concept 
themselves.
In arriving at its findings, the panel adopted a 
legalistic approach. In particular, it examined the 
legal sources and authority of the parties' 
arguments.*^ Although the panel clearly adopted a
** Ibid, Para 2.2.
*** On the CIT findings, see W.A. Kerr, "The Recent
Findings on the Canadian Import Tribunal Regarding Beef 
Originating in the EEC", (1987) 13 World Competition 15.
** Ibid, Paras 4.1-4.5 and Paras 4.6-4.8.
*^  Ibid, Para, 5.6.
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teleological approach to the interpretation of Article 
2(1) - referring to the purpose of the provision and
reconciling its function with the other terms of the 
Code - it gave little consideration to the economic 
arguments advanced by Canada. It dismissed the Canadian 
submissions relating to 'continuous sequential process' 
and 'functional dedication' by rejecting the claim for 
support for these notions in the preamble to the Code.
Instead, the panel held that Article 2(1) must be 
defined in terms compatible with the concept of 
'domestic industry' in Article 6(5).*^ Reviewing the 
travaux nreparatiores from the negotiation of the Code, 
the panel concluded that the draughtsmen had intended to 
give this concept a narrow definition. In these 
circumstances, the CCA was ineligible to raise a 
complaint against European imports because it did not 
represent an industry engaged in the manufacture of a 
like product.
In their decision, the panel emphatically rejected the 
proposition that signatories were entitled to determine 
standing according to their gloss on the terms of the 
Code. However, this case is a prime illustration of a 
signatory taking advantage of the vagueness of the Code 
to engage in unilateral interpretations of its 
international obligations. It evidences the principal 
defect in any attempts to regulate international 
behaviour - that detailed substantive rules and 
effective procedures must be created in order to deter 
unilateral interpretation.
This report has been blocked by the Canadian 
representative on the Subsidies Committee, ostensibly on 
the ground that the European Union and the United States
463 Ibid, Para. 5.11.
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have been permitted to prevent the creation of a 
consensus for the adoption of reports that have gone 
against their interests. The Canadian government has 
successfully maintained its opposition to the adoption 
of the report despite the pressures imposed by the 
European Union.**
United States Definition of Industry Concerning Wine and 
Grape Products
The next case deals with a similar issue, namely the 
right of a producers group to be considered part of a 
domestic industry for the purposes of initiating a 
complaint against a particular foreign import alleged to 
have been subsidised.
The European Union complained to the Subsidies Committee 
that the United States definition of wine producing 
industry infringed Article 6(5) because it was too 
broad.*3 The original United States legislation 
defining 'domestic industry' for the purposes of 
countervailing investigations broadly followed the 
definition provided in the 1979 Code.** But, the Trade 
and Tariff Act of 1984 amended this section to 
specifically provide that for wine and grape products, 
the term 'industry* expressly includes the domestic 
producers of the principal raw agricultural product, 
namely grapes.*? This allowed grape growers to petition 
the DOC for the imposition of countervailing duties on
*3* Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT 
BISD, 39th Supplement 407 (1993).
** United States - Definition of Industrv Concerning 
Wine and Grape Products. GATT Doc. SCM/71 (March 1986); 
GATT BISD, 39th Supplement 436 (1993).
** Section 771, Tariff Act of 1930.
*®7 Section 612(a) (1) , Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
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imports of subsidised wines from Germany France and 
Italy.
Although the subsequent investigation resulted in a 
negative determination by the USITC, the Union 
nevertheless proceeded with the complaint because the 
USITC decision was appealed to the Court of 
International Trade and because the U.S. Congress was, 
at that time, considering bills to seek to extend the 
definition of domestic industry applicable to processed 
products to producers of the raw agricultural inputs.** 
This would permit agricultural producers to petition 
against a broad range of imports, not necessarily 
directly related to their own.
The critical question that the panel had to decide was 
whether grapes producers constituted part of the same 
domestic industry as American wine producers. Only a 
domestic industry affected by the imports can initiate 
a complaint according to the terms of Article 6(5). 
Since the grape producers were not producers of 
identical products, the panel considered whether grapes 
were 'like products' to wine.** However, the panel did 
not provide a detailed analysis of the method it 
employed to make this determination. It merely stated 
that:
"In view of the precise definition of 'domestic 
industry' the Panel considered that producers of 
the like products could be interpreted to comprise 
only producers of wine,"*?°
The existence of two separate industries in the United
** Supra note 465, Para. 3.5.
** Footnote 18 to the Code defines 'like product*
470 Supra note 465, Para. 4.2.
215
States, namely an industry comprising wine-grape growers 
on the one hand, and an industry comprising the wineries 
on the other therefore precluded grape-growers from 
initiating a complaint against imports of European 
wine * *7^
In a clash of two giants such as the United States and 
the European Union, it will be no surprise to learn that 
the final panel report has not yet been adopted by the 
Subsidies Committee even although it was submitted in 
March 1986.^%
The interesting point is that the offending measure in 
U.S. trade legislation was removed by the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Hence, even although 
the incriminating measures have been removed, the United 
States opposed the adoption of the report while the 
European Union vigorously advocated its adoption. In the 
final analysis this matter is more of a clash of egos 
than of principle. The report was finally adopted by the 
Subsidies Committee in April 1992.
United States Countervailing Duties on Non-Rubber 
Footwear From Brazil
This decision was a technical question relating to the 
non- application of the injury test in countervailing 
investigations into imports of Mexican footwear when the 
measures were imposed prior to 1980 when the 1979 Code 
became effective. In essence the panel ruled that the 
continued application of the duties after 1980 was
471 Ibid, Para. 4.6.
*77 Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee. GATT
BISD, 38th Supplement 95, 98 (1992).
*7* Annual Report of the Subsidies Committee, GATT
BISD, 39th Supplement 407 (1993).
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consistent with the terms of the Code and the 
obligations of the United States under that 
agreement. *7"^
In an unusual twist, Brazil objected to the adoption of 
the report on the grounds that the panel's 
interpretation of the GATT and the Code constituted a 
clear violation of the MFN o b l i g a t i o n . I n  fact, 
Brazil even attempted to have another panel investigate 
the matter under the general provisions of the GATT and, 
in particular. Article I.*7® No break-through in this 
impasse has yet been r e a c h e d . ^ 7
Canadian Countervailing Duty on United states Grain Corn
The next dispute considered by the Subsidies Committee 
on countervailing duty matters and in which a report has 
been rendered concerns a Canadian investigation into 
imports of U.S. grain and whether the United States 
position as the world's dominant grain producer was 
significant for a determination of in jury. *7» The 
Canadian Import Tribunal had held that this was a 
significant factor in establishing injury since it 
related to the dramatic decline in world corn prices.
The panel report concluded that the CIT determination 
was not consistent with the terms of the Code, and in 
particular Article 6, because it had not determined on
*7* United States Countervailing Duties on Non-Rubber 
Footwear From Brazil. GATT Doc SCM/94 (1989).
475 GATT, Activities Report 1989 (1990), 104.
476 GATT, Activities Report 1990 (1991), 72.
*77 GATT, Activities Report 1991 (1992), 59.
*7* Canadian Countervailing Duties on United States
Grain Corn. GATT Doc SCM/140 (1992); GATT BISD, 39th
Supplement 411 (1993).
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the basis of positive evidence that the injury to the 
Canadian industry had occurred as a result of imports of 
subsidised grain corn from the United States, 
Accordingly, the panel 'recommended* that Canada amend 
its countervailing measure to conform with the Code.
The findings of the panel were adopted by the Subsidies 
Committee in March 1992 but Canada has stated that the 
adoption of the report will not prevent Canada taking 
action in the future against subsidised imports.*?*
United States Countervailing Duties on Imports of 
Softwood Lumber From Canada
This has been one of the longest running disputes in 
United States-Canadian trade relations. In October 1986, 
a controversial determination was made in a
countervailing duty investigation against imports of 
softwood lumber imported into the United States from 
Canada, The countervailable duty was assessed at 15% but 
in a bilateral understanding the Canadian government 
agreed to impose a 15% export tax in return for the 
suspension of the duties.
The Canadian government introduced changes to its 
support programmes as part and parcel of this 
understanding and eliminated the export charge once 
these changes had been implemented. On September 3,
1991, Canada gave the United States notice of its
intention to terminate the understanding. On October 4, 
1991, the ITA self-initiated a countervailing
investigation for these products and immediately Canada 
requested consultations on the matter.
*7* GATT, Activities Report 1991 (1992), 61-62. 
480 GATT, Activities Report 1991 (1992), 62-63.
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Canada alleged that the self-initiation of the 
investigation contravened Article 2 of the Subsidies 
Code which required that authorities may only proceed in 
such circumstances if they have sufficient evidence of
(a) a subsidy; (b) material injury; and (c) a casual 
connection between subsidisation and injury. In December 
1991 a panel was established to investigate the issues 
raised in the dispute.
In February 1993, the panel issued its findings which 
found that the investigation has been properly conducted 
in a manner consistent with the requirements of the 
Code. In its view, the US Department of Commerce had 
sufficient evidence of a subsidy in respect of Canadian 
stumpage pricing practices and a threat of material 
injury to domestic producers following the termination 
of the understanding. In fact, this is one of the very 
few cases were a panel has found in favour of the 
respondent.*2 To date, the panel report has not been 
adopted by the Subsidies Committee but Canada is 
unlikely to accept this result graciously.
United States Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh 
and Chilled Salmon From Norway
This was the parallel complaint to that lodged by Norway 
against United States anti-dumping duties against the 
same products.** In fact the countervailing duties 
imposed by the United States amounted only to 2.27%. A 
panel was convened in September 1991 and rendered its 
report in December 1992 finding in favour of the United
United States Countervailing Measures Against 
Exports of Softwood Lumber From canada. GATT Doc, 
SCM/154 (1993), not yet reported,
GATT, Activities Report 1992 (1993), 32-33.
** See text, supra, pp.200-201.
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States,*** The imposition of the duties was not 
inconsistent with the terms of the Subsidies Code. The 
panel report has recently been adopted by the Subsidies 
Committee. ***
(4) Tentative Conclusions
In addition to the legal problems that arise in the 
actual operation of the Subsidies Code, other issues are 
raised by the asymmetry of the rights of signatories to 
impose countervailing duties to prevent injurious 
subsidies and the more limited rights of affected 
parties to seek redress through the international 
machinery established to provide redress.**
Since no substantive obligations were incurred by 
signatories in relation to the use of domestic 
subsidies, the only available remedy to counter such 
measures is the imposition of countervailing duties, a 
unilateral measure that detracts from the principles of 
multilateralism embodied in the GATT. This has been 
reflected in the policy of the United States to impose 
duties on products that have benefitted only from 
generalised domestic subsidies.
As regards dispute settlement and implementation, quite 
clearly the process is extremely ineffective as 
contesting parties, especially the United States and the 
European Union can block the coalescence of a consensus
-----------------------
*** United States Countervailing Duties on Imports of 
Fresh and Chilled Salmon From Norwav, GATT Doc SCM/149(1992) .
*85 GATT, Focus. No. 109, 4 (1994).
** See J. Terry, "Sovereignty, Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties in the Context of the Canada- 
United States Trading Relationship", (1988) 46
University of Toronto Faculty Law Review, 48-95, 64-68.
____________________________________________________ ___________ __
220
for adoption in the Subsidies Committee. Further, the
recommendations made by panels are rarely implemented 
and, in the past, have been used as an excuse for
delaying adoption. At present, four new cases are
presently pending before the Subsidies Committee for
resolution.*7
(4) The Uruguay Round Attempt to Salvage A Minimum 
Degree of Restraint
(A) Anti-Dumping Measures
The negotiation of a third Anti-Dumping Agreement at the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations proved 
an exacting task. This may be attributable to one single 
factor, namely a tension developed between the major 
importing nations and the major exporting countries. The 
policy objectives of the European Union and United 
States were broadly similar: to prevent the imposition 
of more rigorous restrictions on their anti-dumping 
activities. Those of the exporting states were to put a 
straight-jacket on these countries and in particular the 
more novel forms of anti-dumping such as anti­
circumvention and anti-absorption measures.
Hence, no consensus materialised at the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations on the terms of even a 
draft Anti-Dumping Code by the time of the Brussels 
meeting in December 199 0.*® These divisions separated
*®7 Argentina Countervailing Duty Measures on Diarv 
Products from the EC; United States Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Portable Seismographs from Canada; United 
States Countervailing butv Measures on Imports of Steel 
from the EC; and Australian Couhtervailing Dutv Measures 
on Imports on Frozen Pork from Canada; Annual Report of 
the Subsidies Committee. GATT BISD, 39th Supplement 408(1993) .
*® Draft Final Act of the Uruguay Round MTNs. GATT 
Doc. MTN.TNC/W/35 (December 1990).
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the negotiating parties prior to the December 1990
discussions into two camps.** At one end of this 
spectrum were those participants requesting the adoption 
of more rigorous disciplines on the use of anti-dumping 
measures.*** At the other end were those states wishing 
to adopt rules to place new developments, such as anti­
circumvention measures, on a more solid legal
foundation. **^
At the same time, there was no agreement on a number of 
more fundamental issues such as the definition of
dumping and the definition of injury. As the background 
press briefing reports described the situation prior to 
the December 1990 meeting in Brussels:
"Successive drafts for a comprehensive revision of 
the Anti-Dumping Code have failed owing to the 
diverging and indeed diametrically opposed 
interests aired on the main p r o b l e m s . " * %
A draft revision of the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code was
rejected by most of the participants as unbalanced 
because it failed to eliminate certain perceived 
protectionist biases in the existing Code.***
*®* See E-U. Petersmann, "The Uruguay Round 
Negotiations", in E-U. Petersmann et al.. The New GATT 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Second 
edition, 1991), 501-577, 545.
*** For example, see the proposals made by the 
Japanese Study Committee on Anti-Dumping entitled 
Proposed Amendments to the GATT Anti-Dumping Code. Fair 
Trade Centre (March 1989).
*** See GATT, Activities Report 1989 (1990), 57.
*92 GATT, Press Background Briefs. November 1990, 33.
*** GATT, Focus No. 76, 2 (November 1990).
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In substantive terms, the main areas of disagreement 
related to: (a) the determination of dumping (ie. normal 
value, calculation of dumping margins, more precise 
criteria for price adjustments to ensure a 'fair 
comparison' between export price and home price, and the 
definition of like products); (b) factors relevant to
the determination of injury (ie. cumulation, 
determination of the threat of material injury); (c)
definition of industry (ie. exemption of related 
producers); (d) initiation of investigations (ie. proper 
documentation and verification of requests); (e) the
imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties (ie. 
review and refund procedures, duration and retroactive 
application of duties); and (f) anti-circumvention 
measures.***
A second draft text - known as the 'Dunkel Draft' - made 
a number of significant proposed amendments to the 
original text and met with slightly greater approval.**^ 
This initiative proved to be the necessary bridge 
between the chaos of the December 1990 Ministerial 
Meeting and the final anti-dumping agreement contained 
in the December 1993 Final Act which, for present 
purposes, will be referred to as the Third Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.**® It is useful at this stage to consider 
some of the more important provisions of the Third Anti- 
Dumping Agreement in order to determine whether or not 
these improve on the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code obstacles 
which arose in the course of the discussions.**^
*** See GATT, Activities Report 1990. 42 (July 1991) .
**3 Draft Agreement on the Implementation of Article 
VI of the GATT. GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (1991).
**® Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
GATT 1994. GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AlA-8 (December 1993).
**7 In general, see G.N. Horlick & E.G. Shea, "The 
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement", (1995) 29:1 JWT 5,
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(1) Calculation of dumping margins
The changes required in the method of calculating 
dumping margins was a contentious issue. First, a number 
of parties questioned the extent to which actual data is 
employed in establishing dumping margins as opposed to 
constructed values and estimates on the basis of the 
best information available.
The related issue of the lack of symmetry in the
comparison of normal price and export price also 
generated heated exchange. For example, if averaging was 
to be used to establish home market price, it was
questioned why this technique not be employed to
calculate the export market prices in all cases. The 
difficulties inherent in the comparison were also 
debated. Among these issues was the question of the
appropriate period for cost recovery in determining 
whether the home price is below the costs of production.
The Third Anti-Dumping Code sets out new guidelines for 
comparing the normal value of a product with the export 
price* The purpose of these guidelines is to curb the 
practice of arbitrarily creating or inflating dumping 
margins.*® For example, there are specific rules
regulating the application of exchange rates to export 
prices**, the use of weighted average values^**, the 
method of establishing comparable levels of trade**^ and 
the calculation of third country prices where there are 
inadequate sales in the country of origin.
*® Ibid, Article 2.
** Ibid, Article 2.4.1. 
3** Ibid, Article 2.4.2. 
3*^ Ibid Article 2.4.
3*7 Ibid, Article 2.2.1.
__
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In addition, Japan was successful in including within 
the Agreement a provision preventing the imposition of 
duties on products where a de minimis dumping margin is 
established. Article 5(8) of the Agreement establishes 
the de minimis rate as a dumping margin of less than two 
percent of the export price.
(2) The method of establishing material injury
The perennial issue of material injury again proved to 
be a major stumbling block to reaching a viable 
consensus on the terms of an agreement. The general 
rule, stated in Article 3(1), is that a determination of 
injury must be based 'on positive evidence and involve 
an objective examination' of both the volume of dumped 
imports and the impact of these products on domestic 
producers. The requirement of positive evidence is a 
recurring theme through Article 3 which sets down the 
standards required for a determination of injury.
In addition, new rules have been created to regulate 
cumulation of injury from two or more sources. 
Cumulation of injury may be made if (a) the margin of 
dumping established in relation to the imports from each 
country is more than de minimis and the volume of 
imports from each country is not negligible; and (b) a 
cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is 
appropriate in light of the conditions of competition 
between imported products and the conditions of 
competition between imported products and the like 
domestic products.***
Finally, a de minimis level has been established for the 
volume of dumped products when an assessment of injury 
is being made. The volume of dumped imports is normally
503 Ibid, Article 3.3.
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to be regarded as negligible if the volume of dumped 
imports from a particular country is found to account 
for less than 3% of imports unless countries which 
individually account for less an 3% of imports 
collectively account for more than 7% of imports.***
(3) Definition of industrv
The definition of domestic industry for the purposes of 
identifying interested parties and assessing injury is 
broadly the same as the earlier 1979 Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.*** No proportion of a particular industry is 
specified as being represented for the purposes of 
making a complaint and the term 'a major proportion* is 
retained. Hence, the charges made against both the 
United States and the European Union for setting this 
threshold too low will undoubtedly continue.**®
(4) Procedure for investigations and evidence
The procedural and evidential requirements for 
initiating an anti-dumping complaint have undoubtedly 
been tightened up. **7 Although initiating complaints 
remains the primary prerogative of domestic industries, 
the Agreement introduces the concept of * interested 
parties' which are granted certain rights including the 
right to present evidence and the right to be promptly 
informed of the outcome of preliminary and final 
determinations. **®
*** Ibid, Article 5.8.
*** Ibid, Article 4.
**® See text, infra Chapter 11,
**7 Supra, note 505, Article 5.
**® Article 6.11 of the Agreement defines 'interested 
parties' as (a) an exporter or foreign producer or the 
importer of a product subject to investigation, or a
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Interested parties are also given the right to have an 
opportunity to present a defence of their interests.*** 
The method and manner of making such representations is 
also regulated. In addition, the release of confidential 
information is subject to the requirement that such 
information cannot be disclosed if there is 'good cause 
shown' for preservation of confidentiality.*^*
Evidential thresholds are also raised substantially. All 
interested parties are to be given notice of the 
information on which the investigating authorities 
require and 'ample opportunity' to present in writing 
all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of 
the investigation in question,*^^
(5) The imposition of duties and termination of 
measures
Provisional duties may only be applied if an 
investigation has initiated in accordance with the 
procedural and evidential requirements set out in the 
Agreement and a preliminary affirmative determination 
has been made of dumping and consequent injury to a 
domestic i n j u r y . There is an additional requirement 
for the imposition of such duties namely that the 
authorities judge such measures necessary to prevent
trade or business association a majority of the members 
of which are producers, exporters or importers of such 
products; (b) the government of the exporting country; 
and (c) a producer of the like product in the importing 
country or a trade and business association a majority 
of the members of which produce the like product in the 
importing country.
*** Ibid, Article 6.2.
*^* Ibid, Article 6.5.
*“ Ibid, Article 6.1.
**7 Ibid, Article 7.1.
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injury being caused during the investigation.
The application of provisional measures is limited to as 
short a period as possible, not exceeding four months 
or, after a decision of such authorities, on request by 
exporters representing a significant percentage of the 
trade involved, to a period not exceeding six months.
Definitive anti-dumping duties are to remain in force 
for a maximum period of five years from the imposition 
of such duties or as long as, and to the extent 
necessary, to counteract the dumping causing injury.^* 
This is unless a review is initiated after a 
substantiated request made by or on behalf of the 
relevant domestic industry.
Two important controls are not included in the new 
Agreement. The first is that there is no compulsory 
requirement that duties are limited to an amount equal 
to those necessary to remove the material injury caused 
to the relevant domestic industry. In other words, 
national agencies continue to be entitled to impose 
duties to the greater of the margin of dumping or the 
margin of injury.
Second, there is no compulsory public interest 
requirement which would oblige national agencies to take 
into consideration the interests of consumers or other 
producers in the territory.
Ibid, Article 7.4.
Ibid, Article 11.1.
It should be noted that, at present, the European 
Commission applies both these requirements on a 
voluntary basis.
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(6) Anti-circumvention measures
The issue of anti-circumvention measures serves to 
highlight the vast differences among signatories in the 
negotiations. On the one hand, developed countries 
desired the extension of anti^dumping duties to products 
manufactured in third countries or broken down and 
assembled inside a country imposing duties on the 
finished product. These guidelines were deemed necessary 
to prevent the repetition of the successful attack on 
the anti-circumvention measures of the European 
Union.
These proposals were opposed by a Japan-Pacific Rim 
coalition on the ground that they amounted to an 
unnecessary extension of the concept of dumping to the 
internal treatment of goods within a country.
In fact, the Dunkel Draft Agreement contained a detailed 
section on the regulation of measures to prevent 
circumvention of definitive anti-dumping duties.^? 
These terms have been deleted from the text of the Third 
Anti-Dumping Agreement in whole. Consequently, there are 
no express provisions confirming the legitimacy of such 
measures. Hence, anti-circumvention measures must be 
justified in accordance with the obligations contained 
in the General Agreement itself and the terms of the 
Third Subsidies Code. For the most part, guidance may be 
obtained in this matter from the panel decision in the 
finding against the European Union's anti-circumvention 
measures.
EEC Regulation on Imports of Parts and 
Components. GATT Doc. L/6657 (March 1990).
Article 12, Draft Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the GATT. GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (1992).
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(B) Countervailing Duty Measures
The regulation of countervailing duties through the 
Second Subsidies Agreement proved slightly easier than 
the control of anti-dumping measures. As noted earlier, 
the Final Act contains a new Subsidies Code which 
follows its predecessor in regulating both subsidies and 
countervailing measures.^* For the most part, the 
Agreement's provisions attempt to close the loop-holes 
in the terms of the 1979 Code without adding any 
significantly new concepts. At least in terms of
substantive obligations, the new Agreement even follows 
the contours of that agreement.
In common with its predecessor, the Second Subsidies 
Agreement consists mainly of a series of obligations 
imposed on signatories requiring them to refrain from 
certain practices or to implement procedures that 
correspond to the terms of the Agreement. The main
concepts which have been clarified are: (a) the
definition of countervailable subsidies; (b) the
relationship between regulated subsidies and 
countervailable subsidies; (c) the test of material 
injury; and (d) anti-circumvention measures.
(1) Countervailable subsidies
The new Agreement ties the concept of subsidy under the 
multilateral framework for the regulation of subsidies 
to the concept of countervailable subsidies for the 
first time. Thus, a countervailable subsidy must satisfy 
the following two conditions:
(a) there must be a financial contribution from a 
public body to a private individual which
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AlA-13 (December 1993).
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confers a benefit on that individual^*; and
(b) the subsidy must be specific with the terms of 
Article 2 of the Code.^^°
Therefore while the 1979 Code recognises that states 
possesses the right to impose duties on all kinds of 
subsidies, the Second Agreement restricts this 
discretion, although export subsidies and specific 
domestic subsidies, unless exempt, will continue to 
remain countervailable. In order to determine whether or 
not a subsidy is specific, reference must be made to 
Article 2 of the Code.^i
Unfortunately, in common with the 1979 Code, the new 
Agreement does not provide rules to quantify a 
countervailable subsidy, instead providing that any 
method used to calculate financial assistance should be 
embodied in national legislation and should be both 
transparent and adequately explained. Nevertheless, any 
legislation relating to quantification must be 
consistent with five basic standards.
519
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Article 1(1), Second Subsidies Code, 
Article 1(2), Second Subsidies Code. 
See text supra, pp.125-130.
(1) Government provision of equity capital shall 
not be considered as conferring a countervailable 
benefit unless the investment decision is inconsistent 
with the normal investment considerations of private 
investors; (2) A loan by a government does not confer a 
benefit unless there is a difference between the amount 
the firm receiving the loan pays the government for the 
loan and a comparable commercial loan available to the 
firm in the commercial money markets; (3) A loan 
guaranteed by a government shall not confer a benefit 
unless there is a difference between the amount that the 
firm receiving the guarantee paid for the loan and the 
amount that the firm would pay in the absence of the 
guarantee; (4) The provision or purchase of goods or 
services by a government shall not be considered as 
conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for 
less than adequate remuneration or the purchase is made
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Naturally the converse is also the case and where 
government assistance fails to meet these criteria a 
benefit is conferred.
A considerable degree of discretion therefore continues 
to reside with governments as to the determination of 
countervailable subsidies. No detailed rules, such as 
those proposed by the Group of Experts on the 
Measurement of Subsidies, were adopted to facilitate 
measurement of a benefit under a programme and this is 
clearly a defect in the scheme.
(2) The relationship between regulated subsidies 
and countervailable subsidies
The relationship between countervailable subsidies and 
the three categories of subsidies subject to general 
regulation - prohibited, actionable and non-actionable - 
is in fact defined by a footnote to Article 10 of the 
new Agreement. This provides that, although complaints 
may be lodged with the competent authorities at the 
international level to complain about prohibited and 
actionable subsidies, only one form of relief may be 
g r a n t e d . I n  other words, countervailing duties cannot 
be imposed on a product if countermeasures have been 
approved by the Subsidies Committee after the submission 
of a competent complaint.
Subsidies that are deemed non-actionable cannot be 
countervailed. This is consistent with the philosophy
for more than adequate remuneration; and (5) Where the 
government is the sole provider or purchaser of goods or 
services, the provision or purchase of such goods or 
services shall not be considered a benefit unless the 
government discriminates among users or providers of the goods or services; Article 14, Second Subsidies Code.
Interpretative note 1, Article 10, SecondSubsidies Code.
— _____
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that a non-actionable subsidy causes insignificant or 
limited injury. However, the fact that a subsidy is 
alleged to be non-actionable does not prevent any 
investigation being conducted to confirm this 
assessment.
(3) The method of establishing material injury
The new Agreement adopts the basic principles behind the 
1979 Code and, again, injury may take any one of three 
forms: (a) actual injury; (b) threat of injury; and (c) 
material retardation of a domestic industry. Articles 
15(2), 15(4) and 15(5) of the Second Subsidies Agreement 
are identical to Articles 6(1) (application of the tests 
relating to volume of imports and impact of imports), 
6(2) (elaboration of the volume test) and 6(3) 
(elaboration of the impact test) of the 1979 Code.
A new rule has also been adopted to tackle the problem 
of cumulation of injury. The concept of cumulated injury 
refers to the process whereby injury is assessed on the 
basis of the impact or effects of all goods of a certain 
classification from all sources, not only those 
countries that are alleged to have subsidised 
production. This process tends to discriminate against 
small foreign exporters, especially those situated in 
another country from producers benefitting from scales 
of economy who contribute more directly to causing 
injury.^
Where imports from more than one country are 
simultaneously subject to countervailing duty 
investigations, the authorities may cumulatively assess 
the effects of such imports only if two conditions are
B. Balassa, "Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures: Economic Considerations", (1989) 23:2 JWT, 63, 72-73.
,:,1|
___ ____________________________________ _______________
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satisfied:
the amount of subsidisation established in 
relation to the imports from each country is 
more than de minimis (which is not defined) 
and that the volume of imports from each 
country is not negligible as defined in 
Article 11(7); and
that a cumulative assessment of the effects of 
the imports is appropriate in light of the 
conditions of competition between imported 
products and the conditions of competition 
between the imported products and the like 
domestic product.
A related concept, the doctrine of cross-cumulation 
refers to calculations of injury based on the impact of 
both subsidised goods and all other like goods that have 
benefitted from some form of unfair competitive 
advantage, such as dumping. It is not clear how far an 
assessment of injury caused by violations of other 
unfair trade laws, such as dumping, should extend to 
countervailing investigations trade practices, but, the 
Second Subsidies Code does not address this issue.
(4) Anti-circumvention measures
The 1979 Code failed to tackle this issue but this 
situation was rectified in part in 1990 Draft Subsidies 
Agreement.^* Under its provisions, two situations would 
have justified the imposition of anti-circumvention 
duties:
when parts and components are shipped from the
Article 15(4), Second Subsidies Code
Article 12, Second Subsidies Code.
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countervailing order to the importing country 
for assembly or conversion into a product 
covered by the order, and the value of the 
parts and components imported is equal to, or 
exceeds, an as yet unspecified percentage of 
the total value of the assembled or finished 
product; and
- when parts and components are shipped from a 
country covered by a countervailing order to 
a third country for assembly or completion 
into the product covered by the order and then 
exported into the importing country, and the 
value of the parts and components again exceed 
the minimum percentage of the total value of 
the finished product,
In both these cases, signatories could apply the 
relevant duties to the imported products, although the 
manner in which this will be achieved is not yet 
settled, and there were at least two conditions applying 
to the imposition of such measures.^*
See J.H, Bello, "Anti-Circumvention Measures: 
Shifting the Gears of the Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws", (1990) 24 Int'l Lawyer 207.
528 First, in the case of parts and components 
brought straight into the importing country, the 
investigating authorities must be satisfied: (a) that
imports of the parts or components have increased since 
the enactment of the order; (b) the exporter of the 
parts or components, the producer covered by the order, 
and the assembler are related parties; (c) the most 
significant parts and components are being shipped for 
assembly or completion; and (d) the assembly or 
completion process was started, or materially expanded, after the issue of the countervailing order. Second, 
where parts of components are being brought in via a 
third country, the authorities must be satisfied: (a)
shipments of the parts or components have increased 
since the order; (b) exports to the importing country from the third country have similarly increased; (c) the 
exporter, producer and assembler in the third country 
are related parties; (d) the most significant parts and 
components are being shipped to the third country; and
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In fact, the final text of the Second Subsidies Code 
omits such provisions, a situation which mirrors that of 
the Third Anti-Dumping Code. This matter is therefore 
regulated by general principles of the GATT itself and 
the Second Subsidies Agreement.
(5) Tentative Conclusions
The Second Subsidies Agreement is not a radical overhaul 
of its predecessor and, in that respect, suffers from 
the defects outlined earlier in the text when that 
agreement was examined.
However, from a practical perspective, it is likely that 
the Second Subsidies Agreement will be accepted by a far 
greater number of signatories than its predecessor. At 
least as far as the developed contracting parties of the 
GATT are concerned, the Uruguay Round agreements are to 
be treated as a single document. A Member wishing 
concessions in a field unrelated to the obligations on 
countervailing duties will therefore be more prepared to 
accept the terms of the Second Agreement in order to 
obtain the benefits sought under the related agreements, 
particularly those concerning non-tariff barriers. As 
the former GATT Director-General pointed out, the final 
stage of the round was guided by the maxim 'nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed,
Now that the Uruguay Round negotiations have been 
successful, it is likely that the Agreement's provisions 
on countervailing duties will attract considerably more 
participants than its predecessor. The question that 
arises is whether quantity will act as a sufficient
(e) the assembly process was started or materially 
expanded since the issue of the order.
London Times, January 11, 1992, p.18.
-A . __________________
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substitute for quality.
(5) Observations
The fundamental flaw in the whole GATT regulatory system 
for administered protectionism was to permit such 
measures to be applied on a basis which deviates from 
the MFN principle. This factor alone has contributed 
most to the proliferation of such measures because it 
allowed states to grant protection to specific domestic 
industries seeking protection from competition from 
particular foreign competitors.
This feature has also been responsible for the way in 
which these measures have evolved within states and, in 
particular, the United States and the European Union. 
Quite clearly, the present shape and content of these 
mechanisms in both these countries is far removed from 
the rudimentary structures for anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties operated when the GATT was 
originally conceived. The increased sophistication of 
such measures has been stimulated by the increased 
demands for protection from domestic industries 
competing in the aggressive markets of modern times.
In such circumstances, it should not therefore be 
surprising that such measures, especially anti-dumping 
measures, have transcended their original function and 
have become instruments of protectionism. The new 
international rules on anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures must recognise that this change has occurred 
and that both types of measures will continue to be the 
predominant method of obtaining protection in the 
foreseeable future particularly as average levels of 
tariffs decline now that agreement at the Uruguay Round
___________________________________;----- i " '  - J
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has been secured.
At the same time, the desirability of allowing states to 
continue to use measures which are effectively 
unilateral in nature must be questioned. The sole 
justification for unilateral measures must be to release 
pressure built up from legitimate requests for relief 
where pursuit of an international trade complaint would 
not provide an effective relief to a particular 
industry. The proper mechanism for such relief was 
recognised in Article XIX of the GATT and continues to 
remain the same to-day: selective safeguard measures.
It is not only the relationship between the different 
types of measures of administered protection which 
requires elucidation to be more effective; some of the 
basic concepts themselves also need clarification. For 
example, it no longer serves any useful purpose to 
continue with the fallacy that anti-dumping measures are 
designed to prevent some form of predatory or target 
pricing. Evidence of such behaviour is not required for 
the imposition of anti-dumping measures and, in any 
event, relief may be obtained against such practices 
through the normal channels of anti-trust or competition 
law.
It is necessary to discontinue the pretence that anti­
dumping measures are necessary to prevent injurious 
predatory pricing and instead recognise that anti­
dumping measures are simply a method of preventing the 
flow of cheap products from one country to another. It 
is a form of protection and the rationale for such 
protection is not economic but political; to protect 
domestic economies. Pretending that there is some viable 
economic rationale for anti-dumping measures cannot 
serve any other purpose than to obfuscate the nature of 
the rules which are required to properly regulate this
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activity.
However, true to past form, the 1979 Agreement on Anti­
dumping (and countervailing duties for that matter) 
failed to provide sufficient detail to allow the 
effective functioning of regulatory norms. To a certain 
extent this is merely one feature of international rules 
in general, namely that states are reluctant to limit 
their discretion to act by agreeing precise workable 
rules. Nevertheless, the effect of the vagueness of the 
rules contained in these agreements can only serve to 
undermine their enforceability and efficacy. That this 
is true is more than evidenced in the pre-1995 
experiments into establishing legal regulations for 
these measures.
In general terms, the approach of the trade negotiators 
at the Uruguay Round in developing rules to regulate 
dumping and subsidies has been to follow the contours of 
the 1979 agreements respectively. The strategy has been 
to try to settle the applicable rules by adopting less 
imprecise definitions, guidelines and rules. This 
approach has been pursued even although the basic rules 
themselves have been ineffective.
This is also demonstrated by the fact that problems in 
the operation of the regulatory regime which arose even 
before the 1979 Codes continue to plague the 1995 
system. Here we can cite the defects in the calculation 
of normal value and export prices, the issues of 
adjustments, deductions, sampling, averaging and the 
determination of injury and causation as well as the new 
practices which have emerged in the last ten years such 
as indirect dumping, cumulation and cross-cumulation of 
injury, exchange rate fluctuations, anti-circumvention 
and anti-absorption.
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Even some of the most fundamental rules of Article VI of 
the GATT and the 1979 Code have been breached by both 
the United States and the European Union. For example, 
both countries have provisions in place which allow for 
simultaneous investigation of both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty complaints despite the prohibition 
on the imposition of such duties in Article VI. Flagrant 
violations such as these, and others we shall examine in 
due course, confirm that both Codes have, to a large 
extent, been failures.
Within the 1979 Subsidies Code, the failure to link 
prohibited or regulated international subsidies with 
countervailable subsidies was also clearly a major 
substantive defect in the whole structure. The Second 
Subsidies Code will at least partially remedy this 
situation by linking countervailable subsidies with 
actionable subsidies. Only subsidies which are non- 
actionable will be non-countervailable. This adds some 
degree of clarity to the objective of trying to link the 
concept of prohibited/actionable subsidies with 
countervailable subsidies.
At the end of the day, both the countervailing duty 
provisions of the Subsidies Code 1979 and the provisions 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 1979 were intended to 
harmonise the laws of the signatories - including the 
United States and the European Union - at a basic 
minimum level. While superficially the anti-dumping and 
countervailing laws of both these countries are 
similarly structure, the dramatic increase in the use of 
these measures since 1979 has demonstrated that 
harmonisation does not necessarily mean limitation.
It is also highly unlikely that,the negotiation of the 
new agreements for countervailing and anti-dumping 
duties will result in a decrease in the overall amount
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of such investigations by either the United States or 
the European Union. These states can simply redefine 
their laws in light of the international rules taking 
advantage of lacuna and short-comings in order to 
provide protection to their domestic industries. If the 
United States and the European Union do in fact fine- 
tune their laws in these areas, there will still remain 
the substantial administrative discretion which has been 
exercised by the administrating agencies in both 
countries. The inadequate detail in both agreements will 
ensure that this will be the case.
In addition, the failure to secure new rules to regulate 
the more exotic aspects of anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures will be exploited by both the 
United States and the European Union for operating these 
mechanisms. Thus, anti-circumvention measures and anti­
absorption measures have escaped express regulation and 
now are controlled only by general principles.
The more rigorous procedural and evidential standards 
set down in the new Agreements are not likely to produce 
a decline in the volume of anti-dumping or 
countervailing investigations pursued by the United 
States or the European Union each year. It is more 
likely that the procedure for conducting an 
investigation will become more complex and intricate as 
interested parties are granted rights to be heard during 
the proceedings. Of course, the more complicated an 
investigation becomes, the greater the expense a foreign 
producer incurs in defending its interests. Hence, there 
may be an increase in the number of investigations each 
year where foreign producers simply withdraw their 
products from the market rather than incur expenditure 
which may or may not be justified in the future.
Turning to dispute settlement and rule implementation.
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both phenomenon have been abysmal in the case of the two 
1979 Codes. The volume of cases submitted for dispute 
resolution is considerably lower than would normally be 
anticipated being no more than an average of two or 
three cases each year except for 1992 and 1993 when the 
procedure was clearly being used as part and parcel of 
the negotiating strategies of certain countries. Also, 
although the position under the Anti-Dumping Code has 
been slightly better than under the Subsidies Code, the 
panel procedure has failed to satisfy the needs of 
either the complaining or the responding parties.
Blocking adoption of panel reports has been for some of 
the most spurious reasons. Countries have refused to 
allow adverse reports to be adopted because other 
countries have been able to stall adoption in the past. 
Similarly, objections to the adoption of reports have 
been made because the panel recommended a particular 
form of relief or because the panel allegedly rendered 
erroneous legal interpretations.
It is not a trite observation to note that more panel 
reports have been blocked than have been adopted. In 
other words, if a party initiates a complaint, it has 
less than a fifty-fifty chance of having the final 
report adopted without being contested. It has even less 
chance of the defending state revising its laws to 
eliminate the mischief. It can therefore be legitimately 
concluded that the panel procedure does not provide a 
sufficiently satisfactory means of allowing effective 
complaints to be made. This has been a substantial 
contributing factor to the fragmentation of the 
effectiveness of the Codes.
It is true that this analysis has concentrated on the 
deficiencies of the international rules for measures of 
administered protection and largely ignored the rules
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which are clear and well-respected. However, to a large 
extent this is the test for effective regulation. The 
most effective rules are those which are non- 
contentious, which do not permit any degree of 
administrative discretion or which are based on easily- 
identifiable concepts. In fact, it is the degree to 
which many of the present international rules under 
examination are imprecise, or ignored, that is the cause 
of concern.
PART B
THE DIRECTION AND SHAPE OP THE TRADE 
POLICIES OP THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Direction and Shape of United States Trade 
Policy
The United States trade policy is at a crisis point. 
There is deep division within the government of that 
country as to whether trade policy is best served 
through the existing multilateral system, or through the 
pursuit of unilateral measures coupled with bilateral 
diplomacy and the negotiation of free trade agreements. 
It is a principal theme of this work that certain forces 
within the United States are at work to draw that 
country into a more unilateralist/bilateral trade 
policy.
Multilateral trade diplomacy no longer occupies as 
central a place in the formulation of United States
trade policy in the 1980s and 1990s as it did in the
first three decades of the GATT, Increasingly, the 
United States has sought to achieve policy objectives 
through a combination of unilateral trade measures and 
bilateral d i p l o m a c y . This change of direction has 
also be accompanied by an erosion in the commitment of 
the United States to respect the fundamental tenets of 
the GATT such as the binding of tariffs, the reduction
of charges on imports and the prohibitions on
discriminatory internal taxation.
Once it is realised that the continued commitment of the 
United States to the GATT, and the principle of 
multilateralism, is no longer an immutable of U.S. trade 
policy”^ I shall be able to evaluate the degree to
See J.H. Jackson, "Multilateral and Bilateral 
Negotiating Approaches for the Conduct of United States 
Trade Policy", in R.M. Stern (ed), United States Trade 
Policies in a Changing World Economy (1987), 377-401.
See the comments of former Ambassador A.W. Wolff, 
"International Competitiveness of American Industry: The 
Role of U.S. Trade Policy", in B.R. Scott & G.C. Lodge
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which a greater emphasis is now placed on bilateralism 
and unilateralism. In addition, I shall evaluate the 
primary objectives of the United States at the Uruguay 
Round to determine whether the United States has 
reaffirmed its commitment to the GATT or whether 
participation in the Round is simply a means through 
which the United States can achieve policy objectives 
which are unobtainable through a combination of 
bilateral and unilateral measures.
(1) The Erosion of the United States Commitment to the 
Fundamental Principles of the GATT
There is little doubt that the United States has made 
considerable tariff concessions during the various 
rounds of MTNs, including both the Tokyo and Uruguay 
Rounds. The Trade Policy Review of the United States 
conducted by the GATT in 1989 concluded that weighted 
average tariff rates on agricultural imports presently 
stand at 3.3 percent and at 5.0 percent for industrial 
p r o d u c t s . T h e  United States also maintains a high 
degree of tariff binding on both agricultural and 
industrial products (90% for agricultural products and 
more than 90% for industrial products).
These low average tariffs obscure the fact that in 
certain sectors, such as agriculture, textiles and 
footwear, tariff rates of over twenty five percent are 
maintained which effectively eradicates competition in 
these sectors. However, low tariff rates encourage trade 
liberalisation only if they are fairly operated. The 
United States authorities have been able to impede
(eds), United States Competitiveness in the World 
Economy (1985), 301.
532 GATT, Trade Policy Review of the United States. 
1989 (1990), 176 [hereinafter 'TPRM USA 1989'].
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imports by manipulating its laws and practices relating 
to the application of tariffs. These measures have the 
effect of increasing levels of duty to the detriment of 
foreign importers. Four common practices can be 
identified: product re-classification, customs users
fees, discriminatory internal taxes, and the removal of 
countries from the GSP programme.
(A) Unilateral Reclassification of Imports
Customs duties can be increased on certain products by 
unilaterally and periodically reclassifying them into 
headings which are subject to higher rates of duties. 
This practice has occurred in the United States tariff 
schedules despite adoption of the Harmonised Commodity 
Description and Coding System^^^ into United States 
customs laws.
As a result of such reclassification, the European Union 
has alleged that duties on a number of textile products 
have risen from 8-15% to 39%, heavy machinery products 
from 3% to 18% and certain food additives from 7% to
17.5%.#5
Similarly, in January 1989, the U.S. Customs Service 
issued a classification ruling which reclassified two 
types of vehicles -minivans and sports utility vehicles 
- as light trucks which attracted an ad valorem rate of 
duty of 25% as opposed to the rate of 2.5% previously
Protocols Relating to the Introduction of the 
Harmonized Commodity and Coding System. GATT BISD, 34th 
Supplement 5 (1988).
Sections 1201-1217, Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988. 102 Stat. 1147.
European Commission, Report on United States 
Trade Barriers and Unfair Practices 1991 (1991) 
[hereinafter the European Commission Report 1991], 17.
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applied when these products were classified as passenger 
cars.^ *^* On appeal, this reclassification was reversed 
by the Department of the Treasury for minivans, but the 
ruling stood for sports utility vehicles. It was only in 
May 1993 that the Court of International Trade issued a 
ruling overturning the Treasury's order for sports 
utility vehicles although this decision was rendered on 
the basis of American customs law and not the 
international rules.
While a Customs Valuation Agreement^^® was agreed as 
part of the Tokyo Round package of agreements and 
implemented into United States law this Agreement
does not fetter the discretion of customs officials to 
classify products on the basis of principles of national 
law that have developed over the course of time.^ The 
above examples demonstrate the almost arbitrary and 
unilateral nature of reclassification decisions by the 
American customs authorities and, while appeal is 
possible, it is not immediately to a court of law but to 
a political agency, namely the U.S. Treasury Department, 
and only thereafter to the Court of International Trade.
536 TPRM USA 1989, 221.
See European Commission, Progress Report on EU-US Relations. 15-16 (Dec 1994).
538 q^t t BISD, 26th Supplement, 116 (1980).
Section 201, Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 93Stat. 144 (1979).
On the principles, see W&J Sloane Inc v United 
States, 408 F. Supp. 1392 (Customs Ct., 1976) and Nootka 
Packaging Co v United States. 22 C.C.P.A. 464 (1975),
both reproduced in part in J.H. Barton & B.S. Fisher, 
International Trade and Investment (1986) , 402-406, 408- 413.
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(B) Illegal Introduction of Custom Users Fees
An equally pernicious practice has been the periodic 
introduction of customs users fees. The GATT does not 
prohibit charging fees to importers using the services 
of customs officials but places an obligation on all 
contracting parties to levy such fees at a charge 
commensurate with the cost of rendering the services.
In a series of statutes between 1985 and 1986, the 
United States imposed additional processing fees on a 
number of merchandise goods including vehicles, vessels, 
trains, private boats and a i r c r a f t . T h e  effect of 
these fees was to place foreign producers at an unfair 
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis United States 
manufacturers because these fees were imposed on 
selected products. Further, the measures are directed 
against the European Union and Japan as the principal 
suppliers of these goods. In other words, these charges 
provided indirect protection through de facto 
discrimination.
Another such charge, the merchandise processing fee, was 
in fact challenged by the European Union and Canada in 
the G A T T . This charge was levied on an ad valorem 
basis on all commercial merchandise entering the United 
States at a rate of 0.22% of the value of the 
merchandise.
A panel was established to investigate the matter and
Articles 11(2)(c) and VIII(l)(a), General Agreement.
Extended and modified in the Customs and Trade 
Act of 1990 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990.
Introduced in the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1986.
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concluded that the ad valorem structure of the 
merchandise processing fee was inconsistent with the 
obligations of the United States under Articles 11(2)(c) 
and VIII (1) (a) of the GATT.^  The basis of the decision 
was that the charges were levied in excess of the costs 
of the services rendered. This was tantamount to an 
additional tax on imports contrary to the principle that 
contracting parties shall not levy fees or other charges 
unless these are commensurate with the costs of the 
services rendered.
Despite the adoption of the panel report in the Council 
in November 1987, the United States was reluctant to 
implement its findings. Instead of repealing the 
measure, the United States simply changed the rates with 
the average rate being decreased but minimum threshold 
charges being i n t r o d u c e d . T h e  Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 extends the scheme for a 
further four years until September 1995 and also 
provides for the discretionary adjustment of fees.
(C) The Use of Discriminatory Internal Taxes
Article III of the GATT establishes the rule that 
internal taxes and other charges or laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting the internal sale or use of 
products should not be applied to discriminate between 
imported and domestic production of identical goods.
An example of a United States measures blatantly
^  United States - Customs Users Fees, GATT BISD, 35th Supplement 245 (1989).
The main provisions of this legislation was a 
0.17 percent ad valorem charge on all entries, a $21 
minimum fee and a $400 maximum fee, and various 
additional fees for manual entries and informal entries; Customs and Trade Act of 1990. See GATT, Focus. No. 75 (Oct 1990), 3.
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violating this obligation was the scheme introduced by 
the Suoerfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986. This legislation was ostensibly enacted to fund a 
programme financing the cleaning of hazardous waste 
sites by imposing an excise tax on petroleum at the rate 
of $0,082 per barrel for domestic crude oil and $0,117 
per barrel for imported petroleum products. Again, the 
European Union and Canada, this time joined by Mexico, 
challenged the validity of this programme in the GATT.
A panel was convened which promptly held the United 
States in violation of its GATT obligations.^ The 
panel found the excise tax on petroleum was inconsistent 
with Article 111(2) of the GATT because it was an 
internal tax which imposed charges on imports in excess 
of those applied to like domestic products. After 
immense international pressure, the Executive submitted 
a bill to Congress to correct the legislation by 
equalising the rates of tax on the imported and domestic 
products and was successful in persuading Congress to 
adopt the legislation into law.
Periodically, the United States Congress introduces 
bills designed to afford protection to American 
industries by means of discriminatory taxes. For 
example, in 1991, a luxury excise tax was introduced 
which levied a 10% tax on the retail price of passenger 
cars over $30,000.^* The European Union and Japan have 
both attacked this measure since the price of
United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain 
Imported Products. GATT BISD, 34th Supplement 136
(1988) .
See generally, D.J. Roussland & J.W. Suomela, "The Trade Effects of a U.S. Import Surcharge", (1985) 
19 JWTL 441.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. This 
measure has been extended by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993.
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domestically-produced passenger cars rarely exceeds this 
level whereas many European and Japanese producers have 
concentrated their sales efforts on the luxury car 
market in order to prevent the application of quotas.**
This tax becomes more blatantly discriminatory if it is 
considered that other luxury goods such as private 
aircraft and boats, which are predominantly manufactured 
in the United States, were excluded from the scope of 
the measure by a specific amendment. In effect this is 
tantamount to de facto discrimination, which occurs when 
a measure which is prima facie non-discriminatory has 
effects which are discriminatory or is administered in 
a discriminatory fashion. It is on this basis that the 
European Union intends to attack this measure and a 
request for the establishment of a panel on the matter 
was made to the GATT in May 1994.*®
(D) The Unjustifiable Removal of Countries from the GSP 
Programme
The United States GSP system is open to all countries 
designated by the President as being a 'beneficiary 
developing country'.*^ The scheme is governed by 
American law and there is no international agreement to 
determine how such programmes should be administered. 
Approximately 140 countries benefit from the United 
States GSP system, but the grant of benefits can be 
unilaterally withdrawn by the President.
Countries are generally removed from the GSP programme
** The European Commission estimates that 41.2% of 
European vehicles are subject to this tax in comparison 
to 2% of American-produced vehicles; European Commission 
Report 1994, 50.
550 g^tT, Focus, No. 109, 4 (1994).
Section 502(a)(1), Trade Act of 1974.
-
252
for two reasons. Either countries have achieved a degree 
of economic development that will remove them from the 
category of beneficiary developing country or they fail 
to meet the subjective standards set by the United 
States for the proper running of their economies.
On grounds of advanced economic development, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan were removed 
from the list of eligible countries with effect from 
January 1989
Other countries have been removed for a myriad of 
political reasons. Nicaragua was removed from the 
programme in March 1987 for alleged workers' rights 
violations. Paraguay, Chile, the Central African 
Republic and Myanmar were suspended from the programme 
on similar grounds between 1987 and 1989. Panama was 
suspended from the scheme on the grounds that it 
provided inadequate controls to prevent the domestic 
production and exportation of narcotics. In other words, 
this sanction is often used to punish states for not 
complying with moral standards set by the United States.
(E) Other Indicators of Change in Trade Policy 
Direction
Imports are also restricted through discriminatory 
measures taking the form of quantitative restrictions, 
discriminatory product standards, public procurement 
policy and discriminatory barriers in certain service 
sectors.
The United States also operates a series of quantitative 
restrictions designed to protect domestic farmers from 
the effects of international competition in the
TPRM USA 1989, 177.
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agricultural sector including peanuts, sugar and dairy 
products. The United States indicated at the Uruguay 
Round negotiations that these restraints will continue 
even after the negotiations have been c o n c l u d e d . I n  
addition quantitative restrictions are maintained in 
other sectors, mainly by means of import licences, many 
of which are of dubious compatibility with the 
obligations of the GATT. For example, in 1989, the GATT 
reported that questionable restrictions were imposed on 
imports of natural gas, fish and wildlife, controlled 
substances, alcoholic products and biological 
products. 534
United States legislation relating to product standards, 
testing, labelling and certification has been subject to 
much criticism despite its adherence to the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade agreed in 1979.^3 The 
United States has persistently used its product standard 
legislation to protect domestic producers by impeding 
goods that have not satisfied United States standards 
despite having satisfied technically equivalent 
standards. 536
These barriers to trade are most prominent in a number 
of heavily protected sectors of the economy such as 
telecommunications which was even excluded from the 
scope of even the Canada-United States Free Trade
533 j.H. Bello & A.F. Holmer, "The Uruguay Round: 
Where Are We Now", (1991) 25 Int'l Lawyer 723, 727.
554 TPRM USA 1989, 181.
555 Gj^ TT BISD, 26th Supplement 8 (1980).
536 European Commission, Report on United States 
Trade Barriers and Unfair Practices 1994 (March 1994) 
[hereinafter European Commission Report 1994], 55-60.
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Agreement at the behest of the U.S. government. 
Other areas of notable prominence are sanitary and 
photosanitary requirements such as the sampling of wine, 
mineral water, and tinned produce, as well as electrical 
products and components.
There are also a number of American laws relating to 
public procurement that blatantly violate the 1979 
Public Procurement Code.^* In fact, the United States 
has been accused of a myriad of measures deviating from 
its obligations under the Agreement most often on the 
pretext of national security considerations.^* The main 
problem in challenging such measures is that complaints 
have to be raised on a case by case basis which 
inevitably involves almost insignificant volumes of 
imports. 56o
Again, a number of procurement practices have been 
identified as violating the GATT Agreement, including 
the supply of valves and machine tools to the Department 
of Defence, the procurement of equipment by American 
radio stations and the use of synthetic fibres by the 
Department of Defence. In addition, a number of states 
maintain 'buy American' legislation at the state level.
Trade barriers in the service sector are, for the most 
part excluded from the present discussion because the
55^ Chapter 14, Canada - United States Free Trade 
Agreement.
338 The Code was given effect in U.S. law by Sections 
301-309, Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
55* See, for example, the National Securitv Act of 
1947. Title VII Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 and Airport and Airwav Safetv. Capacity. Noise 
Improvement and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1993.
5^  See United States Procurement of Sonar Mapping 
Systems bv the US National Science Foundation. GATT Activities Report 1991. 64-65.
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GATT is inapplicable in its present form to the supply 
of services although the Uruguay Round, of course,
contains an agreement on this subject.^^i. yet passing
reference should be made to impediments to the supply of 
services by foreign companies in the fields of the
financial services sector, maritime transport, air 
transport and telecommunications.
International investment has also been progressively 
restricted as the United States public has reacted to 
Japanese purchases of prominent American companies and 
properties such as Sony's purchase of Columbia and 
Matsushita's takeover of MCA, as well as Mitsubishi's 
purchase of the Rockefeller centre. These events
precipitated the introduction of the 'Exon-Florio* 
provisions into the 1988 Trade Act which require that 
mergers and acquisitions deemed to affect national 
security must be reviewed by a special committee with 
powers to recommend divestiture to the United States
President. 562
(2) The Greater Emphasis on Bilateral Trade Diplomacy
There is substantial evidence pointing to a shift in 
emphasis from multilateral to bilateral diplomacy on the 
part of the United States. This policy has been 
manifested not only in the negotiation of a number of 
free trade agreements with trading partners, but also in 
the reaching of bilateral accords or understandings with
56^ General Agreement on Trade in Services. GATT Doc. 
MTN/FA II-lB-1 (December 1993).
562 Section 5021, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
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trade rivals.
Deviation towards bilateral diplomacy has been caused, 
for the most part, by American misgivings with the 
present multilateral trading system. Former U.S. 
President Reagan admitted as much when, commenting in 
1985 at the launch of the Uruguay MTN, he declared;
"To reduce the impediments to free markets, we will 
accelerate our efforts to launch a new GATT 
negotiating round with out trading partners.... But 
if these negotiations are not initiated or if 
insignificant progress is made, I am instructing 
our trade negotiators to explore regional and 
bilateral agreements with other nations.
The first manifestation of the intention of United 
States policy-makers to place trade relations on a more 
bilateral footing was the United States-Israel Free 
Trade Agreement 1 9 8 5 Although in 1965 the United 
States and Canada had negotiated a complex bilateral 
agreement for free trade in automotive products the 
1985 treaty with Israel signalled a significant change 
of policy towards comprehensive bilateral free trade
563 Arguing the case for greater use of bilateral 
measures, see Senator M. Bancus, "A New Trade Strategy; 
The Case for Bilateral Agreements", (1989) 22 Cornell
Int'l Law Journal 1.
564 Remarks by President Reagan to Business Leaders 
and Members of the President's Export Council and 
Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations. Reproduced in 
J.H. Jackson, The World Trading Svstem (1989), 147.
565 24 ILM 653 (1985) . Ratified in the United States 
by the United States-Israel Free Trade Area
Implementation Act of 1985. 99 Stat. 82 (1985).
566 United States-Canada Automotive Products 
Agreement 1965, 17 UST 1372 (1965) . See generally, S.
Metzger, "The United States-Canada Automotive Products 
Agreement of 1965", (1967) 1 JWTL 103.
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agreements.
A more significant step was the negotiation of the 
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1988.5** 
This agreement not only covered trade in goods and 
agricultural commodities, but also contained provisions 
regulating energy supplies, services, investment, 
government procurement and technical standards. A number 
of sectors such as textiles, the wine industry, the 
automotive industry, and the energy resource sector were 
singled out for special treatment. There were also 
detailed rules on permissible subsidies, countervailing 
duties and anti-dumping measures.^*
The treaty was a comprehensive model of United States 
trade policy objectives.First, it lowered tariffs in 
all sectors other than those which were required for the 
protection of sensitive sectors, such as 
telecommunications. Second, it allowed the United States 
to continue to operate its trade protection laws, albeit 
nominally fettered by a separate dispute resolution 
procedure. Third, it protected both trade in services 
and American foreign investment, both paramount 
objectives in the multilateral trade negotiations.
562 See also the Caribbean Basin Initiative in the 
Caribbean Basin Economy Recovery Act of 1983. 97 Stat. 
384 (1983).
568 27 ILM 281 (1988) .
56* S.A. Baker & S.P. Battram, "The Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement", (1989) 23:1 International Lawyer 37, 73.
52® Statement made by the U.S. Representative to the 
GATT Working Party on the Free Trade Agreement Between 
Canada and the United States, GATT BISD, 38th Supplement 
47, 48 (1992). For a Canadian perspective on the
Agreement, see M.M. Bowker, What Will the FTA Mean to 
Canada. An Independent Analysis Based on the Text of the 
Canada-United States FTA, Unpublished Manuscript, 
Edmonton, Alberta (July 1988).
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Finally, it established an effective bilateral dispute 
resolution process to ensure the enforcement of the 
obligations assumed by the parties.^*
President Bush made little secret of his desire to 
create a North American free trade area, in which the 
1988 agreement with Canada was only one cornerstone. 
The other was an agreement with Mexico to link the three 
countries in a single market. As President Bush 
emphatically declared in April 1991:
"The United States has embarked on a historic task 
with Mexico and Canada, a creation of a trilateral 
free trade agreement, which would establish the 
largest free trade area in the world. It would 
involve some 3 60 million people and a total of $6 
trillion in combined annual o u t p u t .
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
entered force on January 1, 1994, is a tripartite
agreement between the United States, Canada and 
Mexico.524 It is modelled on the text of the Canada - 
United States FTA which should hardly be surprising
321 Canada - United States Binational Secretariat, 
Background Note on the FTA Binational Secretariat and a 
Status Report of Cases Filed with the Secretariat, 
reproduced at 30 ILM 181 (1991). On the constitutional 
legitimacy of these provisions, see D. Reshicoft, "The 
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the United 
States Constitution", (1990) 13:1 Boston College Int'l & Comp. Law Review, 237-272.
522 See T. Wu & N. Longley, "The United States-Mexico 
Free Trade Agreement: United States Perspectives",(1991) 25:3 JWT 5.
523 statement at the Presidential News Conference 
held with President Salinas of Mexico on April 7, 1991. 
Quoted from Congressional Quarterly, April 13, 1991, p.937.
574 32 ILM 289 (1993).
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since it is merely an extension of United States trade 
policy objectives. For trade in goods, the agreement 
phases out tariffs over a ten year period, with an 
extension to fifteen years for a limited range of
products.
There are also extensive provisions regulating national 
treatment and market access for goods together with
measures to eliminate non-tariff barriers such as 
import/export restrictions, customs users fees, country 
of origin marking requirements and special sector 
p r o v i s i o n s .  326 special sector provisions cover areas
s u c h  as e n e r g y ,  p e t r o c h e m i c a l s  and 
telecommunications. 526 Similarly, mechanisms are 
included for the regulation of anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties and safeguard measures and well as 
the removal of technical barriers to trade. Intellectual 
property rights, investment and services are also
included within the scope of the agreement.
The purpose of the agreement is simple: the establish a 
free trade area covering the whole of Northern America. 
Already, the United States has conducted preliminary 
negotiations for the extension of the system further 
south, with Venezuela, Brazil and Panama being the most 
likely candidates for inclusion within the scheme. In 
the event that more countries are included within this 
framework, it is likely that we shall witness the 
creation of a regional economic bloc with the United 
States at the centre as a dynamo. In other words, the 
scheme places the United States in the same position 
relative to the members (present and future) of the 
NAFTA as was the case vis-a-vis the immediate post- 
Second World War international trading community.
1:4;
525 Ibid, Articles 300-310.
526 Ibid, Article 601.
-ilJ;
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Bilateral overtures have not been confined to the North 
American hemisphere. It has also played an increasingly 
significant role in the conduct of commercial relations 
between the United States and the European Union, 
outside the scope of the GATT. 522 one of the most 
evident manifestations of bilateralism between the 
United States and the Union was in connection with 
European integration.^* The United States was vigourous 
in its bilateral lobbying for the adoption of 
international standards in the harmonisation process 
initiated under the Single European Act. The objective 
of bilateral discussions was to protect United States 
business interests in the European Union after 1992.
This process culminated in the Declaration on European 
Union - United States Relations in November 1990.52* 
This instrument, which is not legally binding, was 
signed by the United States, the European Union and the 
twelve Member States. It recognises inter alia that it 
was a common goal of the parties to "promote market 
principles, reject protectionism and expand, strengthen 
and further open the multilateral trading system*. 
Nevertheless, there was no direct reference to the 
Uruguay Round negotiations and, on the whole, the 
Declaration referred to a list of vague traditional 
values and common goals.
There is also a plethora of bilateral agreements between 
the United States and the European Union resolving
522 See generally, I.G. Bercero, "Trade Laws, the 
GATT and the Management of Trade Disputes Between the 
United States and the EEC", (1985) 5 Yearbook ofEuropean Law 149.
528 For example, see Y. Devuyst, "European Community 
Integration and the United states: Towards a New
Transatlantic Relationship?", (1990) 16:1 Journal ofEuropean Integration,
579 European Commission, Bulletin, Vol 11, 96 (1990)
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specific international disputes, such as the bilateral 
agreement on trade in civil aircraft, and even extending 
as far as co-operation in the field of anti­
trust/competition law enforcement.58®
Commercial relations with Japan have also been the 
subject of bilateral diplomacy .58^ Indeed, agencies 
within the government have been engaged in feasibility 
studies on the subject of a free trade agreement between 
the United States and Japan.5*2 For the most part, the 
initiative for such an accord have stemmed from a near- 
xenophobic fear of Japan inside United States government 
circles and a failure on the part of the Executive to 
explain the imbalance in the trading relationship 
between these two countries.5*3
One recent example of this paranoia was the bill 
introduced by majority leader Gebhardt, in the U.S. 
Congress on January 28, 1992, which, had it become law, 
would have mandated the United States trade deficit with 
Japan by 20% in each of the following five years through 
a series of draconian and coercive measures. Failure to 
reach these targets would have resulted in sanctions 
being imposed on Japanese imports of motor vehicles 
which presently account for 75% of the trade deficit 
with Japan.
580 See text, infra pp.335-336.
58^ On United States-Japan trade relations, see 
Symposium, "The U.S.-Japan Trade Relationship", (1989) 22:3 Cornell Int'l Law Journal, 371-515.
582 See ITC, "Initiating Negotiations with Japan to 
Explore the Possibility of a United States-Japan Free 
Trade Area Agreement", USITC Pub. No. 2120 (September 
1988), reproduced in (1989) 1:1 WTM 49. Also reproduced 
in K.R. Simmonds & B.H.W. Hill, Law and Practice Under 
the GATT. Vol. 2, III.D.2 (May 1989).
585 j . Bhagwati, The World Trading Svstem at Risk 
(1991), 13-22.
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The same bill would also have compelled the opening of 
a Section 301 investigation on behalf of the United 
States auto parts industry to investigate the alleged 
'toleration of systematic anti-competitive practices' by 
the Japanese government. These alleged anti-competitive 
practices included the 'Keiretsu' and the methods of 
distribution in Japan, both of which were expressly 
identified as unfair commercial practices in the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1 9 8 8 .^ 4^ in addition, 
an anti-dumping investigation would have been initiated 
into the sale of Japanese auto parts into the American 
market as part and parcel of the package of 
protectionist measures envisaged in the bill,
A bilateral trade agreement is seen as at least a 
partial solution to these concerns. It is seen as the 
most expeditious method of tackling the contentious 
disputes which frequently arise between these countries. 
In fact, the motives for such an agreement are a blend 
of politics and e c o n o m i c s . From a political 
perspective, such an agreement would form a surer 
foundation for co-operation on a host of other matters 
including security. Economically, it would provide a 
framework for resolution and enforcement of trade 
disputes. Such a strategy may, of course, back-fire on 
the United States if it believes that such an agreement 
would be a one-way street for raising disputes.^®
584 On the legitimacy of these practices, see GATT, 
Trade Policv Review Mechanism for Japan 1990. GATT Doc. 
1486 (April 1990); reproduced in part at (1990) 2:5 WTM 30.
585 See G.S. Fukushima, "United States - Japan Free 
Trade Agreement: A Sceptical View", (1989) 22 Cornell Int'l Law Journal 455.
586 In general, see also M.W. Punke, "Structural 
Impediments to United States - Japan Trade: The 
Collision of Law and Culture", (1990) 23 Cornell Int'l 
Law J. 55; and J.O. Haley, "Luck, Law, Culture and 
Trade; The Intractability of U.S. - Japan Trade
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At the same time, the idea of an Asian-Pacific trade 
block consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand and the Pacific Rim states has been voiced 
with a degree of credibility that might not have been 
possible ten years ago.^ ®^  This is especially the case 
now that a loose framework for co-operation have been 
created since the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
Forum has been constituted.^*
The negotiation of a greater number of free trade 
agreements and bilateral trade accords may be an 
expeditious means of settling international trade 
disputes and conducting negotiations. But, this is a 
short-term view.5** This network of bilateral agreements 
and understandings will, in the long-term damage the 
multilateral trading system and cause polarisation and 
even fragmentation. This is especially the case since 
the European Union has also adopted a similar policy 
towards bilateral agreements. We are in fact witnessing 
the gradual separation of the North American market and 
the European market into isolated trade areas which are 
related only through the gossamer threads spun by the 
GATT unless, of course, the Multilateral Trade 
Organisation is successfully supplanted as an effective 
bulwark against this trend.
Conflict", (1990) 22 Cornell Int'l Law J. 403.
5*2 See K. Anderson, "Is an Asian-Pacific Trade Bloc 
Next?", (1991) 25:4 JWT 27.
5*8 Members of this organisation are: Australia,
Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
the Phillippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the United states.
58* See C.M. Aho, "More Bilateral Trade Agreements 
Would be a Blunder: What the New President Should Do",
(1989) 22 Cornell Int'l Law J. 25.
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(3) The Primary Instrument of U.S. Unilateral Trade 
Policy - Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
Retaliation, in the sense that the term is used in 
international trade law, is the use of economic 
countermeasures against foreign states accused of 
engaging in inequitable trade practices. It is the 
embodiment of unilateralism and a device for coercing 
other states into accepting the views of a country 
without resorting to any international forum for 
arbitration or adjudication on the merits of a dispute. 
Subjectivity and coercion are the two main elements in 
retaliatory measures and it is these two factors that 
most often raise concerns as to the legitimacy of such 
measures in light of the express provisions of the 
GATT. 5*®
At the same time, economic retaliation is a bullying 
tactic. Almost by definition, smaller states and 
economically disadvantaged countries are never in a 
position to use such measures. Only when a state is 
aware that it has the ability to withstand counter­
measures from the targeted state that retaliation is 
effective. In today's world economy, only the United 
States, the European Union and perhaps Japan could 
aspire to exercise such a power but the smaller relative 
size of the Japanese internal market would be a factor 
militating against its ability to effectively engage in 
such practices.
The United States has pioneered the most aggressive form 
of unilateralism by creating an institutionalised 
mechanism for retaliation, originally contained in the 
Trade Expansion Act of 19 62 and now contained in Section
5*® See generally, J. Bhagwati & H. Patrick (eds) , 
Aggressive Unilateralism (1992).
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301 of the Trade Act of 1974. as amended. True, the 
European Union also subsequently adopted legislation to 
facilitate retaliation in its New Commercial Policy 
Instrumenté*^, but the use made of this measure has been 
insignificant compared to that made by the American 
government of Section 301.5*%
Section 301 has been variously described as a 'highly 
dangerous piece of international brinkmanship'^*, 'a 
misguided and dangerous measure which puts the 
international trading system at risk'5*4 and 'an 
instrument of aggressive unilateralism '5*5 on the one 
hand and as 'the champion of market liberalisation' on 
the other hand.5*6 There is little doubt that it is 
intended to open markets to American products by 
threatening to withdraw reciprocal benefits in the event 
that foreign governments do not succumb to the policy 
objectives of the United States. But it is an inherently 
destabilising measure in so far as the use of Section 
301 is inconsistent with both the spirit and letter of 
the GATT.
5*^ Council Regulation 2641/84 fl984) . O.J. L 252/1(1984) .
592 See text, infra, pp.337-349.
5*5 R.E. Hudec, "Retaliation Against 'Unreasonable' Foreign Trade Practices: A New Section 301 and GATT
Nullification and Impairment", (1975) 59 Minnesota Law 
Review 461, 463.
5*4 Peter Sutherland, Director-General of the GATT, quoted in the Financial Times. March 4, 1994, p.l.
5*5 J. Bhagwati, The World Trading Svstem at Risk 
(1991), 126.
5*6 J. Bello, "Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Laws: 
Champion of Market Liberalisation", Paper presented to 
the Bruges Conference on Trade Law, September 1989.
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(A) A Brief Background to the Evolution and Use of 
Section 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is designed to 
counter undesirable trading practices by foreign states 
by granting retaliatory authority to the President. This 
authority was to be 'exercised vigorously to ensure fair 
and equitable conditions for U.S. commerce. *5*% Section 
301 is therefore unequivocally intended to impose 
unilateral pressure on foreign trade partners to reduce 
or remove commercial practices deemed undesirable by the 
United States authorities.^*
The mechanism may be invoked by complaints from 
interested private parties or on the initiative of the 
President or another agency within the Executive. While, 
on the one hand, Congress has been generally satisfied 
with the private petition procedure under Section 301, 
it has been thoroughly dissatisfied with the matter in 
which Section 301 has been implemented by the Executive 
and every legislative opportunity has been taken to 
compel greater use of the measure. Amendments to Section 
301 have occurred with the passage of every significant 
trade measure since its enactment. The Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979. the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 all made 
substantial alterations to the mechanism with the 
general aim of encouraging greater retaliation in trade 
relations.
Between 1974 and the amendments made by the Trade
5*2 Senate Report No. 1298, 93rd Congress, 2nd 
Session, 164 (1974), reproduced in part in J.H, Jackson 
& W.J. Davey, International Economic Relations (Second 
edition, 1986), 811-12.
5*8 See M.A. Echols, "Section 301: Access to Foreign 
Markets From an Agricultural Perspective", (1980) 6Int'l Trade Law Journal, 4, 11.
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Agreements Act of 1979. a total of eighteen petitions 
were lodged under Section 301.5** International 
settlements were reached in four of these complaints by 
reference to GATT panels^®®, eleven were settled through 
bilateral negotiations, three investigations were 
suspended on the negotiation of MTN Codes or 
undertakings and one complaint was dismissed for lacking 
merit. In three cases, the United States adopted 
retaliatory measures,®®^
At least in part, the failure of the Executive to resort
5** The final determinations in these cases are as 
follows: Inv. No. TA-3 01-1 Guatemala Shinning Practices  ^
40 Federal Register 29,134 (1975); Inv. No. TA-301-2
Canadian Egg Quotas. 41 Federal Register 9430 (1976);
Inv. No. TA-301-3 EC Levies on Egg Albumin. 45 Federal 
Register 48,758 (1980); Inv. No. TA-301-4 EC Minimum
Price and Licence Practices on Canned Fruit, 44 Federa1
Register 1504 (1979); Inv. No. TA-301-5 EC Export
Subsidies on Malt. 40 Federal Register 41,558 (1975);Inv. No. TA-301-6 EC Export Subsidies on Wheat Flour, 45 
Federal Register 51,169 (1980); Inv. No. TA-301-7 EC
Variable Levy on Sugar. 45 Federal Register 41,254
(1980); Inv. No. TA-301-8 EC Sovabean. 44 Federal 
Register 1,504 (1979); Inv. No. TA-301-9 ROC Tariffs on 
Home Appliances. 41 Federal Register 15,452 (1976); Inv. 
No. TA-10 EC/Japan Steel Diversion to the United States. 
43 Federal Register 23,456 (1978); Inv. No. TA-11 EC
Citrus Preferences. 50 Federal Register 30,146 (1988); Inv. No. TÂ-301-12 Japan Silk Import Policies. 43 
Federal Register 8,876 (1978); Inv. No. TA-301-13 Japan 
Leather Quotas, 51 Federal Register 9,435 (1977); Inv. 
No. TA-301-14 USSR Marine Insurance. 43 Federal Register 
7,894 (1978); Inv. No. TA-301-15 Canada Broadcasting
Deductions. 44 Federal Register 12,345 (1979); Inv. No. 
TA-301-16 EC Wheat Export Subsidies. 45 Federal 
Register 49,428 (1980); Inv. No. TA-301-17 Japan Cigars. 
46 Federal Register 1,389 (1981); Inv. No. TA-301-18
Argentina Marine Insurance. 45 Federal Register 49,732 (1980).
6®® Inv. No. TA-301-6 EC Export Subsidies on Wheat 
Flour; Inv. No. TA-301-8 EC Sovabeans; Inv. No. TA-301- 11 EC Citrus Preferences; Inv.
Leather Quotas. No. TA-301-12 Japan
601 Inv. No. TA-301-11 EC Citrus Preferences; Inv. 
No. TA-301-13 Japan Leather Quotas; and Inv. No. TA-301- 15 Canada Broadcasting Deduction.
I
______ __ __________ _________________ ___
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to more vigorous assertion of these claims was due to 
United States involvement in the Tokyo Round 
d i s c u s s i o n s . 6 ® 2  was widely believed that retaliation
during this period might well have jeopardised the 
United States negotiating position in several areas.®®* 
This concern was not shared among Congressmen who, 
responding to the wishes of their constituents, 
attempted to refine Section 301 into an even more lethal 
weapon in 1979.
Between 1979 and 1984, the point at which Section 301 
was yet again amended, twenty nine investigations were 
opened but in only one case was retaliatory measures 
adopted.6®* This lack of retaliatory measures fomented 
hostility in Congress and, one Senator who subsequently 
became the Vice-President of the United States is on 
record as stating:
"[I]t is clear that some of our major trading 
partners have pursued policies that have placed 
unfair burdens on some United States 
industries...[and]... since the United States has 
already removed most of its trade barriers, it is 
time to enact new legislation to allow the United 
States to retaliate against countries which have 
not reciprocated by removing their own trade
6®2 See S. Coffield, "Using Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Government Trade 
Actions: When, Why and How", (1981) North Caroline
Journal of Int'l Law and Comparative Regulation 381,
6®* See K.J. Ashman, "The Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988: The Section 301
Amendments", (1989) 7 Boston Univ. Int'l Law Journal,
115-153.
6®* Inv. No. TA-301-24 Argentinean Hides, 47 Federal 
Register 53,989 (1982).
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barriers. "®®5
The third phase in the evolution of Section 301 followed 
the amendments made by the Trade and Tariff Act of 
1984,6®6 This period marked a decisive moment in 
American trade policy. It marked a significant departure 
from the pursuit of trade dispute resolution through 
multilateral processes towards a new policy of seeking 
solutions through unilateral measures. In the pursuit of 
this policy. President Reagan himself took the 
initiative to initiate investigations and despite the 
commencement of negotiations in 1986 for the Uruguay 
Round of discussions, no degree of restraint was 
exercised in the pursuit of this policy of naked 
unilateralism.
For the first time, in 1985, at the President's 
direction, four investigations were self-initiated®®^^ 
and in the period between 1986 and 1987, without any 
preceding formal investigation under Section 302, a 
whole series of investigations were launched.®®* During
®®5 D. Quayle, "United States International Competitiveness and Trade Policies for the 1980s", 
(1983) Northwestern Journal of Int'l Law & Business 1, 4.
606 98 Stat. 2948 (1984)
®®2 Inv. No. TA-301-TA-49 Brazilian Informatics. 50 
Federal Register 37,608 (1985); Inv. No. TA-301-50
Japanese Tobacco Products. 50 Federal Register 37,609 
(1985); Inv. No. TA-301-51 Korean Insurance. 50 Federal 
Register 37,609 (1985); and Inv. No. TA-301-52 Korean
Intellectual Propertv Rights. 50 Federal Register 45,883(1985).
®®* Inv. No. TA-3 01-54 European Community Enlargement. 51 Federal Register 18,294 (1986); Inv. No, 
TA-301-56 Taiwanese Customs Valuation Practices. 51 
Federal Register 28,219 (1986); Inv. No. TA^301-57Taiwanese Beer. Wine and Tobacco Products. 51 Federal 
Register 39,639 (1986); Inv. No. TA-301-58 Canadian
Softwood Lumber Products. 52 Federal Register 231 
(1987); Inv. No. TA-301-60 European Communitv Hormones.
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the 1985-1988, a total of thirty three investigations 
were conducted under Section 301 and retaliation was 
authorised in nine instances.®®* Quite clearly, the 
proportion of investigations culminating in the adoption 
of unilateral measures markedly increased.
Section 301 was again radically altered by the 
amendments made in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988.®^® These will be examined in detail later 
in this chapter.
Already there have been a number of notable 
investigations against foreign countries maintaining 
restrictions deemed contrary to American trade policy 
objectives. 2^ Between 1988 and 1992, a total of twelve
52 Federal Register 49,131 (1987).
®®* (1) Inv. No. TA-301-48 Japanese Semiconductors. 
52 Federal Register 13,412 (1987); (2) Inv. No. TA-301- 54 EC Enlargement. 51 Federal Register 18,296 (1986);
(3) Inv. No. TA-301-62 EC Hormones. 52 Federal Register 
49,131 (1987); (4) Inv. No. TA-301-25 EC Pasta Export
Subsidies. 53 Federal Register 53,115 (1988); (5) Inv.
No. TA-301-13 Japanese Leather Imports. 51 Federal 
Register 9437 (1986) ; (6) Inv. No. TA-301-36 Japanese
Leather Footwear. 51 Federal Register 9435 (1986); (7) 
Inv. No. TA-301-11 EC Citrus Fruits. 50 Federal Register 
26,143 (1985); (8) Inv. No. TA-301-58 Canadian Softwood 
Lumber Products. 52 Federal Register 229 (1987) ; and (9) 
Inv. No. TA-301-61 Brazilian Pharmaceuticals. 53 Federal 
Register 41,551 (1988).
®^® 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) . On the nature of this
statute in general, see A.F. Holmer & J.H. Bello, "The 
1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge of the International 
Trading System?", (1989) 23:2 Int'l Lawyer 523.
®^  ^See text, infra, pp. 274-289.
®^2 See for example S. Thaveechaiyagarn, "The Section 
301 Cigarette Case Against Thailand - A Thai 
Perspective", (1990) 21 Law & Pol'y Int'l Business 367.
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investigations were conducted^* and of the six 
investigations concluded as of January 1, 1993,
retaliation had been authorised in only two cases. 
The explanation for this is two-fold. First, the various 
modified types of Section 301 had come into operation 
during this period. Second, the Uruguay Round 
negotiations involved a sensitivity in trade policy 
which could be upset by the adoption of retaliatory 
measures.
The legislative background to the passage of the 
amendments to Section 301 in the 1988 Act indicates the 
level of near-hysteria in Congressional circles at the 
Executive's refusal to initiate even more investigations
6^* Inv. No. TA-301-71 EC Canned Fruit. 54 Federal 
Register 41,708 (1989); Inv. No. TA-301-72 Thailand
cigarettes, 55 Federal Register 49,724 (1990); Inv. No. 
TA-301-79 Norway Toll Eguioment. 55 Federal Register 
19,692 (1990); Inv. No. TA-301-80 Canada Import
Restrictions on Beer. 56 Federal Register 308 (1991);
Inv. No. TA-301-81 EC Enlargement. 55 Federal Register 
53,376 (1990); Inv. No. TA-301-82 Thailand Copyright
Enforcement. 56 Federal Register 67,114 (1991); Inv. No. 
TA-301-83 EC Third Country Meat Directive. 56 Federal 
Register 1,663 (1991); Inv. No. TA^301-84 Thailand
Patent Protection. 56 Federal Register 25,765 (1991);
Inv. No. TA-301-85 India Intellectual Property. 57 
Federal Register 763 (1992); Inv. No. TA-301-86 PRC
Intellectual Property. 57 Federal Register 3,084 (1991); 
Inv. No. TA-301-87 Canada Softwood Lumber. 58 Federal 
Register 8,902 (1992); Inv. No. TA-301-88 PRC MarketAccess Barriers, 57 Federal Register 3,084 (1991).
6^^* Inv. No. TA-3 01-80 Canada Import Restrictions on 
Beer, 57 Federal Register 308 (1992); Inv. No. TA-301- 
63 EC Sovabean Export Subsidies. 57 Federal Register 50,123 (1992).
6^3 Of course, the notable exception to this was Inv. 
No. TA-301-63 EC Sovabean Processing Subsidies, where 
the United States threatened to adopt extensive counter­
measures in the event that the European Union failed to 
implement the panel report in the Second Oilseeds Subsidies Case.
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and to adopt a greater number of retaliatory 
measures.®^®
Most of the proposed bills submitted between 1985 and 
1987 to amend Section 301 stemmed from Congressional 
concern to reduce the budget deficit. The most dramatic 
proposal no doubt was the so-called 'Gephardt Amendment' 
introduced by Congressman Richard Gephardt, at one time 
a Democratic contender for the 1988 Presidential 
elections. The Gephardt amendment provided that;
"[A]n excessive and unwarranted trade surplus 
country must reduce its trade surplus by ten 
percent annually. If not then the United States 
Trade Representative must take action under Section 
301 and/or take administrative action to meet the 
surplus reduction requirements."^?
The main point about this amendment was that retaliation 
was not directed against foreign states accused of 
engaging in specific unfair trade practices. The 
existence of the trade surplus inso facto characterised 
such a state as a threat to United States economy.
Despite strong Executive pressure to resist the adoption 
of mandatory retaliation against foreign trading 
partners, both House of Congress adopted bills requiring 
mandatory retaliation.
The first major Senate Omnibus Trade Bill would have
®^® J.H. Bello & A.F, Holmer, "The Heart of the 198 
Trade Act; A Legislative History of the Amendments to 
Section 301", (1988) 24(2) Stanford Journal of Int'l Law 1, 4-5.
®*2 Quoted from J.C. Bliss, "The Amendments to 
Section 301: An Overview and Suggested Strategies For Foreign Response", (1989) 20 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus.,501, 522.
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required mandatory retaliation within fifteen months of 
an investigation in almost every case in which an unfair 
practice was deemed to exist.®** The equivalent bill in 
the House of Representatives required mandatory 
retaliation in all cases involving violations of trade 
agreements, unjustifiable practices that burden or 
restrict United States commerce and export targeting.®**
Mandatory retaliation also had bipartisan support in the 
Congress with both Democratic and Republican supporters 
favouring such action. There was little in terms of 
policy content between Congressmen from either party in 
this matter. This rabid sprint towards greater 
retaliation was not confined to the members of one 
single party.
In the final event, Section 301 was significantly 
altered to facilitate the use of retaliation while 
diluted versions of the mandatory retaliation proposals 
became special and super section 301 measures.
There is little doubt that throughout the 1980s, 
Congress has been utterly determined to move the weapon 
of unilateral retaliation from the background of 
American trade policy to the foreground. Unilateralism 
is construed as underpinning a successful trade policy 
and in the event that Congress achieves its goal, first, 
by removing many of the discretionary powers from the 
Executive to retaliate and, second, by creating super 
and special Section 301 mechanisms designed to allow 
automatic retaliation against specific countries, there 
will be a significant step backwards for trade 
liberalisation.
®** Senate Bill No. 1860 (1985) .
®** House of Representatives Bill No. 4800 (1985) .
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(B) Enlarging the Scope for Retaliation in the 1979 and 
1988 Acts
Originally, retaliation could only be authorised if 
foreign states were found to be indulging in any one of 
four practices deemed to be burdening or restricting 
United States commerce. First, maintaining unjustifiable 
or unreasonable tariff or other import restrictions 
which impair the value of trade commitments made to the 
United States. Second, engaging in the discriminatory 
acts or policies that are unjustified or unreasonable. 
Third, granting export subsidies on products destined 
for the United States or to other countries with the 
effect of substantially reducing sales of competing 
American products in those foreign markets. Fourth, 
imposing unjustifiable or unreasonable restrictions on 
access to supplies of food, raw materials, or 
manufactured or semi-manufactured products.®?®
The 1979 Act substantially altered these conditions by 
generalising the power to retaliate under Section 
301.®?* The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988 
tightened these conditions even more by creating two 
categories of Section 301 mechanisms: mandatory action 
and discretionary action.
(1) Mandatory Action
Reading this power in conjunction with the amendments 
made by the 1988 Act, Section 301 now reads that the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) must adopt 
retaliatory measures if any of the following
®?® See generally, B.S. Fisher & R.G. Steinhardt, "Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for 
U.S. Exporters", (1982) 14 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 569.
®?* Section 301(a) Trade Act of 1974. as amended by 
Section 901 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
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circumstances are disclosed after an investigation;
(1) the rights of the United States under any
trade agreement are being denied; or
(2) an act, policy or practice of a foreign 
country:
(a) violates, or is inconsistent with, the 
provisions of, or otherwise denies 
benefits to the United States under, any 
trade agreement, or
(b) is unjustified and burdens or restricts 
United States commerce.®??
In these circumstances, the USTR has little option but 
to adopt the authorised measures although he or she does 
have discretion as to the type of measure which may be 
adopted and the extent of the sanction.®?* This
®?? Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. as amended 
by Section 13 01 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
®?* The USTR is not required to take action in the 
following cases; (a) the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the GATT 
have determined, a panel of exports has reported to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, or a ruling issued under the formal 
dispute settlement proceeding provided under another 
trade agreement finds that (i) the rights of the United 
States under a trade agreement are not being denied or 
(ii) the act, policy, or practice is not a violation of, 
or inconsistent with, the rights of the United States or 
does not deny, nullify or impair benefits to the United 
States under any trade agreement; (b) the USTR finds that (i) the foreign country is taking satisfactory 
measures to grant the rights of the United States under 
a trade agreement or (ii) the foreign country has agreed 
to eliminate or phase out the act, policy or practice or 
agreed to an imminent solution; (c) it is impossible for 
the foreign country to comply but the country has agreed 
to provide compensatory trade benefits; (d) where the 
taking of action would have an adverse effect on the 
United States which is substantially out of proportion 
to the benefits of such action; or (e) the taking of action would cause serious harm to the national security 
of the United States; Section 301(a)(2) Trade Act of 
1974. as amended.
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authority is intended to be exercised in consultations 
with the U.S. President who can issue specific 
directions but it is clear that the U.S. Congress 
intended that the USTR should have a considerable 
latitude in wielding this power in order to prevent 
Presidential procrastination.
(a) Violations of. or denial of benefits accruing 
to the United States under, trade agreements
The 1979 and 1988 Acts broaden the scope of retaliation 
to cover infringements, or the denial of benefits, under 
any trade agreement regardless of whether the agreement 
was a Congressionally approved trade agreement or an 
Executive agreement. Nor is a distinction drawn between 
multilateral and bilateral agreements important for this 
purpose. Informal international instruments, not in 
themselves trade agreements have also been invoked to 
found a Section 301 investigation into legal, but 
allegedly unfair, foreign trade practices.®^
The most obvious example of a violation that would give 
rise to an investigation under Section 301 is an 
infringement of the GATT or one of the Tokyo Round 
Agreements.
There are numerous examples of United States retaliation 
for alleged violations of the Tokyo Round Agreements®?®, 
but the most notorious are the EC Hormones Case and the
®?^ See Inv. No. TA-301-51 Korea Insurance; and Inv. 
No. TA-301-48 United States - Japan Semiconductor 
Arrangement.
625 pqj, example, Inv. No. TA-301-25 EC Pasta Export 
Subsidies ; and Inv, No. TA-301-60 EC Third Countrv Meat Directive.
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EC Soyabean Case.^ * In the former investigation, in 
1987, the U.S. President proclaimed increased duties on 
a number of European Union products in response to a 
proposed European Union hormones d i r e c t i v e . T h i s  
legislation was designed to protect European Union 
consumers from certain hormones used for fattening 
cattle, mostly in the United States. The effect of the 
directive was to limit imports of beef from the United 
States into the Union.
The measures of retaliation were suspended based on 
Union assurances that individual Member States would be 
permitted to continue to import meat products derived 
from animals treated with hormones until 1988.
In 1989, the European Union suspended trade in hormone- 
treated animals. In response, the United States raised 
tariffs to 100% on selected European Union foodstuffs 
and prevented the supply of Union beef products to 
American troops in E u r o p e .
Throughout this dispute, it must be conceded that the 
European Union has acted with the utmost mala fide. The 
European Union repeatedly blocked American efforts to 
resolve the dispute in the GATT Standards Committee, 
which allows the right of disputing parties to set up a 
panel of experts to investigate a complaint, on the most 
spurious of grounds of interpretation.
This case will be considered in greater detail 
later in the text, see infra, pp.458-460.
Inv. No. TA-301-62 EC Meat Hormones. 55 Federal Register 20,376 (1987).
■
628 This latter measure is known as the Harkin 
Amendment and was signed into United States law in 
December 1989. The purpose of this law has explicitly 
stated to be 'because the European Community put a ban on all meat and meat products that were using hormones' .
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In the final event, the United States did not seek to 
settle the dispute through the general GATT dispute- 
resolution processes, but opted for unilateral 
retaliation, generally out of legitimate frustration 
with the antics of the European Union. The matter was 
eventually partially resolved in a rather innovative 
manner by setting up a US/EU Hormones Task Force given 
the mandate of 'lifting retaliation on EC products to 
the extent that US meat exports to the EC resume *. In 
other words, this Task Force is required to agree 
periodically on reductions on a reciprocal basis. 
Between 1990 and 1994, two reductions in the levels of 
retaliatory duties were in fact made.
The most common alleged violation of a non-GATT 
agreement is in the area of intellectual property rights 
where investigations have been initiated into alleged 
failures to protect copyright materials^\ patents^* 
and other intellectual property r i g h t s . To a large 
extent, these rights will in the future be regulated by 
GATT agreements.
629 European Commission, Report on United States 
Barriers to Trade and Investment 1994. 79 (March 1994) .
630 Yor example, Inv. No. TA-3 01-82 Thailand 
Copvriqht Enforcement. 56 Federal Register 67,114
(1990).
For example, Inv. No. TA-3 01-61 Brazil Pharmaceutical Patents. 52 Federal Register 1,607
(1987); Inv. No. TA-301-68 Argentina Pharmaceutical 
Patents, 53 Federal Register 2,012 (1988); and Inv. No. 
TA-301-84 Thailand Patent Protection. 56 Federal 
Register 18,609 (1991).
632 ggg for example, Inv. No. TA-3 01-8 5 India 
Intellectual Property. 56 Federal Register 18,090
(1991); and Inv. No. TA-301-86 PRC Intellectual
Property, 56 Federal Register 21,713 (1991).
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Propertv Rights Including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods. GATT Doc. MTN/FA I-IC (December1993) .
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(b) Unjustifiable acts, policies and practices
An 'unjustifiable' practice is defined as 'any act, 
policy or practice which is in violation of, or 
inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the 
United States'.^* A breach of international obligations 
is therefore required before retaliation can be 
triggered on this ground but the illegitimate act is not 
expressly confined to violation of trade and economic 
undertakings.
Examples of unjustifiable acts are inserted into the 
1974 Act by the 1984 Act. Unjustifiable acts include 
policies and practices which deny United States 
producers the right to national or most-favoured-nation 
treatment, the right of establishment or the protection 
of intellectual property rights. It should be noted that 
multilateral achievement of the last two of these rights 
is a declared objective of the United States at the 
Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, Section 301 gives the 
United States government a mandate to pursue these goals 
through unilateral measures.
Denial of most-favoured nation treatment in a number of 
sectors in a number of countries has provoked the United 
States government into retaliating under Section 301. 
The protracted EC Canned Fruit is one case in point. 
This investigation was initiated in 1981 at the request 
of a Californian trade association on the basis of 
allegations that production subsidies on canned fruit 
favoured European Union producers over American 
producers. The United States brought the matter to the 
attention of the GATT and a panel was constituted which
634 Section 304, Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
Inv. No. TA-301-26 EC Canned Fruit. 46 FederalRegister 2,316 (1981).
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subsequently found in favour of the Americans.®^
The European Union vigorously objected to the adoption 
of the report in the Council and, to date, the report 
has not been adopted. In September 1985, the President 
instructed the USTR to recommend retaliatory measures in 
the event that the dispute was not settled by December 
of that year. Before that deadline expired, an agreement 
was reached between the United States and the Union on 
the phasing out of subsidies for canned fruit.
The European Union failed to honour its commitments and 
in June 1989, the USTR announced in a second 
investigation that proposals would be submitted for 
retaliatory measures.^? The adoption of these measures 
was eventually suspended after the two parties agreed to 
adopt a further agreement clarifying the prior accord.
(2) Discretionary Action
Section 301 permits the USTR to take measures at his or 
her discretion if certain other types of unfair 
commercial practices are being perpetrated by foreign 
states. The element of discretion enters into the 
equation because the types of behaviour that may be 
subject to such measures are not necessarily illegal or 
inconsistent with the GATT. Here the whole mechanism 
itself enters into a grey area of legality.
The measures which may be subject to discretionary 
retaliation at the instance of the USTR are any acts, 
policies or practices of a foreign country which are 
unreasonable, discriminatory or burdens or restricts
European Community - Production Aids on Canned 
Fruit. GATT Doc L/5778 (1985), not yet adopted.
Inv. No. TA-301-71 EC Canned Fruit. 54 FederalRegister 41,708 (1989).
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United States c o m m e r c e .
(a) Unreasonable practices
An 'unreasonable' practice is one deemed unfair and 
inequitable, but 'not necessarily in violation of or 
inconsistent with the international legal rights of the 
United States'.^* Three practices are defined as being 
unreasonable: denial of workers rights, export targeting 
and denial of market access.
Workers rights
A persistent pattern of conduct which denies employees 
the rights of association, organisation, collective 
bargaining, or which permits forced or compulsory 
labour, or which fails to provide a minimum age for the 
employment of children, or a minimum wage or maximum 
hours of work is deemed unreasonable.^^
This amendment was not motivated by humanitarian 
considerations but by the belief in Congress that 
American workers could not compete with foreign workers 
that have been coerced or forced to supply their 
labour.
The terminology itself has been borrowed from Section 
503 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 which designates 
beneficiary developing countries under the United States
Section 301(b) Trade Act of 1974, as amended by 
Section 1301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
Ibid.
Section 301(d) (3) (B) (iii) of the Trade Act of 
1974 as amended by Section 1301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
Ashman, supra note 603, 132.
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GSP programme. This language in turn has been taken from 
a number of International Labour Organisation 
Conventions, It is of more than passing interest to note 
that the United States has never saw fit to adopt any of 
these agreements. Similarly, the United States has been 
a traditional opponent of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 which contains 
similar rights to those imposed under threat of 
retaliation.
It is therefore nothing short of hypocritical for the 
United States to demand, under threat of economic 
coercion, that states adopt standards of labour rights 
that it has itself refused to accept either in treaty 
form of in its philosophy towards economic and social 
justice in general.
Export targeting
Export targeting, which is defined as 'any government 
plan or scheme consisting of a combination of 
coordinated actions that are bestowed on a specific 
enterprise [or] industry...to become more competitive in 
the export of a class or kind of merchandise is also 
deemed unreasonable and therefore a c t i o n a b l e . T h e  
precedent for this type of protectionism was the 
Japanese industrial policy of the 1970s which devoted 
vast amounts of national resources to the production of 
electronic goods.
A targeting programme can generally be identified by 
four features. First, the market in question is closed 
off by the government to domestic producers who are 
guaranteed the entire home market usually at premium 
prices. Second, national resources are diverted to the
Section 3 01(d)(3)(ii) of the 1974 Act as amended by Section 1301 of the 1988 Act.
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targeted industry in the form of subsidies, loose 
enforcement of anti-trust laws, tax incentives and other 
means. Third, as production increases, the volume and 
amount of domestic assistance is decreased and access 
gradually opened to foreign suppliers. Finally, once the 
industry is competitive on a global basis, exports are 
encouraged.
Export targeting is thought to violate a number of 
provisions of the GATT, most notably Article XI 
prohibitions on the use of quotas and Article XVI 
restrictions on the use of subsidies. It is to be 
distinguished from infant industry protection which is 
intended to protect fledgling industries as opposed to 
the deliberate diversion of resources into particular 
sectors for the purposes of increasing international 
competitiveness.
However, every country that implements an industrial 
policy will favour one sector over another and may be 
liable to charges of export targeting. Further, there is 
nothing ipso facto unreasonable in such practices if the 
means selected do not violate the rules of the GATT.
Denial of market access
Finally, market restrictions by states restrict access 
to the internal market place to American firms are also 
deemed unreasonable/*^ Such restrictions include any 
systematic anti-competitive activities by private firms 
or among private firms in the foreign country that have 
the effect of restricting, on a basis that is 
inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of 
United States goods to purchasing by such firms are also 
deemed unreasonable.
Section 301(d)(3)(B) (i) (III) of the 1974 Act asamended by Section 1301 of the 1988 Act.
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Examples of unreasonable foreign practices include 
toleration of cartels, or monopolistic behaviour, 
failure to enforce anti-trust laws and toleration of 
closed purchasing arrangements by private firms.
An illustration of the use of Section 301 to prise open 
a closed foreign market was the Taiwan Customs Case.*^  
In an investigation in 1986, Taiwan was accused of 
failing to maintain adequate access to its markets in 
some products contrary to both the GATT and the Customs 
Valuation Code. Immediately following this 
determination, Taiwan agreed to revise its customs laws 
in light of its undertakings under these agreements and 
the USTR decided that the amendment of its customs laws 
was sufficient to prevent the need for Section 301 
action.
Other unreasonable practices
The 1984 Act definition of 'unreasonable* clearly 
envisages a greater number of foreign practices being 
actionable than those added by the 1988 Act. The 
definition refers to 'any' act, policy or practice 
•deemed to be unfair and inequitable*. The original term 
expressly included acts, policies and practices which 
deny fair and equitable (a) market opportunities; (b) 
opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise; 
and (c) deny adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights.
This provision leaves ample scope to define actionable 
practices since it is a subjective judgment to determine 
which practices deny market opportunities or the chance
644 See Ashman, supra note 603, 135.
Inv, No. TA-301-56 ROC Customs Valuation. 51Federal Register 37,608 (1986).
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to establish a business.
(b) Discriminatory practices
Discrimination is defined as 'any act, policy or 
practice which denies national or most-favoured national 
treatment to United States goods, services or. 
investment'.** It should be noted that the requirement 
to refrain from discrimination against United States 
producers and suppliers extends to goods, the provision 
of services and capital investment.
(C) Forms of Retaliation
Authority to retaliate under Section 301 extends to 'all 
appropriate and feasible steps within [the President's] 
power to obtain the elimination of such 
restrictions'.*? This authority allows the President to 
suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of the 
benefits of trade agreement concessions and to impose 
duties and other import restrictions on relevant foreign 
products. The President is also authorised to enter into 
international agreements to phase out offensive measures 
or to provide the United States with appropriate 
compensation.**
These actions may be taken on a discriminatory basis 
against a particular country. These is no requirement 
for the extension of the MFN principle to measures of 
retaliation. Further, the response adopted may be taken 
against goods or economic sectors unconnected with the
** Section 301(e)(5) of the 1974 Act as amended by 
Section 304 of the 1984 Act.
*? Section 301(a) and (b) , Trade Act of 1974. as amended.
648 Section 301(c), Trade Act of 1974.
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original offending practices and this is most often the 
case in practice.**
The actual form of retaliation is at the discretion of
the USTR, but the amount of relief must be equivalent to
the burden of the restrictions imposed by the unfair 
practices on American goods and services. While the 
forms of retaliation remain discretionary, the USTR is 
bound to ensure that a preference be given to tariff 
increased or the removal of tariff preferences over 
quantitative restrictions.*® This is because, when 
quantitative restrictions are employed, foreign 
producers benefit from the monopoly rents that accrue 
under such measures whereas with tariffs, the Treasury 
Department receive the revenue.
(D) Compatibility of Section 3 01 with the GATT
A significant inconsistency of Section 3 01 with the GATT 
is that it prevents the operation of the proper dispute 
resolution procedures established both in the GATT and 
in the Tokyo Round Codes. Unilateralism and the pursuit 
of settlements at the multilateral level are polers 
apart even if the object of both is the same, namely the 
effective settlement of disputes.
Section 301 circumvents the need for the United States 
to resort to the GATT and the various dispute resolution 
committees set up under the Tokyo Round agreements 
except in particular circumstances. The use of this 
measure is therefore further evidence of the deviation
** B.S. Fisher & R. Steinhardt, "Section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974: Protection For U.S. Exporters of
Goods, Services and Capital", (1984) 14 Law & Pol'yInf 1 Bus. , 569, 573 .
*® Section 901, Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 93
Stat. 144 (1979).
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of the United States from the policy of multilateral 
trade diplomacy and towards the pursuit of unilateral or 
bilateral remedies.
Section 301 has been defended on the basis that 'the 
results of this program...have been substantially more 
open, freer trade, widely benefiting producers and 
exporters in third countries as well as in the United 
States'.** But, in this case the means do not justify 
the end. While trade liberalisation has been achieved in 
a number of instances, the practices that the 
retaliatory measures have been directed against have 
been unilaterally deemed unfair, unreasonable, 
restrictive or discriminatory. There has been no 
objective or impartial assessment of alleged offending 
practices.
At the same time, the use of Section 301 against the 
sole trading group that can withstand such pressures - 
the European Union - cannot have been said to have been 
successful. The principal effect of the measure has been 
to encourage the European Union to engage in 
illegitimate practices in order to avoid the 
consequences of retaliation. Thus, the European Union 
has blocked the adoption of panel reports in the GATT 
Council, indulged in bad faith in the interpretation of 
its international obligations under the Tokyo Round 
Agreements, generally procrastinated in fulfilling its 
commitments and entered into bilateral agreements with 
the United States which, it is difficult to believe, 
were entered into for any other purpose than expediency.
The utility and sense of using unrelated measures to 
counter unfair foreign practices also must be called
** A.F. Holmer & J.H. Bello, "The 1988 Trade Bill: 
Saviour or Scourge of the International Trading System",
(1989) 23:2 Int'l Lawyer 523, 527.
____
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into question. When the United States accuses the 
European Union of engaging in unfair agricultural 
practices, and then adopts retaliatory measures in the 
form of restrictions on manufactured or industrial 
goods, it is obvious that the remedy is ineffective. 
Certainly such measures do not benefit American 
agricultural producers.
Although the GATT authorises the use of retaliation in 
Article XXIII(2), this sanction must only be used when 
decided by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Individual 
contracting parties are not free under the GATT to 
engage in unilateral retaliation outside the scope of 
the organisation.
There are also a number of technical infringements of 
the GATT caused by Section 301 such as unduly 
restricting the consultations and conciliation procedure 
under Articles XXII and XXIII.
The problem of Section 301 and its consistency with the 
GATT has arisen in one particular case. In 1985, the 
United States imposed retaliatory tariffs against Brazil 
for failure to provide patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products.** The measure itself fell 
outside the scope of the GATT, being concerned with the 
enforcement of property rights and not trade in goods.
Brazil subsequently raised the matter before the GATT 
alleging that the United States retaliatory tariffs are 
inconsistent with the GATT being imposed on the basis of 
a question outside the scope of the GATT.** Brazil 
contended that the United States measures violated GATT
** Inv. No. TA-301-49 Brazilian Informatics. 50 
Federal Register 37,608 (1985).
**^ GATT Activities Report 1989 (1990) , 97-98.
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Articles II, because the products in question had been 
bound at particular tariff rates, and Article I because 
the duties were directed only against Brazil and were 
not imposed on an MFN basis.
The United States argued unsuccessfully that, in the 
absence of internationally agreed rules on patent 
protection, contracting parties were free to take 
measures necessary to protect intellectual property 
rights. The Council rejected this ridiculous argument 
and established a panel to investigate the matter. Aware 
that it would be unable to prevail in the event of a 
panel report, the United States caved in and withdrew 
the Section 3 01 measures.**
It was rather unfortunate that the issue was not heard 
by a panel which might have had a number of comments to 
make on the legitimacy of Section 301 as well as the use 
made of the provision by the United States. To the 
knowledge of the present writer, there has been no panel 
ruling on the legitimacy of measures under Section 301 
other than decisions rendered on the basis GATT 
complaints raised under Section 301 by private 
petitioners and taken up by the USTR at the multilateral 
level.**
** GATT Activities Report 1990 (1991), 66.
** For example, Thailand - Restrictions on theImportation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes. GATTBISD, 37th Supplement 200 (1991).
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(4) Variants of section 301 - Super Section 301
Actions and Special Section 301 Actions
(A) Super Section 3 01 Actions
The 1988 Act added Section 310 to the Trade Act of 
1974.** This amendment, known as 'Super 301' was 
introduced to 'combat generic or systematic foreign 
trade practices' and imposes a series of self-initiation 
investigations obligations on the USTR, Initially the 
mechanism was effective for only two years, 1989 and 
1990.** However, President Clinton resurrected the 
provision by means of an Executive Order on March 3,
1994,658
The renewal of the measure was provoked by the failure 
of negotiations between the United States and Japan for 
a suitable arrangement to ensure the opening of the 
Japanese market to United States goods.** The purpose 
of the negotiations was to establish quantitative and 
qualitative indicators to measure the progress of Japan 
in opening its markets.**®
The measure originally required the USTR to self­
initiate section 301 investigations after identifying 
'priority trade liberalising practices and countries'
*** Section 1302, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
657 European Parliament, Report on United States - 
European Community Relations (1991), 3.
**^ Presidential Proclamation No. 341 59 FederalRegister 35,109 (1994).
*** Financial Times. March 4, 1994, p.l.
**® Japan had been reluctant to agree the terms of 
such indicators because of concern that these might 
subsequently become benchmarks, failure to meet which might provoke trade sanctions.
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and then to seek to negotiate the elimination of such 
p r a c t i c e s . T h e  statute lists specific factors that 
the USTR is required to take into consideration in 
identifying priority practices and countries. In the 
event that these negotiations were unsuccessful, 
mandatory retaliation was required. The 1994 measure 
requires the USTR to identify a similar group by 
September 1994 and to enter negotiations with these 
states over a 12-18 month period failing which sanctions 
are to be imposed.
On May 25, 1989, the USTR, Carla Hills, designated
Japan, India and Brazil as priority states for 
investigation and market-opening negotiations. 
Subsequently, on June 16, 1989, investigations were
commenced into six particular priority practices 
maintained by these three states.*3
Both South Korea and Taiwan were widely believed to have 
narrowly avoided being included on the priority list and 
their omission was generally attributed to an intense 
lobbying effort and a spree of trade concessions granted 
at the last minute.** One of the concessions granted by 
Taiwan to avoid inclusion in the list was an undertaking 
to expand its domestic demand and to reduce its trade 
deficit with the United States by a minimum of ten
**^ These practices and countries were to be 
identified by reference to the annual National Trade 
Estimates Report.
**^ TPRM USA 1989. 2 64.
**^ Inv. No. TA-301-73 Brazil Import Licensing: Inv. 
No. TA-301-74 Japan Satellites; Inv. No. TA-301-75 Japan 
Supercomputers; Inv. No. 301-TA-76 Japan Forest 
Products ; Inv. No. TA-301-77 India Investment 
Restrictions ; Inv. No. TA-301-78 India Barriers to 
Insurance Sales; 54 Federal Register 24,238 (1989).
**^ C. Svernlov, "The Implementation of 'Super 301'", 
(1990) 31 Harvard Int'l Law Journal 359, 362.
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percent per annum. Korea also caved in to the pressure 
and granted undertakings to open its domestic 
agricultural markets, to abolish certain import 
restrictions and to lift barriers on the provision of 
certain types of services.
These two illustrations aptly demonstrate the potency of 
Super 301 as a weapon of unilateral trade aggression. 
Without an opportunity being presented to examine the 
merits of their case, both South Korea and Taiwan were 
induced to make concessions under the threat of 
retaliation and the closure of the United States market 
to their products. The one-sided nature of this device 
is also exposed since the United States was not required 
to make a reciprocal concession in order to obtain these 
benefits.
Japan
Japan was named as a priority country because of the 
existence of a number of exclusionary government 
policies that afforded protection to domestic products 
by excluding foreign suppliers. These barriers were 
particularly prominent in the areas of government 
procurement of forestry products, supercomputers and 
foreign satellites.** Nevertheless, the naming of Japan 
on the priority list was not a surprise to many 
commentators.** Indeed, many of the motives behind 
Super 301 originated in the balance of trade between
** 54 Federal Register 26,136 (1989); 54 FederalRegister 26,137 (1989).
** E.K. King, "The Omnibus Trade Bill of 1988: Super 
301 and Its Effects on the Multilateral Trade System 
Under the GATT", (1991) 12:2 Un. Pen J. Int'l Bus. Law 245, 258.
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these two countries.*?
The Japanese response to this development was to point 
out, with some degree of accuracy, that the United 
States itself maintained counterpart import restrictions 
in the sectors identified and initially the Japanese 
government refused to negotiate for the removal of the 
offending practices. At one point, the Japanese 
government threatened to bring a complaint to the GATT 
in order to determine the legitimacy of Super 301, but 
unfortunately the issue was settled before the complaint 
had been submitted.
Discussions on the removal of Japan from the list were 
held at top level between President Bush and former 
Prime Minister Uno, at the OECD Summit in Paris in July 
1989. The pretence was maintained that these discussions 
were conducted outside the Super 301 framework but the 
outcome was the removal of Japan from the list and the 
implementation of the Structural Impediments 
Initiative.** These negotiations lead to a bilateral 
pact on all three problem areas.
This settlement produced a revolt in the House of 
Representatives where seventy members signed a petition 
calling for the USTR to change her mind and return Japan 
to the list. A bill was introduced in Congress, known as 
the Levin-Specter bill, to force the designation of 
Japan on the list as a nation that discriminates against 
American exports. In fact, the bill was eventually 
dropped but, as noted earlier, such bills are a common
*? See generally, P.B. Edelman, "Japanese Product 
Standards as NTBs: When Regulatory Policy Becomes a
Trade Issue", (1988) 24:2 Stanford J. Int’l Law 389.
** See also the report on the meeting between 
President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu at Newport 
Beach, United States, August 19, 1991, Oxford Analvtica. 
Report No. 910404 (1991).
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occurrence in the United States Congress.**
Brazil
Brazil was alleged to maintain a series of import 
restrictions on a number of U.S. exports including 
agricultural products and manufactured goods such as 
plastics, chemicals, textiles, leather products, 
electronic items, motor vehicles and furniture.*?®
The reaction of the Brazilian government was 
significantly different from that of the Japanese 
government. Instead of pointing to the illegality of the 
measures, the emphasis was placed on the need for Brazil 
to maintain these barriers in order to achieve a trade 
surplus which would then allow the country to pay its 
foreign debt. In support of its argument, Brazil pointed 
out that the offending measures were both temporary and 
non-discriminatory.
As a matter of law, the arguments put forward by Brazil 
could also be justified under the GATT. Article XVIII of 
the GATT contains an exception for the orderly 
adjustment of fundamental balance-of-payments 
disequilibrium. Developing countries with unstable 
currencies, such as that of Brazil, or massive external 
debts are eligible for a waiver from the more onerous 
GATT obligations. At the same time it is true that 
Brazil has never applied for such a waiver, and 
therefore is not technically exempt from the rigours of 
the General Agreement, but the basic argument is not
** See text, infra, pp.368-372. 
m  54 Federal Register 24,438 (1989).
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without merit.
Instead of confronting the United States, Brazil opted 
for appeasement and offending measures have been 
progressively reduced in order to satisfy the United 
States. Consequently, like Japan, Brazil was removed 
from the list of priority countries in 1990.*?^ For the 
most part, this was due to the unilateral dismantling by 
Brazil of the alleged trade barriers and not through any 
negotiated settlement in the form of an agreement.
India
The inclusion of India on this list was not strictly 
because of trade practices but was due to India's trade- 
related investment measures which required foreign 
investors to export a portion of their production and to 
use locally-manufactured parts and components.*?^ In 
addition, barriers to trade in U.S. services helped 
identify India as a priority country.
The Indian government reacted vigorously to its 
placement on the list and described the Super 301 
procedure as 'totally unjustified, irrational and 
unfair'.*?"* It has been the only one of the three 
governments that has stood up against the threat of 
unilateral retaliation by the United States, due in part 
to the domestic political system in India which forbids 
politicians from being seen to succumb to pressures from
*?* For further consideration of this matter, see 
E.K. King, "The Omnibus Trade Bill of 1988: 'Super 301* 
and its Effects on the Multilateral Trade System Under 
the GATT", (1991) 12:2 University of PennsylvaniaJournal of Int'l Bus., 245, 259-262.
672
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674
55 Federal Register 18,693 (1990). 
54 Federal Register 26,135 (1989). 
Svernlov, supra note 664, 363,
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foreign governments.
India had the unfortunate honour of being the only 
country cited under Super 301 in 1990.*?^  The rationale 
for this decision were basically the same as for the 
original determination, namely the protection of its 
insurance industry and for discouraging foreign 
investment.
(B) Special Section 301 Measures
The second variant on Section 301 introduced by the 1988 
Act was the so-called Special Section 301 measure.*?* 
This mechanism requires the USTR to identify priority 
foreign countries that 'deny adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights'. The USTR is 
required to select those countries;
(1) whose failure to provide protection has the 
greatest impact on relevant American products;
(2) which have not entered into good faith 
negotiations to provide adequate protection of 
intellectual property rights; and
(3) which deny market access to products subject 
to intellectual property protection.*??
Special Section 301 measures, together with Section 301 
actions themselves and Section 337 actions are at the 
core of the United States single-handed crusade to 
secure worldwide protection for intellectual property
*?* 55 Federal Register 18, 693, 18,695 (1990).
*?* Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974. as amended 
by Section 1303 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
*?? Ibid.
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rights.
No country was identified by the USTR as priority 
countries in May 1989, the first year of the operation 
of the programme. Instead, a 'watch list' of countries 
was created*?® as well as a 'priority watch list'.*?* 
The intention was to review the status of countries on 
the priority watch list each year.
The standards of intellectual property protection 
demanded by the USTR for a country to be removed from 
the watch lists appears to be unduly excessive. A number 
of European Union countries were placed on the 1989 
watch list including Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece. 
In 1990, Portugal was dropped from the list and Germany 
added. However, the most remarkable development was the 
placement of the European Union itself on the priority 
watch list because of the proposed broadcast 
directive.*®®
The USTR is also required to self-initiate 
investigations into a number of miscellaneous foreign 
practices affecting the supply of American services. 
Particular emphasis has been placed on certain Japanese 
practices relating to the provision of architectural, 
engineering, construction and consulting services 
offered by United States companies.*®*
*?® This list consisted of Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
*?* This consisted of Brazil, India, South Korea, 
Mexico, China, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Thailand.
680 European Parliament Report, supra note 657, 4,
*®* Section 1305.
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(C) Tentative Observations
At least on the face of it, Super Section 301 has been 
successful in bringing countries to the negotiating 
table. Both South Korea and Taiwan made numerous 
concessions to the United States to avoid being named on 
the list, while both Japan and Brazil adopted measures 
to comply with the requests of the USTR to remove 
offending measures.
However, at the same time, the use of such measures 
against the European Union could lead to the 
fragmentation of the international trading system. 
Sources within the European Union indicate that the 
Union narrowly missed being targeted in 1989 for its 
public procurement practices in heavy electrical 
equipment, for agricultural subsidies and for the 
government support provided to the Airbus programme. 
The placing of the European Union on the list would have 
resulted in a vicious spiral of retaliation and counter­
retaliation which could have had the effect of stifling 
international trade.
These are considerations over and above the violations 
of the GATT caused by the introduction of Super 301. The 
automatic nature of any retaliation, had any been 
required, would have violated the consultation and 
conciliation procedures in the General Agreement and the 
degree of unilateralism involved would have infringed 
the Most-Favoured-Nation principle. In any event, 
retaliation is only authorised under the GATT in strict 
circumstances and even then only under specific 
conditions.
682 European Parliament, Report bv the Delegation for 
Relations with the United States, Doc No. PE 141.199, 5(1990).
Article XXIII(2) of the General Agreement.
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The Special 301 measures are not likely to be repeated 
now that agreement has been reached in the protection of 
intellectual property rights at the Uruguay Round. 
However, somewhat sinisterly, the United States has 
turned its attention to the unilateral pursuit of non- 
MTO regulated issues. For example, in February 1994, the 
USTR announced his intention to consider new initiatives 
for special treatment. These include a 'blue 301 
measure' for the protection of labour rights and human 
rights as well as a 'green 301 measure' for the purpose 
of ensuring protection of the environment. The 
separation of trade from non-commercial considerations 
raises suspicions that the United States will use any 
pretext to restrict trade.
(5) Lipservice to Multilateralism - The Priority 
Objectives of the United States at the Uruguay 
Round Negotiations
Certain trade policy objectives can only be secured 
through multilateral negotiations. These objectives are 
outside the immediate scope of unilateral measures and 
bilateral trade diplomacy. The United States has not 
abandoned its intention to secure specific multilateral 
policy objectives and this explains to a large extent 
its ongoing active participation in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.
A closer examination of the principal trade policy 
objectives of the United States at these discussions 
reveals a remarkable degree of similarity between the 
trade objectives which cannot be secured by 
unilateral/bilateral means and the policy goals which 
have been placed highest on the agenda by the United 
States. We shall consider four policy objectives in this 
context; reductions in levels of export subsidies.
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improved market access, trade in services and the 
protection of intellectual property rights.
(A) Reduction in Levels of Export Subsidies
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 called 
for the Executive to negotiate rules to assist American 
agriculture by:
"increasing United States agricultural exports by 
eliminating barriers to trade and reducing or 
eliminating the subsidisation of agricultural 
production consistent with the United States policy 
of agricultural stabilisation..."**
Discussions on agricultural subsidies were conducted in 
the Negotiating Group for agriculture while industrial 
subsidies were tackled in the Negotiating Group on 
Subsidies. Reductions in export subsidies is 
fundamentally dependant on the willingness of the 
granting state to reduce these levels and countervailing 
measures only neutralises export subsidies on goods 
entering the United States. They do not neutralise the 
subsidies made available to foreign goods to compete in 
third country markets with goods made in the United 
States.
The issue of the reduction of agricultural subsidies 
proved to be a major stumbling block at the 
d i s c u s s i o n s . T h e  main difference was between the 
United States, supported by the Cairns Group, on the one
Section 1101(a)(7)(B), Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
** See J.G. Filipek, "Agriculture in a World of 
Comparative Advantage: The Prospects for Farm Trade
Liberalisation in the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations", (1989) 30:1 Harvard Int'l Law Journal123.
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hand, and the European Union, supported by no-one else, 
on the other hand. The settlement eventually negotiated 
has been discussed elsewhere in the text.
The most obvious device to tackle this type of subsidies 
is countervailing duties, and as we shall see, the 
United States sees itself as blazing a trail in the use 
of countervailing duties.*®* This phenomenon has
occurred against a background of growing disenchantment 
with the multilateral rules for the regulation of 
subsidies. Countervailing duties offer the prospect of 
neutralising subsidies on foreign products entering the 
United States market. They do not provide a solution to 
the problem of rectifying the competitive relationship 
between American goods and subsidised foreign goods in 
either the country where the subsidised goods were
produced or third country markets.
There is therefore a degree of compatibility between 
United States trade policy objectives at the 
multilateral level and the aims sought to be achieved 
through the use of trade protection laws. Further, trade 
protection measures can be used in two way to underline 
the policy of eliminating subsidies. First, additional
duties may be imposed as a means of coercing a trade
partner into agreeing to a certain undertaking. Second, 
the countervailing law and Section 301 provide a major 
incentive for the trading partners of the United States
to reach an agreement on this issue since the
alternative would be the unilateral and unrestricted use 
of these devices to seek this objective.
(B) Improved Market Access
The 1988 Act instructs the Executive to negotiate to
686 See text, supra. Chapter 8.
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obtain competitive opportunities for United States 
exports in foreign markets substantially equivalent to 
the competitive opportunities afforded to foreign 
exports in the American m a r k e t . T h i s  is specifically 
deemed to include the elimination of tariff and non­
tariff barriers such as the following:
(1) measures identified in the annual report to 
the Congress on foreign trade barriers;
(2) foreign tariffs and non-tariff barriers on 
competitive United States exports when like or 
similar products enter the United States at 
low rates of duty and other tariff disparities 
that impede access to particular export 
markets.
The market access negotiations at the Uruguay Round 
covered trade in industrial products, tropical products 
and natural resource-based products and concerned the 
elimination or reduction of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade in thee products. Progress on this 
subject was slow because of the difficulties in arriving 
at a consensus among the participants on a single common 
approach to the issue.
Clearly the most efficient manner of reducing non-tariff 
barriers is to conduct multilateral negotiations on each 
subject. The ability of the United States to 
unilaterally disarm the rest of the international 
trading community of non-tariff barriers is not 
infinite. While Section 301 measures may be directed 
against foreign states engaging in unreasonable or 
inequitable trade practices, the retaliate against all 
such practices would be infeasible.
Section 1101(b) (13), Omnibus Trade andCompetitiveness Act of 1988.
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In this particular area, the trade policy objectives of 
the United States cannot be properly served by trade 
protection laws. These barriers to trade are mostly 
outside the reach of such measures.
(C) Trade in Services
Trade in services has become an increasingly significant 
element in the invisible earnings of developed 
countries. The United States is no different in this 
respect and attached considerable importance to the 
successful conclusion of a multilateral agreement to 
regulate this activity.^*
According to the 1988 Act, the negotiating objectives of 
the United States in relation to trade in services are:
(1) to reduce or eliminate barriers to, or other 
distortions of, international trade in 
services, including barriers that deny 
national treatment and restrictions on 
establishment and operation;
(2) to develop internationally agreed rules which 
are consistent with the commercial policies of 
the United States and which will reduce or 
eliminate such barriers or distortions and 
thus ensure fair and equitable opportunities 
for foreign markets.^*
This issue was originally intensely pursued by the 
American delegation in Geneva and by the Brussels 
Ministerial meeting in December 1990, the negotiators 
had made significant breakthroughs in establishing the
F, Lazar, "Services and the GATT: United States 
Motives", (1990) 24:1 JWT 135.
Section 1101(b)(9), Omnibus Trade andCompetitiveness Act of 1988.
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main features for a General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS)
The final General Agreement on Trade in Services is 
designed to establish a multilateral framework of 
principles and rules to regulate trade in services, 
bearing in mind the overall objectives of transparency, 
progressive liberalisation and the introduction of 
disciplines for individual sectors.
The United States attempted to increase the pace of 
liberalisation of trade in services outside the 
multilateral sphere through bilateral negotiations on 
the issue and also through the use of Section 301. Trade 
in services was a critical issue in the negotiations on 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, a treaty which 
contains extensive provisions regulating trade in 
services. The text provides for the right of national 
treatment for most commercial service industries except 
transportation, telecommunications, legal services and 
medical treatment.
The other tool for the unilateral pursuit of this 
objective is Section 301 which is sufficiently broad as 
to include trade in services. In fact, the 'Super 301' 
procedure required the USTR to report to the Congress in 
1989 and 1990, trade liberalisation priorities including 
the identification of priority practices which impede 
U.S. exports of goods and services to those countries 
placed on the list. As we have seen, this statute has 
been used to coerce Japan into opening certain sectors
See generally, P. Nicolaidas, "Economic Aspects 
of Services: Implications for a GATT Agreement", (1989) 23:1 JWT 125.
691 GATT Doc. MTN/FA (December 1993) .
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of its economy.
(D) Protection of Intellectual Property
The United States has also placed great store in 
protecting intellectual property rights registered in 
its territory from infringement by foreign 
m a nufacturers.The great difficulty has been in 
protecting American patents, copyrights and trademark 
from pirating by unauthorised reproducers. Not only are 
sales within the United States undermined, but also 
distribution networks and agencies set up to market 
products in other countries are eroded by the appearance 
of plagiarised works.
In order to interdict this illicit trade. Congress 
instructed the President to enter into negotiations to 
protect intellectual and industrial property rights 
based on two principles:
(1) the enactment of effective enforcement 
provisions by foreign countries to protect 
intellectual property and to provide 
protection against unfair competition; and
(2) to establish GATT obligations to implement 
adequate substantive obligations based on 
international standards and procedures to 
prosecute and enforce infringements.^*
This structure is to be underpinned by an effective 
dispute settlement procedure designed to improve on the
692 See text, infra, pp.292-294.
See ITC Report, "The Economic Effects of 
Intellectual Property Right Infringement", reproduced in(1988) 22:4 JWT 101.
Section 1101(b) (10), Omnibus Trade andCompetitiveness Act of 1988.
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existing GATT procedures.
It is significant that, in the past, the United States 
has shunned any involvement in the international 
instruments for the protection of intellectual property 
rights. For example, it has only recently signed the 
Berne Convention on the international protection of 
copyright and the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1970, 
Nevertheless, the United States is a vigorous convert to 
the need to protect intellectual and industrial property 
rights.
The United States again has two mechanisms unilaterally 
to enforce the protection of intellectual property 
rights, first in the home market and, second, in foreign 
markets. Counterfeit imports into the United States from 
foreign sources can be restricted through section 337 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930. as amended, which allows 
American petitioners to seek relief from 'unfair import 
competition' resulting from the importation of products 
that have been manufactured through the infringement of 
a patent, copyright or trademark registered in the 
United States.
(6) Observations
The principal issue here is whether or not the United 
States conducts its general trade policy in a manner 
consistent with the international rules of the GATT 
trading system. In other words, is its commitment to the 
multilateral trading system a tangible and quantifiable 
fact? This is an important issue and one which deserves 
attention separate from the issue of whether or not 
measures of administered protectionism are being abused 
in the pursuit of a unilateralist trade policy.
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Since the GATT itself was originally conceived as an 
instrument of United States trade policy, that country 
has been historically reluctant to abandon its 
commitment to that institutional framework. However, in 
recent times there have been indications that a 
continued commitment to the principle of multilateralism 
no longer serves the interests of the United States. In 
particular, there has been a tangible reliance on 
bilateral trade agreements and the use of unilateral 
trade measures.
The negotiation of the NAFTA is orima facie evidence of 
a distinct trend towards bilateralism as a preferred 
means of conducting trade policy. The creation of a 
single North American market represents a considerable 
coup for those trade policy-makers favouring the 
abandonment of the GATT in favour of a more insular 
trade policy. The Clinton administration has been a 
strong convert to this philosophy and clearly sees 
tangible benefits in direct negotiations with countries 
as opposed to the intricacies of negotiations at the 
multilateral level.
To a certain extent this policy has been successful in 
the short term. However, once the United States extends 
its bilateral policy towards trading nations such as 
Japan and the European Union, more difficulties will be 
encountered. This will also establish the authenticity 
of the proposition that this policy is not connected to 
a geographical nexus but rather is evidence of the 
abandonment of multilateralism as the principal arm of 
United states trade policy.
Inevitably, it is the increased arsenal of unilateral 
measures which causes the greatest concern as a 
measurement of trade policy direction. Section 301 and 
its variants are fearsome measures to support aggressive
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unilateralism in the conduct of trade policy. It is a 
unilateral mechanism which functions largely independent 
of the international mechanisms for the resolution of 
disputes. Its purpose is to coerce other states into 
accepting the views of the United States on what is a 
legitimate or illegitimate commercial practice. 
Inherently, the use of such a mechanism involves an 
abuse of the United States economic position and, as we 
have seen, its legitimacy is the subject of considerable 
doubt.
Nevertheless, the legality of Section 301 is not the 
only international concern in relation to its existence. 
The use made by the Reagan and Bush administrations is 
a landmark in the evolution of United States trade
policy. In the event that the United States is 
unsuccessful in securing international policy objectives 
at the multilateral level, it has the ability to pursue, 
at least to a limited extent, a state by employing this 
device. Since the vast majority of states are
economically relatively weak when compared to the 
United States, even the threat of the use of such
measures may compel a state to submit to the implied 
threat inherent in the mechanism.
The legislative history of the measure, and in 
particular, behind the 1988 Act, indicates that Congress 
is a strong proponent of the more aggressive wielding of 
this power. The United States Congress has historically 
taken a more protectionist and insular view of American 
foreign trade policy than its counterpart in the
Executive branch of g o v e r n m e n t . I n  Section 301, 
Congress has been relatively successful in shackling 
successive administrations into considering the adoption 
of countermeasures even when such action may be against
For more on this point, see text infra, pp.365*374.
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the long-term or strategic interests of trade policy.
It is interesting to note that Section 301 was 
originally conceived when the United States, for the 
first time, suffered a trade deficit. The measure was 
borne from the desire to reduce this deficit and that 
rationale has continued to shadow its functioning. It is 
therefore a knee-jerk reaction to an incredibly complex 
problem. Further, the use of the measure ignores both 
the cause of the U.S. trade deficit and fails to address 
the other issues which are relevant to this problem.
The United States would do well to de-emphasise Section 
301 if it is to demonstrate to the rest of the 
international trading community that it is pledged to 
the continued operation of the principle of 
multilateralism and to the new World Trade Organisation. 
But, in this respect the U.S. Executive has a dilemma. 
The use of the measure has been relatively successful 
particularly in coercing the European Union and Japan 
into negotiating over trade problems. For example, it is 
difficult to believe that, in the absence of the 
threatened measures proposed in November 1992 against 
the European Union, an accord to resolve the issue of 
oilseeds/soyabeans would ever have been negotiated. 
Section 3 01 deserves the credit for this achievement. 
Hence, domestic observers and politicians have ample 
ammunition to defend the effectiveness, if not the 
legitimacy, of such a measure.
The extension of the principles behind Section 301 to 
issues which are not directly concerned with trade is 
also another serious concern. For example, the 
connection of trade with workers rights seems to 
indicate that the United States believes itself 
justified in interfering with the socio-economic affairs 
of other countries. The more sinister proposals to link
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human rights and environmental protection to trade is 
also discouraging.
The various manifestations of Section 301 also 
illustrate how the United States has adopted a policy of 
tackling particular issues with specific measures. In 
other words, trade disputes are being brought to a 
confrontational level because the United States can 
tailor unilateral action to the needs of its own 
domestic industries. Quite clearly Japan was targeted 
for hi-tech electronic equipment which competes with 
American products of a similar standard. Brazil and 
India were targeted because of the alleged failure to 
protect particular industries which require the world­
wide protection of intellectual property rights for 
their profits.
Finally, it is an illuminating fact that not all the 
main trade policy objectives of the United States can be 
secured by the use of unilateral measures. Multilateral 
diplomacy still remains essential to negotiate 
liberalisation of trade in services, reductions in 
levels of export subsidies when the subsidised goods 
compete with American goods in third markets and 
improved market access in the form of the reduction of 
tariffs, quantitative restrictions and measures having 
an equivalent effect. In these circumstances, the United 
States is compelled to maintain at least a minimum 
pretence of adherence to the principles of multilateral 
trade diplomacy. If this was not required, it seems 
relative clear from the internal currents within the 
United States that trade policy would in the future 
consist of a blend of unilateralism and bilateral trade 
diplomacy.
Therefore, to sum up, there is a distinct and 
unmistakable trend in the policy of the United States
311
away from multilateralism as embodied in the GATT 
towards more direct means of securing its interests. 
Section 301 and the other trade protection laws, as we 
shall see later, have substantially contributed towards 
this orientation.
The change of policy on the part of an important country 
in the international trading system does not bode well 
for the future. In the event that the United States is 
dissatisfied with the performance of the WTO, there is 
a distinct possibility that the multilateral trade- 
regulating system will fragment with the United States 
forming a North American block. The United States has 
already demonstrated a dissatisfaction with the existing 
rules and processes by developing these unilateral and 
bilateral techniques.
On the other hand, successful performance by the WTO 
will not necessarily mean the disarming of the United 
States and the abandonment of unilateralism and 
bilateralism. Quite simply, there is no need for such 
action since there are few restraints contained in the 
Uruguay Round Final Act to limit the use of these 
measures. Hence, it is extremely unlikely that the 
nascent international trading system will be able to 
prevent the United States from pursuing the avenues of 
unilateralism and bilateralism particularly as regards 
its tendency towards the use of trade protection laws.
The Direction and Shape of European Union 
External Trade Policy
The European Union is a unique organisation in 
international terms, a fact which must be borne in mind 
at all times when analyzing its commercial policy. 
Formulation of trade policy within the European Union 
involves peculiar institutional processes which have no 
analogy within sovereign states. The essential 
difference is that the European Union's trade policy is 
not the embodiment of the commercial interests of a 
single state, but rather is a compromise among the 
interests - internal and external - of its various 
Member States, The institutional processes within the 
European Union are intended to focus these interests to 
allow the European Union to speak with one voice even if 
this is not always a harmonious one.
Among the Member States of the European Union, these 
interests vary considerably despite the promotion of the 
fundamental goal of economic integration. Together the 
fifteen countries produce a wide variety of goods and 
services which compete with those of other countries in 
the international market-place. But there continues to 
be considerable specialisation of production and supply 
within each in country.
The significance of agricultural production in the 
economies of the fifteen countries is an obvious 
indicator of economic divergence. The percentages of the 
population engaged in agricultural production differs 
considerably between France, Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece on the one hand and the United Kingdom, Germany 
and Belgium on the other hand. At the same time, the
Eurostat, Structural Data Report to the European 
Commission (December 1994), 6.
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provision of services represents a greater proportion of 
gross domestic product (GDP) for the United Kingdom and 
Germany than for other Member States.*^
Aside from the issues of production and supply of goods 
and services, there are also large differences in the 
export and import profiles of each Member State. 
According to a recent GATT Report, in 1990, trade to GDP 
ratios ranged from 12.5% for Spain to 62.5% for Belgium 
for exports and from 18% for Italy to 64.5% for Belgium 
as far as imports were concerned.^*
At the same time, external trade links with non-EU 
countries also vary among the various Member States with 
external trade from the United Kingdom and Denmark far 
exceeding the proportion of exports by France, for 
example, to non-EU states. Naturally, the greater the 
volume of exports made to European Union countries as 
opposed to third countries, the less inclined a Member 
State is to concede concessions in the MTN process where 
this would compromise national interests.
This spread of diffuse economic and commercial interests 
among Member States is an important factor behind both 
the shape and form of European Union external trade 
policy since it is the trade-off of these interests that 
gives content to the final policy. Frequently, it is a 
difficult process for the Member States to arrive at a 
common position on trade policy matters due to these 
divergent national interests.
The unique nature of the European Union decision-making 
processes in trade policy matters must therefore always
Ibid.
698 GATT, Trade Policv Review of the European 
Communities (1991), 5.
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be borne in mind when considering the final content and 
shape of the policy. At the same time, it is important 
to note that as the Member States of the European Union 
progress towards closer economic integration so the 
trade policy of the European Union should become more 
coherent and consistent as greater and greater 
responsibility is transferred to the European Union from 
Member States. This is not to say that this transfer 
process is not acrimonious; it is merely to say that 
coherence in trade policy can only evolve in proportion 
to a commonality of commercial interests within the 
Member States.
(1) Constitutional Foundations of European Union Trade 
Policy
From an international trade policy perspective, the 
European Union remains at its heart a common market - an 
advanced form of customs union - notwithstanding the 
ratification of the Treaty on European Union 1992.“*^  
The trade policy of the European Union is founded on two 
pillars - the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) and the Common 
Commercial Policy ( C C P ) T h e  CCT is essentially a 
Union-wide tariff schedule which has replaced the pre­
existing individual national tariff schedules with a 
single harmonised and comprehensive system to facilitate 
the levying of duties on goods entering the European 
Union.™
Treatv on European Union, signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, O.J. C191/1 (1992).
™  See generally, D. Lasok, The Customs Law of the 
EEC (Second edition, 1990); and N, Green et al., The 
Legal Foundations of the Single European Market (1992), 
3-27.
™  Council Regulation 2 658/87. as amended, O.J. 
L256/1 (1987).
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The CCP is the policy implemented by the European Union 
in the pursuit of international commercial objectives 
with trading partners.™ The constitutional foundation 
of the Common Commercial Policy is Article 113 of the EC 
Treaty which provides:
*[T]he common commercial policy shall be based on 
uniform principles, particularly in regard to 
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff 
and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity 
in measures of liberalisation, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken 
in the case of dumping or subsidies,'
This list of relevant subjects is non-exhaustive and, in 
light of the judgment in EC Commission v EC Council 
rEuropean Road Transport Agreement!™, the European 
Union's competence in matters of external relations 
extends to subjects covered by the aims and objectives 
of the organisation set out in Article 3 of the EC 
Treaty, On the other hand, this competence is not always 
exclusive and may be shared between the Union and the 
Member States as, for example, the European Court held 
in Re; Competence of the Community to Conclude 
International Agreements™ where the Court declared 
that the Union had sole competence to conclude the WTO 
Agreements on trade in goods but shared competence with 
Member States to conclude the Agreement on Services and 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
™  See D. Lasok, The Customs Law of the EEC (2nd 
edition, 1990), Chapter 13; and E.L.M. Volker, "The 
Major Instruments of the common Commercial Policy", in 
J.H.J. Bourgeois, Protectionism and the European 
Communitv (1983), 17-51.
™  Case 22/70 [1971] ECR 263.
™  Opinion 1/94 [1995] 1 CMLR 205.
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Property Rights.™
The creation of a comprehensive external trade policy 
among the original Member States of the European Union 
was a primary goal of the EC Treaty.™ The Treaty 
transfers exclusive competence to formulate trade policy 
to the European Union institutions.™ This means that 
Member States cannot legislate in fields covered by 
European Union measures nor can they enter into 
international obligations that would restrict the powers 
of the Union.™ Nor can they negotiate with third 
states on matters that impinge on measures adopted at 
the European Union level.™
But, despite the expiry of the transition period for the 
completion of a common commercial policy. Member States 
have continued to express reluctance to transfer 
complete authority to the European Union to formulate a 
comprehensive and coherent Commercial P o l i c y . T h i s  
reluctance may be attributed to two factors. First, the
™  See also Layinq-Uo Fund For Inland Waterwav 
Vessels. Opinion 1/76 [1977] ECR 741.
™  Article 3(b), EC Treaty.
™  Articles 110-116 EC Treaty. See also Articles 71- 
75 ECSC Treaty.
™  See Donkerwolcke v Procureur de la République 
Case 41/76 [1976] ECR 1921.
™  See Re ILO Convention 170 on Chemicals at Work. 
Opinion 2/91 [1993] 3 CMLR 800; and R v Her Majesty's 
Treasury and the Bank of England Ex parte Gentro-Com Sri 
[1994] 1 CMLR 109 (QBD).
See generally, G.N. Yannopoulos, "The European 
Community Common External Commercial Policy; Internal 
Contradictions and Institutional Weaknesses", (1985) 19 
JWTL 451; and M.C.E.J, Bronckers, "Legal Aspects of 
Protectionist Measures Affecting Japanese Imports into 
the European Community", in J.H.J. Bourgeois (ed) Protectionism and the European Communities (1983), 53- 
98.
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institutional structure for the formulation and 
administration of the Common Commercial Policy is 
inadequate. Second, the actual objectives of the policy 
are fragmented, and not stated with a sufficient degree 
of precision in the Treaty to encourage a transfer of 
competence to the European Union.
It is self-evident that a consistent commercial policy 
requires a certain degree of power within a centralised 
agency. While the Commission has power to propose 
measures it is the Council that has ultimate 
responsibility for commercial policy. This institution 
is renowned for indulging in extensive and prolonged 
internal debates and bargaining before a mandate is 
finally given to the Commission to enter into 
negotiations. Since the final policy position within the 
Council is the embodiment of an essentially political 
compromise, the result is that many final measures are 
without depth, substance or coherence.
A recent illustration of the weakness in the fabric of 
the CCP occurred in June 1993 when Germany announced 
that it has independently negotiated a bilateral 
understanding with the United States to exclude Germany 
from the proposed sanctions to be imposed on the rest of 
the European Union as retaliation for alleged 
discrimination against foreign suppliers as part of a 
measure to regulate public procurement in the 
telecommunications sector.
Germany relied on the terms of a 1954 Germany-United
Under the terms of Council Directive (EC) 93/38. 
O.J. L199/84 (1993), EU companies remain the favoured
candidates for supply contracts even if a non-EU company 
underbids the EU supplier by up to 3% over the non-EU company's contract price.
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States Friendship Treaty to justify its decision. 
This treaty prohibited both parties from discriminating 
against each others suppliers and required both parties 
to apply the principle of mutual non-discrimination. 
Although the European Commission claimed that the U.S.- 
German accord was unlawful under EU law, the practical 
effect was to remove Germany from the scope of the 
proposed sanctions. This was the case even although 
Germany has voted along with the other eleven Member 
States to adopt a measure invoking counter-sanctions 
against the United States measures.
Neither the Single European Act^ ** nor the Treaty on 
European Union^^^ significantly amend the provisions of 
the EC Treaty relating to the Common Commercial Policy 
and therefore the possibility of such gaps in the policy 
remains.™ The Common Commercial Policy is therefore
™  On the legality of such a proposition, see R. 
Lauwaars, "Scope and Exclusiveness of the Common 
Commercial Policy - Limits of the Powers of Member 
States", in J. Schwarze (ed), Discretionary Powers of 
the Member States in the Field of Economic Policv and 
Their Limits under the EEC Teatv (1988), 73-95.
™  For further on the settlement of this dispute, 
see text infra pp.462-463.
™  See generally, M. Hilf, "The Single European Act 
and 1992: Legal Implications for Third Countries",
(1990) 1:2 European Journal Int'l Law 89.
™  Articles G26-31 repealed Articles 111, 114 and
116 of the original EC Treaty, but Articles 113 and 115 
were replaced with almost identical provisions except 
that references to transitional periods were deleted and 
some minor alterations made.
™  While neither of these agreements altered the 
substantive content of the policy by amending the EC 
Treaty itself, the Single European Act contributed to 
the CCP by requiring the adoption of Community-wide 
quotas for foreign trade while the Treaty on European 
Union made significant alterations to the manner in 
which international agreements are to be negotiated, agreed and approved.
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not only subject to the criticism that it is often 
inconsistent with other European Union policies, but in 
fact, despite almost 40 years of evolution, it remains 
not yet fully complete.
(2) Participation of the EU/EC in the GATT Multilateral 
Trading System
To permit the European Union to pursue trade policy 
objectives with third states, it has been given limited 
international personality.™ This competence is 
manifested in two forms. First, the European Union 
conducts direct negotiations on trade policy matters and 
frequently concludes international treaties - both 
bilateral and multilateral - with other states. Second, 
it participates in a number of international 
organisations, most notably the GATT (now the WTO) and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), in its own capacity.™
European Union participation in the GATT system has not, 
however, been without problems. Even when the EC Treaty 
was agreed in 1957, it was clear that certain GATT 
contracting parties did not agree that its terms were 
compatible with the General Agreement. In fact, a GATT 
committee was established to assess the degree of 
compatibility between the two systems. The final report 
of the committee was unfavourable towards the European
™  This is consistent with Article 6 of the Vienna 
Convention on Treaties For International Organisations 
1986. reproduced at 25 ILM 543 (1986). See also Lachman, 
'International Personality of the European Community", (1984) 1 LIEI 93.
See European Commission, Relations Between the European Communitv and International Organisations 
(1989) and J. Groux & P. Manin, The European Community 
in the International Order (1984), 61-67.
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Union and concluded that the EC Treaty was not 
consistent with the GATT on the grounds, inter alia, 
that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) introduced 
greater quantitative restrictions on the flow of 
agricultural products, because of the increased amount 
of trade restrictions in general and since the formula 
used to create the common customs tariff was not 
consistent with the GATT provisions allowing exceptions 
for free trade areas and customs unions.™
It appears that a waiver has never been obtained by the 
European Union to justify its existence within the GATT 
framework but, although at one point the matter 
threatened to develop into 'an oversized legal 
issue*™, it appeared at one point that the issue was 
resolved through a series of diplomatic compromises. 
Technically, therefore, the continued existence of the 
European Union is a violation of the GATT, in the strict 
sense but the indefinite suspension of discussions on 
this matter was then seen as de facto informal
accommodation of the European Union within the
international trading system.™
To a certain extent, the expansion of the European 
Union, first in 1973 and again in 1981 and 1986,
reopened the difference of opinion on the legal status
719 GATT, BISD, 6th Supplement 68-112 (1958), BISD, 
7th Supplement 69-71 (1959).
™  R. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade 
Diplomacy (1975), 195.
™  See A.F. Lowenfeld, Public Controls on 
International Trade (1979), 57-58.
™  See E-U. Petersmann, "Participation of the EC in the GATT", in H.G. Schermers & D. O'Keefe, Mixed 
Agreements (1983), 167-198.
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of the European Union.™ In these discussions, the 
European Union representatives asserted the view that 
the matter was closed as the CONTRACTING PARTIES had 
failed to formulate recommendations under Article XXIV 
to allow the Union to comply with the terms of the 
General Agreement but, in response, some members of the 
Working Party set up to investigate the issue disagreed 
claiming that the matter had merely been suspended and 
was therefore unresolved. The subsequent enlargement of 
the European Union has, to some extent, revived this 
dispute.™
This situation seems anomalous in light of the full 
participation of the European Union within the GATT 
itself. Since the Dillon Round of MTNs, the European 
Union has negotiated agreements on behalf of its Member 
States and has participated in all subsequent 
negotiations as an informal contracting party.™ In 
fact, since 197 0, the vast majority of agreements 
negotiated within the GATT system have been concluded by 
the European Union as Union agreements without the 
additional participation of the individual Member 
States.™ Even the Uruguay Round Final Act was signed 
on behalf of the European Union (although referred to in
723 G A T T  BISD, 30th Supplement 168-190 (1982-1983); 
BISD, 35th Supplement 293-321 (1987-1988).
™  The United States, as well as a number of other 
trading partners, successfully obtained compensation 
from the EU for increased duties charged by Austria, 
Finland and Sweden on U.S. goods following the accession 
of these states in settelement completed in December 
1995.
™  See E-U. Petersmann, "The EEC as a GATT Member - 
Legal Conflicts Between GATT Law and EC Law", in M. Hilf (ed). The European Communitv and GATT (1986), 23-71, 38.
™  The major exceptions are the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade 1979 and the Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft 1979.
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its capacity as a European Community in the text)
At the same time, within the dispute settlement 
procedures of the GATT, the European Union's standing to 
raise complaints has never been challenged™ nor has 
its responsibility for alleged violations of the General 
Agreement as well as the supplementary codes.™ There 
is consequently strong evidence to support the 
proposition that the European Union is at least a de 
facto contracting party.™
(3) The Traditional Policy of the European Union 
Towards Developing Bilateral Trade Relations and 
Deviation from Multilateralism
The European Union has used a blend of 
bilateral/regional and multilateral diplomacy in 
pursuing its trade policy objectives. In this context, 
bilateral/regional diplomacy means dialogue with 
individual states, or groups of states, with the 
objective of placing commercial relations on a 
formalised legal basis. In contrast, multilateral 
diplomacy involves the participation of the European 
Union in the many international forums for the
Final Act Embodvinq the Results of the Uruauav 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. GATT Doc. MTN/FA (1993).
See US - DISC Legislation. GATT BISD, 23rd 
Supplement 98 (1977); Canada - Importation. Distribution 
and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks. GATT BISD, 35th Supplement 
37 (1987-1988); and Japan - Trade in Semiconductors.
GATT BISD, 35th Supplement 245 (1987-1988).
™  See EEC - VAT Deductions. GATT BISD, 31st 
Supplement 247 (1984).
™  See also, E-U. Petersmann, "EC and GATT: On the 
Economic and Legal Functions of GATT Rules", (1984) LIÉI 
37; and E-U. Petersmann, "International and European 
Foreign Trade Law", (1985) CML Rev 401.
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negotiation of multilateral trade agreements. By 
engaging in bilateral diplomacy, the European Union 
conducts discussions directly with the government of one 
or more states whereas in multilateral negotiations the 
European Union is only one of many participants.
Bilateral diplomacy is an extremely important element of 
the European Union's trade policy. Trade and co­
operation agreements have been negotiated with a vast 
number of the states participating in the present 
international trade system. Each of these are tailored 
to suit the European Union in conducting its trade and 
commercial relations. Certainly in such negotiations, 
the European Union generally has considerable ability to 
influence the final content of such agreements due 
largely to its size and importance in the international 
market-place.
The concern here is that eventually the European Union 
will be able to conduct its external commercial affairs 
without needing to resort to the multilateral mechanisms 
provided at the international level. Alternatively, it 
may de-emphasise its efforts at the multilateral 
negotiations if bilateral negotiations may provide an 
effective substitute. The belief that the European Union 
could rely exclusively on the development of such a 
network of arrangements is perhaps one of the greatest 
threats to the present international trading system. If 
the Union is successful at enshrining its commercial 
rights and duties through a network of 
bilateral/regional agreements, the question must be 
asked whether or not it has any more need of 
multilateral diplomacy.
It is not just the proliferation in the number of such 
agreements that raises concerns. Increasingly, these 
agreements have covered a wider and wider range of
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topics - from trade and commercial affairs to financial 
co-operation and development aid. In other words, the 
European Union is easily able to achieve its objectives 
in certain areas through bilateral endeavours although 
naturally there are areas where, in the absence of 
multilateral agreement such objectives cannot be secured 
such as, for example, in the case of an international 
regime for the co-ordination of competition law and 
policy or the protection of intellectual property 
rights.
Another disconcerting development is the evolution of 
distinctive European Union policies for different 
geographical areas. At least six categories can be 
identified: (a) Western Europe; (b) Eastern Europe; (c) 
the Mediterranean; (d) Africa and the Caribbean; (e) 
Asia and the Far East; and (f) a residual category for 
other countries. In each of these areas the goals of the 
Union are different. Hence, bilateral arrangements 
between countries in different areas differ 
significantly while, in contrast, the arrangements 
between states in the same area are noticeably similar.
This is undoubtedly an issue that warrants closer 
examination. The question that must be asked is whether 
the European Union is deliberately carving up the globe 
into regions which it can exercise effective commercial 
control over its own trade policy agenda?
(A) Western Europe
In 1992, the most spectacular success of European Union 
bilateral trade diplomacy was achieved in the shape of 
the Agreement on the European Economic Area which 
united, at least temporarily, the majority of Western
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European states in a commercial union.™ The 
arrangement entered into force on January 1, 1994 and 
involved the nineteen members of the European Union and 
the European Free Trade Area ( E F T A ) T h e  pre-existing 
trade arrangements between the European Union and the 
members of the EFTA were largely superseded once the 
agreement came into effect. While not strictly a 
bilateral agreement, the EEA Treaty is a product of 
direct discussions with the EFTA members outside the 
traditional multilateral processes.
The conclusion of this agreement is a significant 
landmark in the European Union's commercial trade 
policy. At the outset, it replaces the complex system of 
free trade agreements between the EFTA countries and the 
European Union which in the past was confined mainly to 
the abolition of customs duties and measures having an 
equivalent effect.™ The new single agreement extended 
the four freedoms of European Union law to EC-EFTA 
trade™ while the European Union's competition rules 
are to apply to trade in goods and services.™ In 
addition, an independent surveillance authority and a
Agreement Establishing the European Economic 
Area, signed in Oporto on May 2, 1992, Commission Doc. 
5994/1/92 Rev 1.
732 scheduled date for implementation was delayed 
after the rejection of the Agreement by the Swiss 
population after a referendum held in December 1992.
Agreement Between the EEC and Austria. O.J. 
L300/2 (1972); Agreement Between the EEC and Sweden.
O.J. L300/97 (1972); Agreement Between the EEC andSwitzerland. O.J. L300/189 (1972); Agreement Between the 
EEC and Iceland. O.J. L301/2 (1972); Agreement Between 
the EEC and Norwav. O.J. L171/2 (1972); Agreement
Between the EEC and Liechtenstein. O.J. L300/281 (1972); 
Agreement Between the EEC and Finland. O.J. L328/2 
(1973) .
™  Articles 8-52, EEA Agreement.
735 Articles 53-65, EEA Agreement.
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court have been established to supervise the operation 
of the terms of the agreement.™
The most interesting aspect of the EEA Agreement from 
the European Union perspective is that it established an 
effective instrument for influencing the trade policies 
of the EFTA states vis-a-vis the Union as far as matters 
within the scope of the agreement are concerned. The 
EFTA countries, to a certain extent, surrendered the 
right to enact measures which conflict with the 
existing, and presumably future, acquis communautaire. 
The exact legal implications of this diminution cannot 
be speculated on until the first relevant rulings of the 
EEA Court, but since the ECJ has already ruled that 
European Union law prevails over national law, and since 
the treaty itself was modified to ensure the continued 
application of this principle, it is difficult to see 
how the rules applied by the EEA Agreement will not 
prevail over inconsistent laws of EFTA countries.
Perhaps the most important concession obtained by the 
EFTA states from the European Union in the Agreement was 
the suspension of the application of European Union 
anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and measures against illicit 
commercial practices legislation in the intra-trade 
area.™ However, this concession is subject to two 
qualifications:
(a) the European Union competition laws are to 
apply in the area which allows action to be
™  It was these institutional arrangements which 
caused the ECJ to reject the constitutionality of the 
agreement; European Economic Area Agreement (No 1) , 
Opinion 1/91 [1992] 1 CMLR 245. The terms of the
agreement were accordingly amended in light of this opinion; European Economic Area Agreement (No 2) . 
Opinion 1/92 [1992] 2 CMLR 217.
737 Article 26, EEA Agreement.
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taken against practices otherwise considered 
unfair such as predatory pricing.
(b) the prohibition on the use of such measures is 
subject to the qualification that the European 
Union reserves the right to introduce measures 
to avoid circumvention of the application of 
such instruments.^*
The European Union has reserved the right to employ 
safeguard measures although these take a different form 
than measures taken under the European Union's general 
safeguard legislation. In the event of 'serious 
economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a 
sectorial or regional nature', which are considered by 
the European Union as liable to persist, an application 
for safeguard measures may be made to the EEA Joint 
Committee.™
Therefore, the European Union has grandfathered the 
right to resort to its ultimate weapon in the event of 
trade flow problems albeit that this measure can only be 
justified under strict conditions.
(B) Eastern Europe
In the period between 1988 and 1992 the geopolitical map 
of Eastern Europe changed significantly.Gradually 
the countries with the most progressive economies have 
entered into association agreements to regulate their
™  Protocol 13, EEA Agreement, 
™  Article 112, EEA Agreement.
740 G. Merritt, Eastern Europe and the USSR (1992)
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commercial relationships with the European Union. 
Association agreements are generally seen as a positive 
step towards future membership of the Union.
The first step in the integration of Eastern European 
countries was the negotiation of comprehensive 
agreements between the Union on the one hand and 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovakian 
Republic, Romania and Bulgaria on the o t h e r . T h e s e  
agreements were generally known as "Interim 
Agreements'and were intended to provide a model for 
future negotiations between the European Union and the 
remaining other Eastern European countries.
As part of the stated objective of the British 
Presidency at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992^ "*^ , a further 
series of agreements have been entered into with this 
group of states. These agreements are designated as 
* Europe Agreements " and are the next stage in the
See Agreement Between the European Communitv and 
Hungary on Trade and Commercial arid Economic Co­
operation. 0.J. L327/2 (1988); Agreement Between the
European Community and Poland on Trade and Commercial
and Economic Co-operation. O. J. L33 9/2 (1989); Agreement
Between the European Community and Czechoslovakia on 
Trade and Commercial and Economic Co-opération. O.J. 
L291/29 (1990); Agreement Between the European Community 
and Romania on Trade and Commercial and Economic Co­
operation. O.J, L79/13 (1991).
European Commission, The Community and Its 
Eastern Neighbours (1991), 3.
Co-operation Agreement Between the EC and 
Czechoslovakia. O.J. L115/1 (1992); Co-operation
Agreement Between the EC and Hungary. O.J. L116/1 
(1992); and CC-OPeration Agreement Between the EC and 
Poland. O.J. L114/1 (1992) ; Co-operation Agreement
Between the EC and Bulgaria. O.J. L323/2 (1993); and Co­
operation Agreement Between the EC and Romania. O.J. 
L81/1 (1993).
See, European Commission, Europe and the Process of Enlargement. EC Bulletin, Supp. 3/92 (1992).
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assumption of these states into the European Union. Four 
states presently have such agreements, namely, Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.^* 
Despite their designation, these agreements are in fact 
free trade agreements which provide the following 
framework:
(a) The implementation of free movement of goods
over 10 years, the necessary reductions being 
made on the basis of a distinction drawn
between industrial goods and agricultural 
goods.
(b) The introduction of the rights of free
movement of workers, the right of 
establishment and the right to supply 
services.
(c) Liberalisation of capital movements
(d) Competition policy (based on Articles 85 and 
86 EC Treaty).
(e) Approximation of laws mechanisms.
(f) Economic co-operation.
(g) Cultural co-operation
(h) Financial co-operation.
(i) An institutional framework for implementation 
of decisions and measures.
Europe Agreement Establishing an Association 
Between the European Communities and Their Member States 
and the Republic of Hungary. O.J. L347/2 (1993); Europe Agreement Establishing an Association Between the 
European Communities and Their Member States and the 
Republic of Poland. O.J, L348/2 fl993\; Europe Agreement 
Establishing an Association Between the European 
Communities and Their Member States and the Slovak 
Republic. O.J. L359/2 (1994); Europe Agreement
Establishing an Association Between the European
Communities and Their Member States and the Czech
Republic. O.J. L360/2 (1993); Europe
Establishing an Association Between the EuropeanCommunities and Their Member States and theO.J. L357/2 (1994); Europe Agreement Establishing an
Agreement
Romania
Association Between the European Communities and Their 
Member States and Bulgaria. O.J. L358/2 (1993).
■■
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These instruments are the final step prior to formal 
application for membership of the European Union and in 
fact both Hungary and Poland have recently made such 
applications.^* Now that these states have been 
integrated into this framework, the European Commission 
has now turned its attention to bilateral agreements 
with the Baltic states and the states of the former 
Soviet Union.747
Through this process, the European Union has 
successfully procured intensive commercial (and 
political) relationships with these states which allow 
considerable influence over the future shape of 
commercial relations between the European Union and 
these countries. The achievement of free trade, in a 
form compatible with the existing EC treaty provisions 
on the free movement of goods, is a considerable 
extension of a fundamental principle of Union law.
From a European Union point of view, the process of 
trade liberalisation with these states, and potentially 
more in the area, assists reduce trade barriers between 
these states and the European Union and throughout 
virtually all of continental Europe, with the European 
Union at the centre and the EEA Agreement and the 
bilateral obligations with the Eastern European 
countries acting as the legal basis for the operation of 
the system. This network has been established without 
needing to resort to negotiations at the multilateral
74* Hungarian Application lodged April 1, 1994/
Polish Application lodged April 8, 1994. The anticipated 
accession of both these countries is approximately 2000.
747 See, for example, Agreement on Free Trade and 
Trade-Related Matters Between the European Communities 
and the Republic of Latvia. O.J. L374/2 (1994);Agreement oh Free Trade and Trade-Related Matters 
Between the European Communities and the Republic of 
Estonia. O.J. L373/2 (1994).
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level.
(C) Mediterranean Area
The European Union has devoted considerable time and 
effort to ensure that its relationships with its 
neighbours in and around the Mediterranean area are 
placed on a formal legal basis/** It has successfully 
established commercial relations, on a bilateral basis, 
with virtually all of the countries bordering the 
Mediterranean. The commercial policy of the European 
Union for this region is based on a broad distinction 
between those Mediterranean countries situated in 
Southern Europe and those situated in North Africa and 
the Eastern Mediterranean.
As a general rule, those countries situated in Southern 
Europe has traditionally been allowed to enter 
association agreements with the European Union. Thus, 
prior to their accession, Spain, Portugal and Greece had 
their relationships with the Union regulated on such a 
basis while Turkey, Cyprus and Malta each have separate 
association agreements.** These association agreements 
are intended as a stage towards future membership of the 
European Union although to date the Union has resisted 
the application of Turkey for full membership.
74* See generally, C.M. Fransen, "The EEC and the 
Mediterranean Area: Association and Co-operation
Agreements", (1992) 5:2 Leiden Journal of Int'l Law 215.
74* Agreement Establishing an Association Between the 
EEC and Turkev. O.J. L217/3687 (1964); Agreement
Establishing an Association Between the EEC and Cyprus. 
O.J. L133/2 (1973); Agreement Establishing an
Association Between the EEC and Malta. O.J. L61/2 (1971).
750 EU recently concluded a free trade agreement 
with Turkey in March 1995 and its terms were ratified by 
the European Parliament in November 1995.
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The structure of these agreements is basically the same. 
They provide for the creation of an environment for the 
free movement of goods and the abolition of duties and 
quantitative restrictions. However, there is no right to 
free movement of persons*% services or capital, while 
the European Union's rights to impose anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy measures are expressly protected. The terms 
of these agreements are periodically supplemented by 
protocols dealing with related subjects such as 
financial activities.
In contrast, the countries of Northern Africa and the 
eastern Mediterranean have only been allowed to enter 
co-operation agreements with the U n i o n . I t  is clear 
that the European Union does not envisage future 
membership for these countries and in fact the 
application for membership made by Algeria was rejected. 
The major exception is Israel which has been permitted 
to enter into a free trade agreement with the European 
Union but this was mainly for political reasons.**
These treaties deal with economic, technical and 
financial co-operation and have the stated objectives of
751 See R V  Secretary o f  State. Ex Parte Nairn [1990] 
1 CMLR 682.
7^7 See for example. Protocol on Financial and 
Technical Co-operation Between the EEC and Malta. O.J. 
L180/47 (1989).
7^* Co-ooeration Agreement Between the EEC and Egypt. 
O.J. L268/2 (1978); Co-operation Agreement Between the 
EEC and Jordan. O.J. L268/2 (1978); Co-operationAgreement Between the EEC and Svria. O.J. L269/2 (1978); 
Co-operation Agreement Between the EEC and Lebanon. O.J. 
L267/2 (1978) ; Co-operation Agreement Between the EEC
and Tunisia, O.J. L265/2 (1978); Co-operation Agreement 
Between the EEC and Algeria. O.J. L263/2 (1978) ; arid Co- operation Agreement Between the EEC and Morocco. O.J, 
L264/2 (1978).
7^  Agreement Between the EEC and Israel. O.J. L136/3
(1975) .
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encouraging and promoting exports to the European Union 
from these countries. Tariff-free entry to the EC is 
provided for industrial products but only limited tariff 
concessions have been granted for agricultural products. 
Since agricultural production is the most important 
economic activities in many of these countries, the 
value of this concession is seriously undermined.
The individual contents of these treaties are, of 
course, tailored to meet the particular form of 
relationship between the European Union and the country 
concerned. However, all of these reserve the rights of 
the European Union to revert to anti-dumping, anti­
subsidy and safeguard measures given the existence of 
the appropriate conditions.
(D) Africa and the Caribbean
The European Union system for the regulation of imports 
from the former colonies of Member states in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, hardly requires detailed 
exposition in this work. It is suffice to say that the 
European Union regulates these imports through a series 
of periodically revised agreements, the most recent of 
which is known as Lome IV negotiated in 1988-1989.
The Lome agreements grant those countries participating 
in the system tariff preferences to allow duty-free 
imports of industrial goods, but which are more 
restrictive for agricultural products which, in fact, 
such countries might have a comparative advantage in 
over producers in the European Union. In addition to the 
tariff concessions and access benefits, the Convention 
provides certain forms of financial support such as aid
7* See generally, European Commission, General 
Report of the Activities of the European Union (1995), 
317-327.
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to support export earnings and technical assistance 
mainly through aid projects.
The grant of preferential status under the Lomé 
programme does not prevent the application of anti­
dumping measures on products that have been imported 
into the European Union.**
(E) Asia and the Far East
The European Union has entered a number of commercial 
and co-operation agreements with Asian countries*? as 
well as with the Association of South-East Asian Nation 
(ASEAN) .7^*
The terms of these agreements are broadly similar and 
are, for the most part, declaratory. Thus, they affirm 
MFN treatment for imports to the European Union and 
encourage economic co-operation in fields of mutual 
concern. There are also provisions to establish an 
institutional framework to facilitate dialogue between 
these governments and the European Union.
756 See, for example, Urea From Trinidad and Tobago. 
Commission Regulation (EEC) 1289/87, O.J. L121/11 (1987) 
[provisional duties]; and Denim From Macao. O.J, C73/3 
(1989) [finding of no injury].
7^7 Commercial Co-ooeration Agreement Between the EEC 
and Bangladesh. O.J. L319/2 (1976); Agreement on Trade and Economic Co-operation Between the EEC and China. 
O.J. L250/2 (1985); Agreement For Commercial and
Economic Co-operation Between the EEC and India. O.J. 
L328/6 (1981) : Commercial Co-operation Agreement Between 
the EEC and Pakistan. O.J. L168/2 (1976); and Agreement 
on Commercial Co-operation Between the EEC and Sri Lanka. O.J. L247/2 (1975).
7^* Co-operation Agreement Between the EEC and 
Indonesia. Malaysia, the Philippines. Singapore and 
Thailand - Member Countries of the ASEAN. O.J. L144/3 (1980).
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The notable exception to this system is Japan. The 
European Union has not yet entered into a comprehensive 
trade and co-operation agreement with Japan which seems 
to be a surprising omission in light of the importance 
of that country as a trading partner.**
(F) Other Countries
A number of agreements regulate the European Union's 
relations with the remaining developed states of the 
international trading system with the notable exception 
of the United States. Thus, agreements are in place for 
the European Union's commercial relations with Canada^*® 
and many of the states of South America. 7*^ These 
arrangements contain broad general terms which are of 
limited practical importance.
While there is no general commercial agreement with the 
United States, there are a number of agreements 
concerning commercial matters between the two trade 
partners. Thus, in 1992 an agreement on anti-trust co­
operation was negotiated to defuse the tension which had 
arisen as a consequence of both nations applying the 
principle of the extra-territorial effect of anti-trust 
l a w s . 7*7 In the same year, both countries negotiated an
7^* On EU-Japan relations, see European Commission, 
Background Report on the European Community and Japan. 
Doc. ISEC/B24/90 (1990).
7*^ Framework Agreement For Commercial and Economic 
Co-operation Between the EEC and Canada. O.J. L260/2(1976).
7*^ See for example. Framework Agreement For Co­
operation Between the EEC and Brazil. O.J. L281/2 (1982) .
7*7 Agreement Between the United States and the 
European Community Regarding the Application of 
Competition Law. Council Decision 95/145/EC, ECSC, O.J. 
L95/45 (1995).
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agreement to regulate certain activities in the 
aeronautical industry.
The principal instrument through which the Union 
conducts its commercial relationships with non-ACP 
developing countries is through the Generalised System 
of Preferences (GSP) by which the Union provides 
favourable duty reductions on a unilateral basis for 
eligible countries. The preferences themselves are 
calculated on an annual basis but with reference to a 
ten-year plan.
Again most manufactured products are eligible for GSP 
treatment if the country of export has GSP-status, 
subject to ceilings for certain types of products. 
Agricultural products, on the other hand, are not 
granted as favourable treatment.
(G) Observations
The continued commitment of the European Union towards 
multilateral trade diplomacy must be assessed against 
the extensive background of bilateral agreements 
negotiated with third states. This framework has become 
so legally robust and well-structured that it exists as 
an infrastructure on which the European Union can, quite 
easily, conduct commercial relationships with most of 
its trading partners with the exception of the United 
States and Japan.
There must also be serious doubts about whether this 
structure and in particular the existence of Union-third 
state free trade agreements is compatible with the terms
7*^ Agreement Between the EEC and the United States 
on the Aeronautical Industry. O.J. L301/31 (1992).
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of the GATT itself.** Article XXIV of the GATT allows 
the creation of free trade areas as long as such 
arrangements eliminate duties and restrictions on 
'substantially all trade' between the members of the 
arrangement. In addition, the resulting barriers cannot 
be more restrictive vis-a-vis third states than was 
previously the case.
(4) The Reluctance of the European Union to Use 
Unilateral Measures
The tendency of the European Union towards unilateralism 
has not been a pronounced feature of its external trade 
policy during the period being studied in this woek, ie. 
1947-1994. Instead, the European Union concentrated more 
on bilateral trade diplomacy and resolving disputes 
within the GATT dispute settlement procedures and fora.
To a certain extent, this phenomenon reflects the more 
passive approach of the European Union to trade 
relations than the active, and some would say 
aggressive, approach taken by the United States in 
unilaterally enforcing its alleged international rights. 
This does not, of course, imply that the European Union 
acted in a manner more inconsistent with the terms of 
the GATT than the United States; it only means than it 
was less hypocritical. The European Union acted outside 
the parameters of the GATT with relative impunity but 
did not exacerbate this behaviour by targeting countries 
for unilateral coercive measures when, and if, these 
countries acted outside its perception of. fair trade.
Again this is not to say for a moment that the European 
Union was reluctant to enforce its international rights.
7*4 See generally, F. Schoneveld, "The EEC and Free 
Trade Agreements", (1992) 26:5 JWT 59.
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It did so often but normally within the mechanisms 
stipulated by the GATT. In fact, the volume of 
international claims brought by the European Union in 
this period was probably second only to that brought by 
the United States.
Against this background, it might seem rather anomalous 
that the European Union had in its arsenal of trade 
remedy laws a measure which had great potential for 
allowing the European Union to act unilaterally, namely 
the New Commercial Policy Instrument.** The existence 
of this measure caused concern among the European 
Union's trading partners for legitimate reasons. The 
NCPI had great potential for facilitating unilateral 
action. Certainly inside the European Union, some Member 
States, especially France, vigorously called for reform 
of this mechanism into an analogous measure to Section 
301,7**
In the following sections, the New Commercial Policy 
Instrument will be analyzed. The purpose of this 
analysis is to outline the considerable discretion which 
this measure conferred on the European Union for 
unilateralism and the flexibility which was inherent in 
its operation. After this analysis, we can evaluate 
whether or not the fear of these mechanisms among the 
European Union's trading partners was justified.
7** Council Regulation (EEC) 2641/84 (1984) . O.J.
L252/1 (1984). The replacement mechanism for the NCPI 
recently came into effect by virtue of Council 
Regulation (EC) 3286/94. O.J. L349/71 (1994), known as the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR). This measure lays 
down procedures in the field of the common commercial 
policy in order to exercise the EU's rights under the 
international rules established under the WTO.
766 Financial Times. December 7, 1993, 1.
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(A) The New Commercial Policy Instrument
The introduction in 1984 of the New Commercial Policy 
Instrument (NCPI) amounted to recognition by the 
European Union that the fabric of the common commercial 
policy was not complete and needed to be strengthened 
notably in fields not covered by the then existing rules 
of administered p r o t e c t i o n . i n  particular, a 
mechanism was considered necessary to defend 
'vigorously' the legitimate interests of the Union 
although the nature of these interests is not is not 
expressly defined.
The Instrument had two main policy objectives.** The 
first was to secure protection for the European Union 
markets from imports that were produced with the benefit 
of some form of unfair competitive advantage other than 
dumping or subsidisation. In this context, it was 
therefore an instrument of administered protectionism 
along similar policy lines as anti-dumping and anti­
subsidy measures, and, not surprisingly, many of the 
fundamental concepts behind these two measures, such as 
injury to a Union industry and the concept of European 
Union interest, were reproduced in the NCPI.™
7*7 On the background to the measure, see E.L.M. 
Volker, "Community Law Regulations on Foreign Trade", in 
M. Hilf & E-U Petersmann (eds), National Constitutions and International Economic Law (1993), 137, 156-159.
7*® Recital 6, Council Regulation (EEC) 2641/84. O.J. 
L252/1 (1984).
7** See generally, M.I.B. Arnold & M.C.E.J. Bronckers, "The EEC New Trade Policy Instrument: Some 
Comments on Its Application", (1988) 22:6 JWTL 19; and 
M.C.E.J. Bronckers, "Trade Laws Regarding Access to 
Foreign Markets", A Paper Given at the Annual Conference 
of the College of Europe, Brugge, September 15, 1989.
770 See generally, M.C.E.J. Bronckers, "Private 
Responses to Foreign Unfair Trade Practices - United 
States and EEC Complaint Procedures", (1985) 6
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The second goal was to dissuade the European Union's 
trading partners from engaging in, or permitting, 
certain types of unfair trade practices. It was in the 
pursuit of this objective that the element of 
unilateralism was manifested. In order to coerce foreign 
states to behave in a certain manner, it was considered 
necessary to apply pressure and indeed the adoption of 
such measures was expressly authorised in the basic 
regulation.
To achieve these objectives, the basic regulation 
created a complaints system through which both Member 
States and private individuals could lodge complaints 
with the European Commission alleging illicit foreign 
practices. The Commission then investigated these 
allegations before deciding whether or not measures 
would be required to counter the illicit practices 
alleged to exist.
While at a first glance the NCPI had much in common with 
Section 3 01 of the United States trade laws, on a closer 
examination they had relatively few shared features in 
terms of substance. True, the Instrument was enacted 
slightly after it became clear that the United States 
was intending to make full use of this tool and in fact 
the basic regulation itself noted that NCPI was enacted 
to ensure that the European Union acted as effectively 
'as its trading partners' in providing such relief. But, 
as we shall see later, a comparison of the two devices
Northwestern Journal Int'l Law & Bus., 653, 716.; and F. 
Castillo de la Torre, "The EEC New Instrument of Trade 
Policy; Some Comments on the Latest Developments", (1993) 30:4 CMLR 687.
771 See J.H.J. Bourgeois, "EC Rules Against Illicit 
Trade Practices", in B, Hawk (ed), Annual Proceedings of 
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1988; and M.B. 
Devine, "The Application of Regulation 2641/84 on 
Illicit Commercial Practices with Special Reference to 
the US", (1988) 22(4) Int'l Lawyer 1091.
341
shows interesting differences.
(1) Grounds for Action
The purpose of the Instrument was to establish 
procedures intended to;
(1) respond to any illicit commercial practices 
with a view to removing any injury caused by 
the practice; and
(2) ensure the full exercise of the European 
Union's rights with regard to the commercial 
practices of third states.
The right to lodge complaints on both these grounds was 
confined to Member States, Private individuals could 
initiate complaints only when based on allegations of 
illicit commercial practices.
While both grounds for action concerned violations of 
international commercial rights and practices, it is 
clear that the existence of a separate mechanism for 
dispute settlement in a particular agreement, such as 
Article XXIII (2) of the GATT, did not bar a complaint 
under the NCPI. In other words, the two systems existed 
in parallel. In the Fediol Case, the ECJ considered that 
the existence of international procedures for settlement 
of dispute, while not constituting a substantive grounds 
for identifying an illicit practice, did not prevent the 
applicant from seeking a remedy from the Union by way of 
a complaint.™
777 See text infra, pp. 346-347.
77^ Article 1, Council Regulation 2641/84.
77"^ EEC Seed Crushers and Oil Processors Federation 
(Fediol) V  EC Commission. Case 70/87 [1991] 2 CMLR 489.
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Illicit commercial practices were defined as 'any 
international trade practice attributable to third 
countries which was incompatible with international law 
or with the generally accepted r u l e s ' . ™  in other 
words, illicit practice were not synonymous with illegal 
practices. A particular commercial activity could 
constitute an illicit practice if it was contrary to 
generally accepted rules.
In deciding whether a measure was illicit, the 
legitimacy or otherwise of the measure under national 
law was not relevant. Thus, in one case, the European 
Commission accepted a complaint against an import ban 
imposed under Section 337 of the US trade laws. The 
basis of the claim was that this provision applied 
procedures which were less favourable to foreign 
producers than federal court procedures which are the 
normal procedurals for domestic p a r t i e s . ™  This was 
alleged to be contrary to Article 111(4) of the GATT in 
that the discrimination constituted a denial of national 
treatment. 7??
Illicit practices could take the form of both acts and 
omissions. Failure by the Indonesian government to enact 
laws or measures to protect record producers in the 
European Union from unauthorised copyright infringement 
constituted a basis for investigating a complaint from 
the European record industry.^*
775 Article 2(1), Regulation 2412/84.
77* For a discussion of this case see G. Denton, "The 
New Commercial Policy Instrument: Akzo v Du Pont",(1988) EL Rev 3.
777 O.J. C25/2 (1986) .
77* International Federation of Phonogram Industries 
V  Indonesia. O.J. C136/3 (1987).
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In the same vein, a failure to enforce a national law 
enacted to implement a rule of international law could 
have amounted to an illicit commercial practice. For 
example, Thailand's failure to enforce its legislation, 
which although formally in terms compatible with the 
Berne Convention as revised, was regularly infringed, 
has been alleged to be an illicit practice.™
Under the NCPI, complaints could only be addressed 
against illicit practices that could be attributed to 
foreign states. In other words, if the practice was 
committed solely and exclusively by private individuals, 
there would be no actionable grounds under the 
Instrument.
The Full Exercise of the European Union's Rights
In terms of the concept of the 'full exercise of the 
European Union's international rights was widely 
drafted. The basic regulation provided that:
'The European Union's rights shall be those 
international trade rights of which it may avail 
itself either under international law or under 
generally accepted rules. '7*°
The exercise of these rights was linked to the GATT, 
particularly as regards dispute-settlement.7*^
(2) Remedies and Retaliation
If, after an examination, the third country alleged to
77* Pirate Sound Recordings in Thailand. O.J. C189/26 (1991).
7*° Article 2(2), Council Regulation 2641/84.
781 Explanatorv Memorandum. 4.
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be engaged in the illicit practice had taken measures 
which were considered satisfactory the procedure could 
be terminated. 7*7 The most obvious illustration was 
repealing a measure found to be an illicit practice or 
enacting measures to rectify any lacunae in the national 
law. 7*7
If, after an investigation, it was found that action was 
necessary in the interests of the European Union to 
respond to any illicit commercial practice with a view 
to removing any injury caused by the practice or to 
ensure full exercise of the Union's international 
commercial rights, 'appropriate measures' could be 
adopted on behalf of the European Union.7*4
The European Union ensured that any action taken in 
response to an illicit practice was, both in terms of 
procedure and substance, compatible with its 
international obligations.
Retaliatory measures could only be adopted if they were 
'compatible with existing international obligations and 
procedures'. The Commission was empowered to recommend 
the adoption of measures of retaliation against any 
foreign country engaged in illicit practices causing 
injury to a Union complainant as long as the procedural 
dispute settlement steps had been exhausted.
The scope of the European Union's authority to adopt 
retaliatory measures was circumscribed by the 
requirement that such acts had to be 'compatible with
782 Article 9(2)(a). Council Regulation 2641/84.
783 For example. International Federation of 
Phonogram Industries v Indonesia, supra note 784, was 
settled by the enactment of Article 48 of the Indonesian Copyright Law.
784 Article 10(1), Council Regulation 2641/84.
345
existing international obligations and p r o c e d u r e s  » 
This implies that the European Union could not itself 
infringe the rules of international law when retaliating 
against an unfair commercial practice. Thus, unless the 
GATT authorised such measures, the Union could not 
unilaterally impose import restrictions or quantitative 
restrictions.
This also implies that, if measures were to be adopted 
against a GATT contracting party, the European Union 
would be obliged to obtain authorization from the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES before adopting any retaliatory 
measures simply because this was the procedure that the 
GATT specifies. Since the GATT authorised retaliatory 
restrictions in only one case, any complaints relating 
to the terms of the GATT were therefore unlikely to 
succeed.
In terms of form, three types of measures could have 
been adopted, namely;
(a) the suspension or withdrawal of any concession 
resulting from commercial policy negotiations;
(b) the rasing of existing customs duties or the 
introduction of any other charge on imports; 
and
(c) the introduction of quantitative restrictions 
or any other measures modifying import or 
export conditions or otherwise affecting trade 
with the third country concerned.**
Any measures adopted had to be tailored with a view to 
removing the injury caused by the illicit practice.*?
7*5 Article 10(2), Council Regulation 2641/84. 
786 Article 10(3), Council Regulation 2641/84.
787 Article 10(1)(a). Council Regulation 2641/84.
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(3) Contrast, Between the NCPI and Section 3 01
The NCPI and Section 301 of the United States trade law 
provided mechanisms for the potential unilateral 
application of countermeasures against foreign trade 
practices. While their aim was similar, the two measures 
had few features in common. In particular, the European 
Union made infrequent use of the Instrument in contrast 
to the United States.
In terms of scope of substantive grounds, the concept of 
illicit practice was considerably narrower than that of 
'unfair foreign trade practices' used in Section 301.
There was an overriding obligation in the NCPI to comply 
with the Union's obligations under international law. In 
effect, this meant that any measure adopted by the Union 
would be subject to judicial review by the Court if an 
application was brought by an interested party with 
standing.
No such obligation is expressly stated in Section 301. 
The grounds for a complaint extended to 'acts 
inconsistent with trade agreements' or acts 
•unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory'. There 
is little doubt that a review of a measure enacted under 
Section 301 would not result in the measure being 
annulled solely because it was an act inconsistent with 
international law.
From a procedural perspective, the requirement in US 
legislation that a complainer be 'an interested party' 
was considerably broader in scope than the European 
Union industry definition in the Instrument.
It also seems likely that the procedural requirements
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for a successful complaint were considerably higher 
under the NCPI than under Section 301. The need to 
establish sufficient evidence was a substantial hurdle 
to overcome from a complainers point of view. Even if 
not expressly stated, in practice the Commission applied 
this standard rigorously which helps explain the dearth 
of case law on this subject.
The scope of measures than could be deployed to counter 
unfair foreign trade practices also varied considerably 
between the two measures. Under Section 301, 'all 
appropriate and feasible action' could be taken, but 
under the NCPI measures were restricted to those 
compatible with existing international obligations and 
procedures.
While injury was required under Section 301, a 
complainer need only establish injury, and not material 
injury or serious injury. Further, the injury need not 
affect an American industry per se but it was sufficient 
that the foreign trade practice 'burdens or restricts 
United States commerce ». This is an extremely liberal 
definition of relevant injury.
(4) Observations on the Effectiveness of the 
Instrument and its Compatibilitv with GATT
The NCPI did not prove to be as great a threat to the 
international trading system as Section 301 of the 
United States trade laws. In part, this was due to the 
rigorous nature of the provision, in terms of both 
substance and procedure, as well as the thorough 
investigation standards imposed by the Commission in its 
investigations. Both these factors combined to produce 
a relatively low number of complaints.
However, that is not to say that the complaint procedure
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established was absolutely ineffective. Even the threat 
of lodging a complaint could discourage a third country 
from continuing a practice. For example, when EU 
producers of Scotch whisky publicised the fact that they 
were considering lodging a complaint against the 
Bulgarian government for allowing the sale of local 
liquor under the designation of 'Scotch whisky', the 
Bulgarian government immediately entered into 
negotiations with the producers before enacting measures 
to prevent this practice.** Similarly, the threat of 
measures prompted the Indonesian govern to change its 
legislation for the protection of copyright.
But, there were a number of shortcomings from the 
perspective of a complainer.
First, by linking the measure to the GATT dispute 
settlement, it effectively required the exhaustion of 
all international remedies before measures could be 
adopted. GATT dispute settlement took a notoriously long 
time and there were very few instances when the GATT 
authorised the use of countermeasures. In response to 
this criticism, it can be pointed out that frequently 
GATT disputes were settled out of court. It was not 
always necessary for the complaint to proceed to formal 
settlement. Naturally such an expedited settlement can 
be preferable for all interested parties.
Second, the whole mechanism was fraught with 
possibilities for upsetting foreign relations with other 
governments. In addition, the measure of discretion 
given to the European Commission was also a factor which 
mitigated against the effectiveness of the mechanism.
Judicial review of measures under the NCPI was also a
788 Arnold & Bronckers, supra note 769, 36.
________________________________   I__
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matter which raised concerns. While Member States and 
complainers had standing to complain, foreign producers 
could encounter difficulties in establishing standing, 
and in particular direct and individual concern under 
Article 173(2) of the EC Treaty, when the measures in 
question were directed against foreign states. This in 
fact closed this avenue off to foreign producers wishing 
to challenge the measure.
(5) Continued Commitment of the European Union to 
Multilateralism
Since the trade policy of the European Union has been 
more passive, especially in terms of unilateral 
measures, than that of the United States, it is not 
surprising that its trade policy objectives are 
different. In addition, many trade policy objectives are 
secured by means of bilateral commercial agreements 
which circumvents or relieves the pressures for more 
ambitious goals in trade negotiations.
During the Uruguay Round, the principal aim of the 
European Union was to secure agreement in the following 
areas;
(a) Significant cuts in tariffs and duties on
imports.
(b) The reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade 
by the negotiation of stricter disciplines to 
prevent abuse of such measures, procedures and 
practices.
(c) The extension of the GATT rules in areas of
trade which were, in the past, subject to
special regimes such as agriculture, textiles 
and clothing.
(d) A revision of many of the GATT rules to
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improve their effectiveness and, in 
particular, the strengthening of the rules to 
prevent the use by the United States of 
unilateral trade measures.
(e) The expansion of the GATT rules and 
disciplines in areas other than trade in 
goods, especially trade in services (ie. 
banking, insurance, construction, 
telecommunications, transport and television)
(f) The protection of intellectual property rights 
and trade-related investment.**
Quite clearly, these are not as ambitious or exotic 
objectives as those of the United States. Similarly, 
they are not tailored to fit into a policy of 
unilateralism or coercion. These aims are little more 
than the expansion of the fundamental GATT principles 
into areas other than those traditionally regulated by 
the organisation.
For the most part, the European Commission believes that 
these objectives were secured in the final agreement. 
Although this may have been the case, the European Union 
was not as successful in preventing the adoption of many 
rules which operate against its interests such as those 
for the elimination or reduction of export subsidies, 
the tightening of anti-dumping rules or the restraints 
on assistance for the development of aircraft.
It is difficult to claim that the European Union has 
abandoned the principle of multilateralism. The 
organisation has sent out different signals. On the one
789 European Commission, Background Report on the 
GATT Negotiations, Doc. ISEC/B6/91 (1991).
7*° European Commission, Global Agreement and Global 
Benefits; Report on the Conclusion of the Uruauav Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1994).
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hand, it has established an elaborate network of 
bilateral agreements to sustain its commercial policy. 
On the other hand, it has consistently rejected 
pressures to adopt a more aggressive posture on the use 
of its unilateral measures although this possibility has 
not been eliminated.
The explanation for this rather inchoate approach is 
two-fold. First, the interests of the different Member 
States inside the European Union inevitably result in a 
less decisive trade policy that for a unitary state. 
Second, the European Union tends to view trade 
negotiations as an opportunity for defending its 
existing measures rather than to specifically identify 
foreign trade practices considered to be detrimental to 
European Union interests. The only major exception to 
this last statement is, of course, the attempts to 
counter the continued use of Section 301 and its 
variants by the United States.
In the long-term, the continued commitment of the 
European Union to the principle of multilateralism may 
well decline with the negotiation of more comprehensive 
trade agreements such as those with Eastern Europe. In 
addition, the successful procurement of sector-specific 
agreements will also signal the decline in the 
importance of this principle in European Union external 
trade policy.
I
Finally, the litmus test of this commitment will, of 
course, be the attitude of the European Union towards 
the dispute settlement procedures which will in the 
future apply to a larger range of subjects. A 
willingness to implement panel decisions, which will be 
a significant deviation from its past policy, will be an 
indication of continued commitment while refusal or 
partial implement will indicate the contrary.
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<6) Observations
The European Union has progressed from being merely an 
advanced form of customs union into a more tangible 
supranational entity embracing political, economic and 
social objectives. Nevertheless, the European Union 
continues to rely strongly on the EC Treaty as a 
foundation or pillar upon which to place the political 
and social superstructure. While external trade policy 
has now become only one of a number of major policies of 
the European Union, it is still the primary point of 
contact on commercial matters between the European Union 
and third states.
The organisation is now composed of fifteen sovereign 
states whose commercial interests are diverse. This 
factor, together with the elaborate and incomplete 
decision-making processes within the organisation, is 
responsible for the inchoate and haphazard nature of its 
external trade policy. The variety of interests which 
coalesce as its external trade policy is virtually 
infinite. To name just a few, there are Member States 
national political, social and economic interests, 
private party interests, European Union interests, 
consumer interests, European industry interests and, of 
course, the interests of participants in the decision­
making processes to maintain commercial relationships 
with trading partners.
This confusion of interests is reflected in the external 
trade profiles of the fifteen Member States which differ 
considerably. Some Member States are net exporters of 
goods and products while others are net importers. At 
the same time the importance of trade in services is 
more relevant to some Member States than others. Even 
within the area of trade in goods, some Member States
_
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are more dependant on agricultural production than on 
industrial production while the converse is the case for 
others. The spread of diffuse economic and commercial 
interests among Member States is an important factor in 
the shaping of European Union external trade policy 
since it is the trade off of these interests which gives 
content to the final policy itself.
Yet, despite widespread recognition that the European 
Union's external trade policy is fragmented and 
ineffective, the Treaty on European Union made only 
slight amendments to Article 113, the constitutional 
foundation of the common commercial policy. One might 
have expected that this opportunity would have been 
taken to undertake a radical reform of the commercial 
policy to specify in more detail the powers and rights 
of the organisation vis-a-vis the European Union and its 
Member States on the one hand and the European Union and 
third states on the other hand.
Turning to the role of the European Union in the 
international trading system, it is relatively clear 
that the functioning of the European Union within the 
GATT system needs to be clarified once and for all. Its 
anomalous position is unsatisfactory bearing in mind the 
full participation of the European Union within the GATT 
system. Given that the GATT has transformed itself into 
the WTO and that the European Community has 
metamorphosised into a European Union, the time is right 
to end this saga once and for all and for some permanent 
relationship to be established between them in order to 
solidify the relationship.
At the same time, the commitment of the European Union 
towards multilateralism has been suspect in the last 
twenty years. It has placed a disproportionate emphasis 
on establishing bilateral trade relations with other
il
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countries. Over time, this policy has become more 
threatening in two respects.
First, the European Union no longer needs bilateral 
commercial relationships with geographically proximate 
countries. It has extended its web of bilateral 
agreements well outside the area of Western Europe and 
reaching well into Eastern Europe, North Africa and the 
Far East, The notable exception is the failure to 
negotiate comprehensive bilateral agreements with its 
major trading partners such as the United States, Canada 
and Japan. Quite clearly, the European Union perceives 
tangible benefits in pursuing these relationships at the 
multilateral level presumably to water down the relative 
authority of these countries to negotiate direct 
concessions from the European Union.
Second, there has also been a deepening of these 
relationships. As we have seen, particularly among 
Eastern European countries, the change has been from 
purely co-operation agreements to more comprehensive 
free trade and association agreements. Similarly, in 
recent times, the re-negotiation of bilateral agreements 
with non-European countries frequently involves numerous 
non-commercial matters and is beginning to resemble the 
friendship, commerce and navigation framework 
established by the United States in the earlier part of 
this century. The linkage of aid with economic co­
operation in these agreements is further evidence of 
this trend.
The negotiation of the European Economic Area Treaty was 
perhaps even more significant than the conclusion of the 
NAFTA because of both the size of the, linkage in terms 
of population and the depth of the substantive 
arrangements involved. Much of the acauis communautaire 
now applies to the six EFTA countries which have signed
______
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the Agreement. From a legal perspective, these states 
are de facto no longer considered part of the external 
commercial trade relationship of the European Union but 
rather as a partially integrated element in the internal 
market programme initiated by the European Union. Even 
although the arrangement has been in force for less than 
a single year already the momentum generated by the 
agreement for integration into the European Union has 
been manifested by the recent accessissons of three 
former EFTA states to full membership of the Union.
Turning eastward, the European Union has been very 
successful in extending and deepening its bilateral 
trade contacts in Eastern Europe. The negotiation of the 
Interim Agreements can be seen as the first stage of the 
economic absorption of these countries into the sphere 
of influence of the European Union, Negotiations with 
other states on new agreements in this area are also 
continuing. The promise of membership, financial 
assistance and co-operation has been extended as an 
incentive for these states to acquiesce to the trade 
policy wishes of the European Union.
There is a legitimate concern whether or not the 
erection of this bilateral commercial structure is in 
fact consistent with the GATT itself. The creation of 
this substructure beneath the multilateral system 
undermines the principle of multilateralism embodied in 
the GATT and permits the European Union to pursue its 
own trade policy agenda largely independently of 
multilateral constraints. The existence of this 
structure at the very least raises the question why such 
a framework is necessary when the European Union 
professes to adhere to the principle of multilateralism.
The existence of the New Commercial Policy Instrument is 
a more difficult phenomenon to explain. Most likely, the
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European Union perceived the need for such an instrument 
when the United States indicated that Section 301 would 
be applied more aggressive, around 1980-1982. In the 
event that Section 3 01 measures were applied more 
liberally to the European Union, the best response would 
be to counter with measures under the NCPI. The motive 
for the existence of the measure was not therefore a 
genuine belief that a mechanism for such a response was 
GATT consistent but anticipatory self-defence.
In reality, this need has been more perceived than 
actual. Until recently, the United States had not 
adopted many measures against the European Union. Hence, 
the European Union refrained from emphasising the 
existence of the measure instead using the mechanism to 
pursue limited objectives against certain developing 
countries.
There are two further explanations for the limited use 
of the mechanism. First, the European Union quite simply 
had no nerve for a tit-for-tat exchange between Section 
301 and the NCPI. Second, the European Union was 
reluctant to paint itself the same colour when it was 
able to stigmatize every use of Section 301 as an unfair 
measure, a policy which had broad support not only with 
other trading partners but also the GATT Director- 
General. This strategy allowed the European Union to 
take the higher moral ground when such measures were 
employed against it.
Comparison of the NCPI and Section 3 01 in fact 
highlights the different purposes of these measures. 
Section 301 was an instrument primarily available to 
United States industries to allow them to seek 
international redress for so-called unfair trade 
practices by third countries. The NCPI was more an 
instrument to allow the European Union to protect its
  '
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interests in a manner consistent with international law 
and the mechanism for complaints was only one part of 
the whole instrument.
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PART C
ANALYSIS OP THE INTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL 
AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES WITHIN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
The Internal Institutional and Decision-Making 
Process in the Formulation of Trade Policy in the 
United States
It is the fundamental proposition of this thesis that 
international commercial obligations entered into by the 
United States exercised, during the period of 
investigation, only a nominal normative influence on its 
behaviour in the formulation of trade policy with third 
states. These commitments were only one element among 
many forces at work which cumulatively determined the 
policy of the United States in this field. This chapter 
will attempt to identify the most significant non-legal 
forces at work in the equation which ultimately defined 
the trade policy of the United States.
The starting point for doing so must be to analyze the 
governmental framework which provided the context for 
the formulation of trade policy. The political, legal 
and administrative mechanisms involved are fundamental 
to isolating the reasons why there was such a 
significant degree of divergence between the United 
States international obligations and its trade 
practices.
In general terms, two groups of participants can be 
isolated in the decision-making process. On the one 
hand, there is the United States government and its 
ancillary bodies and institutions. On the other hand, 
there are private interest groups. Traditionally, 
private interest groups in the United States have played 
a greater role than their counterparts in other 
countries in the formulation of trade policy, both as 
initiators of trade complaints, and as mobilisers of 
public opinion in favour of the adoption of particular 
legislative measures.
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The role of governmental institutions, by which I mean 
the U.S. Executive and Congress as well as the numerous 
administrative agencies, becomes evident when an 
investigation of the constitutional foundation of trade 
policy is conducted. This reveals that the Executive and 
Legislative branches of government were locked in a 
conflict in which the mainly protectionist Congress was 
pitted against an Executive, which at least for the last 
three administrations have supported a relatively more 
active policy of trade liberalisation. Nevertheless, the 
prevailing emotion throughout the last decade in 
government circles has been for increased protection and 
for greater isolationism.
The role of private interest groups and private parties 
is more subtle and more difficult to quantify, although 
no less important. The two most obvious means through 
which private interest groups influence trade has been 
by increasing pressure, especially on Congress, for the 
adoption for more protectionist measures and the 
unhealthy reliance of certain United States industries 
on trade protection laws.
Trade protection laws are simply measures of 
administered protectionism. These mechanisms played an 
important role in United States trade policy, despite 
the fact that they were predominantly triggered by 
private complaints. Indeed, the structure of trade 
protection laws fits comfortably into the general 
framework of the decision-making process in United 
States trade policy.
The prospect of the enactment of national legislation or 
the imposition of administrative measures inconsistent 
with the international obligations of the United States 
would be significantly reduced if interested parties 
(both domestic and foreign) could challenge the validity
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of such measures in the U.S. courts. In other words, if 
the U.S. courts permitted the judicial review of 
national measures against the applicable international 
standards, this would safeguard against the formulation 
of a trade policy inconsistent with the international 
rules. So, as a final matter, I shall consider in this 
chapter the degree to which the United States 
legislature and courts permitted challenges to be made 
against trade policy decisions based on international 
standards.
(1) The Conflict Between the Executive and Legislative 
Branches of Government in the Formulation of Trade 
Policy in the United States
From a strictly black-letter constitutional point of 
view, prima facie the Congress exercises the greatest 
influence over trade policy. It is the Congress that has 
authority *to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises' and 'to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations'.^* Congress is also responsible for the 
discharge of functions relating to trade policy such as 
the approval of budgets for economic policy objectives, 
enacting legislation fixing the value of the currency, 
taxation, approving membership in international 
organisations, consenting to treaties, and confirming 
political a p p o i n t m e n t s . The Congress is therefore 
primarily charged with the maintenance of a broad 
framework of American economic policy.
In contrast, the constitutional powers of the Executive 
Branch are considerably more restricted. The most
791 Article I, Section 8, United States Constitution.
See J.H. Barton & B.S. Fisher, International 
Trade and Investment (1986), 93-142.
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important organic constitutional responsibility 
conferred on the President for the conduct of trade 
policy is the authority to negotiate treaties, including 
international trade agreements, subject to the advice 
and consent of a qualified majority of the Senate. In 
addition, the President has an inherent foreign affairs 
power to conduct international diplomacy in pursuit of 
his authority to negotiate international agreement s.
Nevertheless, the role of the Executive has been greatly 
enhanced by its ability to react quickly to 
international developments and to respond to the day-to- 
day administrative tasks required to implement trade 
policy, such as conducting international negotiations 
and supervising the implementation of measures of 
administered protection. This flexibility has allowed 
the de facto delegation of varying degrees of authority 
to conduct trade policy on behalf of the nation to the 
Executive. Yet, although Congress has been compelled to 
grant considerable negotiating powers and administrative 
functions to the Executive, it has never abandoned its 
influence of the formation of trade policy.^*
1
At the end of the day. Congress has the ultimate 
sanction in that it can veto any trade package 
negotiated by the Executive with foreign countries. In 
fact, the only real constitutional pressure that the 
Executive could bring to the absolute exercise by 
Congress of its power to establish commercial policy 
with other nations is the Presidential veto which itself 
may be overruled by a two-thirds majority vote in
J.H. Jackson, "U.S. Constitutional Law Principles 
and Foreign Trade Law and Policy", in M. Hilf & E-U.
Petersmann (eds), National Constitutions andInternational Economic Law (1993), 65, 67-70.
P. Dymock & D. Vogt, "Protectionist Pressure in 
the U.S. Congress", (1983) 17 JWTL, 496-512.
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Congress. Not surprisingly then, the Executive has 
traditionally had to rely on delegated legislative 
authority to influence decision-making on the issue of 
trade policy.
(A) Congressional Influence Prior to the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979
At different periods in time, the influences of the 
President and Congress in the formulation of trade 
policy have varied relative to each other. From the 
passage of the disastrous Smoot-Hawlev Tariff Act of 
1930. until the early 1970s, Executive authority to 
execute trade policy continuously expanded. During 
this period, some writers claim that the influence of 
the President was decisive in the formulation of trade 
policy.Indeed, at the end of this period, more than 
twenty different Executive agencies exercised delegated 
powers in the field of trade policy.
Until the Trade Act of 1974"^ ^^. a tacit understanding 
had prevailed between Congress and the Executive which 
allowed the President to take the initiative in 
proposing trade legislation. However, the 1974 statute 
was enacted during a period in which considerable
On the effects of the 1930 Act, see generally, 
E.E. Schattschneider, Politics. Pressures and the 
Tariff: A Studv of Free Enterprise in Pressure Politics 
as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tariff (1935).
See S. Haggard, "The Institutional Foundations of 
Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
of 1934", (1988) 42:1 International Organisations, 91-
119; and D.A. Lake, "International Economic Structures 
and American Foreign Economic Policy", in J.A. Frieden 
& D.A. Lake (eds), International Political Economy 
(1987), 145-165.
S.D. Cohen, The Making of United States 
International Economic Policy (1977), 57-60.
88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
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Congressional suspicion had arisen in the activities of 
the President.^^ The passage of this legislation marked 
the transition from Executive branch leadership in trade 
policy to Congressional dominance and oversight in trade 
policy-making.
In this statute. Congress set about imposing limitations 
on the principal prerogative of the Executive in 
fashioning policy - the right to negotiate international 
agreements with other states. With the embarrassing 
experience of the Executive in the Anti-Dumping Code 
fiasco still in mind Congress reimposed its will on 
the powers of the President to negotiate through two 
measures. First, it introduced greater direct 
Congressional controls on Executive discretion to 
negotiate during multilateral trade negotiations. 
Second, it successfully ensured an unprecedented level 
of Congressional participation in any subsequent 
multilateral trade negotiations.
The composition of these controls is interesting from a 
policy-making perspective. The statute conferred broad 
advance authority on the President to initiate 
negotiations to reduce non-tariff barriers and other 
trade distortions, but obliged the President to notify 
both the House of Representatives Ways and Means 
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee at least 
ninety days before entering into any agreement.^'
See H.H. Koh, "Congressional Controls on 
Presidential Trade Policy-making After I.N.S. v Chadha",
(1986) New York Journal of Int'l Law & Politics 1191, 1200-1208.
See R.B. Long, "United States Law and the 
International Dumping Code", (1969) 3 International
Lawyer 464, 472-489.
801 Section 102, Trade Act of 1974.
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While, prima facie. it might appear that these 
procedural rules could work to the advantage of the 
Executive, Congressional control took three forms. 
First, explicit parameters were set on the negotiating 
objectives of the President. For multilateral 
agreements, the overall negotiating objectives were 
expressly specified in the statute together with the 
sectoral objectives.Authority was also conferred for 
the negotiation of bilateral agreements on the basis 
that such arrangements 'provide for mutually 
advantageous economic b e n e f i t s ' .
Second, the authority of the President to enter into 
negotiations in the pursuit of trade policy was subject 
to time limits, embodied in the so-called 'sunset 
provision'. Under Section 101(a)(1) of the Act, this 
authority expired five years after the enactment of the 
statute. In the event that negotiations became 
protracted, the Executive would have to return to 
Congress to seek an extension of authority to negotiate.
Third, Congress imposed a legislative veto in its favour 
in no less than six separate provisions of the 
statute.^* This mechanism allowed either House of the 
Congress to veto the adoption of implementing 
legislation, but again only as a whole, and not by way 
of amendment.
Additional restrictions on the ability of the President 
to negotiate were imposed by rigorous consultation 
obligations. The President was statutorily obliged to 
engage in extensive consultations with Congressional and 
private sector advisers and an extensive range of formal
Sections 103 and 104, Trade Act of 1974. 
Section 105, Trade Act of 1974.
804 Koh, supra note 799, 1207.
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certification and post-negotiation reporting 
requirements were i m p o s e d . A t  the same time, a 
sizeable Congressional delegation was set up for 
participating in the multilateral stages of any trade 
discussions.
These developments have signalled increased intervention 
on the part of Congress in the conduct of trade policy. 
The regime set up for the negotiation of trade 
agreements placed the Executive in a policy-making 
straight-jacket. While the Executive nominally retained 
the right to initiate negotiations, its discretion was 
fettered, firstly by the Congress setting the 
negotiating agenda, and secondly, by Congress retaining 
the right to reject any proposed trade package. Trade 
liberalisation measures negotiated at the multilateral 
level were therefore at the mercy of the whims of 
Congress, a body notoriously susceptible to the 
prevailing currents in the constituencies of its 
members.
(B) The Congressional Stranglehold on Presidential 
Control of International Trade Policv
While the Trade Agreements Act of 1979^^  was enacted 
ostensibly to incorporate the results of the Tokyo Round 
trade negotiations, even in this legislation. Congress 
took the opportunity to reinforce its domination of 
trade policy. Further, both the Trade and Tariff Act of 
1984 0^^ and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
805 Sections 131-135, Trade Act of 1974.
See J.H. Jackson et al (eds), Implementing the 
Tokyo Round (1985), 153.
93 Stat. 144 (1979).
98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
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1988809 bear the indelible marks of the hand of Congress 
in trade policy formulation.
The renewal of Presidential authority to conduct trade 
negotiations was extended in section 101 of the 1979 Act 
for an additional eight year period. But, supplementary 
restrictions were placed on the type of negotiations 
that could be pursued. In addition, for the first time 
in almost fifty years. Congress instructed the President 
to study and report within two years on the desirability 
of negotiating trade agreements with North American 
countries, including Canada, a significant departure 
from the prior multilateral orientation of trade 
policy.
In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Congress replaced 
these controls with even greater fetters on Presidential 
discretion in this f i e l d . T h e  1984 Act was enacted on 
a wave of Congressional sympathy for domestic import- 
affected industries which had been denied administrative 
protection.In this context, the statute was intended 
to achieve two objectives:
(a) To overrule undesirable decisions by the ITA 
and the ITC in the field of administered 
protection and to provide rules to regulate 
new issues that had arisen such as input 
dumping and upstream subsidies; and
(b) To limit the degree of discretion exercised by 
the Executive in administered protection
102 Stat. 1107 (1988).809
Section 1104, Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
98 Stat. 2948 (1984).
1^2 See J. Bello & A.F. Holmer, "The Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984: The Road to Enactment", (1985) 19
International Lawyer, 287-292.
_________
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cases, particularly safeguard actions.
The Executive was singled out for harsh criticism in the 
Trade Remedies Reform Bill of 1984 which eventually 
became part of the final statute. In the Report on the 
measure by the Trade Sub-Committee, direct attacks were 
made on the International Trade Administration (ITA), an 
Executive agency (part of the Department of Commerce) 
for failing to tighten the definition of countervailable 
subsidy and on the Executive for its decisions relating 
to foreign market value in anti-dumping 
determinations.
The Trade Reform Bill also proposed two additional 
controversial measures to tackle foreign trade 
p r a c t i c e s . T h e  first was export targeting, defined 
broadly as 'any government plan or scheme consisting of 
coordinated actions that is bestowed on a specific 
enterprise, industry or group, the effect of which is to 
assist the beneficiary to become more competitive in the 
export of any class of merchandise'. This proposal was 
inspired by the allegations made in the Houdaille 
machine tool case and in the charges of the American 
Semiconductor Industry Association.^* New rules were 
suggested to prevent industrial targeting and the 
singling out of particular industries by governments for 
special treatment.
The exact details of these changes will be 
considered at various later stages in this work. In 
order to avoid repetition, it is unnecessary to consider 
their detail at this stage in the discussion.
814 Qj^  the other hand, see F.O, Boadu, "Enforcing 
U.S. Foreign Trade Legislation: Is There a Need for
Expanded Presidential Discretion?", (1990) 24:4 JWT 79.
See I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics: 
Svstem Under Stress (1986), 136-137.
See infra. Chapter 9.
371
The second proposal addressed natural resource 
subsidies. The practice of the ITA in the past had been 
to declare such subsidies non-countervailable on the 
ground that they failed to satisfy the specificity 
test.*^ ^
The package of measures submitted in the Bill began to 
unravel in 1984 and the most drastic measures were 
dropped from the final text that became the 1984 Act. 
Neither the export targeting provisions nor the natural 
resource subsidies proposal was enacted into law. 
Nevertheless, these themes were both picked up again 
once the legislative momentum had once again gathered 
for the 1988 Act.®^ *
Yet it appears that even the 1984 Act failed to assuage 
domestic critics of American trade policy. In 1985, over 
three hundred trade bills were introduced in Congress, 
indicating the continued level of dissatisfaction with 
the existing trade policy. In 1986, the House of 
Representatives proposed an omnibus trade bill which was 
described by President Reagan as 'kamikaze 
legislation'.^* In the following year, both Houses of 
Congress passed separate bills which the President 
committed himself to vetoing in the event that either 
was passed to him for approval.
The Executive fought long and hard with the Congress to
See Car lise Tire & Rubber Co. v United States. 
564 F.Supp. 834 (CIT 1983).
Resource input subsidies were eventually made 
actionable under the countervailing duty law and export 
targeting was listed as an 'unreasonable or 
unjustifiable' foreign practice under Section 301 in the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
A.F. Holmer & J.H. Bello, "The 1988 Trade Bill; 
Savior or Scourge of the International Trading System?", 
(1989) 23:2 International Lawyer 523, 523.
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dilute or remove most of the blatantly protectionist 
proposals. Among the provisions submitted to Congress 
for approval were measures designed to exclude 
permanently from the American market producers who 
repeatedly violated the trade protection laws, to 
require the President to automatically impose safeguard 
measures in the event of an affirmative injury 
determination by the ITC, to expand the definition of 
subsidy, to provide relief against all forms of 
diversionary dumping, to liberalise the anti-dumping 
rules in order to allow more successful actions and to 
impose trade sanctions against nations sponsoring 
terrorism.^*
(C) The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
and the Present Position
Protectionist sentiments in the Congress built up prior 
to 1987 could not be suppressed and over the course of 
the next year, many elements in these bills were 
fashioned into the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 which was little more than a shopping list for 
Congressional pressure g r o u p s . T h e  international 
response to the 1988 Act was the lodging of protests 
against the content of the legislation with American 
diplomatic representatives.
In the 1988 Act, Congress did extend the authority of 
the President to enter into negotiations for trade
820 Holmer & Bello, ibid, 524-525.
102 Stat. 1107 (1988). Reproduced at 28 ILM 399 
(1989) and in K.R. Simmonds & B.H.W. Hill (eds). Law and 
Practice Under the GATT. Vol. 3, III.C.4 (May 1989).
The European Community, with the support of a 
number of other countries, attacked the legislation at 
the GATT Council meeting of September 22, 1988; see
International Trade Reports (BNA) Vol. 5, 1302
(September 1988).
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agreements and to utilise the fast track procedure for 
implementing l e g i s l a t i o n . This authority was however 
extended only until March 1, 1991, with the object in 
mind of a conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
in December 1990. The Executive therefore had to return 
to Congress to seek approval of this authority for a 
further two years*^ and then an additional nine 
months^* in order to ensure the success of the 
negotiations.
The 1988 Act reduced Presidential discretion to grant 
administered protection and introduced a number of 
blatantly protectionist measures to United States trade 
remedy laws. In particular, acute criticism was 
levelled at the Administration's failure effectively to 
retaliate against foreign manufacturers under Section 
301.*^ ® A number of other protectionist measures were 
also adopted which will form much of the subject-matter
*23 Section 1103, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988.
824 The first extension was granted on May 24, 1991, 
and authority renewed for both the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round and the NAFTA; Financial Times. May 25, 
1991. On the background debates see Financial Times. May 
23, 1991 and London Times, May 23, 1991.
825 Fast track authority was extended for a further 
nine months by the Clinton Administration in March 1993, 
to expire on December 15, 1993; see Aoencie Europe. No. 
5927, 10 (25/3/93).
On the fast track process itself, see A.F. Holmer 
& J.H. bello, "The Fast Track Debate: A Prescription for 
Pragmatism", (1992) 2 6 Int'l Lawyer 183.
*22 See K.J. Ashman, "The Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988: Insignificant Changes from 
Prior Law?", (1989) 7 Boston Univ. Int'l Law Journal, 
115-153, 115-117.
828 J.H. Bello & A.F. Holmer, "The Heart of the 1988 
Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to 
Section 301", (1988) 24:2 Stanford Journal of Int'l Law, 
1-44, 1-2.
................. .
374
in the forthcoming analysis of trade protection laws.
(D) Observât ions
The role of the Executive in the formulation of trade 
policy has therefore been gradually eroded by this 
progression of restrictive statutes and as we have seen 
a similar process can be detected in the Executive's 
authority to administer rules of trade policy. On the 
latter point, not only has Congress usurped to a large 
extent the administrative discretion conferred on the 
President, but at the same time, it has dramatically 
reduced the scope of Executive authority to conduct 
trade negotiations.
Although it is dangerous to over-generalise, it is more 
likely that the most recent three administrations can be 
characterised as more pro-trade liberalisation than the 
various Congresses that have convened during their 
periods in office.^* The Bush and Clinton 
administrations in particular have been reluctant to 
exercise their discretion under either the safeguard 
legislation or the various manifestations of Section 301 
of the Trade Act of 1974 which have the effect of 
granting relief to ailing industries.®^®
Similarly, while both administrations have presided over
®2* On the track record of the Reagan administration, 
see M. Borrus & J. Goldstein, "United States Trade 
Protectionism; Institutions, Norms and Practices",
(1987) 8 Northwestern Journal of Int'l Law & Business 
328.
®®® Non-Rubber Footwear Import Relief Determination. 
50 Fed Reg. 35, 205 (1985); reproduced in J.H. Jackson 
& W.J. Davey, International Economic Relations (Second 
edition, 1986), 570, See also Carbon and Steel Alloy
products. 49 Fed. Reg. 5,838 (1984), and the commentary 
in P. Dwyer, "Rejection of Recommendation on Steel 
Import Regulation", (1985) Harvard Int'l Law Journal 
287.
■"1
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a considerable growth in the number of export restraint 
agreements, on the whole this has been to forestall 
action at Congressional level. Generally, it is true to 
say that the Executive is more willing to respond to the 
international currents of influence than the Congress 
because it is closely involved in international trade 
negotiations and is required to listen to the concerns 
of foreign governments over American trade practices.
Congressmen, on the other hand, are notoriously 
susceptible to respond to the wishes of their 
constituents and pressure groups. Since these pressures 
are mostly domestic, and because foreign concerns are 
rarely matters that are discussed in the floor of 
Congress, the legislature, particularly in the last 
decade, responds primarily to domestic concerns at the 
expense of the long-term interests of United States 
trade policy.
(2) Reconciling National Commercial and Economic 
Interests and Concerns with International 
Commitments
In its most simple terms, the formulation of national 
commercial and economic policy requires a balance to be 
struck between diametrically opposite forces. 
Domestic producers, manufacturers and their 
representatives exert enormous political pressure on the 
governmental decision-making process to preserve and 
protect favourable market conditions in domestic 
markets. This normally requires measures designed to
R.E. Baldwin, "The Political Economy of Post-War 
U.S. Trade Policy", in R.E. Baldwin & J.D. Richardson 
(eds), International Trade and Finance (Second edition, 
1981), 64-77; and E. Grilli, "Macro-Economic
Determinants of Trade Protection", (1988) 11 World
Economy 313.
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impede, or at least inhibit, access to the internal 
market for foreign competitors. In the present economic 
climate, this protection increasingly takes the form of
non-tariff barriers.
In opposition to these pressures are groups which 
advocate the reduction of national barriers to trade. 
These groups are composed of domestic producers who wish 
to penetrate foreign markets and who recognise that such 
access is best achieved on a reciprocal basis, as well 
as foreign governments who wish to promote exports, 
private foreign manufacturers, exporters and importers 
and consumers whose interests lie in obtaining the best 
possible return on their income.^*
National commercial policy is shaped by trading these 
interests off against each other and requires compromise 
between the wishes of domestic producers for greater 
protection and the goals of other groups which, for 
various reasons, collectively desire the uninhibited 
exchange of goods.
At the same time, other elements of national economic 
policy influence the profile of trade policy. Fiscal 
policy, trade imbalances, and volumes of international 
investment also are relevant. Each of these elements 
impinges on the nature of the trade policy adopted by a 
particular country, but in recent years inside the 
United States the most important factors is often deemed 
to be any trade imbalance. In the event that a country 
runs a persistent and substantial trade deficit, often
See G.C. Hufbauer et al., Trade Protection in the 
United States: Thirty One Case Studies (1986).
See S.D. Cohen, The Making of U.S. International 
Economic Policv (1977), 41-117.
See K.W. Abbott, "The Trading Nation's Dilemma",
(1985) 26 Harvard Int'l Law Journal, 501-532, 503-504.
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there is a growth of protectionist sentiment within 
internal political circles. This has occurred in the 
United States where there is immense political concern 
at the size of the trade deficit which has consistently 
and dramatically increased throughout the 1980s.
For the last twenty years, the United States government 
has directly linked that country's merchandise trade 
deficit with the need to decrease foreign imports and to 
prise open foreign markets. Thus the 1988 Act identifies 
as the principal negotiating objective in trade 
discussions the need to:
"develop rules to address large and persistent 
global current account imbalances of countries, 
including imbalances which threaten the stability 
of the international trading system, by imposing 
greater responsibility on such countries to 
undertake policy changes aimed at restoring current 
account equilibrium, including expedited 
implementation of trade agreements where feasible 
and appropriate".
Such a suggestion implies that United States trading 
partners should reduce their efficiency in order to 
allow its producers to capture greater shares of the 
market that they are entitled to in normal competitive 
situations. It also implies that trading partners with 
trade imbalances are somehow cheating by not 
implementing their international commitments. No doubt 
the United States would have been the first to 
vigorously protest at the inclusion of such an objective 
in the negotiating policy of one of its trading partners 
during the 1950s and 19 60s, when it enjoyed a healthy 
trade surplus with most states.
Section 1101(b)(5), Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988.
-----------------------------------------------------
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Although the impulse behind this linkage has grown 
primarily from within Congressional circles, during the 
Reagan administration and throughout the Bush and 
Clinton administrations, there have been indications of 
sympathy with this view.*^® The use of measures of 
administered protectionism has been one of the most 
overt symptoms of the pursuit of a policy of attempting 
to redress the existing trade balance by impeding 
foreign imports.^?
The growth of protectionist sentiments within the United 
States political system, particularly in Congress, can 
be traced back to the early 1970s, when the United 
States was faced with a trade deficit that pales into 
insignificance in contrast to the present figure. Since 
the first appearance of the persistent trade deficit in 
1970, the United States has constantly retreated from an 
avowed policy of trade liberalisation towards greater 
protectionism, including increased administered 
protectionism. Further, the tendency of the United 
States to adopt autarkic policies has increased as its 
trade deficit has widened.^*
The relationship between the trade deficit and the 
greater resort to measures of contingent protectionism 
is clearly illustrated by two developments at this time. 
First, the previously near-dormant countervailing duty 
mechanism was gradually revived. In the years
836 These issues are fully discussed, in the context 
of the present United States deficit, in R.H. Clarida, "That Trade Deficit, Protectionism and Policy 
Coordination", (1990) 13 World Economy 415.
See generally, A.M. Rugman & A.D.M. Anderson, 
Administered Protection in America (1987).
G.C. Carvounis, The United States Trade Deficit 
of the 1980s (1987), A.M. Solomon, The Dollar. Debt and 
the Trade Deficit (1987), and A.E. Burger, United States 
Trade Deficit; Causes. Consequences and Cures (1989).
B. Butler, "Countervailing Duties and Export 
Subsid-isation: A Reemerging Issue in International
Trade", (1968) 9 Virginia Journal of Int'l Law, 82.
P.B. Feller, "Mutiny Against the Bounty: An
Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and 
the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law", (1969) 
1 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 17-76.
Executive Branch GATT Studies, Tax Adjustments in 
International Trade: GATT Provisions and EEC Practices. 
7-17 (1973), reproduced in J.H. Jackson & W.J. Davey,
International economic Relations (Second edition, 1986), 
785-789.
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immediately before the 1970 U.S. balance of payments 
deficit was announced, a record number of countervailing 
petitions were lodged against foreign products.^* 
Almost immediately, after eight years of inactivity, the 
Treasury Department imposed countervailing duties in six 
instances in a twenty-one month period.
Second, the Administration of the time made no attempt 
to disguise its belief that the economic problems of the 
United States were attributable to unfair foreign trade 
practices. Considerable blame for this malaise was 
placed on European subsidisation of agriculture and 
industrial production and a warning was issued to 
European trade partners that failure to achieve 
international reform of their subsidisation policy would 
necessitate retaliatory measures.
The Nixon administration opted for a deliberate policy 
of arresting the decline in the trade figures by 
imposing trade restrictions. In an attempt to close a 
deficit of nine billion dollars, the Nixon 
administration severed the fixed parity between the 
dollar and gold, allowing the currency to float and 
thereby establishing more competitive prices for 
American exports, and imposed a ten percent surcharge on
:î
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dutiable i m p o r t s . I n  addition, the President 
established the Williams Commission to report on changes 
required in American commercial policy. The Commission 
reported in July 1971, and recommended, inter alia, that 
access to the countervailing duty, anti-dumping and 
safeguards laws should be liberalised and that time 
limits should be established for investigations in order 
to apply pressure for affirmative decisions.
We have observed that calls for greater protectionism 
are often based on the trade deficit.^ While the 
sources and consequences of the present American 
economic shortcomings are outside the scope of the 
present work, it is a primary contention of this thesis 
that the greater the protectionist sentiment within the 
United States, the stronger the use of unilateral 
measures such as administered protection. It is 
therefore necessary to consider the effect of the trade 
deficit within American political circles.
There is little support for the proposition that the 
trade deficit of the 1980s and early 1990s is caused 
solely by consumer preferences for foreign goods. Three 
other causes have at least contributed to this 
situation: decreased relative efficiency of the economy, 
an overvalued currency, and the inability of the United 
States to impose its fiat on the international economy.
J.H. Jackson, "The New Economic Policy and the 
U.S. International Obligations", (1972) 66 AJIL 110-118.
Williams Commission Report entitled International 
Economic Policv in an Interdependent World (July 1971); 
and J.H. Jackson, "The New Economic Policy and U.S. 
International Obligations", (1972) 66 AJIL, 110-118.
^  For example, see R.O. Cunningham, "The 
Restatement as Prologue to Turmoil in the Law: A
Commentary on the Restatement of U.S. International 
Trade Law", (1990)24 Int'l Lawyer 315, 318-319.
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There is little doubt that the United States has not 
maintained the same degree of economic efficiency in 
relation to Japan and the newly industrialised nations 
of South-East Asia that it possessed in the 196Os. 
While relative growth in the United States has 
marginalised, growth in these countries has increased 
relatively unimpeded. Labour and other costs in these 
countries are modest compared to the United States, and 
foreign companies have found investment in these areas 
attractive. The costs of transportation of these goods 
to the United States market can be easily absorbed into 
a final price lower than of comparable American 
products. While research and development continue mainly 
in the developed countries, the actual production of 
finished products, which accounts for the most 
considerable part of the final price, can be carried out 
in such countries with lower manufacturing overheads.^*
American industries must compete in world markets in 
order to maintain growth. But the economic conditions 
within the United States, such as wage costs, labour 
laws, and taxes place such businesses at an economic 
disadvantage, although not necessarily an unfair 
disadvantage, in comparison to countries where these 
costs are minimal. Traditional industries are unable to 
withstand such competition, and without research and 
development into new products or services, new 
employment will not be generated. The United States is 
now only one producer among many in a truly 
international market place.
There are three principal elements in the 
determination of comparative advantage: capital, labour 
and resources. The United States probably now maintains 
limited advantages in terms of its capital resources and 
its skilled labour force.
See generally, C.J. Brown, "United States 
Competitiveness in World Markets", (1986) New York 
Journal of Int'l Law & Politics 1075.
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Industrial and economic policy are therefore of immense 
importance in maintaining international 
competitiveness.Providing attractive conditions for 
investment and financing research and development are 
more likely to ensure a health economy than continued 
reliance on traditional industries which cannot compete 
with foreign producers on the simple premise of the 
principle of comparative advantage.
Failure to recognise and address changes in global 
economic perspectives and a persistent refusal to 
abandon outdated notions of fair and unfair trade also 
help explain the present economic predicament. These 
elements have created a deep-rooted fear of foreign 
competition and even when there was a substantial 
economic resurgence at the beginning of the 1980s, 
pressures to adopt protectionist measures did not 
subside in Congress.^*
The second element that has contributed to the trade 
deficit has been an overvalued dollar at least for the 
first half of the 1980s. An overvalued currency makes 
exports more expensive and foreign imports more 
competitive. In the past, exchange rates were set 
essentially by trade flows. A current account surplus 
implied that the demand for the domestic currency 
exceeded the supply and the exchange rate ought to rise, 
all other factors remaining equal. Equally, a deficit 
would normally imply a decline in the exchange rate. 
This would render exports cheaper and redress the 
imbalance.
See the analysis in D.F. Burton, "Markets in 
Motion: U.S.-Japan Trade in the Fast Lane", (1986) 18
New York Journal of Int'l Law & Politics 1137.
A.M. Rugman, "United States Protectionism and 
Canadian Trade Policy", (1986) 20 JWTL, 363-380.
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However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, capital 
transactions became progressively liberated until, in 
1985, capital flows are approximately fifteen times 
greater than trade in g o o d s . F o r  most purposes, 
capital can be equated to investment, and in the 1980s, 
the United States has been an attractive location for 
investment. First, in the early part of the 1980s, 
economic growth in the United States provided the 
incentive for investment. Second, the need to finance 
the growing budget deficit has required high interest 
rates which, in turn, attracted capital from Japan, 
Europe and the Middle East.
Throughout the 1980s the capacity of the United States 
to borrow on the strength of the dollar in the 
international market-place has exceeded the downward 
pressure exerted by artificially large imports and 
declining e x p o r t s . T h e  dollar was not allowed to 
return to a value that realistically reflected its true 
value. This contributed to the mounting deficit and 
since no readjustment policy has been initiated, the 
deficit has persisted at around the same level.
The overvalued dollar created problems for manufacturers 
on both sides of the import-export equation. American 
consumers purchased cheaper foreign goods in place of 
American goods, thereby reducing sales of domestically 
produced goods. Domestic firms and labour unions vented 
their frustration at this practice by lobbying for 
protection in order to cut losses in both employment and 
output. At the same time, American industries could not 
sell their goods in foreign markets because they were
849 See Brown, supra note 846, 1079.
See R.I. McKinnon, "Protectionism and the 
Misaligned Dollar: The Case For Monetary Coordination", 
in D. Salvatore, The Protectionist Threat to World 
Welfare (1987), 367-387.
See R.M. Kubarych, "Trade Policy and the Dollar",
(1986) 18 New York Journal of Int'l Law & Politics 1113.
D, Kenen, "Exchange Rate Management", (1987) May 
American Economic Review 194.
R.H, Clarida, "That Trade Deficit, Protectionism 
and Policy Coordination", (1990) 13 World Economy 415, 
433-436.
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comparatively more expensive than goods from other
■ ■countries due to the artificial rate of the dollar.
I:':
The United States government has not been ignorant of 
this problem, but has instead chosen to adopt a policy 
of 'benign neglect' towards exchange rate p o l i c y . T h e  
main response has been to seek informal agreements 
within the Group of Seven for exchange rate 
coordination. In 1985, the so-called Plaza Accord was 
agreed at the Group of Seven meeting in New York in an 
attempt to coordinate exchange rate policy among the 
seven leading industrial nations of the world. In 
reality, this was nothing more than a gentlemen's 
agreement among the central banking figures in the 
United States, Germany and Japan, to devalue the dollar 
through intervention purchasing. The whole experiment 
was a failure and within eighteen months another 
understanding, the Louvre Accord, was agreed in February
1987.853
The Louvre Accord involved a coordinated effort to 
stabilize the value of the dollar within a range, or 
'target zone', roughly equal to the value of the 
currency at that time. This time the range was 
maintained by a host of measures, including the raising 
of American interest rates and the tightening of 
monetary policy. After a period of less than a year, the 
dollar stabilised at its agreed level and for the most 
part, has remained stable to date.
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The third factor contributing to the inability of the 
United States to reduce its trade deficit has been the 
shifts in economic power within the international 
trading system.^* The United States is no longer the 
principal or dominant economic power in the 
international trading system. During the 1970s and 
1980s, both the European Union and Japan have emerged, 
for different reasons, as economic forces to be reckoned 
with by the United S t a t e s . T h i s  erosion of economic 
supremacy has required the United States to examine the 
ways in which it conducts business. It can no longer 
impose its ideas of trade policy on the international 
community.
Conflicts therefore arise because both the European 
Union and Japan maintain different commercial policy 
objectives from the United States. For example, the 
Union maintains that non-tariff barriers such as 
subsidies are legitimate social devices.Similarly, 
the Japanese business community includes certain non­
tariff barriers that contain sociological and cultural 
elements that defy regulation.
But, it is possibly the expansion of the European Union 
from its original six Member States to fifteen Members, 
together with the vast network of free trade agreements
See R.E. Baldwin, "The New Protectionism: A
Response to Shifts in National Economic Power", in D. 
Salvatore, The New Protectionist Threat to World Welfare
(1987), 95-112, 99-102.
See H. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law 
(Second edition, 1983), Vol. 6, 78-82.
See H. Malmgrem, International Order for Public 
Subsidies (1977), 22.
M. Matsushita, "The Legal Framework of Trade and 
Investment in Japan", (1986) 27 Harvard Int'l Law
Journal, 361-388; and G.R. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura, Law 
and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economv (1986), 3-55.
—      - ■   __
386
with the rest of Europe and its preferential trade 
agreements, that have placed definite limits on the 
scope of United States economic influence. Regardless of 
the trade policy of the European Union, its presently 
stands as the largest consumer market in the world. The 
United States is therefore obliged to give greater 
countenance to the concerns and interests of the 
European Union than would otherwise be the case if there 
were fifteen separate states.
As a result of these factors the trade deficit has 
increased and the internal pressure for both 
unilateralism in international commercial policy and for 
protectionism in general are presently more acute than 
at any other time in American economic history.^* As a 
result of many factors, not least economic 
mismanagement, the United States presently confronts the 
largest trade deficit in its history, a fact that 
invariably invokes calls for greater protection.^*
Many of the proposals made by the Executive to try to 
redress the trade deficit have assumed an air of 
absurdity. For example, the Structural Impediments 
Initiative (SII) was initiated by President Bush and 
Prime Minister Uno in Paris in July 1989 with the 
objective of formulating policies to reduce Japan's 
annual trade surplus with the United States.*^ The 
result was a report detailing a number of policy pledges 
by each side to reduce impediments to market
858
859
J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (1989), 48-59.
R.Z. Lawrence & R.E. Litan, "The 
Prescription; Errors in Diagnosis and 
1 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
See
Protectionist 
Cure", (1987)
289-310.
y.S. Lanneaux, "Joint Report of the United 
States-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments 
Initiative", (1991) 32 Harvard Int'l Law Journal 245.
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penetration. On the Japanese side, this involved a 
commitment to spend 43 0 trillion yen (approximately 
US$28 trillion) on public investments on infrastructure 
between 1991 and the year 2000. Japan also agreed to 
remove measures blocking import-clearance and to 
encourage American investment.
In contrast, the United States undertook to reduce the 
Federal budget, to encourage joint-ventures and direct 
foreign investment, to deregulate certain sectors and to 
promote research and development. The naked imbalance of 
these pledges clearly illustrates which of the parties 
is the weaker trading partner.
At the same time, the phrases 'level playing field* and 
'fair trade' have been used by administrations as 
panaceas for all the United States economic ailments. 
Yet, it is clear that trade protectionism will not solve 
the trade deficit of the United States, which requires 
action in fiscal policy, industrial policy, exchange 
rate policy and controls over the budget deficit which 
currently attracts an artificial volume of foreign 
investment. It is more likely that protectionism will 
add to the economic plight of the United States by 
closing foreign markets to American products thereby 
strangling economic growth.
Meanwhile the rush towards 'administered* or 'contingent 
protectionism* has continued u n a b a t e d . A m e r i c a n
Neither party was satisfied with the others 
progress on these commitments at the first review 
meeting; see Report on Meeting Between P.M. Kaifu and P. 
Bush, Newport Beach, United States, August 19, 1991,
Oxford Analvtica. Report. 910404 (1991) .
862 The origins of the terms 'administered* or 
'contingent protectionism' have been attributed to De 
Grey, See R. deC Grey, Trade Policv in the 1980s: An 
Agenda For Canada-United States Relations (1981).See 
also J.M. Finger et al., "The Political Economy of
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business claims that, although it can compete with 
foreign firms on equal terms, it cannot compete with the 
national treasuries of foreign governments and subsidy 
programmes, or against state monopolies perpetrating 
dumping, or against discriminatory non-tariff barriers. 
Yet, it is obvious that the use of measures of 
administered protection by American industries is not 
primarily to seek redress against specific unfair 
practices.
We shall now examine the use of administered protection 
devices by sectors of the American industry in order to 
demonstrate the truth of this assertion.
(3) The Systematic Abuse of Trade Protection Laws by 
United States Domestic Industries
Among some of the more traditional industries in the 
United States, there is little doubt that there exists 
serious structural problems. Some of these problems may 
be attributed to the performance of foreign competitors. 
There is little doubt that, in countries where wage 
levels are low, overheads and production costs nominal, 
and employment laws lax, goods can be produced cheaper 
that in countries where these costs are greater. Since 
workers in the United States are paid higher than their 
counterparts in Singapore or Taiwan, it is inevitable 
that price undercutting will occur.
Similarly, it is also predictable that the traditional 
industries, in which basic and labour intensive products 
such as textiles and agricultural products are made, 
will be the first to suffer decline in the face of 
competition with those countries that have a simple
Administered Protection", (1982) 72 American Economic
Review, 452-466.
  _ _ _ _ ____
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comparative advantage over the United States. Once these 
markets have been captured, production in such countries 
will move on to more advanced levels.
In response to this competition, many United States 
traditional industries have contracted. The remaining 
producers have fought a rearguard battle to survive 
mostly by resorting to measures of administered 
protection combined with government intervention, either 
in the form of subsidies or through diplomatic 
negotiations for the adoption of export restraint
mechanisms.
The United States trade protection laws lend themselves 
well to this type of conflict.^* For the most part, 
initiation of investigations into alleged unfair trade 
practices is by way of private petition. Private parties 
also have the option of selecting the most appropriate 
forms %f harassment or saturating the foreign 
competition with a volley of unfair trade allegations 
and investigations. The United States government, 
particularly the Congress, has openly condoned this form 
of aggression, and frequently has altered national 
legislation to allow a wider range of groups to 
participate in this process.
See, G.C. Hufbauer, Trade Protection in the 
United States: 31 Case Studies (1986).
Protection under U.S. anti-trust laws is 
notoriously more difficult to secure; J. Davidow, "The 
Relationship Between Anti-Trust Laws and Trade Laws in 
the United States", (1991) 14 World Economv 37.
For example, see Section 626(c) of the Tariff Act 
of 1984 which extended standing to producers of grape in 
order to allow countervailing duty petitions to be 
lodged by that industry against imports of wine 
products. See also the panel report. United States - 
Definition of Industry Concerning Wine and Grape 
Products. GATT Doc SCM/71 (March 1986).
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The strategies employed by the industries about to be 
discussed have varied but for the most part measures of 
contingent protection have been used as opening shots 
ultimately leading to some type of permanent, or at 
least long-term, relief often in the form of export 
restraint arrangements. In the event that these tactics 
prove ineffective, relief is often sought through 
Congressional bills sponsored by sympathetic Congressmen 
with large traditional industries in their 
constituencies. This medium of relief has, in the past, 
proved both amenable and effective.
Three industries have been selected for this purpose, 
the steel industry, automobiles and motorcycles, and 
consumer e l e c t r o n i c s . O t h e r  sectors in which a 
similar strategy has been adopted include textiles, 
machine tools, footwear and chemicals.
(A) The Steel Industry
Steel production is an example of a labour-intensive and 
capital-intensive industry in which the comparative 
advantage once held by the United States and the Member 
States of the European Union has been gradually eroded 
by developing countries.
The steel industry in the United States is characterised 
by a number of idiosyncratic traits, such as the 
periodic negotiation of wage increases by unions on 
behalf of workers, an unhealthy reliance on the United
On the general background of these industries, 
see W.R. Cline, "U.S. Trade and Industrial Policy: The 
Experience of Textiles, Steel and Automobiles", in P.R. 
Krugman (ed) Strategic Trade Policv and the New 
Economies (1986), 126.
OECD, World Steel Trade Developments, 1960-1983 
(1985); and OECD, The, Steel Market in 1990 and the 
Outlook for 1991 (1991).
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States automobile industry as a major purchaser and the 
lack of government regulation in production.^* At the 
same time, it is also subject to the common problems of 
traditional industries such as sharp declines in 
national supplies of raw materials, the relative
decreases in costs of transportation and a decline in 
unit labour costs of foreign producers relative to
American producers.^*
The United States steel industry appears to have gone 
through three distinct phases in combating foreign 
imports of steel. In the first stage, during the 1960s 
and early 1970s, the main target of countermeasures was 
the newly industrialised countries, most notably Japan.
In response to Japanese competition and from newly 
industrialised countries, more than 3 0 anti-dumping 
cases were filed in the 1960s by American steel
producers.*’® In fact, the overwhelming majority of
anti-dumping suits during this period were brought by 
steel producers. In 1969, the United States negotiated 
voluntary export restraint arrangements for a three year 
period with Japan.*’^
*^* M.K. Levine, Inside International Trade Policv 
Formulation: A History of the 1982 US-EEC Steel
Arrangement (1985), 1-8.
*®^ It should be noted that the industry continues to 
remain heavily subsidised; see A.A. Anderson & A.M. 
Rugman, "Subsidies and the U.S. Steel Industry", (1989) 
23:6 JWT 59.
*’® GATT, Trade Policv Review of the United States. 
1989 (1990), 215.
871 This arrangement was challenged by consumer 
organisations as being unconstitutional and anti­
competitive. Both grounds of action were rejected by the 
Federal court; see Consumer Union of the United States 
Inc V  Kissinger, 506 F.2d (1974), cert, denied, 95 S.Ct 
2406 (1975).
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These restraints were periodically renewed until 1977 
when a trigger price mechanism was introduced in order 
to prevent a conflict with Japan caused by a series of 
twenty-three dumping complaints being lodged by American 
steel producers.The trigger price mechanism involved 
the creation of a scheme to monitor the price of steel 
imports and to expedite anti^dumping investigations into 
imports below the trigger prices.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the second stage 
commenced with the main target being producers inside 
the European Union. An aggressive campaign was waged by 
the American steel industry to restrict the volume of 
European steel imports into the United States. In March 
1980, the United States Steel Corporation filed multiple 
dumping complains against European steel producers.*’^ 
A price trigger mechanism was agreed which incorporated 
quotas and the complaints were withdrawn.
Subsequently, in the light of the failure of the trigger 
price mechanism to provide relief, 132 anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty complaints were filed against 
European and other steel p r o d u c e r s . A t  the same 
time, a number of firms sought protection against 
European Union imports of steel through safeguard relief 
under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.
The ITC found the existence of injury in some of the 
safeguard investigations, but in the majority of cases.
A.M. Wolff, "International Competitiveness of 
American Industry: The Role of U.S. Trade Policy", in
B.R. Scott & G.C. Lodge (eds), United States 
Competitiveness in the World Economv (1985), 301-327, 
310-314.
Wolff, ibid, 313.
Levine, supra note 868, 26-36.
_________ _ __
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the President refused to grant relief.*’* For example, 
in 1983 investigation. President Reagan rejected the 
ITC's recommendations of quantitative restrictions on 
imports of certain steel products, in favour of 
temporary increases in tariffs on only a limited number 
of the products under investigation.*’*
Similarly, in the 1984 safeguard investigation, despite 
the finding of injury, the President rejected the 
proposed import relief on the grounds that it would not 
be in the national economic interest because such 
measures would increase prices, reduce jobs and 
undermine the domestic and international competitiveness 
of the United States steel-consuming industries.*” 
Instead, a programme to facilitate the restructuring of 
the steel industry was introduced including negotiations 
for voluntary export restraint agreements with countries 
whose imports into the United States had increased 
signif icantly. *’*
The barrage of anti-dumping and countervailing 
complaints during this phase was in fact initiated by 
only seven steel companies. These firms can be divided 
into three groups: US Steel, the largest steel producer, 
Bethleham Steel, the second largest producer, and five 
smaller companies.All complaints were filed by these 
companies on the same day.
*’* For example, Stainless Steel and Allov Tool 
Steel. Inv. No. TA-201-48 (1983).
*’* Presidential Proclamation No. 5074. July 19,
1983.
*” In retrospect, it appears that this decision was correct; see ITC, Report on the Effects of the Steel 
Voluntary Restraint Agreement on U.S. Steel-Consuming 
Industries. USITC Pub. No. 2182 (May 1989).
*’* GATT Report, supra note 870, 216. 
*’^ Levine, supra note 868, 26.
f1-
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In early 1982, the ITC reached a decision on the issue 
of preliminary material injury in the anti-dumping and 
countervailing actions and rejected almost half the 
complaints. However, those cases terminated represented 
only ten percent of imports covered by the original 
petitions. In June 1982, the ITA found the existence of 
countervailable subsidies on most European steel 
exports.
The majority of these complaints had been brought to 
impose pressure on the European Union to reach a 
negotiated settlement and, in this regard, the 
petitioners were ultimately successful. The U.S.
Commerce Department entered discussions with the
European Union on an agreed quota system for steel
imports.**® These restrictions were part of a wider 
scheme to allocate a fixed share of the United States 
steel market to foreign producers,**^
There is little doubt that these quotas are inconsistent 
with the GATT for a number of reasons, including their 
discriminatory nature, their infringement of the 
obligation to refrain from introducing quantitative 
except under certain special conditions, and their
inconsistency with the obligations of the United States 
under Article XIX.**^  Similarly, their economic effect 
on patterns of world trade in steel is profound as the
**® F. Benyon & J. Bourgeois, "The European Community 
- United States Steel Arrangement", (1984) 21 CML Rev. 
305.
**^ See Exchange of Letters Between the European 
Community and the United States Concerning Steel 
Products. O. J. L215/2 (August 1983); and Commission 
Decision 2191/83/EGSC. O.J. L215/15 (August 1983).
**^ I. Pogany, "'Steel Wars' vs 'Star Wars'; The 
Impact of the Voluntary Export Restraints on the GATT", 
in D.L. Perrott & I. Pogany (eds). Current Issues in 
International Business Law (1988), 68-88.
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two parties involved are significant producers of 
steel.***
This arrangement continued until July 1989, when 
President Bush announced his so-called 'Steel Trade 
Liberalisation Program' which was scheduled to last 
until March 1992.**^ The continuation of the 
multilateral restraint arrangement was considered to be 
transitional pending the negotiation of a Multilateral 
Steel Arrangement to eliminate the trade distorting 
practices of the major steel-producing nations.
There are also similar agreements between the United 
States and the European Union to limit the volume of 
semi-finished steel, speciality steel and steel products 
imported into the United States.*** In 1989, the 
threshold for semi-finished steel imports was 670,000 
tons.*®* Similar quotas were applied to European Union 
exports of steel pipes and tubes to the United 
States. **’
The third and latest round of this contest commenced in 
April 1992 with the initiation of a series of anti-
*** See C. Rhodes, "Managed Steel Trade and the GATT 
Countervailing Duty Code and the 1979 Trade Act", (1988) 
12:2 World Competition 57.
**^ R. Carbaugh & D. Wassink, "Steel Voluntary 
Restraint Agreements and Steel-Using Industries", (1991) 
25:4 JWT 73, 84.
*** See J. McKinney & K.A. Rowley, "Voluntary 
Restraint Arrangements on Steel Imports: Policy
Developments and Sectoral Effects", (1989) 23:3 JWT 69.
*** Council Decision 89/634/EEC, on the Conclusion of 
an Arrangement with the United States Covering Trade in 
Certain Steel Products, O.J. L368/96 (Dec. 1989).
**’ Council Decision 89/635/EEC, on an Arrangement 
with the United States Regarding Trade in Steel Pipes 
and Tubes, O.J. L368/97 (Dec. 1989).
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dumping and countervailing complaints against European 
and South American steel producers.^* These complaints 
were lodged against a number of manufacturers of 
speciality steel in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and Belgium.
The most notable aspect of the petitions was the high 
level of duties sought by the American producers. 
Countervailing duties of 10 percent, 20 percent and 25 
percent were sought respectively against British, German 
and French producers, but anti-dumping duties of 53 
percent, 69 percent and 79 percent respectively were 
requested against these same companies.
In November 1992, after the ITC made affirmative 
preliminary injury determinations in July of that 
year**®, the ITA announced that provisional 
countervailing duties of up to 59% were to be imposed on 
these imports after the preliminary investigations had 
been concluded. In more than fifty percent of these 
cases, the preliminary rulings were subsequently 
confirmed in the final determinations.*®® Not 
surprisingly, on January 27, 1993, the Department of
Commerce also announced affirmative dumping findings in 
27 of the 42 anti-dumping investigations which were 
conducted at the request of the industry.*®^
Quite clearly, these actions had been precipitated by
*** Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products From 
Argentina. Australia. Austria. Belgium. Brazil. Canada. 
Finland. France. Germany. Italy. Janan. Korea. Mexico,
the Netherlands. New Zealand. Poland. Romania. Spain.
Sweden. Taiwan and the United Kingdom. Inv. Nos 701-TA- 
319-354, (1993) 5:1 WTM 64.
**® Ibid.
*®® Financial Times. February 20, 1993.
*®^ Financial Times. January 29, 1993.
.................................. .....
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the failure of negotiations on a Multilateral Steel 
Agreement to replace the voluntary restraints which 
exist in the United States market. The European 
Commission reacted to the introduction of the measures 
by refusing to continue the discussions on a 
multilateral agreement on steel and no such arrangement 
was incorporated into the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round.
In the final analysis, by employing these devices, the 
American steel industry is almost fully isolated from 
the effects of international competition in steel 
production. The volume of imports is restricted to 
artificially fixed levels and trade in steel to the 
United States is fully managed.
(B) Motor Vehicles and Motor Cvcles
The production of vehicles has been one of the most 
confrontational issues in United States - Japan 
relations. Increasing imports of foreign vehicles are 
seen as substantially contributing to the United States 
trade deficit. Yet, the North American motor vehicle 
industry is, for the most part, responsible for its own 
demise. The vast proportion of American- built motor 
vehicles are intended for use on North American roads 
and are too large or consume too much fuel for use on 
the roads of other countries.
The microeconomic problems of the American car industry 
in the early 1980s were summed up in one ITC 
investigation as follows:
(1) A general decline in demand due to increased 
costs of car ownership and operation;
(2) A permanent shift in consumer preferences to 
smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles and a
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failure by the industry to respond to this 
change in preference;
(3) A substantially negative accounting impact 
resulting from extraordinary investment to 
transform the industry; and
(4) The success of foreign manufacturers in direct 
competition.
The sheer size of the American vehicle industry has 
ensured that it has significant lobbying power in the 
U.S. Congress. Solutions to the problems of the industry 
have been sought not only in this means, but also 
through the use of trade protection laws. The most 
important device in this struggle has been the 
safeguards legislation.*®*
The first action raised by the American automobile 
industry was a safeguard investigation commenced in 
1980. This petition was started by the United Automobile 
Workers union and the Ford Motor Company joined the 
action a few months l a t e r .
*®^ Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and 
Bodies Thereforef Inv. No. TA-201-44 (1980), reproduced 
in J.H. Jackson & W.J. Davey, International Economic 
Problems (Second edition, 1986), 573-584.
*®* On safeguard actions in general, see P.C. 
Rosenthal & R.H. Gilbert, "The 1988 Amendments to 
Section 201; It Isn't Just for Relief Anymore", (1989) 
20 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 403; J.M. Staples, "Section 
603, Standing and the Outsourcing Domestic Industry; The 
ITC's Disappointing Conclusion of Escape Clause Action 
in Industrial Forklift Trucks", (1988) 20 Law & Pol'y
Int'l Bus. 109; and K.C. Kennedy, "Presidential 
Authority Under Section 337, Section 301 and the Escape 
Clause; The Case for Less Discretion", (1987) 20 Cornell 
Int'l Law J. 127.
*®^ For a detailed analysis of this case, see P. 
Stern & A. Wechsler, "Escape Clause Relief and 
Recessions; An Economic and Legal Look at Section 201", 
in G.R. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura, Law and Trade Issues 
of the Japanese Economy (1986), 195.
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In its decision, the ITC was split over the issue of 
whether or not there was sufficient injury to recommend 
relief.*®* Chairman Alberger, Vice-Chairman Calhoun and 
Commissioner Stern were in the majority deciding against 
granting relief. However, there was no degree of 
consistency in the methodology of the majority in 
reaching this conclusion. Nevertheless, the one 
significant common feature was the majority's reliance 
upon the general recession of the time being the most 
significant cause of injury.
President Reagan had, however, made a number of pledges 
to the American automobile industry to provide relief 
against Japanese car manufacturers.*®* Further, the 
automobile industry had substantial support in Congress. 
After the negative determination in the 1980 safeguards 
action, the United Auto Workers union took its case back 
to Congress and demanded action through legislation. 
Considerable sympathy was generated for the position of 
the industry and one Senator described the ITC decision 
as a 'monumental error' while another openly expressed 
his determination to obtain import quotas against 
Japanese vehicles.
Informal discussions were opened between both 
governments with a view to establishing voluntary 
restraints on Japanese imports of cars. These 
discussions culminated in an Exchange of Letters between 
the governments setting quotas on the number of cars 
originating in Japan that could enter the American 
market.*®^ This agreement was intended to last from
*®* Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and 
Bodies Therefor, supra note 892, 581.
*®* New York Times, May 2, 1981.
*®^ Exchange of Letters Between the United States 
Government and the Government of Japan, reproduced in 
Jackson & Davey, supra note 892, 619-622.
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April 1981 for a period of three years.
The 1981 agreement between Japan and the United States 
limited the number of Japanese cars to an upper limit of 
1.68 units as a transitional, temporary and transitional 
step. This arrangement was extended for a further year 
in 1984 and the limit of imports adjusted to 1.85 
million units. In March 1985, President Reagan announced 
that no further extension of this arrangement would be 
sought. The rationale for this decision was not that the 
reasons for protection had evaporated but because a 
Federal Trade Commission report had estimated that the 
restrictions had channelled a subsidy worth US$ 750 
million each year from American consumers to Japanese 
car markers.*®*
There is also little doubt that between 1983 and 1985 
the restraint agreements allowed the American automobile 
industry to adjust substantially to the increased 
competition from Japanese manufacturers. In these three 
years, production of passenger cars in the United States 
grew by 33.6%, 14.6% and 5,3% respectively.*®® However, 
since 1986, production again declined and imports 
increased. It is noticeable that the increased imports 
of foreign cars were of non-Japanese origin and included 
vehicles made in Korea and the European Union.
The American motor cycle industry has also taken 
advantage of Section 201 to petition for relief, again 
against predominantly Japanese manufacturers. In 
September 1982, the Harley-Davidson Motor Company 
petitioned the ITC for relief from imports of 
heavyweight motorcycles, engines and power train 
subassemblies for such vehicles. After a six months
898 GATT Report, supra note 870, 220. 
*®® Ibid, 221.
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investigation, again the Commission was divided on 
whether relief should be granted or not, but this time 
the majority favoured the provision of relief.
The decision was unique for a number of reasons. 
First, the domestic industry under examination consisted 
of three companies, Harley Davidson, Honda of America 
and Kawasaki U.S.. Thus, two Japanese subsidiaries were 
included in the relevant domestic industry in an 
investigation against their parent companies.
Second, the issue of serious injury was vigorously 
contested by the opposing parties.^ The majority in 
the case found that the most serious cause of the injury 
was the increased imports of motorcycles and this factor 
was more significant than the general recession of that 
time. This decision contrasted with that found in the 
investigation into automobiles and much of the change of 
policy in the Commission can be attributed to its change 
of personnel in the intervening period. During this 
period. President Reagan was able to appoint three new 
Commissioners onto the ITC, all of whom reached an 
affirmative determination in this investigation. The 
remaining members rendered decisions urging the 
continuation of the previous policy of refraining to 
provide relief unless the injury was caused by non- 
recession-related factors.
^  The final report was issued as. Heavyweight 
Motorcycles and Engines and Power Train Subassemblies 
Therefor. Inv. No. TA-201-47 (1983).
For an extensive analysis of the decision, see J. 
Hatch, "The Harley-Davidson Case: Escaping the Escape 
Clause", (1984) 16 Journal of Law & Pol*y Int'l Business 
325.
See P. Stern & A. Wechsler, "Escape Clause Relief 
and Recessions: An Economic and Legal Look at Section 
201", in G.R. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura, Law and Trade 
Issues of the Japanese Economy (1986), 195, 204-205.
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Third, the President took the unusual step of adopting 
the recommendation of the ITC for relief in whole. This 
decision is also unusual when it is considered that the 
relief recommended was a draconian increase in tariffs 
of 45 percent.
The increased tariff protection was originally granted 
for a five year period from April 1983, with a 
digressive tariff rate quota on imports. In fact, the 
relief was terminated by President Reagan in October 
1987.
Both the automobile and the motorcycle industries 
demonstrate an unusual profile in their use of safeguard 
measures. Obviously, both industries felt there was 
legitimate grounds for obtaining relief under the 
safeguard provisions. Anti-dumping actions are rare in 
the automobile sector, although in 1988, Hyundi of 
Canada was alleged to have been engaged in dumping 
vehicles and parts into the United States market. 
Countervailing complaints are equally rare. However, 
statutory relief is not as rare and the support for 
these industries in Congress is both enormous and 
bipartisan.
(C) Consumer Electronics and the Semiconductor Industry
The rapid growth policy of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s 
and the foreign market strategies of Japanese companies 
gave rise to fears in the United States that Japanese 
producers would dominate the consumer electronic 
industry.These concerns were manifested in a number 
of trade remedy cases against Japanese electronic goods
See K. Yamamura & J. Vandenberg, "Japan's Rapid- 
growth Policy on Trial", in G.R. Saxonhouse and K. 
Yamamura (eds), Law and Trade issues of the Japanese 
Economy (1988K 238-283.
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in the early 1970s. The continued success of the policy, 
combined with effective market penetration by Japanese 
consumer goods manufacturers, has meant that trade 
protection complaints, particularly anti-dumping
petitions, have been widely used to impede the entry of 
consumer electronics into the market.
One of the earliest precedents for the adoption of trade 
remedy measures to impede the flow of consumer
electronics was against Japanese imports of televisions 
sets. In 1971, after a complaint by Zenith, a finding of 
dumping was made against a number of Japanese
manufacturers of television sets.^ This determination 
was made at a time when production of television sets in 
the United States had decreased 50 percent between 1966 
and 1970, the number of firms involved in production had 
dramatically declined and there was severe and sustained 
price competition.At the same time, law suits were 
filed by the same company alleging predatory pricing and 
attempted monopolisation contrary to the Sherman Act as 
well as countervailing duty actions.
Litigation in the United States court to resolve these 
allegations lasted more than fifteen years, with two 
American companies alleging the unfair practices 
claiming $3 60 million and $900 million in damages. The 
decisions ultimately rendered on the substantive issues 
were as follows:
(a) Anti-trust violations: Litigation continuing.
^  Television Sets From Japan. Inv. No. AA 1921-66 
(1971); 10 ILM 423 (1971).
Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 903, 259.
^  See K.W. Almstdet, "International Price 
Discrimination and the Anti-Dumping Act", (1981) 13 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 747.
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(b) Dumping allegations: Final duties upheld.^?
(c) Countervailing complaint: The U.S. Supreme court 
rejected the contention that non-excessive 
remissions of indirect taxes constituted a bounty 
of grant under the countervailing duty 
legislation.^*
Zenith has continued its relentless war against Japanese 
manufacturers of televisions sets to the present day. In 
the latest case, Zenith has alleged that three Japanese 
manufacturers (Fujitsu, Mitsubishi and NEC) engaged in 
dumping throughout 1982 to 1987
Dumping complaints and Section 337 petitions against 
Japanese manufacturers of consumer electronics such as 
photocopies, photographic equipment, video recorders, 
stereo equipment and telecommunications equipment are 
frequent, although not as coordinated as is the case 
with other sectors of the American e c o n o m y . T h e  
principal exception is semiconductors where the domestic 
industry was able to present a united front to foreign 
producers of competing products.
In 1977, many of the American semiconductor-producing 
firms formed a trade association with the specific 
intention of responding to the commercial expansion of 
Japanese producers into the United States market. This
^  Zenith Radio Corporation v United States. 710 
F.2d 806 (Federal Cir. 1983).
Zenith Radio Corporation v United States. 437 
U.S. 443, 98 S.Ct 2441 (1978).
Zenith Electronics Corporation v United States. 
Slip Op. 90-132 (1991); reproduced in (1991) 3:1 WTM
167.
See, for example, Iwatsu Electric Co and Ors v 
United States (1991), reproduced at (1991) 3:2 WTM 1;
Color Picture Tubes From Canada, Japan and Korea (1988) , 
reproduced at (1988) 22:3 JWT 95-100.
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success could be largely attributed to the industrial 
policy of the Japanese government which revolved around 
support for high technology industries in the form of 
financial aid and limited anti-trust relief for research 
and development.
At the time, this industry was one of the most 
successful and in 1982 held over fifty percent of the 
world market. True, the Japanese market remained 
relatively closed, but other markets, particularly in 
Europe, were extremely lucrative. This success was also 
achieved without excessive government support for the 
industry which contrasted with the positions in Japan 
and the European Union. It seems therefore that the 
American industry was not countering Japanese imports to 
protect itself from economic injury in the domestic 
market, but to preserve its position in the world 
market.
The tactics of the U.S. Semiconductor Association were 
to lobby Congress for subsidies to offset research and 
development subsidies by the Japanese government, and 
when this proved ineffective, to petition for the 
imposition of anti-dumping as well as Section 301 
relief. Countervailing duty actions were generally 
considered to be ineffective despite the fact that 
government assistance in the production of Japanese 
semi-conductors was indisputable because the level of 
such duties is dependant on the amount of the subsidy. 
In the case of semi-conductor production, the duty 
imposed would be an insignificant amount per unit 
because of the enormous volume of production and sales 
of the devices.
The opening shots of the battle were fired with the 
filing in 1985 of a Section 301 petition with the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR) alleging that the Japanese
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government had erected barriers to trade to impede 
American exports in June 1985.®^  ^ The USTR entered into 
dialogue with the Japanese government to resolve the 
problems of market access. The eventual outcome of these 
discussions was the Semiconductor Arrangement of 
September 1986,
Even before the progress of these discussions was clear, 
a number of American semiconductor producers commenced 
an anti-dumping action alleging that four Japanese 
companies were selling erasable programmable read-only 
memory semiconductors (EPROMS) at less than fair value 
in the United S t a t e s . similarly, in December 1985, 
another investigation was initiated, this time by the 
Department of Commerce, into sales by Japanese companies 
of dynamic random^access memory semiconductors of 256 
kilobits and above (256k DRAMs)
The Commerce Department decided to self-initiate the 
third complaint into the dumping of 256K DRAMs by 
Japanese companies under considerable pressure from both 
the industry and C o n g r e s s . Against this background, 
the ITC issued a preliminary finding of material injury 
in the 256k DRAM investigation and the ITA concluded 
that these semiconductors were in fact being sold in the 
market at less than fair value. Preliminary anti-dumping 
duties of between 20% and 110% were imposed on a
Japanese Semiconductors, 50 Federal Register 28,866 (1985).
Erasable Programmable Read Onlv Memories From 
Japan, 50 Federal Register 41,230 (1985).
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 
64K and Above From Japan. 50 Federal Register 51, 450
(1985).
J. Grenwald, "Protectionism and United States 
Economic Policy", (1987) 23 Stanford Journal of Int'l
Law 233, 255-256.
::
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company-specific b a s i s . similarly, preliminary 
dumping duties of between 22% and 188% were imposed in 
the EPROM investigation.^*
A fourth complaint, this time alleging the dumping of 
64k DRAMs was commenced by American producers, ended 
with the imposition of producer-specific anti-dumping 
duties ranging between 12% and 35%.®^  ^ The remaining 
investigations were superseded by the negotiation of the 
Semiconductor Arrangement between Japan and the United 
States.^*
The Semiconductor Agreement of September 1986 is divided 
into three main sections dealing with access to the 
Japanese market, dumping by Japanese producers and 
general enforcement provisions.^*
There is little doubt that the Semiconductor Agreement 
between these parties is one-sided. In return for 
onerous monitoring and market-sharing obligations, the 
Japanese government obtained little more than a 
commitment from the American government that, at least
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 
256 Kilobits and Above From Japan. 51 Federal Register 
4,661 (1986); 51 Federal Register 9,475 (1986).
Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories From 
Japan. 51 Federal Register 9067 (1986).
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 
64k and Above From Japan. 51 Federal Register 21,781
(1986).
On the background to the whole anti-dumping 
problem, see Y.Y. Lee, "Japanese Dumping of 
Semiconductors", (1986) 27 Harvard Journal of Int'l Law 
753 and D. Hirsch, "The Semiconductor Arrangement",
(1987) 28 Harvard Int'l Law Journal 175, 178.
Arrangement Between the Government of Japan and 
the Government of the United States of America 
Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products. 20 ILM 106
(1986).
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for a short time, Japanese producers would continue to 
have unimpeded access to the American market. More 
realistically, the threat of the closure of the American 
market to Japanese producers provided the main incentive 
to the Japanese government to negotiate this agreement. 
This was a clear example of the United States nakedly 
using its sheer economic size as leverage to control 
foreign competition.
Viewed from a global perspective, the Semiconductor 
Agreement is two things. First, it is a market-sharing 
agreement whereby both parties have carved up the globe 
between their producers. Second, it is a price-fixing 
agreement because the price of these products on the 
world market is regulated by the terms of the Agreement 
itself and the power of the Department of Commerce to 
determine the relevant levels of foreign market values. 
In the anti-trust laws or competition laws of the 
majority of developed countries, such an arrangement 
would be struck down on both these grounds as being 
anti-competitive and illegal.
It is not surprising that the European Union took this 
view when challenging the arrangement in the GATT.*^® In 
the absence of international competition rules, the 
European Union based its complaint on allegations of 
violations of relevant GATT provisions.^! The Union 
claimed that the third country monitoring obligations 
placed on the government of Japan, the conditions for 
access to the Japanese market and the lack of 
transparency surrounding the whole arrangement
GATT Report, supra note 870, 218.
On the problems facing the panel on the 
applicable GATT law, see J.C. Kingery, "The United 
States - Japan Semiconductor Arrangement and the GATT; 
Operating in a Legal Vacuum", (1989) 25:2 StanfordJournal of Int'l Law 467.
■ fï'*':;
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contravened the General Agreement. 922
The panel found in favour of the European Union. The 
arrangement itself, as far as it constituted a coherent 
system for restricting exports, contravened Article 
XI (1) of the GATT which prohibits quantitative 
restrictions on both imports and exports. The monitoring 
system was singled out for criticism on the basis that 
•administrative guidance* of export prices was 
incompatible with Article XI(1). The report was adopted 
at the Council Session held in March 1989.*^*
However, the agreement itself was not struck down, only 
certain infringing provisions. Certain technical 
adjustments were made to the terms of the arrangement 
regarding third-country monitoring. Data collection on 
export prices was to be provided only after exports have 
been made and the Supply and Demand Forecast Committee, 
the agency within MITI set up to monitor exports, was 
a b o l i s h e d . The panel investigation was therefore 
unsuccessful in striking down the international cartel 
erected by Japan and the United States in the agreement 
but, in the absence of international competition rules, 
the impact of the report was always limited.
The next stage in this saga has already commenced. 
Negotiations opened in 1991 between the United States 
and Japan for a bilateral accord covering trade in 
integrated circuits against a background of similar 
complaints threatened by American producers of these 
products. The main stumbling block is the United States 
assistance on a minimum Japanese market share for United
Jaoan- Restrictions on Exports of Semiconductors. 
GATT BISD, 35th Supplement 116 (1988).
923 QATT Report, supra note 870, 218.
*24 Ibid.
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States semiconductor c h i p s . T h e  original proposal for 
a 20% market share was rejected by Japan although 
negotiations are continuing at present.
(4) The Limits of International Trade Regulation - The 
Rejection of the Incorporation of International 
Trade Rules in U.S. Domestic Law
If the provisions of the GATT and the terms of the 
international agreements negotiated at the Tokyo and 
Uruguay Rounds could be enforced in the United States 
courts, this would both discourage the enactment of 
legislation inconsistent with international obligations 
and would allow interested private parties to challenge 
such legislation with the very real prospect of 
obtaining effective redress.^*
The denial of the right to challenge domestic 
legislation against the international obligations of the 
United States creates a fundamental asymmetry between 
the rights of nationals and those of foreign parties.^? 
It can be generally assumed that, in the vast majority 
of cases, litigation for a declaration that national 
legislation is inconsistent with the international 
obligations of that state will be initiated by foreign 
interest groups. At the same time it can also be assumed
925 Oxford Analytica. Report No. 910404 (19/8/1991).
*2* On the policy issues involved in such a 
development, see J.H. Jackson, "Status of Treaties in 
Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis", (1992) 86:2 
AJIL 310.
*2’ On the point of standing in such cases, see F.L. 
Morrison & R.E. Hudec, "Judicial Protection of Individual Rights under the Foreign Trade Laws of the 
United States", in M. Hilf & E-U Petersmahn (eds). 
National Constitutions and International Economic Law 
(1993) 91-133.
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that inconsistent legislation of administrative 
practices will have been adopted for the benefit of 
domestic producer groups.
The fundamental asymmetry is created by allowing 
nationals to rely a body of national laws, superficially 
modelled on international agreements but which in 
practice often bear little relationship to the 
international rules, while refusing to allow foreign 
groups to challenge the consistency of these national 
rules against the international standards. In other 
words, foreign interests groups are refused a 
constitutional point of reference in the construction 
and interpretation of national rules against 
international principles.
Such discrimination could be effectively eradicated by 
simply allowing judicial review of statutes allegedly 
incorporating international obligations into domestic 
law. This would compel the courts to give direct effect 
to international obligations and remove any asymmetry 
caused by de facto discrimination. The effect of any 
imbalance is simply to rob parties that are the victims 
of discriminatory measures of the right to challenge 
such measures.
For the purposes of defining the rights of individuals 
in United States law to rely upon international trade 
agreements a distinction must be made between the 
General Agreement itself, the Tokyo Round Codes and the 
Uruguay Round Agreements. Each of these have separate 
implications in American trade law and important 
differences exist among them.
(A) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Since the Executive has maintained that the authority to
__
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sign the GATT was derived from the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934^ ®^, the text of the General 
Agreement has never been submitted to the Senate for 
approval. Therefore, from a constitutional perspective, 
the GATT is an Executive Agreement based on a prior 
grant of authority to the President from Congress. 
Whether or not the GATT is a valid Executive Agreement 
turns on whether the Executive acted intra vires of its 
powers under the 1934 Act as amended. If the GATT is a 
valid Executive Agreement its provisions have a limited 
authority in United States internal law, and if not 
individuals cannot rely on its terms before national 
courts and tribunals.
The most serious objection that can be made to the 
constitutional validity of this Executive Agreement is 
that the substantive obligations of the GATT exceed 
those that the President had authority to negotiate.^* 
Although the 1934 Act authorised the President to enter 
obligations relating to import restrictions, the GATT 
also contains substantive rules relating to export 
restrictions. 0^ For example, the rules contained in 
Article XVI pertaining to subsidies concern matters of 
domestic economic development and not import 
restrictions. Also, the obligation under Article III to 
extend national treatment to imports from GATT 
contracting parties is an issue of internal policy 
regulation. Finally, the institutional provisions of the 
GATT give rise to concerns in Congress that it was in 
fact an international organisation in the guise of a
928 59 Stat. 410 (1935).
R.E. Hudec, "The Legal Status of the GATT in the 
Domestic Law of the United States", in M. Hilf et al.. 
The European Community and the GATT (1986), 187-249,
203-204.
930 Articles VIII, X, XI, XIII and XX of the GATT.
' ____    _ _ _ _ _  _ _ ___ _ _ __ _
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treaty.
In fact, for several decades. Congress habitually 
included qualifications in trade legislation declaring 
that statutes authorising the negotiation of trade 
agreements could not be construed as recognition of 
United States involvement in the GATT.”  ^Even the Trade 
Act of 1974 provides that the annual appropriations for 
the payment of GATT administrative expenses *do not 
imply approval or disapproval by Congress of all 
articles of the GATT.
Assuming that the GATT has been constitutionally 
approved, the next question concerns its force in 
American law and in particular whether an individual can 
rely on a provision of the General Agreement to overturn 
an inconsistent preceding or subsequent legislative 
measure. However, the effect of the GATT in domestic law 
is, at the very least, ambiguous.
In assessing the validity of the GATT in domestic law, 
a distinction must be made between the substantive 
provisions relating to tariffs and those relating to 
non-tariff barriers. Articles I and II of the GATT 
contain the general principles relating to the Most- 
Favoured-Nation treatment of goods from other
J.H. Jackson, "The GATT in United States Domestic 
Law", (1967) 66 Michigan Law Review, 250-329, 257.
In the extensions of trade authority immediately 
after the GATT entered into force, and particularly in 
1953, 1954, 1955 and 1958, Congress added a clause to
the statute which specified that "the enactment of this 
Act shall not be construed to determine or indicate 
approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive 
Agreement known as the GATT", 67 Stat. 472 (1953), 68
Stat. 360 (1954), 69 Stat. 162 (1955), and 72 Stat. 673 
(1958).
Section 121(12) (d). Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat.1978 (1975).
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contracting parties and neither of these articles was 
subject to the limitations imposed by the Protocol of 
Provisional Application.
The leading case on the legality of tariff concessions 
promulgated by the President as part of trade agreements 
with foreign nations is United States v Yoshida 
International I n c . In this case, the plaintiff 
challenged the legal propriety of a Presidential 
Proclamation made in 1971 imposing a ten percent 
surcharge on imports in an attempt to reverse the onset 
on a trade deficit. The plaintiff's argument was that 
the President had violated the terms of the GATT by this 
action and that this action was therefore 
unconstitutional.
The court acknowledged that the surcharge in question 
violated the GATT but held that since the GATT was not 
a treaty which had been ratified by Congress, it did not 
usurp the authority delegated to the Executive by 
Congress through the 1934 Act which was a federal 
statute enacted in accordance with the Constitution. The 
Court held that the statute gave the President express 
authority to terminate a proclamation ratifying a 
treaty. In effect, the Court therefore held that the 
GATT does not prevail over a federal statute, nor action 
taken on the basis of such legislation, in the event of 
a conflict.
The effect of the non-tariff obligations contained in 
the GATT depends on the self-executing nature of the 
provision in q u e s t i o n . A  number of GATT provisions
934
935
526 F. 2nd 560 (CCPA 1975).
On the doctrine of self-execution, see Y. 
Iwasawa, "The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the 
United States; A Critical Analysis", (1986) 26 Virginia 
Journal of Int'l Law 627; S. Riesenfeld, "The Doctrine
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are phrased in language which is clearly intended to be 
self-executing. Thus, products from other contracting 
parties 'shall* be accorded treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded to like products of national 
o r i g i n . N o  countervailing duty 'shall be levied' on 
any product of the territory of a contracting party in 
excess of any amount equal to the estimated bounty.^? 
Similarly, all customs fees imposed in connection with 
importation 'shall be limited in amount' to the 
approximate costs of the service rendered.^*
Yet the GATT was given effect through terms of the 
Protocol of Provisional Application which limits the 
application of Part II of the GATT to existing
legislative provisions. Further, if it is accepted that 
the GATT was incorporated into United States law through 
the operation of section 350 of the 1934 Act, the 
presumption against self-execution is further
substantiated.
Nevertheless, the President did proclaim the whole of 
the GATT in 1947, believing that this was a valid
exercise of his powers under the 1934 Act, as extended,
and supplemented by his inherent foreign affairs 
powers.^* The GATT provisions on non-tariff barriers 
may therefore have force of law by virtue, not of the 
fact that they are self-executing, but because they were 
validly proclaimed by the President.
of Self-Executing Treaties", (1980) 74 AJIL 892; and
J.J. Paust, "Self-Executing Treaties", (1988) 82 AJIL
760.
Article 111(4), GATT.
Article V(3), GATT.
Article VIII (1), GATT.
See Jackson, supra note 931, Appendix B, 316-317.
...............  .. ......
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Legal rights and duties may be created by Presidential 
proclamations, although these acts do not have the 
equivalent force to federal legislation, and a number of 
cases support the theory that the GATT has force in 
American law by virtue of Presidential proclamation. 
But, in the event of a conflict between a Presidential 
proclamation and a federal statute, the American courts 
have expressly declared that the will of the Congress 
will p r e v a i l . T h e  sole concession to the force of the 
GATT in federal law is that the courts will endeavour to 
interpret legislation in order to avoid a conflict 
between the General Agreement and the legislation in 
question.
Although in theory, individual American states cannot 
competently legislate over matters concerning commerce 
with foreign nations since this is an issue reserved to 
the exclusive competence of the Federal authorities, on 
a number of occasions state legislation has indirectly 
conflicted with the provisions of the GATT.^^ This has 
been a common phenomenon in relation to state 'Buy 
America' legislation which requires state organs and 
agencies to discriminate in favour of American suppliers 
and producers for the purposes of procurement.
A conflict between this type of legislation and Article 
III of the GATT has frequently arisen and a number of
Select Tire Salvage Co v United States. 386 F. 
2nd 1008 (1967); and American Express Co. v United
States, 332 F. Supp. 191 (1971) , affirmed 472 F. 2nd
1050 (1973).
Zenith Radio Corporation v United States. 437 
U.S. 443 (1978).
Japan Line Limited v Countv of Los Angeles. 441 
U.S. 434 (1979) ; and Xerox Coro v Harris County, 459 
U.S. 145 (1982).
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cases have been heard on this p o i n t . T h e s e  decisions 
however offer little indication as to whether the courts 
consider that the state legislation is reviewable on the 
basis of the GATT as a self-executing Executive 
Agreement or as a non-self executing Executive Agreement 
that has been given the force of law through 
Presidential proclamation. Regardless of which route has 
been taken by the courts, it is clear that the General 
Agreement has a very limited use for individuals to 
challenge legislation or administrative practices that 
conflict with its terms.
In practice, the relevance of the GATT as an instrument 
for individuals to challenge inconsistent legislation 
has become less significant in light of the various 
agreements that were established at the Tokyo Round to 
tackle non-tariff barriers. These agreements contain 
considerably more detailed obligations than the general 
terms of the GATT. Can individuals rely on the terms of 
these agreements to challenge inconsistent national 
legislation or administrative practices?
(B) The Tokyo Round Codes
Executive authority to engage in trade negotiations was 
granted in the Trade Act of 1974. Section 101 of this 
statute reenacts the power to negotiate and proclaim 
tariff reductions, but at the same time removes all 
reference to authority to proclaim modifications of 
other import restrictions. In place of this broad 
mandate. Congress delegated authority to negotiate on a
Territory of Hawaii v Ho. 41 Hawaii 565 (1957); 
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation v Superior Court. 208 
Cal; American Institute for Imported Steel v Countv of 
Erie. 58 Misc. 2nd 1059 (1968); and KSB Technical Sales 
Corporation v North Jersey Water Su p p Iv  Corporation. 75 
N.J. 272 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
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variety of specific non-tariff matters. 944
This authority was subject to one major limitation, 
namely, that all trade agreements had to be given effect 
by Federal legislation. Section 102(c) of the 1974 Act 
specified that any such agreements 'shall take effect 
with respect to the United States only if the 
appropriate implementing legislation is enacted by 
Congress'. In other words, from the outset none of the 
Agreements entered at the Tokyo Round were to be 
considered self-executing.
The tariff concessions negotiated at the Tokyo Round 
discussions were proclaimed in 1979 by the President. 
All the agreements relating to non-tariff barriers were 
submitted to Congress for approval under the 'fast 
track' procedure introduced by the 1974 Act. The fast 
track procedure allowed the President to enter into 
negotiations on those subjects covered by Sections 101 
and 102 of the Trade Act of 1974. Ninety days prior to 
signing the final text, the President notified Congress 
of progress made and consulted the major Congressional 
committees concerned with the subjects covered in the 
proposed agreements.
The adoption of a number of these agreements, including 
the Subsidies Code, the Anti-Dumping Code, the 
Government Procurement Code, the Technical Standards 
Code, the Customs Valuation Code and the Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft, required amendments to Federal 
law. The only Codes that did not entail amendments to 
Federal law were the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures, the International Dairy Agreement and the
^  See J.H. Jackson et al.. Implementing the Tokyo 
Round (1985), 146-147.
Presidential Proclamation No. 4707, 44 FederalRegister 72,348 (1979).
'  'S'Siï
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Agreement on Bovine Meat. However, all the negotiated 
Codes were submitted to Congress for approval.
Congressional approval did not incorporate these Codes 
directly into United States domestic law but merely gave 
the President authority to accept these obligations on 
behalf of the United States. In fact, by specifying the 
legal rights and duties under domestic law in subsequent 
parts of the statute, the Congress appears to have 
circumvented the direct legal effect of these agreements 
by transforming the agreements into equivalent domestic 
legislation.
In section 2 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 
Congress 'approved* all fourteen agreements but approval 
was not equated to ratification in the constitutional 
sense of that term, only to endorsement permitted the 
President to accept the Agreements on behalf of the 
United States. In order to completely dispelled the 
possibility that the Codes could ever be considered 
self-executing, section 3 of the 1979 Act creates a 
number of rules for the reconciliation of the texts of 
the agreements with the terms of the statute. There are 
two rules in particular that require reiteration;
(1) No provision of any trade agreement approved 
by Congress under the 1979 Act which is in 
conflict with any statutory term shall be 
given effect under the laws of the United 
States.
(2) Neither the entry into force with respect to 
the United States of any agreement approved 
under the statute nor the enactment of the 
statute itself, shall be construed as creating 
any private right of action or remedy for
946 Section 3(a), Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
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which a provision has not been explicitly made
under the statute or another law of the United
States.
The conclusion that must be reached is that the Tokyo 
Round Agreements themselves are not part of American 
internal law.^* The sole rights, duties and remedies of 
individuals are contained in the 1979 Act. Thus, if an 
administering authority imposed countervailing or anti­
dumping duties in a manner that conflicts with the 1979 
Code on these subjects, an individual cannot bring an 
action against the authority in an American court to 
bring the conduct into line with the international 
obligations incurred by the United States.
The inability of individuals to invoke the terms of the 
GATT or related international agreements to challenge 
inconsistent national legislation or administrative 
practices sets limitations on the efficiency of these 
international agreements as standards of national 
conduct. The direct enforceability of these 
international rules in national courts would ensure that 
national measures are not enacted in conflict with their 
provisions.
The obvious defence to such criticism is that many of 
the trading partners of the United States also do not 
allow direct challenges by individuals on national 
measures that are inconsistent with international trade 
obligations. It is therefore necessary that, as part of 
any package of measures agreed at multilateral trade 
negotiations, a general obligation is also included to 
the effect that contracting parties are obliged to give 
individuals directly enforceable rights derived from the
Section 3(f), Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 
Morrison & Hudec, supra note 927, 229.
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international obligations that are agreed by the 
parties.
(C) The Uruguay Round Agreements
Presidential authority to negotiate trade agreements at 
the Uruguay Round is structured on the format 
established for the Tokyo Round. Again, there is a 
division in powers between agreements relating to the 
treatment of tariffs and the treatment of non-tariff 
barriers.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
instructs the President to proclaim tariff reductions, 
modifications or increases as may be required to carry 
out his duties in the negotiating process, bearing in 
mind the overall negotiating objectives specified in 
that statute.^* This authority does not extent to 
reductions in duty rates of more than fifty percent of 
the previous rate, unless the existing rate of duty is 
less than five percent in which case the proclamation is 
valid.
The powers of the Executive to implement legislation for 
the incorporation of international obligations relating 
to non-tariff barriers to trade are again severely 
restricted. Section 1103(a) of the 1988 Act states that 
any agreement negotiated under the authority vested in 
the statute will enter force only if:
(1) the President, at least ninety calender days 
before the date on which he enters into the trade 
agreement, notifies the House of Representatives 
and the Senate of his intention to enter into the
Section 1102(1)(B). 
Section 1102(a) (2) .
" /-. 'I- . '* ________________
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agreement and promptly thereafter publishes notice 
of such an intention in the Federal Register; and
(2) after entering into the agreement, the 
President submits the document to the House of 
Representatives and the Senate containing a copy of 
the final legal text of the agreement together 
with:
(i) a draft of an implementing bill;
(ii) a statement of any administrative action 
proposed to be taken in the implementation 
process;
(iii) a statement of the changes that will be 
required to the existing law.
It therefore appears that no agreement negotiated at the 
Uruguay Round will have direct effect in the United 
States and individuals cannot rely on the terms of such 
agreements to challenge inconsistent legislation.
(6) Observations
There is no single body with all-embracing authority to 
conduct trade policy in the United States. The division 
of responsibility for this task between the Executive 
and the Congress is a schism at the governmental level 
in the formulation of a coherent trade policy. This 
tension has repeatedly been manifested in many 
destructive forms.
In any event. Congress has never been willing to 
relinquish control over trade policy formulation to the 
Executive agencies. When Congress has disagreed with the 
policy adopted by the administration in such matters, it 
has either shackled the further negotiating activities 
of the Executive or simply enacted legislation to alter 
the purported direction of the policy initiated by the
I
  ’Ill
423
Executive.
This tendency is ironic in light of the disastrous 
history of Congressional control over trade policy. In 
the early 1970's and latterly in the late 1980s, 
Congressional interference in trade policy concerns has 
been the major cause of the promotion of isolationism 
and unilateralism in the direction of trade policy. 
Congress has tinkered with too much of the trade 
legislation underpinning the policy generally with a 
view to granting greater protection to American 
industries or to penalise foreign producers or 
competitors allegedly engaging in purported unfair trade 
practices. Despite the practical handicaps involved, the 
Congress has even been successful in securing 
representation in trade negotiations for which the 
Executive is responsible.
Equally, Congress has been successful in influencing the 
direction of the policy by using the so-called fast 
track procedure which is not in fact the grant of a 
benefit to the Executive but rather a means of ensuring 
that Congress retains a greater degree of control during 
negotiations. This participation means that individual 
Congressmen can ensure that the interests of their 
individual constituencies can be taken into account in 
discussions which are intended to have an international 
flavour.
In addition. Congress has been directly responsible for 
tailor-made protection to certain industries. For 
example, the meddling in the countervailing and anti­
dumping legislation to provide protection to specific 
industries has the fingerprints of Congressional 
interference. Resource input subsidies, for example, 
were made actionable under the 1984 Act despite the 
views of the judiciary and foreign governments and even
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the opposition of the Executive. The sheer volume of 
trade protection measures during the mid-1980s also 
illustrates the desire of certain Congressmen to use 
trade policy as a platform for achieving political 
objectives through obtaining protection for local 
industries.
Turning to private party interest groups, these can be 
classified into two general categories. On the one hand, 
there are those producers who are suffering adverse 
consequences as a direct result of foreign competition 
and who genuinely require protection. On the other hand, 
there are domestic producers who are competitive in the 
international market-place and who require market access 
to foreign countries. At various times in United States 
history, one of these groups has prevailed over the 
other. However, since the 1970s, the voices of domestic 
producers requiring protection have been heard more 
loudly than producers engaging in exporting. The trade 
deficit of the United States since this date also 
indicates that this is the case.
It should also be remembered that in the formulation of 
national commercial and economic policy, there are many 
factors to take into consideration not just trade 
balances in the simple formulation of imports versus 
exports. Nevertheless, over the last twenty or so years, 
the United States government has been obsessed by its 
merchandise trade deficits with certain countries and 
has on numerous occasions identified the need to grant 
protection to improve its balance of trade position. The 
need to grant this protection seems to exist regardless 
of whether the protection is granted in the form of 
anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties, safeguard 
measures or Section 3 01 relief.
The linkage of the deficit with unfair trading practices
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is not legitimate. The trade deficit is continuously 
used as a justification for attacking so-called unfair 
trade practices but the converse is never the case. Any 
decrease in the deficit does not relieve this pressure 
on foreign producers. Nor is the deficit linked to 
decreasing or declining competitiveness of U.S. 
industries. In addition, the purported relationship 
gives the United States an apparent, but in fact unreal, 
moral high ground for conducting or justifying its trade 
protection measures.
It has become a very tiresome aspect of United States 
trade policy to accuse its trading partners of cheating 
in terms of the international rules and pointing to its 
own deficit as a consequence of such practices. First, 
it is a hypocritical approach insofar as the United 
States is certainly not free of sin in this respect. 
But, more importantly, too often allegations of unfair 
trade practices are used simply as a pretext for 
introducing measures without any violation having been 
established. The result is more protectionist measures 
and a contraction in the volume of foreign imports at 
the expense of consumers and industrial users of the 
products.
In addition, it is too easy to point to foreign trade 
practices and activities as a panacea for the blame for 
declining competitiveness and inept governmental 
policies. While economic analysis is not within the 
realm of this thesis, there have been numerous theories 
to explain the growing deficit on the declining 
international competitiveness of American goods which in 
turn is due to internal factors. For example, consumer 
preferences for superior goods, the decreasing relative 
efficiency of the United States economy, excessive wage 
bills and an overvalued currency are only a few of the 
many internal factors which are frequently cited as a
_________________________
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cause of this decline.
However, we should not forget that the international 
market is now truly global. The United States 
competitiveness has become a relative matter. Growth in 
a number of the newly-industrialised countries has far 
outstripped growth in the American economy. Many 
countries also have more attractive comparative 
advantages in certain areas of production over the 
United states. The cost of labour is the most obvious 
example. Often low labour costs is simply the lower 
material expectations of the populations of such 
countries and lower standards of living and not because 
of lax labour laws or the manipulation of taxation 
policies.
The traditional industries of the United States have 
undoubtedly been unable to withstand international 
competition and hence these have been the first 
industries to lobby for protection. Although harsh, the 
substitution of hi-tech industries for traditional 
industries is merely one illustration of economic 
progress within a country and it may be the case that 
the United States can no longer afford to sustain these 
traditional industries while at the same time promoting 
new generation industries and the supply of 
services.This is quite simply a fact of economic 
reality. Cheaper sources for these products are now 
found elsewhere and penalising new generation industries 
by requiring them to rely on uncompetitive traditional 
industries may prove to be long-term folly.
Regardless of the factors which have created this 
situation, there is considerable pressure inside the 
United States for protection of certain industries and 
the reaction of the Bush and Clinton administrations has 
been generally to promote these interests over the long-
__
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term strategic interests of the country. While
proclaiming the merits of greater trade liberalisation 
both administrations have been responsible for a
considerable array of protectionist measures. In 
particular, they have both passively acquiesced in 
measures of administered protection being deployed in 
blatantly protectionist strategies by domestic 
industries.
Many United States industries have systematically abused 
the trade protection mechanisms for their own benefit. 
The steel industry, for example, with its idiosyncratic 
qualities have been a substantial beneficiary of this 
process. Motor vehicle producers have also benefited. 
Instead of adjusting their production cycles to the
demands of international competition, they have
continued to make uncompetitive and inefficient vehicles 
while protected by a screen of protectionist measures.
The consumer electronics industry and the semi-conductor 
industry have been equally as active and the result is 
that trade in semi-conductors cannot be described as 
free and, in fact, is better described as being 
conducted in a global cartel composes primarily of 
American and Japanese producers. This situation has 
antagonised many developed countries including the 
European Union.
The effect of measures of United States trade policy 
which are inconsistent with the international rules 
could be suppressed if the United States was willing to 
allow review of national laws with international 
standards. Such a change of policy would create a far 
more fair and equitable environment for foreign 
producers. The United States Congress has vigorously 
resisted this option and hence many of the statutes 
which form the basis of American trade policy cannot be
il; V y v i v,;'
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reviewed against the international standards at the 
request of interested parties, whether they be domestic 
or foreign.
Similarly, the Congress deliberately circumscribed the 
authority of the Tokyo Round Codes by denying the direct 
effect of these agreements in national law. A similar 
approach is likely for the Uruguay Round Agreements 
quite simply because these agreements have been
negotiated on a similar basis to those of 1979, namely 
the fast track procedure. This is unfortunate, but not 
unexpected given the pressured that are presently being 
exerted by domestic interests groups.
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The Internal Institutional and Decision-Making 
Processes in the Formulation of European Union 
Trade Policy
The internal decision-making processes of the European 
Union bear little resemblance to those of the United 
States, or any other sovereign state for that matter; 
they are a reflection of the fact that the European 
Union is a supranational organisation. To understand the 
processes at work inside the European Union in the 
formulation of trade policy, it is first necessary to 
investigate the constitutional framework in which the 
formulation of policy is conducted. This reveals the 
existence of a number of tensions inside the European 
Union between different Member States and even between 
separate institutions themselves.
As a general principle, the Council of Ministers (which 
represents the interests of the Member States) guards 
against any usurpation of its authority by other 
institutions. Yet inside the Council itself. Member 
States are often at odds with each other as to how 
European Union trade policy should be conducted. The 
result is an ineffective process for formulating trade 
policy and one which, by its nature, undermines 
compliance with the international obligations of the 
European Union.
Institutional disharmony is only part of the explanation 
for the widespread violations of the GATT committed by 
the European Union. The other part is that internal 
European Union policy requirements often compete with 
international duties and again when conflict occurs the 
resolution is not always a successful one from the point 
of view of the GATT legal order. The most obvious 
clashes arise where the European Union internally 
regulates commercial matters relating to goods and 
products. Hence, the Common Agricultural Policy, the
__
430
Single Internal Market Policy and the Union Competition 
Policy are the areas where internal European Union 
policies can contravene the terms of the GATT or its 
related Agreements.
The interests of private parties in the formulation of 
trade policy are not so obvious in the European Union 
decision-making process with one exception, namely the 
initiation of anti-dumping proceedings. Nevertheless, 
since this aspect of trade policy is significant, it is 
necessary to consider this more fully and I shall 
consider the grant of protection in this form to certain 
European Union sectors. Hence, I shall focus on the role 
of private interest groups in securing this protection.
Finally, since abusive behaviour by the European Union 
could effectively be addressed by the incorporation of 
international obligations into the European Union legal 
system, as a final matter before reaching conclusions, 
I shall consider briefly the reluctance of the European 
Union, and the European Court, to incorporate rules of 
international trade law into European Union law.
(1) Institutional Tensions Within the European Union in 
the Formulation of Trade Policy
i
The European Union is a creation of international law 
albeit that it has tangible institutions and its own 
legal order. Instead of a unitary or federal government, 
it has organs which act in the interests of different 
groups. Thus, broadly speaking, the Commission embodies 
the interests of the European Union as set out in the 
constitutional treaties, the European Parliament 
represents the interests of the peoples of Europe and 
the Council of Ministers safeguards the interests of the 
Member States.
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Since these organs have different interests to protect, 
it is hardly surprising that friction exist among them. 
It must therefore be recognised that there are tensions 
within the organisation itself particularly between the 
Council of Ministers - the embodiment of national 
interests within the institutional structure - and other 
European Union organs, most notably the Commission. 
In fact, tension is even often manifested inside these 
organs themselves, most notably within the Council of 
Ministers where the Member States perpetually compete 
with each other to promote their own interests.
In the area of trade policy formulation the Council of 
Ministers jealously guards its authority. However, for 
practical reasons. Member States have had no option but 
to tolerate the exercise of certain administrative tasks 
by the Commission. The Commission is therefore the 
initiator of policy within the European Union itself and 
negotiates trade agreements with third states. The 
Council of Ministers acts upon the proposals of the 
Commission and has the final decision in the adoption of 
measures. In addition, the Commission administers the 
commercial defence measures of the European Union but
These tensions are not so evident between the 
Council and Commission on the one hand and the European 
Parliament on the other hand due to the relative lack of authority of the Parliament in trade policy matters. 
Until recently, the powers of Parliament in this area 
were limited to approval of association agreements under 
Article 228. After the amendments made by the Treaty on 
European Union, these powers have increased to a certain 
degree. Now, the assent of the Parliament must be 
obtained in the case of agreements establishing a 
specific institutional framework by organising co­
operation procedures, agreements having important 
budgetary implications and agreements involving 
amendment of an act adopted under the joint legislative 
procedure; Article 228(3) EC Treaty. It is further 
provided that the Council must consult the European 
Parliament in all other cases except for tariff and 
trade agreements under Article 113(3) EC Treaty.
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the Council enacts definitive duties.
Even in matters where the Commission has competence to 
act, the Member States have been successful in 
establishing administrative controls over the activities 
of the Commission. The main tools that the Council 
wields over the Commission in the field of trade policy 
take two forms; (a) the creation of a network of 
committees to facilitate consultations between Member 
States and the Commission in administrative matters 
concerning the implementation of trade policy; and (b) 
tight controls over any mandate given to the Commission 
to conduct negotiations with third states. Both these 
mechanisms warrant further examination since both are 
important in the formulation of trade policy.
(A) Council - Commission Consultation Committee 
Framework
An extensive network of committees has been established 
on a subject-by-subject basis to facilitate co-operation 
and consultations between the Member States and the 
Commission. In the field of trade policy, the most 
important committees are the 113 Committee and the Anti­
dumping Committee but other committees have been 
established in areas such as the management of 
agricultural markets and the interpretation of rules of 
origin.
Authority to establish a committee to co-ordinate 
dialogue between the Commission and the Council, or more 
precisely the Member States, on the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements implementing trade policy is 
specified in Article 113(3) of the EC Treaty and hence 
this particular committee is known as the ' 113
On the proposed reforms of the present 
procedures, see text infra Chapter 11.
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Committee Its primary function is to assist the
Commission in trade negotiations and, at least in 
theory, its role is consultative.
Legally at least, the 113 Committee cannot block 
Commission initiatives. Its function is to clarify the 
Council's negotiating directives as discussions progress 
and to act as a sounding board on which the Commission 
may gauge the degree of acceptability of proposals which 
have emerged during negotiations.^*
The influence of the 113 Committee over trade issues is 
best illustrated by an example. Thus, in the discussions 
over the negotiations with a number of Eastern European 
countries for the 1993 arrangements for imports of steel 
a number of Member State representatives raised both 
technical and legal arguments to the proposals of the 
Commission. The major legal objection concerned the 
legal basis for the proposed measures. Article 71 of the
The Committee is composed of representatives from 
all Member States together with the relevant 
functionnaires from the Commission. The exact 
composition varies according to subject-matter under 
discussion. If the Committee is debating agriculture, 
the national representatives will be from their 
respective agricultural ministries while the Commission 
will be represented by staff from DG I (external 
affairs) dealing with agricultural negotiations.
While the Committee is designated as a 
consultative body, the Commission shows great deference 
to its views for three reasons. First, the Committee 
meetings are an opportunity to size up any objections by 
Member States which may arise at a later stage in the 
approval process. Second, it provides a forum to put the 
Commission's point of view on matters and to provide 
notice of developments in the negotiation process. 
Third, the Commission will not jeopardise its 
repudiation in international trade negotiations by 
running against the tide of opinion in the Committee 
which ultimately reflects the views of the Council. See 
J.H.J. Bourgeois, "Trade Policy-Making Institutions and 
Procedures in the European Community", in M. Hilf & E-U
Petersmann (eds) National___Constitutions____ and
International Economic Law (1993), 175, 191.
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ECSC Treaty gives Member States full power over trade 
policy matters relating to steel products. Hence, it was 
the Member States that are responsible for the final 
s t r u c t u r e . T h e  lack of consensus among the Member 
States representatives in the Committee was the 
principal cause of the European Commission failing to 
reach an acceptable solution to the future regime for 
imports of steel from the region.
The Anti-dumping Committee is composed on a similar 
b a s i s . I t  has been established to allow individual 
Member States to express their views on any measures 
proposed by the Commission under the European Union 
legislation authorising the imposition of anti-dumping 
measures. The Commission is not obliged to adapt its 
proposals to take into account the views of the national 
representatives, but naturally any objections voiced in 
the Committee by the national representatives may 
resurface when the proposal for anti-dumping measures is 
submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval.^?
955 Europe, No. 5897, p.9 (January 14, 1993).
956 composition of the Committee is prescribed by 
Article 6(1) of Council Regulation fEEC) 2423/88 fl988). 
O.J. L209/1 (1988).
Voting on the adoption of anti-dumping measures 
was, until recently, by qualified majority in the 
Council: Article 12(1), ibid. This requirement has now 
been changed to a simple majority; see Article 9(4), 
Council Regulation fECi 3283/94. O.J. L349/1 (1994).
I
The range of measures which are considered in the 
Committee is considerable. According to the 1988 basic 
anti-dumping regulation, the Commission is required to 
consult with the Committee if a finding of dumping or 
subsidisation exists, if injury exists, when causation 
has been established and where the Commission suggests 
that anti-dumping measures are appropriate to prevent
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i n j u r y . in practice, the Commission consults the 
Committee at all stages of an investigation, from the 
submission of a complaint to a request for a review of 
a finding. Thus, the political impact of the Member 
States in any anti-dumping proceeding is significant.^*
(B) Controls Over Negotiating Mandates
The Commission is rarely, if ever, given carte blanche 
to conduct negotiations with third states on trade 
policy matters particular when such negotiations involve 
a major trading partner. Article 228 of the EC Treaty 
outlines the procedure for the negotiation and approval 
of such agreements but there is little mention of the 
control exercised by the Council over the Commission in 
such matters. In fact, in practice, it is the Council 
which establishes the framework for conducting 
negotiations, even though the actual discussions are 
handled by the Commission.
An insight into this process may be gleaned from
958 Article 6(4), ibid.
Issues raised at such meetings include criticism of like product determinations, the calculation of 
material injury, the use of analogue countries in the 
case of imports from non-market-economy countries, 
recommendations of provisional duties, opposition on the 
grounds of protecting consumer interests, assertions of 
Union industry interest and the calculation of 
constructed value in dumping investigations. In other 
words, there are few subjects in which national 
representatives feel obliged to leave to the sole 
responsibility of the Commission.
960it Is now clear from the new Article 228 of the EC 
Treaty inserted by the Treaty on European Union that the 
Council must authorise the Commission before the 
Commission can open negotiations, that the Council may 
appoint of committee to assist the Commission in the 
negotiations and that the Council can issue directives 
to the Commission for the conduct of negotiations. In 
the past, these practices were standard procedure but 
now they have been given formal legal status.
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examining for a moment the procedure employed during the 
Tokyo Round of MTNs. From a European Union perspective, 
the impetus for the negotiations stemmed from a joint 
EC-US declaration supporting another round of trade 
negotiations^! which was subsequently endorsed at the 
first meeting of the Heads of State and Government in 
Paris in October 1972.*^^ The Commission was requested 
to prepare an options report outlining a negotiating 
strategy and identifying policy ob j ectives. *** 
Substantial alterations were made to this proposal 
before the Council approved the final negotiating 
mandate in June 1973.**^
Although the Commission's authority to negotiate was 
contained in the 1973 mandate, the Council appears to 
have felt the need to formalise this power and 
subsequently, in February 1975, it adopted a number of 
directives intended to clarify the exact negotiating 
powers and authority of the C o m m i s s i o n . I t  is not 
absolutely clear whether or not the Council believed 
that the Commission was exceeding its negotiating 
mandate but the adoption of the measure was an instance 
of the Council stamping its authority over the future 
direction of the discussions.*^
961 European Commission, Bulletin, Vol. 5/3, 58-60
(1972) .
*®^ European Commission, Bulletin. Vol. 5/10 15-25 
(1972) .
*®^ European Commission, Bulletin. Supp. 2 (1973) ,
*^  European Commission, Bulletin. Vol. 6/6, Para.
2342 (1973).
*®^ European Commission, Bulletin. Vol. 8/2, Para.
2301 (1975).
*^  See J-V. Louis, "The EEC and the Implementation 
of the GATT Tokyo Round Results", in J.H. Jackson (ed). 
Implementing the Tokyo Round (1985), 21-76, 27-28.
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Even the Commission's power to conduct the actual 
negotiations was not left unsupervised. The Article 113 
Committee was fully involved at all stages in the 
negotiations to ensure Council influence over the 
negotiation of commitments. The resolution of 
contentious issues generally required fresh authority 
from the Council in the form of adjustments to the 
primary directive.
The terms of Tokyo Codes were submitted to the Council 
in February and March 1979.*^^ After deliberating over 
the contents of the agreements, the Council approved the 
authority of the Commission to proceed with 
s i g n a t u r e . The Commission thereafter signed the Code 
on behalf of the European Union.
The ratification of the Code was not, however, straight­
forward. The Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) had established an ad hoc working group to 
consider the legal implications of ratification 
including, inter alia, the issue of the participation of 
Member States in the ratification process. Within this 
forum, representatives were seriously divided as to 
whether the Codes were European Union agreements or 
mixed agreements.^* The Commission's view was that the 
Codes fell within the scope of the EC Treaty and, in 
particular, under Article 113. This position was
*^  ^See European Commission, GATT MTNs - Final Report 
on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva. COM 
(79) 514 (1979).
European Commission, Bulletin. Vol. 12/6, Para. 
1.2.2 (1979).
*^* See J.H.J. Bourgeois, "The Tokyo Round Agreements 
on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in 
International and EEC Perspective", (1982) 19 GML Rev. 
5-33, 21.
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supported by reference to the ERTA d e c i s i o n , %n 
contrast, members of the Working Group asserted that 
certain subject-matters within the Government 
Procurement Code, the Technical Standards Code and the 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, fell outside the 
scope of European Union competence.
Eventually a compromise was reached whereby the European 
Union approved all the Codes but the Technical Standards 
Code and the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft could 
be ratified by Member States if they wished. Therefore, 
in its decision ratifying the Codes, the Council 
•approved' the agreements annexed as an appendix and 
authorised the President of the Council and other 
representatives 'to take such steps as are required to 
bind the European Community'.^!
The differences of opinion among the Member States as to 
the mandate given to the Commission have rarely been as 
contentious as the dispute over oilseeds production 
assistance with the United States. The reluctance of the 
French government to agree to implement the second GATT 
Panel Report on subsidies to oilseed producers^^ 
provoked the United States into threatening in November 
1992 to impose 200% duties on imports of certain Union 
products, the cost of which to European Union producers 
would have been approximately $3 00 million each year. 
The legal basis for this action was Section 301 of the
EC Commission v EC Council fERTA) . Case 22/70 
[1971] ECR 263; [1971] CMLR 335.
Council Decision 156/80/EEC. O.J. L78/1 (1980).
GATT Panel Report, Follow-Uo on the Panel Report 
on EEC - Pavments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and 
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins. 
GATT Doc DS28/R (March 16, 1992).
Europe. Agence Internationale D'Information Pour 
La Presse, No, 5852, p.9 (November 6, 1992).
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Trade Act of 1974 and, according to the United States 
authorities, was justified because the European Union 
had failed to comply with its international 
obligations.^
To avoid the application of these measures, the EC 
Commissioner responsible for agriculture. Commissioner 
MacSharry, entered into negotiations with his American 
counterpart to secure an agreement which would avert the 
application of the measures. These negotiations produced 
the so-called 'Blair House accord' which was in fact 
merely a draft agreement which required approval by the 
Council either on its own or as part of the Uruguay 
Round Final Act.^^ The agreement was a detailed plan to 
reduce European direct subsidies to its oilseed sector 
by introducing payments on a per hectare basis and 
subject to a maximum ceiling.^*
When Commissioner MacSharry presented the proposal to 
the Council of Ministers a number of countries, 
particularly France, expressed the view that he had 
exceeded his negotiating mandate and that the agreement 
was null and void even although it was only a draft,*” 
The matter was not placed on the agenda of the General 
Affairs Council due to the opposition of France which
Interestingly, the Director-General of the GATT, 
Arthur Dunkel, stated that the proposed U.S. measures 
were contrary to the obligations of the Contracting 
Parties towards the functioning of an efficient and 
credible multilateral system but appeared to condone the 
action on the basis of the 'non-application by the 
Community of recommendations imposed by the GATT under 
the proper procedures for the settlement of trade 
disputes' (authors translation); Europe, No. 5854, p.6 
(November 9, 92).
Europe. No. 5862, p.7 (November 21, 1992).
On the details of the agreement, see Europe, No. 
5926 pp.7-8 (February 24, 1993).
*” Europe, No. 5871, p.l (December 7, 1992).
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adopted a number of spoiling tactics including the
insistence on a compatibility and feasibility study of 
the proposal with the GAP reform proposals. In fact, the 
French Prime Minister, Pierre Beregovoy stated that 
France intended to use 'all means necessary* to prevent 
the Council considering the issue/”*
France maintained a consistent position on this matter 
until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
claiming that the accord was ultra vires of the powers 
of the Commission. Eventually, this opposition was
successful and the United States modified its
expectations under the original accord in order to allow 
the conclusion of the Round of negotiations.”* The 
French government, however, only accepted this
compromise after obtaining a considerable number of 
concessions.*®° Once the terms of the revised accord had 
been approved, the way was cleared for Agricultural 
Commissioner Steichen to finalise the Uruguay Round 
agreement on agriculture.**!
The episode illustrates the difficulties faced by the 
European Commission in implementing its mandate in the 
face of dissension within the Council of Ministers. Such 
difficulties rarely occur within a single sovereign 
state even although the government may be divided. The
978
979
Europe, No. 5925, p.7 (February 23, 1993).
The United States agreed to the following 
modifications: (a) the exemption of the then existing
stockpile of 25 million tonnes of oilseeds from the 
terms of the accord; (b) a switch in the base year from 
which subsidised exports must be cut back from the 1986- 
89 average to 1992; and (c) an extension from six to 
eight years of the 'peace clause' under which the United 
States would not challenge the European Union's export 
subsidy regime.
980
981
Financial Times. 1, December 6, 1993. 
Financial Times. 7, December 7, 1993.
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need to take into consideration the interests of fifteen 
separate states in this process not only substantially 
increases the difficulties of the Commission in the 
negotiating process but also undermines the credibility 
of the Commission in the process.
(2) Conflicts Between the Common Commercial Policy and 
Other European Union Policies
Over the last 35 years, the European Union has evolved
special common policies to regulate particular
commercial and economic matters inside the organisation. 
At a very general level, the European Union was 
originally conceived to further political and social 
cohesion through economic integration which required the 
approximation of policies among the Member States to
promote the harmonious development of economic
activities, to permit continuous and balanced expansion 
within the organisation and to promote closer relations 
among the Member States.
The achievement of these objectives requires the 
establishment and effective running of particular common 
economic and commercial policies throughout the European 
Union, most notably the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), the internal market programme and a competition 
policy. Other significant policies include regional and 
state aid^ ^^  and an industrial policy.
982 See the original Article 2, EC Treaty,
On state aid in the EU see, European Commission, Practice Note on State Aids to Public Undertakings in 
the Manufacturing Sector, O.J. C273/2 (1991); reproduced 
at [1992] 2 CMLR 3 69; and J. Gilchrist & D. Deacon,
"Curbing Subsidies", in P. Montagnon (ed) European 
Competition Policv (1990), 31-51.
442
The formulation of these policies is based on a variety 
of internal European Union interests which are not 
always predicated on purely economic or commercial 
rationales. Often these interests clash with the 
standards of conduct set at the international level for 
particular matters.^* Herein lies a fundamental reason 
why the European Union often appears to act outside the 
international norms of behaviour set down by the GATT 
and its associated bodies.
Quite simply, when faced with these competing interests, 
the European Union has opted to take the easier course 
of action and to ignore the international rules. 
Equally, the European Union frequently has had little 
regard for those international rules which indirectly 
impinge on the contents of some of these common 
policies. Often no attempt is even made to achieve 
consistency.
Often the inconsistency is a question of degree - not 
all the policy will be outside the international rules, 
but only particular rules and administrative practices. 
Nevertheless, the point is that, in the past, the 
European Union has enacted a number of internal policy 
measures which are at least prima facie in conflict with 
the international rules.
(A) Agricultural Policv
Agriculture has a special status under the Treaty of 
Rome and is dealt with at the European Union level
See S. Woolcock, "The European Acquis and 
Multilateral Trade Rules: Are They Compatible?", (1993) 
31:4 Journal of Common Market Studies 539.
See P. Montagnon, "The Trade Policy Connection", 
in Montegnon, supra note 983, 76-98,
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through the Common Agricultural Policy ( C A P ) T h e  
purposes of this policy are numerous and, in some cases, 
laudable.But, at least until recently, the bulk of 
agricultural commodities produced and consumed in the 
European Union are isolated from competition in the 
world markets through a system of variable levies. At 
the same time, farm incomes have been supported mainly 
through price support. This has substantially 
contributed to the existing distortions in the world 
agricultural market-place.
While internal pressure for reforms accounted to a 
considerable degree for the need to reform the CAP, as 
we have seen, the United States, among other trading 
partners attempted, at an early stage to use the 
provisions of the Subsidies Code and the General
Agreement itself, as leverage for reform®*^. Even
although the GATT panels ruled against the European 
Union, particularly in the investigation into Union 
exports of wheat, the Union paid little attention to 
accommodating the views of third states in the
formulation of the CAP.
The most important conflict between the CAP and the
trade policy of the European Union, as far as its 
international obligations are concerned, arose over the 
issue of production subsidies for oilseeds. The facts 
behind this case have been described earlier and need no 
reiteration.^* It need only be pointed out that the 
panel concluded in December 1989 that the European Union
986 Articles 38 to 47 EC Treaty.
See generally, J. Usher, The Common Agricultural 
Policv of the European Community (1989).
See text, supra 102-112.
See EC - Pavments and Subsidies to Processors of 
Oilseeds, GATT Doc L/6627 (1989); (1990) 2:2 WTM 5.
:ri'i'
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regulations providing for payments to seed processors, 
as far as these were conditional on the purchase of 
oilseeds of European Union origin, were inconsistent 
with Articles II and 111(4) of the GATT. The panel 
recommended that the CONTRACTING PARTIES 'request' the 
European Union to bring these regulations into 
conformity with the relevant terms of the General 
Agreement.
Despite substantial internal opposition from within the 
European Union itself from certain Member States, 
eventually a new oilseeds production support regime was 
introduced.**^ In place of the original system which 
provides target and intervention prices for oilseeds 
produced in the Union on a per tonne basis, the new 
system involved direct payments to producers of oilseeds 
on a per hectare basis.**^
Dissatisfied with this refusal, the United States 
requested a second opinion from the panel to rule 
whether the revised regime was consistent with the same 
provisions of the GATT.**^
**° EG " Pavments and Subsidies Paid to Processors 
and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed 
Proteins. GATT Doc. L/6627; reproduced in GATT BISD, 
37th Supplement 86 (1991).
**^ Council Regulation fEEC) 3766/91. O.J. L356/17 
(12/12/91).
**^ The two important elements of this system were 
that: (a) the price received from the sale of Union 
oilseeds in the Union market was determined, 
in part, by the price of competing imports; 
and
(b) a direct per hectare payment was received by 
producers depending on average historic yields of 
oilseeds in the region of production.
**^ This procedure was introduced by Para, 1.3 of the 
Decision Concerning Improvements to the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Rules and Procedures, reproduced in GATT,
i^--  ..  1------:-^ _____________
445
The reconstituted panel held that the original finding 
had been based, not on the specific method of delivering 
production subsidies, but rather on the '[Union's] 
systematic denial...of the benefits reasonably to be 
expected from the reciprocal exchange of tariff 
concessions'.**^ The panel observed that the new support 
system had retained the essential features that had led 
to the original decision against the European Union, The 
subsidies in the revised regime were still production 
subsidies specific to the product which was the subject 
of the tariff concession, namely oilseeds.**^ The system 
continued to protect producers from the effects of 
movements in international prices. Although the panel 
accepted that the violations under Article III of the 
GATT had been rectified, the European Union had 
continued to nullify and impair concessions granted to 
other contracting parties as a result of the production 
subsidy scheme introduced under the new regulation.**®
While the panel's original mandate was to recommend 
necessary measures to rectify the deficiencies in the 
first regime, it concluded that there was no reason for 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to continue to defer 
consideration of further action in relation to remedying 
the impairment of tariff concessions and declared that 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES 'should, if SO requested by the 
United States, consider further action under Article
BISD, 36th Supplement 61 (1990).
**^ Follow Up on the Panel Report on EEC - Pavments 
and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of 
oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins. GATT DOc, 
DS28/R (March 16, 1992), GATT BISD, 39th Supplement 91 
(1993) .
**® Ibid, Para. 83.
**® Ibid, Para. 85.
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XXIII:2 of the General Agreement'.**^
The reaction of the European Union was again to dismiss 
the significance of the ruling. *** In fact, the 
European Union even used a subsequent meeting of farm 
ministers at the OECD to try to convince the United 
States that a negotiated settlement was the only 
solution.
Of course this resulted in the United States threatening 
to impose retaliatory tariffs on goods originating in 
the European Union.*** In fact, the United States 
suspended a limited number of tariff concessions shortly
after the decision was announced.Eventually the
matter was resolved as part of the Uruguay Round
package.
There is little doubt that the shape of the CAP directly 
affects European Union trade policy. If the terms of the 
CAP are inconsistent with the European Union's 
international obligations under the GATT system, the 
result will inevitably be conflict. How the Union 
addresses that problem is a question of fundamental 
importance in its trade relations with third countries. 
There has, however, in the past been a degree of
asymmetry between the impact of agricultural policy on
**^ Ibid, Para. 92.
*** The European Commissioner for Agriculture at the 
time, MacSharry, is on record as stating that the 
panel's findings were 'not acceptable to us, therefore 
there is no conclusion of the matter'; Financial Times, 
p.6, March 27, 1992.
*** On May 29, 1992, the Bush administration
published a list specifying $1 billion worth of European 
products on which it intended to impose punitive import 
tariffs of 100%; Financial Times, p.l. May 29, 1992.
1000 European Commission, Press Briefings, June 11,1992.
447
trade policy on the one hand and trade policy on 
agricultural policy on the other hand. History indicates 
that the European Union's agricultural policy had a 
greater impact on trade policy than was the converse 
case. The European Union appeared to have believed that 
the CAP was an internal matter and paid little respect 
to its international obligations concerning agriculture. 
The CAP was therefore a thorn in the side of the Union 
when conducting trade policy.
There are some signs that trade policy will play a far 
more significant role in the shaping of agricultural 
policy than was previously so. Evidence to support this 
proposition can be gained from the developments 
occurring at the Uruguay Round of agricultural 
negotiations. The Union's offer at the Brussels meeting 
in December 1990 was obviously drafted in light of the 
need to reform the present CAP. Opposition to reform of 
the CAP resulted in the Commission having to submit two 
sets of proposals and the Council only agreed on the 
second set after seven attempts before the offer on 
agriculture could be made at the Brussels meeting.
The exact nature of the proposals need not detain us 
here. The important point is that even after these 
efforts, the United States and the Cairns Group rejected 
the European Union position. It was this opposition that 
prompted the Commission to submit further proposals to 
the Council. As the rapporteur to the European 
Parliament Committee on External Economic Relations 
observed:
'Whereas there are many good internal reasons for
reform, a link inevitably exists between the GATT-
1001 European Parliament, Working Document on CAP 
Reform and External Trade. Doc No. PE 151.425 (June 27, 
1991).
  .
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negotiations on agricultural trade on the one hand 
and the timing and contents of the [CAP reform] 
proposals on the other
In February 1991, the Commission submitted proposals 
outlining a reform programme, known as the 'MacSharry I 
P a c k a g e ' . I n  these proposals, it was generally 
recognised that the then existing form of the CAP was 
inconsistent on a number of grounds with the existing 
GATT obligations of the European Union and that it acted 
as a substantial impediment to the negotiation of a new 
GATT agreement on agriculture.
These proposals were not accepted by the Council and the 
Commission formulated new proposals known as the 
'MacSharry II Package' which were presented to the 
Council on July 15, 1991.^^ The main emphasis of the
package was to address the root deficiencies in the 
existing system, namely the relationship between 
production and price guarantees for produce grown. 
Direct payments were to be substituted for indirect 
assistance.Eventually, the Member States farm 
ministers agreed on May 22, 1992, to begin to implement 
the proposed reforms to the CAP. This scheme was
Ibid, 4.
1003 European Commission, The Development and Future 
of the CAP C0M(91) 100 (1991).
1004 European Commission, The Development and Future 
of the CAP. Follow-Up to the Reflections Paper COM
(1991) 258/3 (1991).
On the legislation required, see European 
Commission, Reform of the CAP - Legislation Measures to 
Accompany the Reform of the Market Support Mechanisms 
COM (19) 415 (1991).
1006 essence of these reforms is as follows; (a) 
a movement away from expenditure of £23 billion each 
year on fixing EU food prices to the making of direct 
financial payments to farmers; (b) grain intervention
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introduced in a series of measures in 1993 and is 
adjusted annually.
The final GATT agreement on agriculture was essentially 
negotiated after bilateral discussions between the 
European Union and the United States which contained the 
following key elements^***:
(a) The arrangements were to be phased in over a 
six-year period.
(b) Over this six year period, the total support 
to the agricultural sectors of the two 
countries, measured in terms of Aggregate 
Measures of Support (AMS), was to be reduced 
by 20% compared with a base period between 
1986-1988.
(c) Direct acreage and headage payments granted 
within the framework of 'production limiting 
programmes' were not to be calculated as part 
of the AMS and were not subject to reduction.
(d) All border protection measures were to be 
converted into conventional tariffs and, 
compared to the 1986-1988 base period, reduced 
by an average of 36% over six years.
(e) A special safeguard clause was included to 
allow the EU to add a 'variable element' to 
the tariff if the world market price for a
i.i
prices to be cut by 29%, beef intervention prices to be 
cut by 15%, butter intervention prices to be cut by 5%;
(c) agricultural land use to be reduced by 15%; and (d) 
farmers to be paid 45 ECUs per tonne of grain if they 
adhere to the land set aside rule; see Council of the 
European Communities, General Secretariat, Press Release 
6539/92. 1579th Council Meeting -Aariculture 18-21 Mav 
1992 (1992)
European Commission, The Agricultural Situation 
in the Community. 1992 Report (1993), 9-17.
Europe. November 27, 1992, 1.
_______________________________
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commodity falls by more than 15% below its 
1986-1988 average.
(f) A minimum access clause applied which require 
import opportunities be opened to allow 
imports to capture 3% (rising to 5% at the end 
of the six years period) of domestic 
consumption.
(g) Expenditure on export subsidies, calculated on 
a product-by-product basis, was to be reduced 
by 36% over six years compared with average 
annual expenditure in the period 1986-1990.
(h) The volume of subsidised exports, on a 
product-by-product basis, was to be reduced by 
21% over the six year period, compared with 
the average annual volumes exported in the 
1986-1990 period. Processed products were not, 
however, covered by this undertaking.
On the whole, this understanding formed the core of the 
final text although slight modifications were made to 
percentages, reference periods and time scales.
The question which arises is whether the reformed CAP is 
consistent with the GATT rules and, in particular the 
settlement on agriculture reached in the Uruguay Round 
Final Act. Although the European Commission has stressed 
the compatibility of the reformed CAP with the 
international regime^ ®^ ®, there are grounds for
1009 particular, the United States conceded a less 
radical phase in period for the reduction of export 
subsidies, an exemption of existing stocks from the 
package and the creation of a peace clause to limit 
United States challenges to the legality of EU export 
subsidy practices for a period of eight years.
DTI, The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. Cmnd No. 2579, 12-14 (May 1994).
— .
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scepticism.^"
First, the reforms did not include all farm produce. For 
example, sugar was excluded from the reforms but clearly 
the Agricultural Agreement envisages its application to 
all agricultural products. Second, the reforms do not 
include the change to the concept of tariffication 
agreed by the European Union. Third, future expenditure 
under the revised CAP will have to comply with the 
limits set out in the terms of the agreement. Fourth, 
the manner in which the terms of the Agreement are 
implemented may not be exactly consistent with the 
amendments envisaged in the Agreement.
(B) Internal Market Programme
As the European Union is itself an organisation of 
states, its internal commercial structure has an impact 
on patterns of international trade. For example, the 
objective of reducing or eliminating intra-Union trade 
barriers through trade liberalisation principles such as 
the free movement of goods and services is of particular
See also, A. Swinback, "CAP Reform 1992", 31:3 
Journal of Common Market Studies 359.
This doubt arises from opposition within the 
European Union to certain aspects of the Uruguay Round 
Final Act. For example, France introduced a number of 
preconditions to its ratification of the Agricultural 
Agreement. First, that its farming community will not 
suffer any greater loss of production under the 
Agreement than as agreed under the May 1992 reform of 
the CAP. This requires other Member States to absorb 
production cuts to meet the necessary limits. Second, 
for compensation for any loss of production from the EU 
budget. Third, that the NCPI is strengthened and used 
more aggressively for the protection of the interests of 
the EU and the Member States; see Financial Times. 8, 
December 8, 1993. As regards the commitment to protect 
France's agricultural community from further production cut backs, the European Union that the GATT restrictions 
will 'not increase the restraints of the reformed CAP*; 
Financial Times. 3, December 13, 1993.
 ; : :_______________________
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concern to European Union trading partners because the 
process should have the indirect effect of reducing 
trade barriers for the movement of goods or the supply 
of services from their national producers once inside 
the Union.
One would think that the reduction of intra-Union trade 
barriers would receive a positive response from European 
Union trading partners. However, in general, the 
converse has largely been the case.^^ This reaction 
has been caused by two factors. The European Union, at 
least initially, promoted the programme as a means of 
obtaining reciprocal concessions from trading partners. 
For example, outlining the scope and purpose of the 
programme in 1985, the European Commission pointed out 
that:
"The commercial identity of the Community must be 
consolidated so that our trading partners will not 
be given the benefit of a wider market without 
themselves making similar concessions.
In addition, the 'Fortress Europe' mentality of some 
trading partners has been, to some extent, raised by two 
perceptions. First, these trading partners are sceptical 
that all quantitative restrictions and voluntary 
restraint agreements maintained by individual Member 
States will be abolished despite the overall objective 
of the programme to create a single market. Secondly, 
measures of harmonisation required to standardise 
national laws regulating commerce are perceived by some
See E. Stein et al., "European Trade 1992: 
Fortress or Partnership?", (1989) Proc ASIL 332; and 
Financial Times. 8, April 17, 1991.
White Paper From the Commission to the European 
Council. Para. 19, Commission Doc. No. COM (85) 310 
(June 1985).
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trade partners as themselves creating additional 
barriers to trade.
Generally speaking, the policy of extracting reciprocal 
trade benefits from trading partners as the quid pro quo 
for internal liberalisation has, despite the statements 
of the Commission, not been taken seriously by the 
European Union's institutions. In certain cases, the 
Commission has been willing to listen to the concerns of 
trading partners when drafting proposals, especially in 
the harmonisation of laws relating to services. 
However, the same cannot be said of the second category 
of concerns and this issue merits closer consideration.
(1) Reduction in Quantitative Restrictions 
Maintained bv Member States
The completion of the internal market requires the 
elimination of all measures maintained by individual 
Member States against third countries and the 
replacement of national restrictions with measures at 
the European Union level, where necessary for the 
protection of Union interests.
Article 115 permits Member States, in certain 
circumstances, to retain quantitative restrictions vis- 
a-vis products originating from third states. In the 
past, this provision was used by Member states either to 
renew pre-Union measures or to introduce new
On progress towards completion of the internal 
market, see European Commission, Seventh Report of the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
Concerning the Implementation of the White Paper on the 
Completion of the Internal Market. COM (92) 383 Final
(1992); and Sutherland Committee Report, The Single 
Market After 1992 - Meeting the Challenge (1993).
 -
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restrictions after consultations with the 
Commission.
In fact, following on the expiry of the original 
transitional period. Member States continued to apply 
for extensions or renewals of bilateral trade agreements 
on the ground that they were essential to avoid 
disruptions of normal commercial relations. The
Commission's policy was to permit such extensions or 
renewals as long as the restrictions;
(a) did not constitute an obstacle to the opening
up of Union negotiations with the third
countries nor obstruct the subsequent transfer 
of the commercial substance to Union
agreements ; and
(b) did not hinder the adoption of measures
necessary to complete the standardisation of
import arrangements applied by Member
States. *017
Article 115 was also been interpreted relatively
liberally, with the approval of the European Court, even 
although it was an exception to Article 113 and should 
be strictly construed. Such measures were often
justified by individual Member States as necessary to 
resolve particular problems which were not considered
*0*0 See M.C.J. Bronckers, "A Legal Analysis of 
Protectionist Measures Affecting Japanese Imports into 
the European Community - Revisited", in P. Volker (ed) 
Protectionism in the European Communitv (Second edition, 
1988), 70.
*0*^ Council Decision 69/494/EEC on the Progressive 
Standardisation of Agreements Concerning Commercial 
Relations Between Member States and Third Countries, 
O.J. L326/39 (1969) as renewed from time to time. See, 
for example. Council Decision 91/509 fl991) . O.J.
L272/85 (1991); and Council Decision 92/53 (1992). O.J. 
L22/55 (1992).
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appropriate for European Union-wide protective 
measures.
Before 1986, the Commission did not manifest any 
particular reluctance to authorise Member States to 
adopt quantitative restrictions under the authority 
conferred upon it by Article 115(1). As proof of this 
attitude, a GATT Report cites France as maintaining no 
less than 71 quantitative import restrictions on goods 
as diverse as food products, consumer electronics, 
watches and clocks, and integrated circuits in 1990.*®*® 
The same report confirms that Italy had 48 similar 
measures in force. The same is true of European Union- 
authorised national measures. In 1990, individual Member 
States were authorised by the Commission to restrict 
trade with third states in 79 cases.*®^ ®
There is little doubt that, at this time, the incidence 
of measures maintained by individual Member States 
against products from non-Union countries was high and 
had the effect of insulating the national domestic 
market from external competition often contrary to both 
the letter and the spirit of the GATT.
In its White paper proposing the internal market 
programme, the Commission expressly acknowledged that 
the absence of a complete internal market could be 
attributed, in part, to the continued use of national 
import quotas and national protective measures. The 
proposal specifically envisaged the abolition of such
*®** See Council Decision 76/386 fl976) . O.J. LI01/53 
(1976) and Council Decision 89/54 (1989). O.J. L23/44
(1989).
*®*® GATT, First Trade Policy Review Mechanism EEC
(1990), 12.
*“® Ibid.
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measures by the end of 1992.*®^ *
To its credit, the Commission has in fact already moved 
to eliminate quantitative restrictions maintained by 
individual Member States for certain products 
originating in non-Union countries. Between 1991 and 
1992, two important steps were taken to reduce 
quantitative restrictions. In October 1991*®^  ^ and 
September 1992*®^ ,^ the number of permitted restrictions 
was reduced to 30 in the case of France and to 19 in the 
case of Italy.
At the same time, a procedure has been created to allow 
such measures to exist at a Union-wide level. For 
protection to be given, the Commission indicated that 
Member States will have to demonstrate that there exists 
a European Union-wide - as opposed to Member States - 
problem.*®^ In any event, one possible loophole in this 
policy is that Member States interests will be equated 
with Union interests, leading to virtually the same 
level of protection in certain areas.
Again, while the internal market programme is intended 
to achieve, among other objectives, the free circulation 
of goods as prescribed by Article 10 of the EC Treaty, 
it is unlikely that the legislative programme of the 
Commission in this area will close all existing 
loopholes. For example, while the European Commission 
has reduced the derogations for the common arrangement
*®^* Commission White Paper, supra note 1014, Paras 
35-36.
*®^  Council Regulation (EEC) 2978/91. O.J. L284/5(1991).
*®^  ^ Council Regulation fEEC) 2875/92. O.J. L287/1
(1992).
*®^^* See GATT, Second Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
EEC (1994), 67.
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on exports^^, notable exceptions exist such as in the 
case of arms exports.*®^®
Further, in spite of the commitment expressed by the 
Commission to remove such protective measures, the Union 
has continued to negotiate voluntary export restraint 
agreements with third countries. For example, in 1991, 
reciprocal undertakings were exchanged between the Union 
and Japan^^ concerning imports of Japanese vehicles 
into the U n i o n . T h e s e  measures will be put into
effect at the end of 1992 and will apply until the end 
of 1999. During this period, the understanding applies 
three principles;
(a) the Union market will be harmonised and 
imports will be gradually liberalised in 
countries still applying restrictions;
(b) exports from Japan will be 'moderated* 
according to certain market assumptions 
concerning supply and demand trends but in the 
period imports of cars from Japan are not to 
exceed 1,230,000 vehicles for a market of 15.1 
million vehicles
(c) every six months joint monitoring will be 
conducted to ensure that the understanding is
1025 Second Trade Policv Review Mechanism EEC
(1993), Vol II, 94-96.
1026 see, Draft Strategic Exports Regulation. COM 
(90) 317 Final (1992); [1992] 3 CMLR 221.
1027 po2- a general view of EC-Japan relations, see 
Counci1, A Consistent and Global Approach; A Review of 
the Community's Relations with Japan. COM (92) Doc 219
(1992) .
Transnational Arrangement for the Import of 
Japanese Motor Cars into the Communitv. EC Bulletin, 
Vol. 24, No. 7/8, Para 1.3.34 (31/7/91).
   _ _ - ----
458
correctly applied. 1029
The policy of the European Union towards quantitative 
restrictions with third countries is more than a little 
haphazardous. Whether or not Member States will abolish 
all existing national restrictions without substitution 
of Union-wide measures of protection remains to be seen. 
If this is achieved, then the scepticism of trading 
partners that the internal market programme will not 
reduce the level of grey area protection maintained by 
the Union members will have been vindicated.
(2) Trade Barriers Caused by Harmonisation
It is a prerequisite to the creation of a single market 
for national technical standards be harmonised to ensure 
that the flow of goods and services, and for that matter 
labour and capital, throughout the Union is not impeded 
unreasonably. But, at the same time, harmonisation 
measures are primarily in the interests of the Member 
States and these interests are not always shared with 
third states. The consequence of this choice of 
priorities is that measures adopted for the purposes of 
harmonisation can have serious trade implications.
This is particularly so in the case of absolute 
prohibitions on trade in certain products. One example 
of such a measure occurred in 1985 when the Council 
adopted a directive prohibiting the use of certain types
In June 1993, the EU attempted to renegotiate 
the terms of this arrangement after reports that the 
European market for vehicles would decline by 17% over 
the next ten years. One of the main reasons for the 
attempt to re-negotiate was the change in the views of 
the European Commission on vehicles manufacturer in UK 
plants which were not originally included in the 
permitted quotas. The reversal in views was caused after 
pressure was exerted by France and Germany on the 
Commission to protect their vehicle industries; London 
Times, p.12, June 13, 1993.
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of hormones in animal feedstuffs.*®^® In addition to 
this ban, the directive also prohibited sales of beef 
from animals reared on feedstuffs containing the hormone 
which extended to imports from third countries. The 
health implications of human consumption of such 
products were not absolutely clear and so the measure 
was highly contentious and was adopted against the votes 
of the United Kingdom and Denmark.*®"
In fact, these hormones were used widely by United 
States cattle farmers and the practical effect of this 
measure was to prohibit imports of beef from the United 
States when these substances were involved. The United 
States protested to the European Union that the measure 
was not scientifically justified and acted as a 
technical barrier to trade contrary to the GATT.*®" 
Under the circumstances, the United States felt that 
retaliatory measures were required and applied punitive 
duties on a list of imports from the Union estimated to 
be worth approximately $100 million to Union producers
*®^® Council Directive 85/649 (1985) . O.J. L382/228(1985).
*®^* Even within the EU the adoption of the measure 
caused internal conflict. The legitimacy of the measure 
was doubtful first because evidence supporting the 
proposition that the hormones in question were dangerous 
was insubstantial and because the directive was adopted 
not on the basis of Article 100 of the EC Treaty, which 
requires unanimity, but on Article 43, which concerns 
measures dealing with agriculture, by a qualified 
majority. The United Kingdom challenged the legitimacy 
of the directive on the ground that unanimity was 
required for the adoption of the measure and not a 
qualified majority. The Court rejected this argument put 
forward by the UK, but annulled the directive on the 
basis of a more technical procedural defect; United 
Kingdom v EC Council TRe; Hormones'] . Case 68/86 [1988] 
ECR 855.
*®" See European Parliament Background Papers. 
Committee on External Relations. Doc No. PE 141.199, 9 
(16.5.90).
460
each year.*®"
In response, on January 23, 1989, the Council authorised 
a list of European Union countermeasures but delayed 
implementation pending a possible negotiated 
settlement.*®" The matter was eventually referred to 
the GATT Standard Code Committee for resolution and a 
task force of European and American officials were 
appointed in February 1989 to establish a certification 
scheme on meat products.
Other proposals relating to the harmonisation and mutual 
recognition of standards have raised international 
concerns. For example, the technical requirements for 
the interworking of telecommunications terminal 
equipment with the networks have been cited as 
standards that limit trade opportunities, particularly 
in new and innovative markets.
Certain services directives also have caused problems on 
the international front. Originally at least three 
measures, concerning banking, investment services and 
life assurance, required reciprocity before a company 
from a non-union country was permitted access to provide 
these services.*®" The principle of reciprocity 
requires third countries to extend to European Union 
suppliers of services access to their market on 
comparable conditions to those provided for foreign 
suppliers in the European Union market.
*®" EC Bulletin 22/1, Para. 2.2.7 (1989).
1034 i b i a .
*035 These measures were finally enacted as: Council 
Directive 89/646 [Second Banking Directive], O.J. L386/1 
(1989); Council Directive 90/619 [Investment Services 
Directive], O.J. L330/50 (1990); and Council Directive 
90/618 [Second Life Assurance Directive], O.J. 
L(8/ll/90).
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Not all states have open markets in these services and 
some contain structural impediments. For example, the 
United States does not have a universal banking system 
and banks are established on a state-by-state basis. It 
also maintains a distinction between commercial and 
investment banking which prevents U.S. banks from 
entering into securities transactions.^" Thus, the 
United States companies would have been unable to trade 
in the European Union in these areas because Union 
companies are not be entitled to the freedoms granted in 
the Union market.*®"
The United States complained that a 'national treatment 
standard' was more appropriate that a standard of 
reciprocity.*®" The Commission subsequently revised its 
proposals in April 1989 to reflect the concerns of other 
countries, including the United States. In place of the 
reciprocity requirement, the precondition for allowing 
foreign companies access to these European Union service 
markets is the need to Show 'comparable effective market 
access'.*®" Now the Commission is required to examine 
the relevant legislation of a state to determine whether 
or not a sufficient degree of market access is granted 
to Union companies. In the event that the Commission's 
findings are negative, negotiations may be entered into 
with a view to establishing satisfactory market access.
1036 Glass-Steaaall Act of 1933. 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
*®" See European Commission, Report From the 
Commission to the Council on Treatment Accorded in Third 
Countries to Communitv Institutions and Insurance 
Companies. Sec (92) 1343 Final (July 1992).
*®" See M.A. Goldstein, "1992 and the FCN and OECD 
Obligations of EEC Member States to the United States in 
the Financial Services Area", (1990) 30 Virginia J.
Int'l Law 189, 223.
*®" See, for example. Article 9(3) Second Banking 
Directive and Article 9(3) Second Life Assurance 
Directive.
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The so-called 'Television Without Frontiers Directive' 
has also caused several trade problems.*®*® This 
directive, which came into effect on October 3, 1991, 
charts out the framework of a single European market in 
broadcasting. But the measure requires broadcasters to 
reserve a substantial proportion of transmission time 
for 'European material'. This amounts to a de facto 
local content requirement, but the European Union argues 
that the measure concerns trade in services and not 
goods and therefore the applicability of the General 
Agreement is at least questionable. The United States 
has, however, requested consultations regarding this 
measure although at present the dispute has not been 
resolved.
Finally, the directive on public procurement for 
supplies and works in the excluded sectors (water, 
energy, transportation and telecommunications) was the 
source of considerable friction between the European 
Union and the United States,*®** The measure was 
intended to harmonise the public procurement criteria of 
the Member States in order to reduce this barrier to 
trade. Its purpose is essentially to liberalise the 
supply of goods and services to the public sector by 
reducing discrimination.
The directive contained reciprocity conditions for the 
procurement of goods from third states. If the 
originating country is not legally committed to ensuring 
effective market access for EU companies, the directive 
allows procurement authorities to disregard bids with 
more than 50% content from that country. Any such bids 
must be rejected if their price advantages over
(1989)*®*® Council Directive 89/552/EEC. O.J. L298/1
*®** Council Directive 93/38/EC O.J. L199/84 (1993).
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equivalent tenders from other sources is less than
3 % ,  1042
This measure provoked the United States into identifying 
the EU as a country operating a 'significant and 
persistent pattern of discrimination' against the United 
States products and services under Section 301.*®*^  
Discussions were held between President Clinton and 
President of the Commission Delors in March 1993 in an 
attempt to avoid the imposition of unilateral measures 
and a compromise reached which applied the reciprocity 
provisions only to telecommunications.*®" In fact, the 
United States was dissatisfied with the manner in which 
this compromise was implemented and on May 28, 1993,
imposed limited import tariffs on EU goods. *®*^ In 
response, the European Union retaliated with 
approximately equivalent sanctions on June 9, 1993.
These measures continue to apply although both parties 
are involved in bilateral discussions to resolve the 
matter. *®*®
(C) Competition Policv
At least in theory, European Union measures to tackle 
unfair trade practices and those for dealing with anti­
competitive arrangements share the same policy 
objective, namely the removal of artificial distortions
1042 Article 29, ibid.
*®*^ European Commission, Press Briefings. May 14,
1992.
*®" London Times, p. 18, March 6, 1993; London Times, 
p.11, March 30, 1993.
*®*^ The estimated cost of these sanctions was 
approximately $20 million in lost exports.
*®*® GATT, Second Trade Policv Review Mechanism
(1993), 91-93.
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in the Union market-place.^^ In the circumstances, it 
could be assumed that the two policies would be dove­
tailed at the European Union level. Closer inspection 
reveals that this is not the case at all. In fact, the 
use of anti-dumping measures - the principal instrument 
in combating unfair trade practices committed by parties 
from third states - is frequently incompatible with the 
objectives sought in competition policy.
Within the European Union, competition policy takes a 
different form from anti-trust law in the United States 
in that it is policy-oriented. It has a more flexible 
form than the more legalistic American system. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the European Commission 
administers competition policy throughout the Union 
while in the United States, anti-trust law is applied 
primarily through the courts as opposed to 
administrative bodies.
True, the fabric of European competition policy is 
enshrined in Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, but 
the European Commission has a significant degree of 
discretion in implementing the policy, albeit that this 
discretion is subject to review by the European Court. 
It is in the administration of this particular policy 
that inconsistencies arise with the CCP.
See M, Mendes, Antitrust in a World of 
Interrelated Economies (1991), 19-44; and F. Snyder,
"Ideologies of Competition in European Community",
(1989) 52 MLR 149.
See generally, P. Vandoren, "The Interface 
Between Anti-Dumping and Competition Law in the EC",
(1986) 2 LIEI 3; J. Temple Lang, "Reconciling EC
Antitrust and Anti-Dumping Policy", (1988) Fordham Corp. 
Law Inst, 7; J.H.J. Bourgeois, "Antitrust and Trade 
Policy: A Peaceful Coexistence", (1989) 17 Int'l
Business Lawyer 116; and M. Clough, "Conflicts Between 
EEC Anti-dumping and Competition Law", (1992) 5 ECLR222.
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The interaction of competition policy and trade policy 
is reciprocal; each impinges on the other. The
application of trade policy measures can have serious 
anti-competitive implications and, at the same time, the 
implementation of competition policy affects trade 
p o l i c y . I t  is therefore necessary to consider their 
impact on each other in both dimensions. At the same 
time, there are also serious conflicts in the 
methodologies which are applied in such investigations 
which also warrant discussion.
(1) The effect of trade policv measures on 
competition policy
The operation of trade policy measures, particularly so- 
called 'commercial defence instruments', can cause 
serious anti-competitive effects within the European 
Union. This is because these measures often involve the 
intervention of European Union agencies in the normal 
processes of supply and demand that determine the price 
of particular products. The imposition of an anti­
dumping duty, for example, will in itself distort 
competition simply because it has the effect of 
artificially raising prices and decreasing demand from 
foreign suppliers. Other practices distorting 
competition are less obvious.
The Commission regularly accepts price undertakings from 
foreign companies as a means of establishing a floor
J.H.J. Bourgeois, "Trade Measures, Competition 
Policy and the Consumer: EC Perspective", A Paper
Presented at the Annual Conference on EC and US Trade 
Laws, Brugge, Belgium, September 15, 1989; and OECD
Working Party on Competition and International Trade, 
Report on Anti-Dumping and Competition Policv. Doc. No. 
DAFFE/CLP/WPl (93) 2 (February 1993), Chapter 5.
See generally, R. Kulms, "Competition, Trade 
Policy and the Competition Policy in the EEC: The
Example of Anti-Dumping", (1990) 27 CML Rev. 285.
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price for imports of particular products. In other
words, the Commission is actively establishing a price 
level for such products and naturally European Union 
producers will react to the fixing of such prices by 
adjusting their prices. From a competition point of 
view, the internal Union effect of such an undertaking 
is to increase the prices of Union-produced products 
that would otherwise have been lower in reaction to the 
foreign competition.
Agreements among competitors fixing prices are, however, 
absolutely prohibited as a matter of competition policy. 
In the classic case, Vereenioina van Cementhandelaren v 
EC Commission, the Commission declared as incompatible 
with Union competition law an arrangement among cement 
producers in the Netherlands agreeing prices to third 
parties, even although the arrangement applied only to 
Dutch producers and no other Union producers. 
Similarly, when seven producers of roofing felt in 
Belgium concluded an agreement establishing production 
quotas for each of them and a system of checks and 
compensation where these were exceeded, the Commission 
declared the contract illegal.
If price undertakings are accepted by the Commission, 
these often amount to little more than de facto price 
fixing, the only difference being that it is the 
Commission that is fixing the prices between Union and 
foreign producers. Creating artificial levels for import 
prices will have the effect of establishing a floor 
price within the Union at which Union producers can set
See, for example, EPROMS From Japan. O.J. 
L65/42 (1991).
Case 8/72 [1972] ECR 977.
Belasco SA V  EC Commission. Case 246/86 [1989] 
ECR 2117.
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their products in an artificial competitive environment.
In a similar vein, private cartels between individuals 
inside the Union which operate to regulate supplies or 
production are considered illegal^*, but voluntary 
restraint agreements negotiated under the auspices of 
the Commission appear to be acceptable in certain 
circumstances.^^ In fact, in one case, the Commission 
defended such practices by declaring:
'Measures taken in pursuance of trade agreements 
between the Union and Japan...are acts of external 
policy which are outside the scope of Article 85 of 
the EC Treaty ' .
This appears to suggest the existence of a hierarchy of 
policy within the Commission. Certainly, the Commission 
could not possibly be suggesting that external relations 
policy and competition policy operate in different 
spheres, never overlapping or interacting. There is 
undoubtedly a tangible relationship between both because 
measures adopted as trade protection measures impinge on 
the competitive environment that exists within the Union 
market-place.
Voluntary export restraints and anti-dumping duties may 
even be imposed where there exists only one or two Union 
producers if this is deemed to be in the strategic
1054 See Stichtina Siaarettenindustrie v EC
Commission. Cases 240-242/82 [1988] ECR 3831.
See Gijlstra, "Anti-dumping Policy of the EEC in Practice", in J.H.J. Bourgeois (ed), Protectionism and 
the European Communitv (1983), 151.
Franco-Japanese Ball-Bearing Agreement  ^ O.J. 
L343/19 (1974).
__________
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interests of the Union. This is even so if such 
measures enhances the commercial position of a few 
companies in the union to such an extent that they have 
a duopoly or an oligopoly within the Union. In such 
cases, the application of Article 86 seems to be 
suspended.
A number of procedural aspects of anti-dumping actions 
also involve anti-competitive implications. For example, 
an anti-dumping complaint must be lodged by a producer 
or group of producers 'acting on behalf of a Union 
industry'.**’^* In order to make complaints. Union 
producers often form alliances to ensure that the 
complaint is made on behalf of a sufficient majority of 
Union producers. For example, in EPROMS From Japan, the 
complaint was filed by the European Electronic Component 
Manufacturers' Association (EECMA) which is in fact 
composed of the main Union producers of 
semiconductors.
But the very idea of Union industries co-operating in 
this manner is anti-competitive. It is not, for 
instance, an example of co-operation for the purposes of 
producing an improved product. Rather, it involves a 
group of producers collaborating for the purposes of 
countering the activities of foreign competitors.
The Commission has, on a few occasions, acknowledged the 
sensitivity of the anti-competitive implications in 
administering the anti-dumping laws. Thus, in one case 
the Commission declined to accept price undertakings
See DRAMs From the Republic of Korea. O.J, 
L272/13 (1992).
1058 Article 5, Council Regulation (EEC) 2423/88, 
O.J. L209/1 (1988).
Council Regulation fEEC) 577/91. O.J. L65/1(1991).
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offered by a company after an affirmative dumping 
finding because it was deemed 'not in the Union's 
interest to accept the undertakings offered because of 
the effect these price undertakings could have...on the 
competitive situation and structure of the market'.
However, on the whole, the Commission rarely makes anti­
dumping decisions based on the potential anti­
competitive effects of a measure. More importantly, 
until recently, the Commission declined to consider 
anti-competitive aspects when considering which measures 
are appropriate to a particular situation. For example, 
in Calcium Metal From the PRC and the Soviet Union, the 
Commission declined to take into account the fact that 
the main EU producer of the products under investigation 
had refused to supply the main importer with supplies of 
the product contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty.
The European Court has since reversed this approach and 
considered the refusal to supply as a contributing 
factor to the injury caused to the industry and a factor 
which the Commission was wrong to ignore.Hence, the 
Commission is instructed to take into account anti­
competitive practices in its determination of material 
injury but not necessary in the calculation of dumping 
duties or to treat such behaviour as a rationale for 
excluding the complainer from an investigation.
1060 Glvcine From Japan. O.J. 218/1 (1985).
O.J. L271/1 (1989) .
Extramet Industrie SA v EC Council Case C358/89
[1993] 2 CMLR 619.
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(2) The impact of the application of competition 
law on European Union trade policy
Article 85 of the EC Treaty prohibits agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices between undertakings 
if such arrangements restrict or distort competition to 
a degree which affects trade between Member States. At 
the same time. Article 86 prohibits the abuse by any 
undertakings of a dominant position within the Union 
again when such practices affect trade between Member 
States.
The application of these rules is, however, occasionally 
inconsistent with the rules that the Union has 
established for the operation of its trade policy. The 
main concern is that different rules can apply to Union 
producers and foreign manufacturers even if both 
undertakings are engaged in production of the same goods 
and the same commercial practices.
Perhaps the major instance of such discrimination 
concerns the different treatment of Union industries and 
foreign producers when both are alleged to have engaged 
in practices that amount to dumping.
As far as Union producers are concerned, intra-Union 
dumping is permitted as long as such practices do not 
involve any element of predatory pricing. True, Article 
91(1) of the EC Treaty does purport to prohibit intra- 
Union dumping but this is only during the transitional 
period. The relevant anti-competitive practice, as far 
as Union producers are concerned, is predatory pricing 
not dumping stricto sensu. In other words, even although 
two producers - one Union one foreign - are engaged in 
identical unfair practices, from a legal perspective two 
separate concepts are applied to their activities. The 
important point is that the preconditions for
i. _______________________ _
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establishing dumping are considerably less onerous than 
for proving the existence of predatory pricing.
In competition law, predatory pricing requires proof of 
certain behaviour on the part of the dominant 
undertaking before an infraction is committed. In the 
leading decision on predatory pricing, ECS/AKZO. the 
Commission, in establishing the element of intent, 
pointed to the systematic offering of lower prices to 
customers of a rival undertaking, selective price cuts, 
exclusivity agreements, and special offers.
As far as the present writer is aware, the ECS/AKZO Case 
is the first opportunity the European Court has had to 
consider the concept of predatory pricing in EC 
competition law.^^ This points to the rarity of such 
cases particularly in contrast to the number of anti­
dumping investigations carried out each year by the 
Commission. However, the Court did not fully 
substantiate the Commission's original findings 
regarding intent. Rather the Court formulated a cost- 
based methodology to establish the presence of predatory 
pricing.
The Court held that pricing goods at below average 
variable costs (i.e. costs that vary in proportion to 
the quantity of production) by an undertaking in a 
dominant position seeking to eliminate a competitor is 
an abuse. A dominant undertaking could be presumed to 
have no interest in selling goods at below average 
variable cost unless such a pricing policy was intended
ECS/AKZO. Commission Decision IV/30.698. O.J. 
L374/1 (1985); [1986] 3 CMLR 273.
AKZO Chemie BV v EC Commission Case 62/86 [1993] 
5 CMLR 197. See also the analysis presented in N. Levy, 
"Case Comment on AKZO v EC Commission", (1992) 29:2 CMLR 
415.
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to eliminate a competitor and thereafter profit from its 
exit from the market.
But the Court seems to have confused the issue of intent 
when considering sales at below average total costs 
(i.e. variable costs plus fixed costs), but above 
average costs because, in such circumstances, it 
required proof of some predatory purpose. Since purpose 
involves intent, the Court did in fact establish an 
intent prerequisite where the pricing is at below 
average total costs. Indirectly, this confirms that the 
element of intent is required to establish predatory 
pricing in at least certain circumstances.
In a more recent decision, the European Commission 
attacked a Swedish company supplying aseptic packaging 
for certain liquid food-stuffs on the grounds, inter 
alia. that it had engaged in a general application of 
discriminatory pricing and ad hoc predatory pricing 
aimed at eliminating competitors.^^ Among other abuses 
of its dominant position, the undertaking under 
investigation was found to have engaged in a general 
pricing policy of applying discriminatory pricing 
towards customers and ad hoc predatory pricing designed 
to eliminate competitors. The intention to indulge in 
such practices was derived from the behaviour of the 
company which involved the application of profits made 
in aseptic packaging in which it held a virtual monopoly 
to cover its losses on sales of other packaging in which 
there was competition.
Tetra Pak II. Commission Decision IV/310.43. 
O.J. L72/1 (1992) , See the judgment of the CFI in Tetra 
Pak Rausinq v EC Commission. Case T83/89, Judgment of 
October 6, 1994.
-----
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(3) Lack of Co-operation Inside the European 
Commission
From the perspective of internal co-ordination and co­
operation within the Commission, there is clearly an 
element of disharmony between DG IC which conducts anti­
dumping investigations and DG IV which conducts 
competition investigations. Neither directorate has the 
right to intervene in the work of the other even 
although often the investigations are closely related. 
Nor has either department the right to be consulted by 
the other, although as a matter of courtesy in fact both 
do so.^°^ The main point is that neither department has 
the authority to assert its views against the other.
Of course there are rare instances of co-operation 
between these directorates. The most notable example of 
co-operation on this basis occurred in the investigation 
into glycine originating from Japan. A Union producer of 
glycine lodged an anti-dumping complaint against two 
Japanese producers but in fact the Union producer held 
a dominant position itself in the Union market. This 
raised concerns that, if anti-dumping duties were 
imposed, these would have the effect of enhancing the
dominant position of the Union producer. DG IV drew this 
factor to the attention of the anti-dumping 
investigators in DG IC and, as a result, the final anti­
dumping duties imposed were levied at less than 50% of 
the margin of injury found to exist.
See Disodium Carbonate From the USA [provisional 
measures!. O.J. L83/8 (1995).
Glvcine From Japan, Council Regulation fEEC! 
2322/85. O.J. L218/1 (1985).
  ^  ,
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(3) The Grant of Protection to European Union 
Industries
In common with their American counterparts, a number of 
Union industries have taken conspicuous advantage of the 
existence of the Union's trade protection laws to reduce 
the effect of international competition on their 
commercial activities.
It is in lobbying for the use of these measures that 
private interest groups appear to have the greatest 
influence over the shape of European Union trade policy. 
The influence of private groups in the formulation of 
general trade policy is not as direct as in the case of 
the United States since, again in general terms, within 
the Union, the somewhat byzantine and elaborate nature 
of the constitutional set up of the Union tends to 
discourage lobbying at the Union level in favour of 
placing pressure on national authorities.
Similarly, for a variety of reasons. Union industries 
tend to place considerably greater emphasis on anti­
dumping measures than on the other measures of 
commercial defence. This is simply because protection 
under the countervailing laws is, as a matter of policy, 
more difficult to obtain within the Union. The Union 
prefers to provide relief through its trade remedy law 
in the form of anti-dumping measures as opposed to anti­
subsidy or safeguard measures. Relief is relatively 
infrequently provided in either of these two forms. The 
same is true of measures adopted under the New 
Commercial Policy Instrument. But, in contrast, anti­
dumping proceedings are relatively common and this has 
been the principal mechanism used by Union industries to
1068 e.a. Vermulst, "Dumping in the United States and 
the European Community: A Comparative Analysis", (1984) 
10 Legal Issues in European Integration 103.
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harass foreign businesses.
While there are many industries which have benefited 
from anti-dumping measures, the notable industries 
employing such strategies are the steel industries, the 
chemical industry and the consumer electronics industry. 
Of the anti-dumping measures imposed by the Union 
between 1980 and 1990, over half of these measures 
related to chemicals and allied products followed by 
consumer electronics and steel products. Other notable 
sectors given protection include mechanical machinery 
and t e x t i l e s . I t  is therefore appropriate to examine 
at least two of these main industries in order to 
ascertain the exact nature of the commercial policies 
pursued by these industries to imports from non-Union 
countries.
(A) The Steel Industry
Steel production in the Union has traditionally held a 
special status mainly due to the fact that steel, 
together with coal, was one of the first sectors 
regulated at the Union level.^ °^ ° The steel industry in 
the Union is characterised by a considerable degree of 
government intervention by both Member States and the 
Union. In the past, this intervention has taken two 
forms. First, there is a substantial amount of state 
ownership in the sector at national level. Second, a 
large volume of financial assistance is provided by the 
Union and national governments to ensure the continued
1069 European Commission, Ninth Annual Report of the 
Commission on the Community's Antiv-Dumpinq and Anti- 
Subs idv Activities (1990), Annex H.
European Coal and Steel Communitv Treaty, signed 
in Paris on April 18, 1951. It should be noted that this 
agreement is due to expire in 2002 after which time the 
products covered by the agreement will be regulated 
under the EC Treaty.
___________
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survival of the industry. The future of the industry 
and the degree of protection it receives are therefore 
matters of considerable national interests to many 
national governments.
In addition to production of steel, the steel industry 
in the context which we are discussing, includes 
further-stage product manufacture. It includes first- 
stage and second-stage products such as steel wire, 
steel coils, steel tubes, welded sheet steel and 
galvanised sheet steel. For the purposes of examining 
the measures of protection granted to the steel 
industry, all these related products are included.
In general terms, from around 1975, the Union steel 
industry has found itself in severe economic 
difficulties. Among the factors blamed for its problems 
was the fact that the common market for steel is closely 
linked to the world market, as regards both exports and 
imports, and the prices of steel goods had progressively 
become more and more a r t i f i c i a l . I n  response to this 
situation, the Commission took a number of internal 
measures to adjust trading conditions in the Union 
m a r k e t . T h e s e  measures essentially consisted of the 
introduction of guidance prices and mandatory minimum 
prices for certain steel products.
European Commission, Second Survev on State Aids 
in the European Community (July 1990), Annex XB.
1072 European Commission, Ninth General Report on the 
Activities of the European Community (1975), 172.
EC Bulletin, 10/3, Para. 2.1.17 (1977).
1074 This price system under the steel arrangement 
was in fact challenged before the European Court but the 
Court upheld the legitimacy of the policy on the basis 
that the arrangement was the least harmful system that 
the Commission could adopt in the circumstances; see 
Rumi V  EC Commission. Case 258/80 [1982] ECR 437.
• ..
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This so-called 'anti-crisis' policy has been continued 
but, in addition, in 1979 the Union negotiated a number 
of bilateral import restriction agreements with the 
countries which exported steel to the U n i o n . T h e s e  
bilateral restraint agreements have come to characterise 
the Union's external trade with third countries in steel 
products. However, there is little doubt that their 
existence stems from the threat of the imposition of 
anti-dumping measures in their absence.
The Union steel industry has therefore largely been 
shielded from the effects of international competition 
through a network of bilateral restrictions which allow 
the Union authorities to regulate supply and demand of 
steel products. Nevertheless, Union steel producers and 
manufacturers of later-stage products have made 
considerable use of the Union measures of administered 
protection particularly anti-dumping measures.
The profile of the use of measures of administered 
protection by the Union steel industry, in the broad 
sense of that term, is interesting for a number of 
reasons.
Most significantly, notwithstanding that different steel 
product manufacturers have different commercial 
interests, the lodging of anti-dumping complaints by 
manufacturers of different steel products can be broadly 
classified into three time periods, 1977-78, 1982 and
1991-92. This grouping raises suspicions of a concerted 
effort by the steel industry to obtain protection in the 
form of anti-dumping measures.
In the first period, between 1977 and 1978, anti-dumping 
petitions were lodged on behalf of producers of iron and
:
1075 European Commission, Twelfth General Report on 
the Activities of the European Communitv (1978), 251.
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Steel sheet iron and steel coils1077 galvanised
sheet steel^ ®^ *, pig iron1079 steel and wire rod1080
stainless steel bars^"" and seamless steel tubes 1082
It is interesting to observe that the countries subject 
to these investigations were predominantly the same, 
namely Australia, Brazil, Japan and the countries of 
Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, 
Hungary, Poland and Roumania). In virtually all of these 
investigations provisional duties were imposed and 
definitive measures taken in the majority of cases.
The strategy of the Union steel industry in seeking 
protection in this form therefore paid handsome
1076 Sheets and Plates of Iron and Steel From 
Australia. Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, the GDR. Hunaarv. 
Japan. Poland. Roumania and Spain. O.J. C19/7 (1978);
Sheets and Plates of Iron and Steel From Czechoslovakia. 
Japan. South Korea and Spain. O.J. C19/9 (1978).
Iron or Steel Coils From Australia. Bulgaria. 
Czechoslovakia. Hunaarv. Japan. Poland. South Korea. 
Spain and the USSR. O.J. C19/10 (1978) ; and Iron or
Steel Coils From Greece. O.J. C311/4 (1978).
Galvanised Steel Sheets and Plates From 
Australia. Bulgaria. Canada. Czechoslovakia, the GDR. 
Japan. Poland and Spain. O.J. C19/7 (1978); Galvanised 
Steel Sheets and Plates From Finland. O.J. C27/3 (1978); 
and Galvanised Steel Sheets and Plates From Austria. 
O.J. C41/2 (1978).
Haematite Pig Iron From Brazil. O.J. C187/2
(1977) ; Haematite Pia Iron From Canada. O.J. C19/8
(1978); and Graphite Spheroidal Pig Iron From Brazil. 
O.J. C311/4 (1978).
Wire Rod From Australia. Czechoslovakia. 
Hunaarv. Japan. Poland and Spain. O.J. C19/11 (1978); 
and Alloy Steel Wire Rod From Spain. O.J, C48/3 (1979).
1081 stainless Steel Bars From Brazil. O.J. C317/3
(1979) [Anti-subsidy investigation].
10^  ^Seamless Tubes of Non-Alloved Steel From Spain. 
O.J. C264/2 (1979) ; and Seamless Steel Tubes From Spain. 
O.J. C264/2 (1979) [Anti-subsidy investigation].
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dividends. But, the industry reaped an extra bonus when, 
as a result of the pressure imposed by the lodging of 
such a vast number of complaints, fifteen countries - 
representing 70% of Union steel imports - entered into 
•arrangements' with the Union that may best be described 
as voluntary restraint agreements. These countries 
included, not surprisingly perhaps, Australia, Japan, 
and the countries of Eastern Europe, but not B r a z i l .
The express purpose of these arrangements was to 
establish a sufficiently strong price discipline for 
imports to prevent disruption of the Union market. In 
fact, these arrangements limited the amount of steel 
products being imported by requiring suppliers from 
these countries to abide by the principle of 'the 
preservation of traditional trade patterns'. In other 
words, imports were restricted to their 1976 levels with 
an allowance being made for forecasted falls in 
consumption.
These arrangements were amended in 1981 to allow anti­
dumping proceedings to be initiated where products had 
been imported at prices that seriously and persistently 
undercut the established p r i c e s . T h i s  allowed the 
Commission to open investigations into alleged dumping 
where imports entered the Union at prices lower than the 
base prices. This amendment allowed a second salvo of 
anti-dumping complaints from Union steel producers in 
1982. Other proceedings were brought against products 
from countries which did not have an arrangement with 
the Union.
In that year, petitions were lodged by producers of iron
1083 European Commission, Twelfth General Report on 
the Activities of the European Communitv. 251-52 (1979).
1084 European Commission, Sixteenth General Report 
on the Activities of the European Communitv. 239 (1983).
   . .
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and steel coils^^ , sheets and plates of iron and 
steel^ °8®, welded steel and iron tubes^^^, sheet 
steel^ °88^  and steel tubes and p i p e s . A g a i n  the vast 
majority of these complaints successfully procured anti­
dumping measures.
The resolution of these investigations was pursued in 
two ways. First, the existing arrangements with third 
countries were tightened to prevent the flow of imports 
at below the prices set by the Union with the threat of 
further duties in the event of non-compliance. Second, 
agreements were negotiated with those countries that 
were not parties to arrangements, in similar terms to 
those already in force with other states.
This framework of arrangements appears to have been 
relatively successful from a Union industry point of 
view. Notwithstanding a minor flurry of anti-dumping 
complaints between 1985 and 1986^^, the industry did 
not feel compelled to lodge a substantial number of 
complaints until 1990.
Iron or Steel Colls From Argentina. Brazil. 
Canada and Venezuela. O.J. C303/4 (1982).
Sheets and Plates of Iron or Steel From Brazil. 
O.J. C70/3 (1982) .
^^87 Welded Steel or Iron Tubes From Roumania. O.J. 
C299/2 (1981).
1088 Sheets and Plates of Iron or Steel From Brazil. 
O.J. C146/4 (1982) [Anti-subsidy investigation].
°^8^ Tubes and Pipe Fittings From Spain. O.J. C142/3
(1983) .
See Steel Wire Rod From Brazil. Portugal. 
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. O.J. C48/2 (1985);
Sheets of Plates of Steel or Iron From Yugoslavia. O.J. 
C38/3 (1986); Sheets of Plates of Steel or Iron From
Mexico. O.J. C308/2 (1986) ; and Tubes arid Pipe Fittings 
of Cast Iron From Brazil. Japan. Taiwan and Yugoslavia. 
O.J. C77/3 (1985).
..
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However, in 1990, complaints were lodged against imports 
of semi-finished alloy steel^^% bars of alloy 
steel^^^, welded wire mesh^ °^  ^ and wire rod^°^ while 
in 1991, petitioners were lodged in respect of pig 
iron^ <»5 stainless steel tubes.
(B) Chemical Industrv
Since 1980, in all but one year, anti-dumping 
investigations into chemical and allied products 
accounted for the greater volume of investigations 
opened by the Commission when take on a sector-specific 
basis. In fact, between 1980-82 and 1984-86, 
investigations into these products accounted for more 
than 40% of all investigations opened by the 
Commission^ °^ ,^ although since 1987, the proportion of 
such proceedings has declined slightly to an annual 
level of around 3 0% of investigations.^^ Trade in
f
Semi-Finished Products of Allov Steel From 
Turkey, O.J. C144/5 (1990); Semi-Finished Products of
Allov Steel From Brazil. O.J. C144/5 (1990).
Merchant Bars and Rods of Allov Steel From 
Turkey. O.J. C144/4 (1990).
Welded Wire Mesh From Yugoslavia. O.J. C188/7
(1990).
Wire Rod From Brazil. O.J. C296/3 (1990); Wire 
Rod From Argentina. Egypt. Trinidad and Tobago. Turkev 
and Yugoslavia. O.J. C310/9 (1990).
Haematic Pig Iron From Turkev and the USSR. O.J. 
C246/9 (1991).
Seamless Steel Tubes From Hungary. Poland. 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. O.J. C321/7 (1991).
European Commission, Fifth Annual Report of the 
Commission on the Community's Anti^Dumping and Anti- 
Subsidv Activities. Annex 1, Com (88) 92 Final (1988).
1098 European Commission, Tenth Annual Report of the 
Commission on the Communitv*s Anti-Dumping and Anti- 
Subsidv Activities. Annex 1, Com (92) 716 Final (1992).
— _______________________________
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chemicals is therefore one of the most heavily regulated 
areas in terms of anti-dumping measures applied.
Analysis of the exact profile of Union industry 
activities in this area is complicated because of the 
large variety of chemical products affected. But, 
basically the target of the majority of such complaints 
have been basic chemical compounds (simple compounds of 
two or more elements) and tertiary chemical compounds 
(advanced compounds produced after first or second stage 
processing). Research-derived chemical products, such as 
pharmaceuticals and medicinal products are rarely the 
subject of such measures. Thus, it can be said with 
confidence that the use of anti-dumping complaints by 
the chemical industries has been concentrated in only 
one or two specific sectors of the industry.
Another interesting aspect of the use of such measures 
is that certain countries have been singled-out for 
especially harsh treatment. Complaints are most 
frequently launched against the countries of Eastern 
Europe, China and Korea. In the last four years, eleven 
investigations have been opened into exports of chemical 
compounds from C h i n a . S i m i l a r l y ,  the Soviet 
Union"^ and the Eastern European countries^^^ have
Magnesite (Dead Burned) From China, O.J. G276/3 
(1991); Magnesite (Caustic Burned) From China, O.J. 
C279/10 (1991); Dihvdrostreptomvein From China and
Japan, O.J. C186/33 (1990); Tungsten Ores arid
Concentrates From China. O.J. C2/5 (1989); Silicbn Metal,Chloride From
Tungstic Oxide
Tungsten Metaland Acid From China. O.J. C322/6 1988);
Powder From China and Korea. O.J. C322/6 (1988);
Tungsten Carbide From China and Korea. O.J. C322/7
(1988); Ammonium Paratungstate From China and Korea. 
O.J. C322/4 (1988) ; and Calcium Metal From China and the 
USSR. O.J. C20/3 (1988).
Ferrochrome From Albania and the USSR. O.J. 
C252/11 (1990); Potassium Chloride From the USSR. O.J. 
C274/18 (1990); Potassium Permanganate From the USSR.
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been particularly susceptible to attack.
There is also substantial evidence that in certain 
sectors of the industry, chemical companies have been 
lodging anti-dumping complaints against foreign 
importers in order to reinforce their position in the 
market and even, in some cases, as part of a strategy to 
establish price and production controls within the Union 
market contrary to Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty.
In production and marketing of three chemical products, 
we have the benefit of Commission anti-competition 
investigations which allow us to examine this phenomenon 
more closely. The conclusions of these investigations 
provide a basis for analysis of how, in some cases, 
chemical companies have employed anti-dumping complaints 
to capture greater control over the Union market by 
impeding foreign goods while themselves engaging in 
unfair commercial practices.
The first investigation concerned the production and 
sale of polyethylene. In December 1988, the Commission 
found a large number of companies guilty of operating a 
cartel for the production and distribution of this 
product throughout the Union during the period between
O.J. C192/8 (1989); and Calcium Metal From China and the 
USSR. O.J. C20/3 (1988).
See for example, Methenamine From Bulgaria, the 
CSSR. Hungarv. Poland. Roumania and Yugoslavia. O.J. 
C322/8 (1988); Ferrosilicon From Poland. O.J. C122/4
(1991); Artificial Corrundum From Yugoslavia. O.J. 
C159/5 (1990); Portland Cement From Yugoslavia. O.J.
C149/4 (1989); and NPK Fertilizers From Hungary. Poland. 
Romania and Yugoslavia. O.J. C55/3 (1989).
1102 gQQ p.A. Messer 1 in, "Anti-Dumping Regulations or 
Pro-Cartel Law?", (1990) 13 World Economy 465.
LdPE. Commission Decision IV/31.866. O.J. L74/21(1989).
 :
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1980 and 1985. The companies involved controlled around 
90% of EC production capacity which accounted for 
approximately 50% of the demand in the Union market. 
Substantial fines were imposed by the Commission and the 
companies were ordered to desist in their practices.
In order to limit the volume of imports during this 
period, and thereby increase control and market share, 
the members of the cartel lodged anti-dumping complaints 
against the main suppliers of the product to the 
U n i o n . T h e s e  investigations were terminated by price 
undertakings from the produced alleged to have been 
dumping."^
Ten companies found to have participated in the cartel 
by the Commission were parties to this anti-dumping 
complaint. More importantly, these ten companies 
accounted for the major proportion of production in the 
Union. It seems reasonably clear therefore that the use 
of anti-dumping measures had been part of a deliberate 
strategy of restraining imports in order to increase 
market share in the European Union.
The second investigation concerned the production of 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC). In March 1988, the Commission 
opened an investigation into the activities of the major 
producers of this chemical many of whom - BASF, Atochem, 
Hoechst, ICI and Shell - were also being investigated 
for anti-competitive practices in regard to the 
production and sale of polyethylene.
The Commission found fourteen European producers of PVC
Polvethvlene From Czechoslovakia, the GDR. 
Poland and the USSR. O.J. C230/2 (1982).
Polvethvlene From Czechoslovakia, the GDR. 
Poland and the USSR. Commission Decision 83/248/EEC, 
O.J. L138/65 (1983).
..... ..
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products guilty of conducting a price and quota fixing 
cartel and issued a cease and desist order as well as 
imposing fines of 23,500,000 ECUs. The companies 
involved had controlled approximately 95% of Union 
production of the chemical and held 80% of the market 
share in the Union. The Commission decision in this case 
was in fact annulled by the Court of First Instance but 
only on the basis of infringements of essential 
procedural requirements by the Commission."^
Again it is reasonably clear that the producers had 
abused the anti-dumping procedure by lodging a complaint 
against their main foreign competitors in order to 
regulate the flow of the product into the Union. This 
had taken the form of an anti-dumping complaint lodged 
in 1981 against four Eastern European producers."®® 
Provisional anti-dumping duties were imposed in one case 
and price undertakings accepted in the other three 
cases.
The third illustration of the chemical industry abusing 
the anti-dumping laws for anti-competitive motives 
occurred in relation to the chemical, soda ash. Two 
chemical companies were responsible for the vast 
proportion of EU production of this chemical. Both were 
found to have engaged in anti-competitive practices over
PVC, Commission Decision IV/31.865. O.J. L74/21
(1989) .
Re The PVC Cartel; BASF AG and Others v EC 
Commission. Case 79/89 [1992] 4 CMLR 357.
Polvvinvl Chloride From Czechoslovakia, the GDR. 
Hunaarv and Romania. O.J. C332/2 (1981).
Polvvinvl Chloride From Czechoslovakia, the GDR. 
Hungary and Romania. O.J. L274/15 (1982) .
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a period between 1980 and 1990."^® Both companies 
received substantial fines and were order to desist from 
such practices.
During this period, both companies had jointly lodged, 
and secured, anti-dumping measures against their main 
United States competitors."" The Commission's decision 
expressly found that the companies had used anti-dumping 
measures to shield their anti-competitive practices from 
international competition. Nevertheless, despite this 
finding, the European Commission subsequently granted 
further protection in the form of anti-dumping measures 
despite submissions on behalf of the United States 
companies that these producers had been the probable 
cause of the injury to the EU industry and to EU 
consumers.
(4) The Limits of International Trade Regulation - The 
Reluctance of the European Court to Incorporate 
International Obligations into European Union law
As we have seen in the context of United States trade 
law"^ 8^  refusal to allow judicial review of national 
laws (and in this case supranational laws) acts against 
the interests of foreign producers and exporters and 
favours those of national producers. Failure to 
incorporate, or to incorporate properly, also creates an
"^ ® Soda Ash-Solvav. ICI. Commission Decision 
IV/33.133-A. O.J. L152/1 (1991); Soda Ash-Solvav. CFK. 
Commission Decision IV/33.133?B. O.J. L152/16 (1991);
Soda Ash-Solvav. Commission Decision IV/33.133C. O.J. 
L152/21 (1991); and Soda Ash-ICI. Commission Decision 
IV/33.133D. O.J. L152/40 (1991).
"11 Disodium Carbonate from the USA. O.J, L206/15
(1984), terminated on review, O.J. C64/6 (1989).
11" Disodium Carbonate from the USA [preliminary 
measures]. O.J. L83/8 (1995).
1113 See text supra, pp.410-422.
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asymmetry in legal rights between domestic and foreign 
interested parties. It is, of course, a fundamental 
principle of international law that states must ensure 
that national laws do not conflict with their 
international obligations."" Conflicting national laws 
cannot be used as a defence for the evasion of 
international law.
But between the black and white of implementation and 
non-implementation of international obligations lies a 
twilight area where imprecise international obligations 
can be incorporated into national laws creating 
considerable discretion on the part of the national 
authorities. This discretion would be limited by 
allowing review of national laws against the relevant 
international standards at the request of private 
individuals.
Within the European Union, direct enforcement of 
international obligations would also produce effects 
other than rectifying any asymmetry caused by non­
incorporation, or incomplete incorporation, of 
international obligations. For example, it is more 
likely that European Union institutions will pay more 
attention to international commitments when framing 
internal measures particularly those having an impact on 
the international market-place such as measures to 
implement the Common Agricultural Policy.""
If international obligations prevail over measures of 
internal European Union law. Union institutions would be
■■I
"" See, most recently, UN Headquarters Agreement 
Case. (1988) ICJ Rep 3.
"" See J.H.J. Bourgeois, "Trade Policy-Making 
Institutions and Procedures in the European Community", 
in M. Hilf & E-U Petersmann (eds) , National Constitutions and International Economic Law (1993), 
175.
_________
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forced to take account of such obligations because any 
internal measure could be declared null and void by the 
European Court in the event that it is found 
incompatible with international rules. This, of course, 
assumes that the European Court would be prepared to 
adopt such a policy towards the issue of supremacy 
between international and European Union laws. If, on 
the other hand, the Court of Justice declared that 
European Union legislation prevailed over international 
obligations entered into by the Union, this would 
seriously undermine the normative effect of these 
obligations within the internal Union legal order.
While the EC Treaty prescribes many of the rights and 
duties existing at the European Union level, it fails to 
address expressly the issue of the hierarchy among the 
different types and forms of law that interact with 
European Union law."" It has been left to the Court of 
Justice to resolve the question of the effect of 
international obligations in the Union legal order.
This hierarchy among the different forms of law - 
particularly between European Union law and 
international law - is critical from a trade policy 
perspective because the effect given to international 
obligations in the internal Union law plays a 
significant part in influencing the shape of trade 
policy. Unfortunately, to date, the Court has not ruled 
decisively one way or another on this matter. This has 
been quite simply because the issue itself is not black 
and white, but rather involves a number of complex
"" See generally, J.H.J. Bourgeois, "Effects of 
International Agreements in European Community Law",
(1984) 82 Mich Law Review 1250-1273; T.C. Hartley,
"International Agreements and the Community Legal 
System", (198 ) 8 EL Rev 383; and Volker, "The Direct 
Effect of International Agreements in the Community's 
Legal Order", (1983) 9/1 LIEI 131.
'
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constitutional issues including deciding the hierarchy 
of sources of Union law.
It can, however, be said that the policy of the Court 
towards the application of international obligations 
varies according to the nature of the obligation itself. 
An analysis of the decisions of the Court can assist 
determine the course of action adopted by the Court in 
the event of an inconsistency between internal Union 
law, or a national law for that matter, and a Union 
international obligation. But, this task has been made 
particularly difficult in light of the inconsistent 
signals that the Court has been sending out particularly 
in its most recent decisions.
The approach of the Court towards the application of the 
General Agreement and the 1979 Anti-dumping Agreement 
has been markedly different and for that reason it is 
most prudent to examine the policy of the Court towards 
these agreements separately. As a related matter, in 
this discussion we shall also consider very briefly the 
status that will eventually be given to the new 
agreements which have recently been negotiated as part 
of the Uruguay Round discussions.
(A) The Status of the General Agreement in European 
Union law
The Court of Justice has considered whether the General 
Agreement confers directly enforceable rights on at 
least five separate occasions."" On each occasion the 
Court has demonstrated a manifest reluctance to render 
any of the GATT provisions directly enforceable in 
European Union law despite the participation of all 
Member States, and the Union itself, in the
"" See J. Steenbergen, "The Status of GATT in 
Community Law", (1981) 5 JWTL 337.
 . . .  ^ .
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organisation.
The first attempt to invoke the GATT involved a number 
of European Union regulations which were being 
challenged before a Dutch court on the ground that they 
infringed Article XI of the GATT which concerns the 
general elimination of quantitative restrictions."" 
The case was referred to the European Court under 
Article 177 to allow the Court to decide whether the 
validity of the regulations was affected by reason of 
the fact that their terms were contrary to international 
law.
Two preconditions were declared by the Court to be 
necessary for European Union measures to be held 
invalid:
(a) the European Union must be legally bound by 
the treaty provision in question; and
(b) where the incompatibility of a provision of 
Union law is alleged in a national court, it 
is necessary that the provision of 
international law is capable of 'conferring 
rights on citizens of the Union which they can 
invoke' in such courts.
While the Court was prepared to accept that the General 
Agreement was binding on the European Union because the 
Union exercised the powers originally conferred on the
"" See E-U. Petersmann, "Application of the GATT by 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities", 
(1983) CML Rev 397.
"" International Fruit Comoanv v Produktschap voor 
Groenten en Fruit. Cases 21-24/72 [1972] ECR 1219;
[1975] 2 CMLR 1.
"20 On this case in general, see M. Maresceau, "The 
GATT in the Case Law of the EGJ", in M Hilf et al.. The 
European Communitv and the GATT (1986) 107-126.
— — -----------  j..........
II
See M. Waelbroeck, "Effect of GATT Within the 
Legal Order of the EEC", (1974) 8 JWTL 614; Petersmann, 
supra note , 415-439.
"22 Case 9/73, [1973] ECR 1135.
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individual Member States, it did not accept that the 
GATT conferred rights on individual citizens.
In deciding whether the GATT was capable of clear, 
unqualified and unconditional application, the Court 
examined two factors; the spirit and general scheme of 
the GATT, together with the nature of the individual 
terms being relied on by the applicants. After an 
examination of these elements, the Court highlighted 
aspects of the General Agreement which implied that it 
was not capable of conferring individual rights. In 
particular, it focused on the preamble which cited the 
need to secure 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements', and continued to point to the 
'flexibility* of a number of its provisions including 
those terms relating to derogation, consultations and 
dispute-settlement,
It concluded that these factors were sufficient to 
establish that Article XI was not capable of conferring 
rights on private individuals which could be relied on 
at the European Union level. Consequently, the validity 
of the European Union regulations could not be contested 
against this provision of the GATT.
The methodology employed by the Court in arriving at 
this decision has been criticised by a number of 
commentators."" There seems no reason to dwell on 
these factors since the Court has clearly decided that 
this policy will not be reversed. This was made clear in 
the subsequent cases which followed this decision. For 
example, in Schluter v Hauptzollamt Lorrach"^. the 
argument that compensatory taxes imposed by the Union on
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imports from third countries were incompatible with 
Article II of the GATT was rejected on broadly similar 
grounds,
In the early 1980s, efforts to have the GATT declared 
part of Union law were revived when three separate 
judgments were issued by the Court, each involving 
different factual circumstances. These cases merely 
reaffirmed the position adopted earlier by the 
Court."23 So, at this point, the legal authority of the 
provisions of the GATT in European Union law was 
confined to that of an aid to interpretation of Union
measures. 1124 :S
Recently the European Court modified its position 
slightly in this connection. This change of policy 
occurred in EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' 
Federation v EC Commission (known as the Fediol III 
Case) ."25 In 1986, a trade association lodged a 
complaint with the Commission under the New Commercial 
Policy Instrument of the Union alleging the existence of 
certain illicit commercial practices by the government 
of Argentina concerning exports of soya cake to the 
European Union. Two practices were considered illicit by 
the association, namely a scheme of differential charges 
on exports of soya products which discriminated among 
certain products and a series of quantitative 
restrictions. The facts of the case have been considered
"23 These cases were Societa Italiana Per 
L'Oleodotto Transalpine v Ministero delle Finanze. Case 
266/81 [1983] ECR 731; Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato v Societa Petrolifera Italiana. Case 267- 
269/81 [1983] ECR 801; and Compaqnia Singer and Geiay v 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato. Cases 290- 
291/81 [1983] ECR 847.
1124 Interfood GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg. 
92/71 [1972] ECR 231.
Case
1125 Case 70/87 [1991] 2 CMLR 489.
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in more detail at an earlier point in this study.
The Commission rejected the complaint on two grounds: 
(a) the levying of differential duties was not contrary 
to any of the rules of international law relied on by 
the complainers; and (b) the complaint disclosed no 
evidence of the existence of the alleged quantitative 
restrictions. In response, the applicants challenged the 
decision on the ground, inter alia, that the charging of 
differential rates was contrary to international law and 
in particular Articles III, XI, XX and XXIII of the 
GATT.
In its judgment, the Court made a clear distinction 
between private individuals relying on the GATT to 
establish Union rights which can be invoked before 
courts, thereby sustaining its earlier decisions, and 
relying on the terms of the GATT to establish the 
existence of an illicit practice contrary to the rules 
of international law, of which the GATT forms part. In 
fact, the Court considered all three factors which were 
considered a bar to direct effect - insufficient 
precision in the rules, too much flexibility, and the 
existence of a special dispute settlement procedure - 
before concluding that these factors do not 'prevent the 
Court from interpreting and applying the rules of the 
GATT with reference to a given case (under the NCPI), in 
order to establish whether certain specific commercial 
practices should be considered incompatible with those 
rules. ' "27
The Court then proceeded to interpret all four 
provisions of the GATT which were alleged to be 
incompatible with the Argentinean measures. While the
"2® See text supra, p. 341-342. 
"22 Para 20, supra note 1125.
________ _
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Court rejected all four submissions by the applicants, 
the important point is that it engaged in an 
interpretation exercise for all four rules before 
dismissing the application. It is interesting to observe 
that, although in earlier cases the Court held that 
Article XXIII of the GATT - dispute settlement - was a 
factor which militated against granting direct effect to 
all provisions of the GATT, in this decision the Court 
in fact interpreted the express terms of this provision 
in order to determine whether the compliant was 
justified.
In an even more recent case, the European Court again 
denied the general direct effect of GATT provisions but 
raised the possibility of two exceptions. In Germany v 
EC Council fRe; Imports of B a n a n a s  1 "2», the Court 
considered, inter alia. whether an adverse panel 
ruling"" could be enforced against the European Union 
albeit at the request of a Member State. While again 
affirming the general principle of non-enforceability, 
the European Court did state GATT provisions may be 
enforced in cases where 'the Community intended to 
implement a particular obligation entered into within 
the framework of the GATT or if the Community expressly 
refers to specific provisions of the GATT.' 
Unfortunately, the Court elaborated no further on this 
point and gave no examples by way of illustration.
The final conclusion of this examination is simply that 
a considerable limitation applies on the impact of the 
GATT in the formulation of Union trade policy. While the 
Court has accepted that the GATT is binding on the Union
"28 Case C280/93, Judgment of October 5, 1994, not 
yet reported.
"2® The report had not been adopted by the GATT 
Council; see EEC Import Regime for Bananas. GATT Doc. 
DS38/R (1993).
495
and Member States, it is not prepared to allow 
individual measures of European Union law to be 
challenged on the ground of incompatibility with the 
provisions of the GATT.
As a limitation on the right of the European Union to 
enact internal measures, the GATT has no effect and the 
European Union can act with impunity towards its 
obligations under the General Agreement. There is little 
doubt that this is an unsatisfactory situation.
(B) The Tokyo Round Codes
In its measure of December 10, 1979, the Council of
Ministers 'approved' the Tokyo Round Codes which were 
included as an annex and authorised the President of the 
Council and other Council representatives 'to take such 
steps as are required to bind the European Economic 
Community'. "20 According to Article 228 of the EC 
Treaty, as a result the agreements became binding on the 
institutions of the European Union and form an integral 
part of Union law without the need for transformation. 
This contrasts with the incorporation of the Codes in 
United States law which required the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979. While the American legislation is 
specifically expressed to be the full measure of the 
rights which may be exercised by private individuals by 
virtue of the Codes, the position of these agreements in 
European Union law is considerably more vague.
True, the participation of the Union in the final act of 
the Round subsequently required a number of amendments 
and modifications to existing European Union measures. 
For example, the Union's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
legislation was amended in 1979 to take into account of
"2® Council Regulation fEEC) 3017/79. O.J. L339/1(1979) .
’■  :___________________
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"21 J.H.J. Bourgeois, "The Tokyo Round Agreements on 
Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in 
International and EEC Perspective", (1982) 19 CML Rev., 
5.
"^ 2 Council Regulation (EEC) 3000/79. O.J. L342/1 
(1979) .
"22 Council Decision 80/45/EEC. O.J. L14/36 (1980).
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the changes brought into effect by the Subsidies Code 
and the Anti-dumping Code.
Nevertheless, there is nothing in this legislation to 
suggest that it is the absolute measure of individual's 
rights under the underlying treaties. In other words, it 
remains possible that, in the event of an inconsistency 
between a European Union measure and the obligations 
contained in one of the MTN texts, private individuals 
may be permitted to challenge the Union measure. "2* 
Inconsistencies may arise either because the measure is 
incompatible with the terms of the underlying agreement, 
because it fails to truly reflect the relevant 
obligations or because administrative practices differ 
in some respects from the international rules.
It was the policy of the European Union that 
implementing legislation was only required where the 
provisions of an agreement were too imprecise to permit 
effective administration of obligations although any new 
rules drafted on the basis of such provisions were 
required to remain true to the original obligations. In 
addition to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy. Union 
legislation was also required to implement the Customs 
Valuation Code"22 and the Technical Standards Code."22
To successfully challenge the validity of any Union 
measure concerning trade policy, it remains necessary to 
satisfy the conditions elaborated by the Court for the 
direct effect of Union treaties. Accordingly, this will
'  :_____
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depend on whether the nature and contents of the 
obligations entered into allow for such an 
interpretation, taking into account the spirit, general 
scheme and the terms of the particular agreement being 
relied on. In a number of instances, the officials of 
European Union institutions have implied that judicial 
review of Union legislation against the Anti-Dumping 
Code may be permitted.
Commission officials themselves consider that the anti­
dumping legislation must be applied in a manner that is 
compatible with the Code."^^ jf the Code is precise on 
a particular point, the Commission will endeavour to 
respect its terms. While this is not the same as a legal 
challenge being made by an applicant who considers a 
particular investigation to have been handled in a 
manner incompatible with the terms of the Code it does 
indicate that the Commission officials are wary of 
taking any course of action inconsistent with the Code.
The policy of the Commission has been confirmed in at 
least one case. In an appeal against the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties, the reporting Advocate-General 
commented that:
'the Commission confirmed, in answer to a question 
put by myself, that it did in fact consider itself 
to be bound by the GATT anti-dumping rules'"^
The Court itself has in fact been asked to rule whether 
Commission anti-dumping practices are compatible with
"24 Discussions between the author and Alistair 
Stewart, Chef d*Unite, DG IC2, European Commission, 
November 20, 1992.
"35 Opinion of Advocate-General VerLoren van Themaat 
in Gerlach & Co BV v Minister for Economic Affairs. Case 
239/84 [1986] 3 CMLR 30, 33-34.
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the Anti-dumping Code in at least four separate cases 
yet has managed successfully to evade the issue in each
of its judgments."2^
The first concerns a case brought by Japanese producers 
alleging that the Commission was required to implement 
Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of Regulation 2423/88 in a manner 
consistent with Article 2(4) of the Anti-dumping 
Code. "27 The Commission investigation concerned imports 
of compact disc players from Korea and the appeal was 
based on the contention that, in establishing normal 
value by the constructed value technique, profit added 
should be confined to the profits realised on sales of 
products of the same general category in the domestic 
market.
After analyzing the practice of the Commission during 
the investigation, the Court subsequently held that:
'Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the basic regulation 
complies with Article 2(4) of the 1979 Anti-dumping 
Code inasmuch as it does not disregard the spirit 
of the latter provision but simply specifies, as 
regards the different situations which may arise in 
practice, the reasonable methods of calculating the 
constructed normal value. '"2®
In other words, where there is ambiguity in the 
interpretation of a particular provision, as long as the 
Union regulation did not disregard the spirit of the 
Code, the measure will not be declared non-applicable.
"2® See generally, F.C. De La Torre, "The Status of 
the GATT in EEC Law: Some New Developments", (1992) 26:5 
JWT 35.
"22 Goldstar Company Limited v EC Council. Case 
105/90 [1992] ECR 667, [1992] 1 CMLR 996.
"2® Ibid, 1025.
 : .
"25* Nakaiima All Precision Co v EC Council Case 
C69/89 [1991] ECR I 2069.
See E.A. Vermulst & J.J. Hooijer, "Case Comment; 
Nakajima All Precision Go v EC Council", (1992) 29:2 CML 
Rev 380.
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Of course this implies that if the measure does infringe 
the spirit, the Court would be prepared to accept that 
the provisions of the Code should prevail. Or does it?
The second case is equally important from the point of 
view of enforcing the Tokyo Round Codes in Union law and 
relates to a complaint again by a Japanese producer this 
time alleging procedural violations by the Commission 
during its investigation."" The complaint involved a 
challenge to a Council regulation imposing definitive 
anti-dumping duties on dot matrix printers from 
Japan.
Counsel for the applicants argued that the constructed 
value method prescribed in Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of the 
basic regulation violated Articles 2(4) and 2(6) of the 
Code to which the Council argued that the Code, like the 
GATT itself, had no direct effect and therefore could 
not be relied on by the applicants. The Court rejected 
the Council's argument that the applicants were claiming 
direct effect and found that the appeal was based on the 
legality of a provision of the basic regulation.
However, the Court held that the provision being 
challenged did not violate the terms of the Code because 
it amounted to a reasonable interpretation of the terms 
of the Code.
The most explicit confirmation that judicial review of 
an anti-dumping regulation against the 1979 Code was
—  ■ ...
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given in NMB (Deutschland) GmbH v EC Commission."'*^ The 
applicants sought judicial review of an anti-dumping 
measure on the ground that it was incompatible with the 
1979 Agreement. The Commission objected to the 
admissibility of the application arguing that review on 
such grounds was not possible.
This argument was rejected by the Court which declared 
that;
•As regards the alleged infringements of the GATT 
Anti-Dumping Code, it should be noted that...such 
an infringement may be pleaded for the purposes of 
review of the legality of the basic Union 
regulation'.
This is an explicit endorsement that anti-dumping 
measures, and even the basic regulation itself, may be 
attacked if it is incompatible with the terms of the 
Code.
There has only been one case in which the Court rejected 
the proposition that measures must be interpreted in 
accordance with the GATT Code which really serves to 
obscure the exact legal position. In response to an 
argument for applicants that the previous 1984 basic 
regulation must be construed in light of the GATT and 
the Code, the Court replied with the following 
observation;
'[The applicant] maintains that Regulation 2176/84 
must be interpreted in accordance with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 1979 Anti­
dumping Code, which require a fair comparison to be 
made in order to establish the existence of
1141
80. Case C188/88 [1992] ECR I 1689, [1992] 3 CMLR
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dumping. That argument cannot be accepted. '
This rather cursory statement is of little value to use 
in trying to unravel the mystery surrounding the legal 
status of the 1979 Code in Union law. That this 
statement is unsupported with rational argument severely 
weakens its credibility especially in light of the other 
recent statements made by the Court.
(C) The Uruguay Round Agreements
Implementation of the Final Act embodying the results of 
the Uruguay Round on multilateral trade negotiations 
required considerable amendments to be made to existing 
European Union legislation. The agreements relating to 
rules of origin, preshipment inspection, technical 
barriers to trade, import licensing procedures, customs 
valuation and government procurement, as well as those 
relating to anti-dumping and anti-subsidies, contain 
different rules from those in the existing European 
Union measures.
The Commission first published its proposal for the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round r e s u l t s . I t  was 
the Commission's view that the European Union has the 
•requisite overall competence to undertake the 
international commitments' contained in the Final Act. 
This view was derived from the argument that, while some 
of the instruments contained in the Final Act have 
implications in other areas of concern, all the 
instruments have as their purpose the regulation of 
various aspects of international trade for which the EU
Sharp Corporation v EC Council. Case 179/87 [1992] 2 CMLR 415.
1143 European Commission, Proposal for a Council 
Decision Concerning the Conclusion of the Results of the 
Uruguay Round MTNs. COM (94) 143 Final (April 1994).
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has exclusive competence under Article 113 of the EC 
Treaty (and Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty).
Although this is the position adopted by the European 
Commission, a number of Member States, including the 
United Kingdom and France, challenged this 
interpretation claiming that certain instruments 
regulate matters falling outside the scope of Article 
113. To settle this dispute, the Commission requested an 
Opinion from the European Court on the competence of the 
EU to conclude the WTO Agreement and, in particular, the 
General Agreement in Trade in Services and the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights."^ Once the opinion had been issued, the 
Council adopted a decision approving the texts of the 
WTO Agreement with regard to that portion of the 
agreements which fell within the competence of the 
European Community. Each Member State was therefore 
left to approve the remaining portions of the agreements 
which fell within their competence.
This confusing situation leads to complications when 
deciding whether the WTO Agreement can be given direct 
effect at the request of private individuals. The actual 
text of the final Council decision states that:
'The Agreement establishing the WTO, including the 
Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being 
directly invoked in Community or Member States' 
courts.'
In Re: Competence of the Community to Conclude 
International Agreements Concerning Services and the 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. Opinion 1/94 [1995] 1 CMLR 205.
Council Decision 94/800/EC. December 22, 1994, 
O.J. L336/1 (1994).
    ' j ' _1
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This prohibition is less emphatic than the original 
Commission proposal^^* but nevertheless the impact is 
clear; it is an attempt to forestall the possibility of 
private individuals relying on the terms of the 
Agreement to mount a challenge against Community and 
national measures. Whether the European Court will 
accept this principle depends on two factors. First, 
whether or not, as a general principle, the Eurpopean 
Union can act illegally under international law and, in 
particular, adopt measures inconsistent with its WTO 
obligations. Second, there is the issue of whether the 
Court would permit national governments to enact illegal 
measures under the WTO rules and be able to tiotally 
evade judicial review at the EU level because of the bar 
to proceedings created by this provision. The matter is 
therefore far from being resolved.
(D) Tentative observations
The United States and the European Union, as signatories 
to the various GATT Codes, have selected different 
methods for incorporating the obligations contained in 
these agreements into their domestic legal systems. More 
importantly, the United States has enacted legislation 
expressly prohibiting private individuals from relying 
on the terms of the Code to establish rights in United 
States law. There is no scope for judicial review of the 
implementing legislation against the precise terms of 
the Codes. To this extent, the United States has taken 
an extreme dualist posture with regard to the 
ratification of the texts.
1146 Recital 8 of the Preamble, ibid.
See generally, F. Castillo de la Torre, "The 
Status of GATT in EC Law Revisited: The Consequences of 
the Judgment on the Banana Import Regime for the 
Enforcement of the Uruguay Round Agreements", (1995) 
29:1 JWT 5.
 :  .
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The European Union, on the other hand, incorporated the 
Codes through a decision. This was not a typical course 
of action for the Union to take as regards multilateral 
agreements and the decision must be seen sui generis. 
and not as a precedent. To a certain extent, this course 
has created a number of unique problems in ascertaining 
the exact status of the Codes in Union law. However, as 
a general statement, this procedure does not affect the 
legal validity of the Codes as an integral element of 
Union law. If the conditions for direct effect can be 
established, there is no logical impediment to prevent 
the direct enforcement of the terms of these agreements 
at the Union level.
True, the issue has never been satisfactorily resolved 
by a decision of the Court. But this does not 
necessarily imply that judicial review of Union 
legislation against the obligations contained in a Code 
is incompetent. It depends to a large extent on the 
exact nature of the provision itself. As a result, it is 
possible that the Codes may be used to challenge 
national legislation of Member States and certain Union 
measures.
The same will not be true for the agreements negotiated 
as part and parcel of the Uruguay Round. Further, the 
measures which may be challenged remain limited and, for 
example, it is unlikely that the European Court would 
find acceptable that a provision of the founding Union 
Treaties is void for being incompatible with an 
international obligation of the European Union.
(5) Observations
The institutional framework inside the European Union 
for the formulation of the Common Commercial Policy is 
the key to understanding the lack of normative influence
   —  — _
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of international obligations on the final content of 
that policy. This framework is a mechanism which allows 
the various factors influencing the shape of the policy 
to be hammered into a final position. Its form is 
critical in identifying which factors will be given the 
greatest degree of priority and those which become 
diluted or side-lined in the competition of interests.
Article 113 of the EC Treaty, even as amended by the 
Treaty on European Union, contains only the loosest 
outline for the formulation of policy. The European 
Commission is empowered to submit proposals to the 
Council for implementation of the CCP, to negotiate 
international agreements and to administer the 
commercial defence measures. Inside the European 
Commission, each of these tasks is performed by separate 
departments and units within DGl which habitually ignore 
the interests of other department. Hence, even at the 
basic level of policy formulation, there is incoherence 
which cannot be corrected even by the overall 
supervision of the cabinets of the two Commissioners 
responsible for external relations.
The decision-making process grants the Council of 
Ministers absolute control over the final adoption of 
proposed measures in almost all areas of policy (the 
notable exception being the adoption of provisional 
anti-dumping measures), Here the control exercised by 
the Council over the Commission does not extend only to 
the power of adoption but also through strict control of 
negotiating mandates and the various committees composed 
of Member States. Both these techniques allow the 
Council (through Member State representatives) to have 
two opportunities to influence the final content of 
measures. Hence, the fingerprints of the Member States 
normally cover proposed measures even before these are 
considered by the Council itself where again the Member
■
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States can make their views know in a formal manner.
Once a proposed measure reaches the Council, the 
competing interests of Member states are again 
manifested. We have seen this competition in its most 
naked form in the reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy and the compromise necessary for the acceptance 
of the Uruguay Round Final Act. Both occasions provide 
evidence of the potency of Member State national 
interests in the process.
At a more formal level, unquestionably the voting 
requirements for the adoption of particular measures 
play a significant role in the final content of the 
policy. Member State influence is weakest where there is 
voting by simple majority, for example, now in the case 
of the adoption of definitive anti-dumping measures. On 
the other hand, the negotiation and approval of 
international agreements pursuant to the objectives 
specified in Article 113 requires a qualified majority 
where the agreement is concluded by the European Union 
acting a l o n e . H e r e ,  a consensus for adoption of a 
policy measure - albeit in the form of an international 
agreement - is more difficult to secure.
Other than the competition between Member States and the 
European Union agencies, most notably the Commission, 
there is the plethora of differing interests impacting 
on the decision-making process. Crudely, these can be 
grouped as follows: (a) national interests of Member
States; (b) domestic pressures imposed on the 
governments of Member states; (c) European Union 
industries; (d) and interested private parties. In very 
broad terms, if these interests or pressures were to be 
ranked in terms of potency, this ranking would proceed
4^8 Article 114, EC Treaty, as amended by The 
Treaty on European Union.
. _____________
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from (a) to (d) . This spectrum of interests is both 
diverse and divisive. Nevertheless, channels are made 
available to all these interest groups in the decision­
making process facilitating the formulation of the CCP.
The only normative influence of international 
obligations on this process originates from two sources; 
(a) the European Commission formulating proposals or 
agreeing international agreements in a manner consistent 
with international commitments; and (b) Member States 
voicing concerns over consistency vis-a-vis the European 
Commission on the one hand and other Member States on 
the other hand. In the latter case, the raising of such 
concerns is rarely for altruistic reasons and is, more 
commonly, for the purpose of promoting competing 
national interests over those of other Member States.
The institutional framework acts as a filter for these 
competing interests. The strongest of these (probably 
European Union and Member State interests) prevail over 
the others. Since the influence of international 
obligations is only actively promoted in an indirect 
manner, the institutional process fails adequately to 
protect their enforcement. The result is the formulation 
of a Common Commercial Policy which frequently conflicts 
with the international obligations of the European Union 
and produces the consequent adverse rulings of the GATT 
panels and provokes the ire of the United States.
Leaving aside the complications caused by the inadequate 
institutional structure, the influence of international 
obligations is also mitigated by the influence of other 
European Union policies on the formulation of the Common 
Commercial Policy. The European Community, and now the 
European Union, was established on the premise that 
Community-wide policies were essential to promote the 
objectives of the organisation. Hence, policies such as
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the Common Agricultural Policy, competition policy, and 
latterly the single internal market programme, have 
become ensconced within this structure. Promoting the 
objectives of these policies, and others, is of 
paramount importance to the European Union agencies.
This competition of policy objectives necessarily 
implies a prioritisation of aims and goals. The purpose 
of each of these policies is distinct although 
occasionally there are instances of overlap or conflict. 
In this situation, mechanisms for co-operation and 
ensuring compatibility among policy objectives are 
critical. These mechanisms must also permit the taking 
into account of international obligations or these 
commitments will be subsumed and submerged beneath the 
pressures exerted by the other policies.
Inside the European Union, there is no effective co­
ordination in the formulation of different policies. 
Separate Directorate-Generals have responsibility for 
the administration of external policy (DG I), 
competition policy (DG IV) , the CAP (DG VI) and the 
single internal market programme (DG III). From the 
personal experience of the writer, there are no formal 
co-operation structure between these departments and the 
ad hoc consultation meetings which take place to 
facilitate harmonisation are virtually ineffective. 
While proposed measures are circulated to the cabinets 
of all the Commissioners, in conformity with the 
Commission's own internal procedures, it is normally too 
late for an interested Commissioner to influence the 
content of another Directorate-General's proposed 
measures. Further, the staff administering each cabinet 
is too small effectively to review all proposed measures 
or policies which impinge on the responsibilities of 
their Commissioners.
I
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The result is that final policy measures are rarely co­
ordinated. For example, anti-dumping measures are 
adopted after only cursory discussions with the 
departments responsible for competition policy, the 
internal market programme or, most importantly, 
industrial development policy. Similarly, decisions on 
competition matters are rarely made after consultations 
with other interested Directorate-generals, Hence, there 
is an almost complete break-down in attempts to 
introduce co-ordination among these different areas of 
European Union responsibility.
This lack of co-operation originates within the 
Commission but the Council of Ministers, which is the 
organ responsible for the adoption of most measures and 
policies, does not perform any over supervisory function 
to ensure compatibility. In fact, within this organ, it 
is the interests of national governments which prevail 
and hence the situation is exacerbated as the element of 
Member State interest comes into play.
If the decision-making apparatus of the European Union 
is unable to co-ordinate its own internal policies, it 
is not surprising that it is unable to ensure compliance 
with its international obligations. There is no formal 
procedure within the Commission or the Council of 
Ministers which ensures review of decisions and policies 
for compatibility with international commitments. 
Further, the administrative staff of these institutions 
are composed of many professions other than lawyers and 
even the staff with legal qualifications are not always 
instructed to apply international law when drafting 
measures or formulating policy.
The sole mechanism for ensuring compliance with the 
international rules is by application to the European 
Court and now the Court of First Instance. Even this
■ „ ___
1149 See text, infra, pp.951-960
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procedure has limitations. The standing requirements, as
we shall see later"^, often operate to prevent private 
interested parties from challenging measures in the 
European Court for consistency with EU international 
obligations. Similarly, the European Court has not been 
prepared unconditionally to review EU measures in light 
of the rules of international law. Conditions and 
special requirements must be fulfilled before an 
international obligation is given effect in European 
Union law. At the same time, the exact hierarchy of 
obligations within the European Union legal system is 
not crystal clear and it is doubtful whether the 
European Court would declare a measure of European Union 
constitutional law inapplicable due to a conflict with 
a rule of international law.
The refusal of the European Court to give absolute 
effect to rules of international law also have 
particular repercussions in the area of trade policy and 
the operation of the Common Commercial Policy. The most 
important repercussion is that this refusal eliminates 
any effective counterbalance to protect the position of 
foreign producers and exporters from abusive behaviour 
by European Union agencies. On the whole, by denying the 
complete application of international rules inside the 
European Union legal system these parties are placed at 
a disadvantage and in the unenviable position of being 
unable to defend their position against illegal European 
Union measures.
While the European Court has in the past indicated a 
partial willingness to give effect to some of the 
obligations contained in the Tokyo Round Code, this has 
had an illusionary effect. Foreign producers or 
exporters are rarely successful in challenging EU
_____ __________
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measures against international standards. Even if they 
are successful in establishing standing, the Court has 
been unwilling to accept their arguments. On the whole, 
the Court has supported the European Commission in most 
cases and granted the Commission substantial discretion 
to administer the CCP.
In any event, the prospect of challenging European Union 
measures against international standards has 
substantially deteriorated now that Council decision 
approving the WTO Agreement has been adopted. The 
measure clearly envisages a complete prohibition on 
private parties (mostly foreign producers or exporters) 
from relying on the terms of the agreements to challenge 
EU measures.
PART D
THE TRADE PROTECTION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN LIGHT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RULES AND OBLIGATIONS
8 Abuse of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Measures by the United States
During the period being investigated in this thesis, the 
United States was manifestly guilty of abusing the 
international rules on dumping and countervailing 
measures by engaging in two separate practices. First, 
while the underlying framework of U.S. anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws appeared to equate to the 
general international principles, it enacted numerous 
rules, particularly since 1979, which were blatantly 
inconsistent with the international standards. This 
illegal behaviour was compounded by administrative 
practices which also fly in the face of the spirit, if 
not the letter, of international law.
The same country also took advantage of almost every 
loophole or deficiency in the international system of 
regulation to liberalise its anti-dumping and 
countervailing laws to make available relief to its own 
domestic industries even although, in numerous cases, 
there was no credible injury caused by foreign imports. 
It also frequently interpreted the international rules 
in such a manner as to nullify any normative impact that 
international rules might have had on its behaviour. The 
United States must therefore face three charges.
First, it actively promoted and encouraged the use of 
both anti-dumping and countervailing measures by 
domestic industries even when such relief was not 
justified under the international standards. In 
addition, it was directly responsible for deliberate 
laxity in the application and administration of these 
laws. Finally, it was guilty of complicity, along with 
its own domestic industries, by deliberately engineering 
its own laws to allow its industries to disrupt the flow 
of foreign goods onto its markets and interfering with
— ----------------------------
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the effective distribution and supply of foreign goods.
Before preceding to examine the United States anti­
dumping and countervailing duty measures in detail, it 
is worthwhile considering for a moment why these two 
separate measures have come to be perceived as tandem 
measures in U.S. law. While together they constitute the 
two main components in the policy of administered 
protectionism operated by the United States during this 
period, there are a number of notable conceptual 
differences between the two mechanisms which should be 
noted.
It must be pointed out that anti-dumping measures are 
intended to counter purely private practices which 
rarely involve foreign governments at any level. In 
contrast to subsidisation which involves government 
intervention, dumping is a private commercial act. In 
fact, dumping is one of the few private practices which 
is considered to be a non-tariff barrier to trade. 
Quantitative restrictions, technical standards, 
subsidisation and discrimination between domestic and 
foreign products, are all perpetrated by government 
agencies. Yet dumping is considered such a pernicious 
practice that mechanisms to neutralise its effects have 
been established at the international level.
As a related point, anti-dumping measures themselves 
cannot be considered to be a device that allows the 
international trading system to return to some form of 
imaginary 'level playing field'. The only element of 
government interference in the anti-dumping process is 
at the customs border when additional duties are imposed 
on products found to have been dumped. There is no 
government assistance in the manufacturing processes 
which result in cheaper imports. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to characterise the imposition of anti-
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dumping duties as a proactive measure rather than a 
reactive one.
Throughout this chapter the main theme which will be 
developed is the comparison between the United States 
substantive laws and the international rules of the 
Tokyo Round Codes governing the application of anti­
dumping and countervailing measures, as well as 
consideration of the methodology involved in the 
interpretation and administration of the statutory 
provisions. It is not intended to make a comparison of 
the US substantive laws and the new Uruguay Round rules 
as this would be premature and indeed is unnecessary 
since this work deals with the pre-1995 legal regime.
(1) The Manipulation of the Substantive Anti-Dumping
Laws of the United states for Protectionist Motives i
The rise in the volume of anti-dumping proceedings 
initiated in the United States has not been as 
controversial as has been the case with countervailing 
duty actions simply because anti-dumping measures are 
the preferred choice of administered protectionism by so 
many other developed countries.^ Nevertheless, the 
escalation in the number of complaints during the 1980s 
has fuelled speculation that anti-dumping duties are 
being used in conjunction with countervailing duty 
actions illegitimately and inconsistent with the 
international rules in order to provide relief or 
protection to domestic industries.%
 ^ See generally, J.H. Jackson & E. Vermulst, Anti­
dumping Law and Practice (1989).
 ^ See J. Devault, "The Administration of US Anti- 
Dumping Duties: Some Empirical Observations", (1990) 13 
World Economy 75.
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In many ways this is to be expected because the causes 
behind this phenomenon are broadly similar to those 
behind the increased use of countervailing duties, 
namely pressure from domestic industry for relief from 
foreign competition and the perceived economic problems 
of the United States periodically throughout the 1980s 
and now in the early 199 0s.
(A) The Original U.S Anti-Dumpino Laws - A Variation of 
Anti-Trust Law
The first anti-dumping statute enacted by the United 
States extended U.S. anti-trust laws to the activities 
of foreign producers and exporters. The statute in 
question was the Anti-dumping Act of 1916 which created 
civil liability for dumping in the event that private 
individuals were able to establish that a foreign
producer or exporter was engaging in practices which had 
the effect of 'destroying or injuring an industry in the 
United States, or of preventing the establishment of an 
industry in the United States, or of restraining or 
monopolising any part of trade and commerce in such
articles in the United States'.^
This was a variation of the application of the 
prohibitions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act of 1890. 
relating to predatory pricing, to non-American 
companies. It created a mechanism whereby private
individuals could claim damages against foreign
companies engaging in dumping as defined in the statute, 
namely by reference to the intention of destroying a 
United States industry or of monopolising a particular 
commercial activity.
39 Stat. 798 (1916)
-_____________________
518
In fact there have only ever been two reported cases 
where private individuals have attempted to enforce such 
rights. The first case, reported in 1935, was an attempt 
to enforce the 1916 Act against German exporters but 
failed on technical and procedural grounds/
The second case which was infinitely more significant is 
Zenith Radio Corporation v Matsushita Electronics 
Industrial Co. This involved a claim by an American 
company and a union against Japanese producers of 
televisions sets. The Japanese producers were found to 
have been engaging in dumping by the United States 
Tariff Commission in 1911J The plaintiff's claim was 
based on the 1916 Act and alleged that the Japanese 
producers had embarked on a policy of predatory pricing 
intended to eliminate domestic producers of television 
sets. This law suit led to fifteen years of litigation 
in which the plaintiffs claimed $360 million in treble 
damages plus costs from the defendants.*
The court of first instance awarded damages to the 
plaintiffs based on the allegations that the defendants 
had conspired to fix and maintain artificially high 
prices for their products when sold in Japan, while 
maintaining artificially low prices for the same 
products in the United States, thereby causing injury to 
the United States television manufacturing industry.?
 ^ H. Wagner & Adler Co v Mali. 74 F.2d 666 (2dCircuit, 1935).
* 402 F.Supp. 251 (1975).
* On the background to this case, see M. Gold, 
"Managing Dumping in a Global Economy", (1988) 21 George 
Washington Journal of Int'l Law & Econ., 503.
? Had this ruling stood, a considerable number of 
private anti-trust actions were anticipated; See J.H. 
Jackson & W.J. Davey, International Economic Relations 
(Second edition, 1986), 801.
■______
519
This finding was reversed by the Federal Court of 
Appeals* and the judgment of the Federal Court was 
subsequently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.* The 
Supreme Court in this case noted that predatory pricing 
is by its nature speculative and that, ultimately, its 
success depends on 'maintaining monopoly power for long 
enough both to recoup the predator's losses and to 
harvest some additional gain'. Although the Court was 
sympathetic to the arguments of the domestic industry, 
there was no direct evidence of such anti-competitive 
behaviour.^
The explanation for the lack of use of the 1916 Act 
stems from the fact that it was intended to combat 
predatory pricing as opposed to mere dumping. These two 
practices are not mutually inclusive. In particular, a 
foreign producer may indulge in dumping without being 
guilty of predatory pricing. Yet, as we have seen, the 
alleged raison d 'etre of the anti-dumping legislation is 
to counter predatory pricing. Nevertheless, the 1921 
Act, which formed the basic framework of United States 
anti-dumping law for more than fifty years clearly 
envisaged the imposition of anti-dumping duties even 
when there was no element of predatory pricing.
Given that the conditions for raising an action under 
the 1916 Act were roughly as onerous as commencing a 
domestic anti-trust suit, and presuming that the purpose
* In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust 
Litigation. 723 F.2d 238, 319 (3rd Cir. 1983); 
reproduced in J.H. Barton & B.S. Fisher, International 
Trade and Investment (1986), 614.
* Matsushita Electric Industrial Co Ltd v Zenith 
Radio Corporation. 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986).
It should be noted that the Court was divided 
into a 5-4 majority decision in this case and that the 
main point of division was whether an anti-competitive 
practice in fact existed.
' _________
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of anti-dumping measures was to protect domestic 
producers against predatory pricing, one question comes 
to mind. Why are anti-dumping proceedings almost 
invariably initiated by private parties under the 
successor legislation to the 1921 Act and not the 1915 
Act especially in light of the attractiveness of the 
treble-damages provision?
The answer to this question is relatively straight­
forward. If the anti-dumping laws of the United States 
operated only to prevent predatory pricing, there would 
be no need for them. In other words, the United States 
anti-dumping legislation serves some other purpose and, 
in the opinion of the present writer, this is mainly as 
a vehicle for protectionism. Thus the justification for 
anti-dumping measures in United States law does not 
reside in a legitimate fear of foreign predators and 
this pretext should be discarded.
More recently, pressure has resurfaced within the U.S. 
Congress for dumping to be considered actionable in U.S. 
anti-trust law. In the ten year period until 1990, no 
less than eighteen bills were introduced in Congress to 
give private individuals a right of action against 
foreign manufacturers or exporters allegedly engaged in 
dumping.il At the time, it was considered extremely 
likely that such a right would be included in the bill 
that eventually became the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988.i?
11 Note, "Why a Private Right of Action Against 
Dumping Would Violate the GATT", (1991) 66:3 New York
University Law Review 69 6, 712-715.
1? The enactment of the act does not however appear 
to have reduced the desire in Congress to create a 
private right of damages for United States citizens 
injured by dumping by foreign parties. It is therefore 
a very real possibility that legislation may be enacted 
within the next few years to create such a right.
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The main arguments of proponents of a private right is 
that the existing anti-dumping laws function 
ineffectively, although the majority of proposed 
measures are intended to work in conjunction with the 
existing measures and are not considered to be 
replacements. This perception of ineffectiveness stems 
from two considerations. First, the existing laws are 
alleged to have only prospective relief, at least from 
the perspective of injury to a domestic industry. Relief 
is only available after the anti-dumping order has been 
made, even if the actual levying of duties is done 
retrospectively.
Second, all proceeds of anti-dumping orders go to the 
Federal Treasury coffers and not to firms and companies 
that have been injured by a persistent course of 
dumping. A private right of damages would, the argument 
goes, correct this position by allowing injured 
industries to seek compensation.
It is likely that the creation of such a right would 
violate the general provisions of the GATT itself. 
Firstly, if such an amendment was made to the law, it 
would not have the benefit of the protection of the 
Protocol of Provisional Application. In other words, it 
would have to comply with the express terms of the GATT. 
At the same time, it is unlikely that such a provision 
would be consistent with Article VI which contains the 
sole remedy to counter dumping and makes no reference to 
a private right.
Further complications also arise when the consistency of 
such a proposal is considered in light of the other GATT 
provisions. In particular, it would be difficult to 
justify a particular right to challenge the activities 
of foreign importers accused of predatory pricing while 
not making a similar provision for domestic producers.
__
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This conflicts with Article III which requires 
contracting parties to treat imported products no less 
favourably than like goods of national origin as regards 
all laws affecting their internal sale, purchase, 
distribution and sale. Nor could such a measure be 
justified under Article XX(d) as a general exception.
(B) The Statutory Basis for the Present Anti-Dumoina 
Framework in United States Law
The Anti-Dumping Act of 1921 provided both the 
•conceptual and institutional basis' upon which the 
anti-dumping law has developed.^ This statute 
prohibited foreign manufacturers from selling goods in 
the United States market at prices below those charged 
for like products in the domestic markets and, in 
contrast to the countervailing duty legislation, it 
contained an injury test.^
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 repealed the Anti­
dumping Act of 1921. but amended Title VII of the Tariff 
Act of 1930. The relevant anti-dumping provisions are 
now contained in Title VII of the 19 3 0 Act by virtue of 
the 1979 Act. This has the effect of codifying the 
countervailing and anti-dumping provisions into one 
statute. But of course, the United States Congress has 
not been able to resist the temptation to dabble with 
the 1979 Act and accordingly amendments were made to its 
provisions in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. and more 
radically, by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 which completed the transformation of the United
42 Stat. 11 (1921). See M. Knoll, "United States 
Anti-Dumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration", (1987) 
22 Texas Int'l Law Journal 2 65, 269.
See generally for background, J.P. Hendrick, "The 
United States Anti-dumping Act", (1964) 58 AJIL 914.
-       . -  _____
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States anti-dumping law into its present shape/*
For a number of reasons, Congress has been keen to 
remain the driving force to regulate the content of 
anti-dumping law. In fact, even incorporation of the 
1979 Anti-Dumping Code into United States law through 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was significantly 
obstructed by Congress. The legislative history of the 
statute contains a number of statements conceding that 
some trading partners were concerned that provisions of 
the bill did not repeat the exact terminology of the 
Code provisions.^ Nevertheless, the concerns of foreign 
nations that the provisions of the Code were not 
properly incorporated into American law were dismissed 
with reassurances that the statute was drafted 'with 
every intention of achieving consistency with the 
Code ' . 1?
There is little doubt that the United States did not 
achieve all of its main negotiating objectives in the 
1979 Code.i* The major Congressional criticism was that 
the United States entered into significant procedural 
and substantive obligations which restricted the powers 
of the government to make decisions on the content and 
administration of these laws in return for the status
On the effect of this statute on the US anti­
dumping and countervailing duty law, see G.N. Horlick & 
G.D. Oliver, "Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Law 
Provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988", (1989) 23:3 JWT 5.
Senate Report No. 249. 96th Congress, 1st Session 
87 (1978).
S.A. Lorenzen, "Technical Analysis of the Anti- 
Dumping Agreement and the Trade Agreement Act of 1979", 
(1979) 11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 1405.
See generally, P.D. Ehrenhaft, "What the Anti­
dumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade 
Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade 
Policy", (1979) 11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 1361.
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quo that already existed in many countries as regards 
the administration of such laws/* Of course, this view 
disregards the fact that the United States gained 
significant negotiating objectives in other areas of 
trade policy unrelated to anti-dumping.
If this is truly the case, then the United States has 
spent the better part of the next decade attempting to 
free itself of these bonds and has successfully done so 
through imaginative legislating and administrative 
interpretation
(C) The Definition of Dumping in United States Law
Dumping is defined in United States trade law as 
occurring when 'a class or kind of foreign merchandise 
is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States 
at less than its fair value'.^ Leaving aside for the 
moment the need to establish injury and causation, if 
goods are sold, or are likely to be sold, in the United 
States market place at 'less than fair value' dumping is 
deemed to occur. The investigation into the existence of 
sales at less than fair value is conducted by the 
International Trade Administration (ITA) an agency of 
the Department of Commerce.
The statutory concept of dumping is confined to trade in
19 Ibid, 1398-1402.
The anti-dumping legislation of the United States 
is set forth in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930. as 
added by Section 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979. For a description of U.S. anti-dumping law in 
general, see E.A. Vermulst, Anti-dumping Law and 
Practice in the United States and the European Communities (1987) .
—       — 1
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goods and does not include the supply of services/^
Neither Article VI nor the 1979 Anti-dumping Code
specifically countenances the possibility of duties on 
services provided at less than fair value. Nevertheless, 
the practice of the United States authorities as regards 
the application of duties to services has been to
include services, in certain cases, where they increase
the margin of dumping. For example, in Rail Passenger 
Cars From Canada, the ITA held that, where services form 
an integral part of the merchandise being imported, the 
terms of the statute require the imposition of duties 
where the imported article consists of elements 
involving the technological expertise of the foreign 
manufacturer.^ In other words, the supply of services 
relating to the manufacture or sale of a product can be 
brought into the dumping calculation if this has been 
done at less than the fair value of providing the 
service.
This principle has been clarified in a subsequent case. 
In Automated Fare Collection Equipment and Parts Thereof 
From France, the ITA excluded from the scope of its 
investigation testing, installation and interim 
maintenance services 'which were provided ancillary to 
the purchase of the subject merchandise'.^ The guiding 
principle is therefore that services at less than fair 
value which are provided as an integral element in the 
sale of the product may be taken into the dumping 
calculation while services that are merely ancillary are 
not taken into account.
For a discussion of the possible future 
application of anti-dumping laws to services such as 
insurance and the construction industry, see H. Kubo, 
"Can Anti-Dumping Law Apply to Trade in Services", 
(1991) 12:4 Michigan J. Int'l Law 828.
?? 47 Federal Register 3 6,042 (1982) .
52 Federal Register 55,339 (1987).
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This raises the very real prospect that goods, the price 
of which includes an amount for closely related services 
may be considered dumped if the service component has 
been provided at less than fair value even although the 
goods themselves have not. For example, frequently the 
cost of installing a computer system includes a 
substantial element for services required to devise and 
install the system and the required programme. The 
actual cost of the hardware is often only a minor part 
of the final cost of the contract. In such a case the 
service element may be taken into consideration to 
determine the existence of dumping.
Goods enter the United States at less than their fair 
value when the 'foreign market value' (FMV) of the goods 
is greater than the 'United States price' (USP). Both 
prices are defined by statute but, broadly speaking, the 
foreign market value is the price of the goods in the 
country of origin while the United States price is the 
price of similar goods once they have passed through 
U.S. customs. The determination of 'less than fair 
value' of goods is obviously the crux in the process of 
identifying dumping but this procedure is not as 
straight-forward. Indeed, it is a concept that has been 
the subject of considerable controversy over the last 
ten or so years.^
(1) The United States Price
The statute identifies two methods of valuing the USP: 
the 'purchase price' (PP) and the 'exporter's sales
See generally, D.N. Palmeter, "Dumping Margins 
and Material Injury: The USITC is Free To Choose",
(1987) 21 JWTL 173.
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price' (ESP)
(a) Purchase price
The purchase price is defined as 'the price at 
which merchandise is purchased, or agreed to be 
purchased prior to the date of importation, from 
the manufacturers or producers of the merchandise* 
under investigation.^ In other words, it is the 
value of the goods at the time the merchandise is 
sold to an unrelated purchaser in the United 
States.^
(b) Exporter's sales price
The exporter's sales price is 'the price at which 
the merchandise is sold or agreed to be sold in the 
United States, before or after the time of 
importation, by or for the account of the 
exporter '
The difference in methods employed merely depends on the 
stage at which the first arm's length transaction is 
made.^ Where the goods have already passed through 
Customs for sale to an unrelated party, the ITA values
Section 772(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930. as 
amended by Section 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979.
Section 772(b) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
Sections 772(b) and (c) , ibid.
Section 772(c), ibid.
Section 771(13) of the Tariff Act of 1930 holds 
the following to be related to a foreign exporter for 
the purposes of calculating USP: (a) a U.S. agent or
principal of the foreign exporter; (b) an American 
company that owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 
an interest in the business of the foreign producer; (c) 
an American subsidiary of a foreign company.
___
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the goods on the basis of the purchase price method.^* 
In the event that the first sale across the border is 
made to a related entity, such as a subsidiary, the ITA 
uses the ESP. In such cases, the determination of the 
USP by the ESP method is delayed until the goods leave 
the possession of the related party and become the 
subject of a sale to a third party.
(2) The Foreign Market Value
Foreign market value refers to the price at which a 
manufacturer sells, or offers for sale, the merchandise 
in the country where the goods are produced. If the 
merchandise is not sold in the country of manufacture, 
alternative methods of valuation may be used such as 
sales in third countries or constructed value.
(a) Home market value
The home market value is the price at which similar 
merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offered 
for sale in the country from which it was exported, in 
the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary 
course of trade for home consumption.^^ It is the usual 
basis for valuation and the ITA cannot use an 
alternative basis unless there are no sales for 
consumption in the market or the country of production 
or the existing sales are insufficient to provide an 
adequate basis for comparison.
The Department of Commerce generally determines the 
price of identical goods in the foreign market as 
manufactured by the foreign producers under
See Tubular Steel Framed Chairs From Taiwan. 50 
Federal Register 21917 (1985).
Section 773 (a)(1)(A), Tariff Act of 1930. as
amended.
___
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investigation. However, the Department also has 
statutory authority not only to look to foreign market 
sales by other companies engaged in the production of 
similar goods, but even to select 'similar merchandise' 
as the basis for its analysis,
A weighted-average of the home market price is 
calculated for the period against which a comparison of 
the price of goods sold in the United States, after 
adjustments, is made.^^ Yet, this practice can 
inherently lead to an inequitable result.^ Suppose a 
foreign producer sells a product for $100 in both the 
United States and the home market. After three months, 
the price of the product is raised to $200 in both 
markets. While the average home market price would be 
calculated taking into account both prices, i.e. $150, 
the authorities often take the United States price to be 
the price at the commencement of the investigation, in 
this case $100. An artificial margin of dumping is 
created simply by the time lag that exists during the 
investigation procedure.^
Another controversial practice is that of sampling. 
Particularly in investigations into allegations of 
dumping of agricultural products, large numbers of 
foreign producers are involved.^ To conduct their
See, for example, Certain Tapered Roller Bearings 
and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished From Japan. 
52 Federal Register 30,700 (1987).
N.D. Palmeter, "The Rhetoric and Reality of the 
United States Anti-dumping Law", (1991) 14 World Economy 
19, 20-21.
^ See Certain Iron Construction Castings From 
India. 51 Federal Register 9486 (1986).
For example, in Certain Fresh Winter Vegetables 
From Mexico. over two thousand foreign producers 
exported the subject merchandise to the United States; 
45 Federal Register 20,512 (1982).
r:V..  :  ' . .  :
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investigation, the ITA sample the merchandise from a 
selected number of producers. The main problem is that 
the Department of Commerce selects the largest producer 
groups to collate the relevant statistics. Thus, in one 
case, the ten largest growers were selected from over 
two hundred producers.^ These producers accounted for 
a considerable volume of imports but large scale 
producers are also the most likely to be engaged in 
dumping since they can take advantage of economies of 
scale. Even if such producers are engaging in dumping, 
it is not a logical conclusion that smaller producers 
have the resources to do the same. Nevertheless, all 
producers are grouped with the largest and tarred with 
the same brush.
Sampling was originally an administrative device 
employed by the ITA with no statutory authority but the 
practice was approved by Congress in the 1984 Act.^ 
According to this provision, the ITA may use averaging 
or 'generally recognised sampling techniques' whenever 
a significant volume of sales is involved or a 
significant number of adjustments to prices is required. 
The only guiding principle in this procedure is that 
samples and averages must be representative of the 
transactions under investigation.
The final stage in the determination of the home market 
value is to convert the foreign currency into U.S. 
dollars to allow a comparison to be drawn with USP. In 
this process, as a general rule, the ITA applies the 
exchange rate in effect on the date of the corresponding 
United States sales forming the basis for the 
calculation of less than fair value, as certified by the
Fall-Harvested Potatoes From Canada, 45 Federal 
Register 20,513 (1982).
Section 777A Tariff Act of 1930. as amended by 
Section 620 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
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Federal Reserve Bank as published on that date. However, 
where multiple rates exist, the ITA has the discretion 
to select the most appropriate rate. For example, in one 
investigation, two exchange rates were published, one 
being the official Mexican government controlled rates 
and the other the free exchange rate.^® The ITA opted to 
apply the government controlled rate which was 
significantly less favourable than the alternative rate.
The selection of appropriate exchange rates becomes 
difficult where there exists substantial exchange rate 
movements during the investigation. Thus, if goods are 
exported from the United Kingdom to the United States 
when the appropriate exchange rate is £1=$2, an exchange 
rate movement of £1=$3 in the intervening period would 
inflate the foreign market value of the goods compared 
to the United States price. It is ironic that, when the 
United States economy is weak, and its currency 
therefore relatively devalued, domestic industries will 
have an opportunity to establish dumping margins due to 
currency fluctuations.
The ITA regulations do provide, 'when the price of the 
merchandise is affected by temporary exchange rate 
fluctuations, the Secretary [of Commerce] will not take 
into account in fair value comparisons any differences 
between United States price and foreign market value 
resulting solelv from exchange rate fluctuations'.^
However, the limited impact of this principle was 
demonstrated in the recent case of NTN Bearing
See Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico. 52 
Federal Register 6,361 (1987).
39 Rule 353,60, ITA Regulations for theDetermination of Dumping. 54 Federal Register 12,742(1989).
  ' ■
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Corporation of America v United States.^ The applicants 
claimed that the dumping margin found to exist was in 
fact generated by a substantial increase in the value of 
the Japanese yen against the US dollar during the period 
in which the investigation was conducted. Between 
September 1988 and August 1986, which included the 
period of investigation, it was alleged that the yen 
experienced a 40% increase in value relative to the 
dollar.
The Court refused to give the applicants the benefit of 
this exception. It held that the relevant fluctuations 
were limited to a period of three months and were 
followed by a subsequent decline in value to 
approximately the same as that which existed previously. 
This ruling was issued notwithstanding the fact that 
during these three months the foreign market value would 
have been substantially inflated relative to the dollar 
and that the artificially high prices during this period 
would have affected the weighted-average price.
(b) Third country value
If the merchandise is not sold or offered for sale in 
the home market, or if the home market sales are so 
small as not to permit an adequate basis for comparison, 
the price at which the merchandise is sold to third 
countries can provide a suitable alternative basis for 
this calculation.^ The ITA Regulations provide that 
sales to a third country are to be preferred rather than 
constructed values, if adequate information is available
40 Reproduced at (1990) 2:5 WTM 190.
Section 773 (a)(1)(B), Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended and Rule 353.48(a), ITA Regulations, supra note 
39.
______
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and can be verified.^
As a general rule, if the quantity of the merchandise 
sold in the home market is small in relation to the 
quantity sold for exportation to third countries, it 
will be considered an inadequate basis for the 
calculation of foreign market value.^ While the ITA 
itself has established a five percent lower threshold 
rule^, it has been prepared to abandon this rule when 
it considers such a policy to be expedient. For example, 
in Red Raspberries From Canada the ITA refused to allow 
a foreign market value based on home market sales even 
although the percentage of home sales relative to sales 
to third countries by one producer was as much as twenty 
nine percent.^ When asked to defend this policy before 
a binational panel established under the Canada-United 
States FTA, the ITA representative simply stated that 
the agency 'knows inadequacy when it sees it'.^ This 
is hardly a basis for an adequate policy. Hence, the 
binational panel held the ITA decision on this point to 
be defective.
The ITA also has virtually unfettered discretion to 
select an appropriate third country for making the 
third country valuation. In the discharge of this duty, 
the Department has established the following rules for 
the selection of the appropriate third country:
42 Section 353.49(b), ITA Regulations, supra note39.
This requirement is often referred to as the 
'foreign market viability test'.
See Silver Reed America Inc v United States. 581
F.Supp 1290 (CIT 1984).
50 Federal Register 26,019 (1985).
Binational Panel Review No. 89-1904-01 (1989),
reproduced at (1990) 2:2 WTM 137.
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(a) the degree to which the product exported to a 
third country has similar characteristics to 
that exported to the United States, provided 
that an adequate volume of the merchandise has 
been exported to the third country;
(b) the volume of sales to the country is the 
largest to any country other than the home 
market or the United States; and
(c) the similarity of the market of the third 
country to that of the United States in terms 
of organisation and development.^
In fact, the ITA has expressed a preference for 
selecting the price of goods in developed states to the 
price of goods in developing countries. Thus, in one 
case, the ITA selected Australia as the appropriate 
surrogate for products exported from Taiwan because that 
country was the largest developed market on which to 
base a comparison with United States prices.^ 
Naturally, in general, prices in developed or industrial 
countries tend to be higher than comparative prices in 
developing countries.
(c) Constructed value
Despite the ITA's statement for a preference for third 
country values, the use of constructed value 
calculations has grown considerably in recent years. One 
study into the use of constructed cost valuations 
concluded that in 1987 approximately two-thirds of all 
anti-dumping investigations conducted by the ITA
47 Rule 353.49(b), ITA Regulations, supra note 39.
Tubular Steel Framed Chairs From Taiwan. 50 
Federal Register 21,917 (1985).
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involved cost of production analysis/®
This is the most controversial means of determining the 
foreign market value of goods simply because there are 
numerous techniques for valuing the costs of producing 
goods. It is to a certain extent an arbitrary process 
since the administering authority determine which 
principles and rules are to be applied. Certainly, of 
the three ways of determining foreign market value, this 
basis of valuation provides the ITA with the greatest 
degree of discretion and is susceptible to 
administrative abuse.
The following are the most controversial practices.
The addition of minimum percentages for general 
expenses and profit
General expenses are simply the costs of running a 
manufacturing process. It would be inequitable to omit 
to charge these against the unit cost of producing the 
goods, but at the same time over-allocation of such 
expenses increases the final constructed value and hence 
the likelihood of a margin of dumping being found. By 
statute, general expenses must be at least ten percent 
of the total cost of materials and labour.^ A producer 
is therefore penalised for the difference between the 
actual expenses and the 10% minimum threshold.
The practice of imposing a mandatory minimum charge of 
ten percent of the direct labour and material costs has
G.B Kaplan et al., "Cost Analysis Under the Anti­
dumping Law"; (1988) 21 Geo. Wash Journal Int'l Law &Econ. 357, 358.
Section 773 (e) (1) (B) (i) , Tariff Act of 1930. as 
amended, and Rule 353.50 ITA Regulations, supra note 39.
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drawn substantial criticism/^ This figure bares no 
correlation to the efficiency or otherwise of the 
manufacturer. Further, in fact, it is a relatively 
frequent occurrence for the ITA to substitute the 
mandatory figure for general and administrative expenses 
in the calculation of constructed cost.^
The same statutory provision requires that a minimum 
level of eight percent of the sum of the general 
expenses be allocated to the costs of producing the 
merchandise as an estimate of profit. The rationale for 
linking the general expenses of running a business with 
profit levels is unclear. There appears to be only a 
tenuous relationship between these elements in actual 
practice. A more realistic indicator upon which to base 
an estimated profit figure would be an estimate of the 
levels of profit generally reflected in sales of similar 
merchandise in the country of origin.
The justification for these surrogate statutory amounts 
(general expenses and profit) is that the true values 
are difficult to evaluate.^ However, it is a perplexing 
claim that such high levels of profit and costs are a 
reality of modern production and sale of goods given 
possibly high degree of competition in today's markets.
The inclusion of subsidies in constructed value
calculations
The statutory definition of constructed value requires
Kaplan, supra note 49, 3 83.
See, for example. Cellular Mobile Telephones and 
Sub-assemblies From Japan, 50 Federal Register 45,447
(1985).
See N.D. Palmeter, "The Rhetoric and the Reality of the United States Anti-dumping Law", (1991) 14 World 
Economy 19, 23.
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that the costs of materials include all those costs 
'which would ordinarily permit the production of that 
particular merchandise in the ordinary course of 
business'. What treatment is proper for government 
subsidies which have been provided to assist defray 
these expenses?
This question arose in A1 Tech Specialty Steel Coo v 
United States which concerned West German government 
subsidies to German producers of tool steel.^ In an 
anti-dumping petition, a United State complainer alleged 
that these subsidies should be considered a component of 
the manufacturer's cost. If this policy was adopted, it 
would have the effect of increasing the foreign market 
value under constructed value determinations, thus 
increasing the likelihood of a margin of dumping.
The statute gives no guidance as to the treatment of 
subsidies in constructed value calculations nor is there 
any judicial precedents on the point. Thus, the 
resolution of this question was essentially a policy 
issue. Should subsidies be left for neutralisation 
through countervailing duty complaints or could the 
administering authorities allow the indirect offsetting 
of such effects through anti-dumping proceedings?^
Initially, the ITA was prepared to add government 
subsidies to the reported production costs in 
calculating constructed value.^ However, this policy
54 651 F.Supp 1421 (CIT 1986).
On the policy issues, see generally, J.K. 
Stronski, "Anti-dumping, Constructed Value and Non- 
Countervailable Subsidies: A Proposed Inclusion of
Subsidies in Constructed Value After A1 Tech Specialty 
Steel Coro v United States". (1987) 11 Fordham Int'l Law 
Journal 208.
Certain Steel Products From the Netherlands. 47 
Federal Register 35,664 (1982).
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was subsequently altered and the ITA refused to add 
subsidies to reported costs, the result being confusion 
in the administration of the policy.
The matter eventually fell to the Court of International 
Trade for resolution. The court upheld the distinction 
between the purposes of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty procedures and found that the calculation of 
subsidies in constructed value computations is outside 
the scope of the anti-dumping law.
This ruling has been subject to some criticism from 
certain quarters. One writer has observed that, at the 
very least, non-countervailable subsidies should be 
included in the calculation of constructed values 
because such duties cannot be levied on such 
assistance.^ However, the decision of the Court is 
correct. If subsidies cannot be countervailed because 
they do not fall within the definition of actionable 
subsidy under the countervailing law, it would be 
improper to indirectly attack non-actionable subsidies 
by means of the anti-dumping laws. Such an 
interpretation would have the effect of providing an 
indirect remedy to a matter that the legislators have 
decided should not be provided directly through the 
countervailing duty laws.
Ignoring sales at less than the costs of production
Where the ITA has reasonable grounds for believing or 
suspecting that sales in the home market of the country 
of exportation (or where appropriate third countries) 
have been made at less than the cost of producing the 
merchandise in question, such sales may be disregarded
See Stronski, J.K. 'Anti-Dumping, Constructed 
Value and Non-Countervailable Subsidies', (1987) 11
Fordham Int'l Law Journal 208.
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for the purposes of determining FMV if two conditions 
are satisfied, namely:
(a) the sales have been made over an extended 
period of time and in substantial quantities; 
and
(b) the sales are not at prices which permit 
recovery of all costs within a reasonable 
period of time in the normal course of 
trade.^
If, after such sales are deducted, the remaining sales 
above the costs of production are inadequate to 
calculate the foreign market value, the ITA is 
instructed to calculated the foreign market value based 
on constructed value.^ This rule, originally enacted in 
the Trade Act of 1974. is intended to prevent the 
foreign market value calculation from being distorted by 
the inclusion of sale prices at below the cost of 
producing the merchandise.^
In practice, the effect of this rule is to allow the 
authorities to disregard home market values - the 
fairest method of establishing foreign market value - 
and to replace this with constructed value - the least 
fair method.
(3) Adjustments
The adjustments made to the United States Price and the 
Foreign Market Value are designed to work back in the
58 Section 773(b), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.
Rule 353.51(b), ITA Regulations, supra note 39, 
and see Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico. 55 Federal Register 21,060 (1990),
60 Kaplan et al, supra note 49, 3 69.
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distribution chain to the price of the goods at the 
factory gate, i.e. the ex-works price. The price of 
goods being sold in the home market normally includes 
profits for distributors, discounts for gross sales, 
commission, etc. The price of goods sold in the United 
States normally includes costs incurred for carriage, 
insurance, freight, etc. These expenses must be 
eliminated from the comparison process in order to avoid 
distortion.
At the same time, the adjustment process offers a great 
potential for distorting the margin of dumping. Refusal 
to allow certain adjustments, or exaggerating 
adjustments can easily create artificial dumping 
margins. Similarly, where adjustments are not 
symmetrical, a dumping margin can be created simply by 
the different treatments given to the prices.
The adjustments that are made in United States law to 
the USP and the FMV are complicated and are best 
considered independent of each other. However, it should 
be noted that, as a general rule, any deductions to the 
USP will increase the margin of dumping while additional 
expenses decrease it. In contrast, any deductions to the 
FMV will decrease the margin of dumping while the 
addition of expenses will increase the final duty.
(a) Specific adjustments to the United States 
price
As regards the adjustment for tax, the Court of 
International Trade has distinguished two separate 
components in this tax a d j u s t m e n t T h e  USP is to be 
increased by the amount of foreign taxes imposed
See also Para. 353.41(d) of the ITA Regulations 
For the Determination of Dumping. 45 Federal Register 
8,175 (1980).
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directly upon the exported merchandise which has been 
forgiven (rebated or not collected) because the 
merchandise was exported to the United States. On the
other hand, the adjustment is to be limited to the
amount that such taxes are added or included in the
price of comparison merchandise sold in the home 
market.
Consequently, if the overheads of the subsidiary in the 
United States market are greater than in the home market 
all overheads will be allowed but, if the converse is 
true and home market overheads exceed US overheads, the 
home market expenses will be restricted.^ This has the 
effect of increasing the FMV and increasing the
likelihood of a dumping margin being found.
Also where sales in the United States are made through 
a subsidiary and the ESP price is the relevant USP, the 
so-called 'ESP cap' may apply.^ A subsidiary will incur 
costs in selling the products to an arm's length 
purchaser which differ from those incurred by the 
manufacturer in the home market. An appropriate 
adjustment must be made to account for this difference. 
While this principle is logical enough, the practice of 
the authorities themselves place exporters at a 
disadvantage.
All of the overhead charges incurred in the United 
States are deducted from the ESP when the net USP is 
being calculated but the amount of the relevant
Zenith Electric Corporation v United States. 633 
F.Supp 1382 (1986).
This practice has been upheld by the courts as 
being a 'fair and reasonable exercise of administrative 
authority'; see Consumer Products Division SCM Coro v 
Silver Reed America. 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed Cir. 1985).
64 See Palmeter, supra note 33, 23-24.
__ _
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counterpart deduction in the home market is capped to an 
amount equal to the value of the US deduction.
Consequently, if the overheads of the subsidiary in the 
United States are greater than in the home market all
overheads in each country will be deducted, but if the
converse is true, and home market overheads exceed 
United States overheads, the home market expenses will 
be restricted.^ This practice has the effect of
increasing the home market value in relation to the 
calculation of the USP.®^
(b) Specific adjustments to the foreign market 
value
The ITA has statutory authority to make three principal 
adjustments to the calculation of FMV but only if it is 
established to the satisfaction of the ITA that the 
amount of any difference between the USP and the FMV is 
wholly or partly due to these circumstances.^
First, the fact that the wholesale quantities, in which 
the merchandise is sold in the United States are less or 
greater than the wholesale quantities in which the 
merchandise is sold in the market of the its country of 
origin is a ground for making an appropriate allowance.
The second ground is where there exists differences in
This practice has been upheld by the courts as 
being a 'fair and reasonable exercise of administrative
authority'; see Consumer Products Division SCM Corn 
silver Reed America. 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed Cir. 1985).
V
for
^ The adjustment process in the case of the ESP cap 
the purposes of arriving at the USP was fully
considered in Brother Industries v United States. 540 
F.Supp 1341 (CIT) 1984) . Reproduced in part in J.H. 
Barton & B.S. Fisher, International Trade and Investment
(1986), 290.
Section 773 (a)(4), Tariff Act of 1930.
amended.
as
_________
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the circumstance of sale. Due to the contentious nature 
of this practice, it is considered in a later part of 
this section.
The final ground for adjustments is where similar 
merchandise is used for the purpose of making the 
comparison. In such circumstances, adjustments may be 
made for merchandise that is similar or like in purpose.
(4) The Margin of Dumping
The margin of dumping is the difference between the 
United States Price and the Foreign Market Value for the 
goods. In order to calculate the dumping duty, the 
margin of dumping is expressed as a percentage of the 
value of the merchandise once it is presented for 
clearance at the U.S. customs.^ In other words, the 
anti-dumping duty is a percentage of the cif value of 
the merchandise expressed as an ad valorem figure.
It appears that the Commerce Department has no 
discretion in imposing a level of duty equal to that of 
the anti-dumping margin. The statute requires that, if 
the administering authority finds the existence of 
dumping 'then there shall be imposed upon such 
merchandise an anti-dumping duty...in an amount equal to 
the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the 
United States price for the merchandise'. The imposition 
of the duty equal to the margin of dumping is automatic 
once sales at less than fair value have been found*
The point here is that, if a lesser duty would be 
sufficient to eliminate the injury, the ITA cannot opt 
for the lesser amount but must stick to the margin of 
dumping. This is despite the fact that the Anti-dumping
68 Section 736(a), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
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Code allows for the possibility of the imposition of a 
lesser dumping duty if this would be sufficient to 
prevent further injury.^ Article 8(1) of the Code 
states that it is desirable for signatories to impose 
lesser duties 'if such lesser duties would be adequate 
to remove the injury to the domestic industry*.
While anti-dumping duties are levied against countries, 
in practice, the United States authorities impose 
variable levels of duty on a company-specific basis.^ 
In other words, different levels of duty are imposed 
depending on the levels of dumping found against 
particular manufacturers, producers or exporters.
As a final point, the ITA is not required to consider 
the interests of producers or consumers within the 
United States before imposing duties. In some respects 
this is a disadvantage to United States consumers and 
producers. For example, if anti-dumping duties are 
imposed on semi-conductors imported from Japan and if 
these semiconductors are incorporated into computers in 
the United States, the higher the level of duty the 
greater the indirect level of injury caused to the 
domestic producers.
At the same time, the fact that anti-dumping duties are 
always imposed at the maximum possible level is hardly 
an advantage to foreign producers.
This contrasts unfavourable with the practice of 
the European Commission. See text infra. Chapter 10,
See generally. Certain Small Business Telephone 
Systems and Subassemblies Thereof From Taiwan. 54 
Federal Register 31987 (1989).
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(D) Indirect Dumping
(1) Component Dumping
Before 1988 the ITA had no statutory authority to act 
against products considered to have been dumped as 
component. However, the Department of Commerce, clearly 
as a matter of policy, indicated that foreign companies 
would not be allowed to benefit from component dumping 
even if the companies involved were related.
As a matter of practice, prior to 1988, the ITA merely 
included component parts in the investigation into 
allegations of dumped finished merchandise. Thus, in 
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof. Finished and 
Unfinished. From Japan, the ITA included roller bearing 
component parts in its investigation into finished 
roller bearings.^ The petitioners alleged that the 
component parts had been sold at less than fair value to 
the company manufacturing the finished products. The 
respondents sought judicial review of the duties imposed 
on the ground that the component parts were transferred 
intra-company and therefore no actual sales of component 
parts occurred in the United States. In the absence of 
sales of imported merchandise, the company challenged 
the decision of the ITA to apply the anti-dumping laws 
to the parts.
In response the ITA asserted that the parts were 
included in the initiating petition and therefore were 
automatically subject to investigation. While this is 
correct from a procedural point of view, it is difficult 
to see how two unlike products can be brought within the 
scope of the same petition. Nevertheless, the CIT held 
that the Commerce Department had 'inherent authority to
71 52 Federal Register 47,955 (1987).
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define the scope of an anti-dumping investigation*.On 
this basis alone the Court ruled in favour of ITA. But, 
commenting on the forthcoming legislation, in this case 
the 1988 Act, the Court made the following illuminating 
statement:
'All too often foreign manufacturers effectively 
emasculate our anti-dumping laws by employing 
inventive import strategies....Accordingly, 
Congress has attempted to thwart importers *
circumvention strategies by enacting legislation 
intended to send a clear message to foreign 
producers and trading partners that we will 
actively seek to prevent circumvention of our trade 
laws and thereby decrease the incentive foreign 
producers might have to finesse their way around
our trade laws, in order to engage in recognised
unfair trade practices*.
Hardly the statement of an impartial judicial body. In 
other words, even before the enactment of the relevant 
provisions of the 1988 Act, the Court had already
embarked on a declared policy of preventing any 
activities which might be construed, fairly or unfairly, 
as circumvention.
The provisions of the 1988 Act dealing with component 
dumping were not the first attempt to prevent such 
developments. In the House of Representative *s version 
of the bill that finally became the Trade and Tariff Act 
of 1984 contained a proposal to regulate the issue of 
downstream dumping. Section 104 of this bill defined 
* downstream dumping' as occurring when three conditions 
were satisfied:
NTN Bearing Corporation of America v United States. reproduced at (1990) 2:5 WTM 190.
_______
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(a) a product used in the manufacture of the 
merchandise subject to investigation is purchased 
at a price that is below its foreign market value;
(b) that purchase price is either:
(1) lower than the generally available price 
of the product in the country of manufacture; 
or
(2) lower than the price at which the product
would be generally available in such country 
but for price depression if the price
depression is caused by artificial depression 
of market prices by reason of any subsidy or 
other sales at below foreign market value; and
(c) the difference between the foreign market
value and such purchase price has a significant 
effect on the cost of manufacturing the merchandise 
in question.^
In the event that downstream dumping was found by the 
administering authorities to exist, the proposal would 
have authorised the imposition of an anti-dumping duty 
equal to the difference between the foreign market value 
of such products and the generally available price as 
calculated above. It is likely that, had this measure 
been enacted, a number of contraventions of the GATT 
would have been committed. Most importantly, as observed 
in earlier parts of the work, the investigation would 
not have been into 'like products' to those that 
constitute the final range of finished products/* But 
also, Article VI of the GATT requires that the anti­
dumping duty should be equal to the difference between 
the normal value and the export price.
The amendments to the law on component dumping
See Bierwagen & Hailbronner, supra note 49, 41.
See text, supra pp. 180-182.
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introduced by the 1988 Act did not go as far as those 
proposed in the 1984 House of Representatives bill. The 
major alteration brought by the 1988 Act was addition of 
Section 780 to the Tariff Act of 1930 which introduced 
new procedures for downstream product monitoring.^ This 
allows private parties to petition the ITA for a 
determination that a particular product incorporates 
component parts that have been subject to previous anti­
dumping orders.
The application of the provision is partially restricted 
by the fact that it applies only in three circumstances;
(a) the component part is already subject to 
monitoring as part of a bilateral monitoring 
arrangement;
(b) the component part is the subject of a 
'significant number of investigations' for the same 
country; or
(c) there are two or more cases against the same 
company for related products.
In addition to the existence of one of these 
circumstances, there must also be a dumping margin of at 
least fifteen percent. At the same time, there must be 
'a reasonable likelihood' that imports into the United 
States of the downstream product will increase.
In the event that these factors exist, any imported 
manufactured article which incorporates* the product 
formerly found to have been dumped can be subject to 
monitoring by the ITC.
The main concern of the international community with 
this provision is that investigations can be initiated
75 See text, supra pp.700-701.
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not on the basis of allegations of dumping, but based on 
claims relating to dumping of component parts.^ 
However, it is only the standards for the initiation of 
an investigation that have significantly altered and not 
the standards for reaching a dumping decision. For that 
reason, the issue of downstream product monitoring is 
treated as a matter of procedure as opposed to an issue 
of substance in this text.^
(2) Sub-Assemblv Dumping
For a legal analysis claiming that this amendment 
is legitimate under the GATT, see S.J. Powell & J.D. 
Mclnerney, "International Energy Trade and the Unfair 
Trade Laws", (1989) 11:2 University of Penn. Journal
Int'l Bus. Law, 399, 343-44.
77 Ibid.
Sub-assembly dumping differs from component 
dumping because, sub-assembly dumping occurs when all 
the component parts of the finished product are dumped 
in the United States whereas in component dumping only 
single elements of the product need be dumped.
See generally, L.T. Yanowitch, "Foreign Assembly 
and Outsourcing: New Challenges to the Anti-dumpingLaw", (1986) 18 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 815.
80 50 Federal Register 45447 (1985).
The United States authorities have tackled the problem 
of sub-assembly dumping in the same was as component 
dumping, namely simply by treating the pre-assembly 
package as being imported into the United States as like 
products to the finished products.^ This is a highly 
controversial practice which has attracted considerable 
criticism.^
The landmark case in the application of this approach to 
the issue of sub-assembly dumping was Cellular Mobile 
Telephones and Subassemblies From Jaoan.^ A petition 
was lodged by Motorola, a United States company
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manufacturing cellular mobile telephones, allegedly on 
behalf on the United States cellular mobile telephone 
and telephone subassembly industry. The investigation 
covered a number of products including cellular mobile 
telephones (CMTs), CMT transceivers, CMT control units 
and subassemblies for all of these devices.
The respondents argued that the subassemblies were not 
like products to the finished products and therefore 
fell outside the scope of the investigation. There is 
undoubtedly merit in this argument. It is difficult to 
see how a circuit board, a number of computer chips and 
some electronic equipment could be construed as a 
cellular mobile phone in the absence of the input of 
skilled labour. Further, it appears that the petitioners 
in fact only manufactured the finished products, there 
being no consumer market for subassembly kits for 
cellular mobile telephones.
The ITA rejected the respondent's contentions holding 
that subassembled products could be considered like 
products to the final and completed product. In making 
such a determination, the ITA took into consideration a 
number of factors, including: (a) the general physical
characteristics of the products; (b) the expectations of 
ultimate purchasers; (c) the channels of trade in which 
the product is sold; (d) the manner in which the 
products are advertised; and (e) the ultimate use of the 
merchandise in question. Taking these factors into 
account the ITA held that the finished cellular phones 
and the component parts unassembled constituted like 
products.
In any event, it cannot be said that the ITA would have 
given serious consideration to an argument that 
component parts of a product fall outside a petition if 
they are not like products because the ITA declared that
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it 'has an inherent power to establish the parameters of 
the investigation so as to carry out its mandate to 
administer the law effectively and in accordance with 
its intent'. In other words, in future investigations, 
complete subassemblies of products will be considered 
part of the investigation into dumped finished products 
unless there are facts to establish otherwise.
It is interesting to note that the ITC did not reach the 
same conclusion in its investigation into material 
i n j u r y . in its final determination on this matter, the 
Commission held that the finished products constituted 
like products but that the sub-assemblies for each of 
these components together constituted a separate like 
product. However, this was a majority decision and there 
was considerable debate among the Commissioners 
themselves as to the problem of like products.
There is little doubt that the question of anti­
circumvention was behind the ITA's decision in this 
case. The possibility of large numbers of finished 
products entering the United States market through the 
back-door, as it were, caused genuine concern in the 
absence of anti-circumvention measures.^ However, at 
the same time, there is little doubt that the United 
States would have a difficult time justifying this 
decision before the relevant international authorities 
simply because it was a policy decision and not one 
based on the letter of international law.
(E) Dumoincf From Non-Market Economies
1^ Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies 
Thereof. Inv. No. 731-TA-207 (1986).
8^ On the earlier policy of the ITA, see A. Langer, 
"The Concepts of Like Product and Domestic Industry 
Under the U.S. TAA of 1979", (1983) 17 George Washington 
Journal Int'l Law & Econ., 495.
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One commentator has observed that 'perhaps nowhere is 
the arbitrariness of the [United States] anti-dumping 
law as apparent as in its treatment of products from 
centrally-planned or non-market economies'.^ The main 
problem arises from the nature of the economies of these 
countries. Where the economy of a country is regulated 
by state planners, and not the forces of supply and 
demand, it is virtually impossible to determine prices 
even on a constructed basis.^ Instead, it has been 
necessary to rely upon third country prices for 
valuations of foreign market prices in non-market 
economy countries.^
The principles of liberal trade policy and comparative 
advantage are incompatible with the economic philosophy 
behind the GATT itself and for this reason no non-market 
economy state joined the GATT at the time of its 
original formation.^ True, some non-market economy 
states, such as Hungary and Poland, have subsequently 
acceded to the General Agreement, but on the whole non- 
market economy states have remained outside the world 
trading system. Similarly, no non-market economy country 
is a signatory to the Anti-dumping Code of 1979.
The United States, and other GATT contracting parties.
%
N.D. Palmeter, "The Rhetoric and the Reality of 
the United States Anti-dumping Law", (1991) 14 World
Economy 19, 29.
^ See generally, J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (1988),51.
J.S. Neeley, "Non-market Economy Import 
Regulation: From Bad to Worse", (1989) 20 Law & Pol'y
Int'l Bus., 529.
Both Czechoslovakia and Cuba joined the GATT in 
1948, but their subsequent conversion to non-market 
economies ruled out any active participation in the 
organisation.
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have therefore been allowed to develop their own rules 
to deal with products that have allegedly been dumped in 
the United States market. In contrast to the position 
with subsidised goods, the United States has vigorously 
asserted its anti-dumping legislation against imports 
from non-market economies. Yet, the problems presented 
in the operation of countervailing and anti-dumping duty 
laws are largely similar and stem from the same 
fundamental issue, namely the method of valuing goods in 
such an economy.
The rule originally states in the 1979 Act was that, if 
from available information, the I TA believes that the 
economy of a country from which merchandise is exported 
is state-controlled and does not allow a determination 
of foreign market value for merchandise in accordance 
with the normal rules for this process, a substitute 
foreign market value is made on the basis of the normal 
costs, expenses and profits involved in the 
manufacturing of such merchandise.^ Such valuations are 
to be made by reference to either:
(a) the prices, determined in accordance with the 
normal principles by which such valuations are 
made, of similar merchandise in a relevant non- 
state-controlled-economy when sold:
(1) for consumption in the home market of 
that country; or
(2) to other countries including the United 
States; or
(b) the constructed value of such merchandise in 
a non-state-controlled-economy country.**
The subsequent statutory and administrative history of
*^ Section 773(c), Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
** Rule 353.52, ITA Regulations, supra note 39.
if:
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the treatment of goods from non-market economy countries 
under United States anti-dumping law has been an attempt 
to impose increasingly restrictive rules to goods from 
these countries.
(1) Comparable Third Country Valuation
It would be inequitable if the price of goods in
countries at different stages of economic development 
were used in this process. Therefore, the ITA claims to 
base its prices on costs in a non-state-controlled 
economy country at a similar stage of economic
development to the country from which the goods 
originated.^
Nevertheless, in practice, the choice of comparable 
third countries appears absolutely arbitrary. Thus, in
Unrefined Montan Wax From East Germany, the ITA rejected 
comparisons with the price of component goods in Canada 
and the United Kingdom, in favour of prices in West 
Germany, simply because West Germany was considered, 
from an industrialised point of view, to be 'more
More specifically, the ITA is instructed to 
select, in order of preference:
(a) a non-state controlled economy country other 
than the United States, at a stage of economic 
development comparable to that of the home 
market based on generally recognised criteria, 
including per capita gross national product 
and infrastructure development, particularly 
in the industry producing such or similar 
merchandise;(b) a non-state controlled economy country other
than the United States that is not at a stageof economic development comparable to that of 
the home market country, in which case
adjustments will be made for known differences 
in the costs of materials and fabrication; or
(c) the United States; Rule 353.52, ITA
Regulations. supra note 39.
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comparable' than the other two countries.^ No other 
explanation was given as to why the economy of one of 
the most wealthy and healthy states in the global 
economy of that time was selected as opposed to a less 
efficient country such as the United Kingdom unless of 
course this is simply one way that the ITA artificially 
inflates the foreign market value.
However, the scope for choice in this regard is 
restricted because quite simply many other countries do 
not produce goods that are interchangeable with the 
merchandise under investigation.
Similarly, in some investigations, the country that is 
the first choice as a surrogate foreign market value 
cannot be used for the comparison because national 
officials refuse to allow producers to co-operate with 
the United States authorities in the collection of such 
information. For example, in one investigation, the 
government of Pakistan refused to allow such information 
to be collected for fear that this information would be 
used in a subsequent investigation of Pakistani exports 
of similar merchandise.^ Thus, the country which is 
expressly declared to be the most appropriate must be 
rejected in favour of other country which is clearly not 
the first choice of the investigating officials.
The 1988 Act introduced significant changes in the use 
of third country comparable prices.^ The most dramatic 
of these was the reversal of the preference for third
See Unrefined Montan Wax From East Germany. 46 
Federal Register 38,555 (1981).
See Shoo Towels of Cotton From China. 48 Federal 
Register 37,055 (1983).
Section 773 (c), Tariff Act of 1930. as amended by 
Section 1316, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988.
_____
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country values in favour of constructed values. In 
general, the ITA is instructed to determine the foreign 
market value of the goods on the basis of the factors of 
production utilised in the production of the 
merchandise. Only, where the ITA finds that the 
information available for making a constructed value 
determination, should valuations be made on a third 
country basis.
It is generally accepted that this change will result in 
a greater number of affirmative dumping findings.^ 
There are two principal reasons for this. Factors of 
production within non-market economy states, such as 
labour, materials, etc., are generally relatively lower 
than in market economy states. Pricing such inputs on a 
market economy level will undoubtedly increase foreign 
market values and hence margins of dumping.
Similarly, energy supplies in these countries are often 
heavily subsidised thereby reducing the final price of 
the goods to the consumer within the state. Valuation of 
goods at world energy market rates will result in 
increased foreign market values.
(2) Constructed Value Prices
In the past, in the absence of a comparable price in a 
market economy country, the ITA simply opted to 
construct a value for the goods. If similar merchandise 
was not produced in a market economy country which the 
ITA deemed at a comparable stage of economic development 
to the home market country, a value is to be constructed 
based on factors of production incurred in the home 
market country including, but not limited to, the costs
See G.N. Horlick & G.D, Oliver, "Anti-dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Law Provisions of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988", (1989) 23:3 JWT 5, 17.
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of labour, the quantities of raw materials employed, and 
the amount of energy consumed. But these factors are not 
valued based on the cost of these resources within the 
home country but rather the cost of these factors of 
production in a comparable market economy country.
For example, in the Electric Golf Cars From Poland^, 
the Treasury Department expressly acknowledged that 
there was no comparable product and no counterpart 
country for a relevant foreign market value 
determination. The valuation was made by means of a 
hypothetical cost calculation in which component parts 
were valued according to comparable prices in third 
countries and then a total value was computed by adding 
these together and then making an allowance for labour, 
profits and other overheads. This practice was confirmed 
in the 1988 Act.
Now by statute, the ITA must make its determination of 
foreign market value in non-market economy states on the 
basis of constructed values as opposed to third country 
values. The general rule is that the ITA will determine 
the foreign market value of the merchandise on the basis 
of the value of the factors of production utilised in 
producing the merchandise.^
In valuing these factors of production, the ITA is 
required to use, to the extent possible, the prices or 
costs of factors of production in market economy 
countries that are at a level of economic development 
comparable to that of the non-market economy country and 
relative to significant producers of comparable 
merchandise. This is merely codification of prior ITA 
practice and is unlikely to resolve the problems that
40 Federal Register 25,497 (1975). 
Section 773 (c)(1), ibid.
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were inherent in that process.
As every accountant is aware, costs of production can be 
allocated in different manners for the purposes of 
valuing goods on a constructed cost basis. The ITA has 
considerable discretion as to which method will be 
employed for this purpose, there being no statutory 
guidelines in this respect. This leaves considerable 
scope for manipulation of valuations in order to 
increase relevant foreign market values.
To this value is added amounts for general expenses and 
profit as well as the cost of containers, coverings and 
other expenses. There is no statutory minimum to be
added as profit, but since producers in non-market
economies are not generally manufacturing goods for 
profit, the inclusion of such a figure reveals that the 
United States is not interested in obtaining a true 
value for goods, but rather a surrogate equivalent 
market economy valuation.
It is this reliance on comparable prices for parts in 
third countries that makes this method of valuation as
difficult and as arbitrary as valuation on the basis of
the value of merchandise in third states. Instead of 
valuing a finished product, the ITA will value its 
component parts which will tend to inflate the price of 
the finished merchandise.
In valuing the component parts of the final product in 
the prices that apply in the third country, no allowance 
or adjustment is permitted to reflect differences 
between the country of origin and the country of 
comparison in terms of per capita GNP, the cost of 
materials or labour in the particular sector.^
Unrefined Montan Wax From East Germanv. supra note 90.
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(3) Observations on the Development of Applicable 
Principles
The main criticisms of these principles stem from the 
fact that it is a wholly artificial process to value 
goods in one market by comparing them to another. There 
is no accurate method of valuing the cost of goods in a 
non-market economy without making a number of arbitrary 
assumptions.
Further, originally there was no definition of 'non- 
market economy country' or 'state-controlled-economy 
country' is specified. This has led to difficult 
problems in light of the progress of many of these 
states towards market economies. In 1981 the ITA 
considered a number of economic factors, including wage 
controls, sources of financing, exchange controls and 
currency convertibility, distribution and progress 
towards economic reform, before deciding that Hungary 
was still a non-market economy country.^ However, in 
its decision, the ITA expressly declared:
'we cannot state categorically that certain 
factors we have relied on in this case will have 
the same relevance in any other investigation.'
The 1988 Act introduced rules for determining which 
countries are to be considered non-market economy 
countries.^ Factors to be taken into consideration 
include currency convertibility, wage controls, 
ownership of production facilities, government control 
of resources, and the extent to which joint ventures are 
permitted, naturally, this still leaves considerable
Truck Trailer Axle and Brake Assemblies From 
Hungary, 46 Federal Register 46,152 (1981).
98 Section 771(18), ibid.
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scope for the exercise of discretion which is underscore 
by the fact that the ITA may take into consideration 
'such other factors as [it] considers appropriate' in 
this process.
(2) The Manipulation of the Substantive Countervailing 
Duty Laws of the United States for Protectionist 
Motives
The dramatic rise in countervailing duty actions has 
been a significant factor in drawing the attention of 
the world community to the growing penchant of the 
United States to rely on unilateral mechanisms to 
achieve solutions to multilateral difficulties. As one 
of the most eminent writers in the field of 
international trade law has observed:
'The United States has become far and away the 
largest user of countervailing duty proceedings. 
All other nations combined have probably not used 
countervailing duties explicitly to offset 
subsidies more than about two dozen times...[T]he 
United States is blazing a trail.
The United States has made no secret of its crusade 
against foreign subsidies through this medium which is 
seen as a surrogate for international rules to regulate 
governmental assistance. The failure to negotiate such 
rules is undoubtedly a contributing factor to the high 
levels of countervailing duty actions in the United 
States. But at the same time the authorities have shown 
little sympathy for the complications involved in the 
negotiation of effective international rules and this
J.H. Jackson, "Import Practices: Are They Really 
Unfair", (1986) 30 Law Quadrangle Notes 26, 30.
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has been reflected in both the form and administration 
of present countervailing duty legislation.
At the same time, there is also a fear in governmental 
circles that other countries may follow the American 
example and use their countervailing laws to block 
imports into their markets. This explains why the 
United States has not abandoned efforts at the 
multilateral level to negotiate a revised Subsidies Code 
in favour of a policy of resorting to unilateral 
neutralisation of subsidies through the application of 
countervailing duties.
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the existing 
United States system for imposing countervailing duties 
with the international rules to determine the degree of 
compatibility between these two sets of rules and, at 
the same time, to determine whether the existing 
international rules are sufficiently comprehensive to 
tackle the proliferation of such duties. This will also 
involve an examination of the methodology involved in 
the interpretation and administration of the statutory 
provisions,
In addition, it is necessary to evaluate the degree to 
which countervailing actions provide artificial relief 
to American industries by preventing adjustment to 
increased international competition and efficiency in 
production. In other words, is it proper that a 
legitimate form of relief, sanctioned in the GATT 
itself, has been fashioned into a tool for protectionist 
forces particularly when the United States has consented 
through its international obligations to act in a
100 Jackson, "Perspectives on Countervailing
Duties", (1990) 21 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 739.
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particular mannerT^i
(A) The Statutory Basis for the Present Countervailing 
Dutv Framework in United States Law
Prior to 1970, U.S. countervailing legislation was not 
of any significant importance due to the infrequent use 
of the m e c h a n i s m . in fact, in 1958 the apparent 
redundancy of the procedure inspired one writer to 
observe;
"[T]he relative desuetude of [the anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty] provisions in recent years 
does not justify their retention as the potential 
hatchets of rearguard protectionism."^®^
The economic difficulties of the United States in the 
early 1970s have however saved the countervailing duty 
legislation from this fate. As the balance of trade 
figures progressively worsened, European export 
subsidies were widely seen as being a primary source of 
American economic woes. The natural response to 
subsidisation was countervailing duties and private 
industries needed no-one to point them in the right 
direction.
Not only did the number of countervailing complaints 
increase throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, but
101 For an apologists view on the use of 
countervailing duties by the United States, see J.D. 
Greenwald, "United States Law and Practice", in J.H.J. 
Bourgeois (ed), Subsidies and International Trade (1991), 33.
102 The most significant countervailing duty 
legislation was contained in Section 303 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930. as amended, Stat. (193 0).
103 Ehrenhaft, supra note 18, 76.
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so did the number of affirmative definitions and 
likewise the amount of duties imposed.-®* Once the 
process had been revived, the volume of complaints went 
from strength to strength.The most immediate concern 
of American trade partners was the arbitrary nature of 
the United States countervailing provisions. The passage 
of the comprehensive Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 did 
little to assuage the concerns of these nations 
particularly as regards the changes brought to the 
countervailing duty legislation.
Section 331 of the 1974 Act authorised the imposition of 
countervailing duties on non-dutiable items. 
Implicitly, the original purpose of the legislation was 
replaced and a new purpose substituted - a unilateral 
remedy to the growing problem of subsidisation of 
production by foreign governments.
A number of controversial practices were also officially 
sanctioned in the statute. The hitherto unofficial power 
of the Treasury Department to 'estimate' the amount of 
the subsidy deemed to exist was explicitly sanctioned 
and no guidelines specified as to the type of subsidy 
subject to countervailing duties or criteria for 
quantification.^*
Reacting to international pressure, Congress did submit
i
■Î
'I
■i.
f
See Butler, "Countervailing Duties and Export 
Subsidies: A Re-emerging Issue in International Trade", (1968) 9 Virginia Journal of Int'l Law 82.
See text supra pp. 378-380.
88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
Section 303(a)(2), Tariff Act of 1930. asamended.
Section 303 (a)(5), Tariff Act of 1930. asamended.
 : : .__
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to the introduction of an injury test for countervailing 
duties, but the standard introduced does not appear to 
accord fully with the requirements of Article VI. i®* 
There were perceived to be two primary limitations to 
this test;
(a) Non-comorehensive application of the test
The 1974 Act did not extend the injury test to imports 
of all merchandise, but only to non-dutiable goods. In 
other words, where goods remained dutiable, the 
authorities were not obliged to render a determination 
of injury.
Failure to introduce an injury test when the scope of 
the countervailing legislation was being extended from 
dutiable goods to all goods would have been a flagrant 
violation of Article VI. The United States could not 
have argued that the legislation was grandfathered under 
the Protocol of Provisional Application, because the new 
statute introduced a radical alteration of the pre-GATT 
system.
Indeed, it is also possible that the failure to 
introduce compliance provisions when the statute was 
amended was itself inconsistent with Article VI.
In the context of its international obligations, the 
partial introduction of an injury test was about all the 
United States could get away with without provoking a 
series of international complaints and protests. At the
J.H. Jackson & W.J. Davey, International Economic 
Relations (Second edition, 1986), 752.
In the United States - Manufacturing Clause 
Legislation. GATT BISD, 31st Supplement 74 (1985), a
GATT panel held that consolidating legislation predating 
the GATT was required to be consistent with the GATT and could not benefit from the PPA.
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end of the day, the concession itself was merely an 
empty gesture in view of the volume of trade affected.
(b) The test of iniurv
The standard of harm itself was specified as 'injury* as 
opposed to 'material injury*. This provoked speculation 
as to whether the test of injury was less onerous than 
that of material injury mandated in the GATT.
In reality, the labelling of a particular standard is 
not as important as its practical implementation. In 
other words, if the test was identified merely as 
injury, but the standards applied amounted to those for 
material injury, it is irrelevant that the test was 
referred to as something else. However, the legislation 
did not specify standards for the Treasury Department to 
follow in their assessment of harm, which fuelled 
speculation that the United States was cheating by 
applying a lesser standard.
It is difficult to separate the rhetoric from the facts 
to decide whether the United States test was of a 
sufficiently high standard to comply with Article VI. 
And, for all practical purposes, the whole question was 
rendered moot by the introduction of the material injury 
test in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. a mere five 
years later.
The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Act of 
1974, was radically overhauled by the Trade Agreements
111 See generally, D. Evans, "Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties in GATT: Present Law and Future 
Prospects", (1977) 3 Int'l Trade Law Journal 211.
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Act of 1979^^ .^ which started a new chapter in the 
history of the United States countervailing duty law."^ 
Subsequent alterations were made to the 1979 system by 
both the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984“* and the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.^ ^^ Together, 
these three statutes embody the complete post-Tokyo 
Round countervailing legislation of the Uilited 
States.
(B) The Economic Policv Assumptions Behind United 
States Countervailing Duty Laws
The administration of a countervailing duty policy is 
implicitly based on a number of economic assumptions. It 
is only with the benefit of a defined economic model 
that certain tasks may be performed in the 
implementation of the policy. For example, the 
calculation of the value of a subsidy depends on the 
application of certain economic principles. Whether a 
subsidy is quantified on the basis of the benefit to the 
recipient or the cost to the government depends on the 
economic policy assumptions that underpin the system 
itself. Similarly, certain economic presumptions are
On the negotiating objectives of the United 
States, see P.B. Feller, "Observations on the New 
Countervailing Law", (1979) 11:4 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 
1439.
93 Stat, 144 (1979) . On the background to the
1979 Act, see generally, C.H. Cosgrove, "Technical 
Analysis of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement", (1979) 11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus,, 1497.
98 Stat. 2984 (1984).
102 Stat. 1107 (1988) ,
On the effect of the 1988 Act, see D.B. Cameron 
& S,M. Crawford, "An Overview of the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Amendments: A New Protectionism?'^,
(1989) 20:3 Law & pol'y Int'l Bus. 471.
  -     -
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required in order to allocate the benefits of subsidies 
over the relevant periods of time.
Unfortunately, none of the relevant statutes provides 
guidance as to the relevant economic model. As the ITA 
has pointed out, there is no statutory guidance or 
support in the background Senate Reports as to how the 
rules should be applied and consequently the ITA 
considers that it has 'wide latitude' in the development 
of the relevant economic model.
The economic model selected by the ITA for the 
administration of countervailing measures is based on 
the conception that subsidies are to be considered 
distortions of the market process for allocating an 
economy's resources.“* An obvious question that could 
be asked is why does the analysis of subsidy concentrate 
exclusively on the national market distorting effects of 
such programmes rather than the distorting effects of 
such programmes on the world economy. Nevertheless, the 
agency has observed:
"In a market economy, scarce resources are 
channelled to their most profitable and efficient 
uses by the market forces of supply and demand. We 
believe a subsidy is definitionally (sic) any 
action that distorts or subverts the market process 
and results in a misallocation of resources, 
encouraging inefficient production, and lessening 
world wealth.
Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Products From Argentina. 
49 Federal Register 18,0006 (1984), reproduced in J.H. 
Jackson & W.J, Davey, International Economic Relations 
(Second edition, 1986), 764,
118 See Greenwald, supra note 101, 35.
Certain Wire Rod From Poland, 49 Federal Register 
19,374 (1984),
^    :—  ' '_______________
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The economic principles behind the application of 
countervailing duties can be ascertained from the 
Subsidies Appendices attached to many of the ITA 
decision in the early 1980s. The ITA developed the 
practice of explaining in detail by means of an annex to 
its decisions the explicit calculation, allocation and 
application of duties.^® However, this approach was 
criticised by the Court of International Trade for the 
technical reason that the ITA had failed to engage in 
rule-making pursuant to an administrative procedure 
statute prior to adopting the p o l i c y . I n  the court's 
view this was essential to make the applicable rules 
transparent.
In response, the ITA published the Notice on Rulemaking 
which contained a number of regulations prescribing the 
manner that the ITA would apply countervailing 
procedures in the future. These regulations are based 
upon the economic model articulated in the above 
case. This is generally known as the 'distortion 
model' where the application of countervailing duties is 
measured according to the degree of economic distortion 
it causes in the economy of the country in which the 
benefit is received. However, the economic model applied 
by the ITA has been the subject of immense criticism 
from a number of w r i t e r s ,
See, for example, Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel 
Products From Argentina, supra note 117.
IPSCO Inc V United States. 687 F.Supp 614 (CIT 
1988) ; and Saudi Iron and Steel Co fHadeed) v United 
States, 686 F. Supp, 914 (CIT 1988).
These principles were upheld by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Georgetown Steel 
Corp. V  United States. 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir, 1986),
See generally, R. Diamond, "Economic Foundations 
of Countervailing Duty Law", (1989) 29 Virginia Journal 
Int'l Law 767; A.O. Sykes, "Countervailing Duty Law: An 
Economic Perspective", (1989) 89 Col Law Review 199; and
■
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The primary criticism of the model expounded by the ITA 
is that it is incomplete and overly simplistic. The 
model assumes that, had market forces been allowed to 
operate unhindered, maximum efficiency would be achieved 
whereas in many cases externalities (non-economic 
benefits) can accrue to society, a government or even an 
individual producer.^* On occasion, even market 
efficiency can be raised by subsidies if, for example, 
the actual cost of the final product manufactured with 
the assistance is below its value to society. Cheap 
power is the most obvious example of this phenomenon. 
The proposed rules makes no reference to either the 
measuring of externalities nor the deduction of any 
benefits derived therefrom from the presumed loss to the 
efficiency of the economy.
A related complication brought about by the ITA 
methodology concerns the calculation of net subsidy. 
since the quantification of subsidy is made on the basis 
of the distortion it causes, ie. the benefit to the 
recipient as opposed to the cost to the government, it 
is difficult to determine the amount that should be 
deducted from the gross subsidy to arrive at the net 
amount. If the model of calculation is the distortion 
model, it should include a figure to represent any 
benefits to society. This is not in fact done in the 
calculation of net subsidy.^®
M.J. Trebilcock, "Is the Game Worth the Candle? Comments 
on the Administration of U.S. Countervailing Duty Law", 
(1990) 21 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 694.
R. Diamond, "A Search for Economic and Financial 
Principles in the Administration of U.S. Countervailing 
Duty Law", (1990) 21 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 507, 523.
R.A. Casee, "Trade Subsidy Law: Can FoolishInconsistency Be Good Enough for Government Work?",
(1990) 21:4 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 609, 340.
See ASG Industries, Inc v United States fASG 
Industries III. 610 F.2d 770 (1979).
'   ____
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(C) Definition of Countervaliable Subsidy
The 1979 Act requires the ITA to determine both the 
existence of a subsidy and to calculate its value. 
The 1979 Subsidies Code, it will be recalled, was 
deliberately vague on this point, and the identification 
of countervailable subsidies has largely been left to 
the judgment of individual signatories. Nevertheless, 
the background to the development of the concept of 
countervailable subsidy in American countervailing duty 
law perfectly illustrates how matters such as this 
develop in ways that bring into question the good faith 
involved in the operation of such a g r e e m e n t s .
The starting point for the identification of 
countervailable subsidies is, not surprisingly, the 
statutory definition.
According to the original provisions of Section 771(5), 
the term 'subsidy* simply has the same meaning as 
•bounty or grant' insofar as that term is employed in 
Section 3 03 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Reference to 
Section 303 of the 193 0 Act, as amended by the 1974 Act, 
is of little assistance in defining countervailable 
subsidies because the term 'bounty or grant* itself is 
not defined. However, it is probably sufficient to 
assume the pre-1979 decisions on the concept to remain 
valid since such decisions naturally rely upon the use
Sections 703 (b) and 705(a)(1), Tariff Act of 
1930. as amended.
For a country-specific analysis of countervailing 
duties, see C.D. Stoltenberg, "Subsidies Under United 
States Counter-vailing Duty Law: The Case of Taiwan", 
(1988) 9 Northwestern Journal Int'l Law and Bus., 138.
■f:
.f'
... ,
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of that term. 129
The statute expressly provides two basic guidelines in 
identifying countervailable subsides. First, it 
incorporates the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies 
contained in Annex A of the 1979 Code into the 
legislation to provide illustrations of export 
subsidies. As mentioned earlier, all export subsidies 
are countervailable subsidies. Second, a number of rules 
are provided to isolate countervailable domestic 
subsidies.
(1) Export Subsidies
All export subsidies are countervailable under American 
law and the incorporation of the Illustrative List from 
the Subsidies Code prima facie indicates that United 
States practice is consistent with the Code obligations. 
The list is expressly declared to be non-exhaustive and 
therefore the extension of the concept of 
countervailable subsidy to all forms of export 
subsidisation is legitimate. This interpretation is 
reinforced by the fact that the Code does not expressly 
limit the concept of countervailable subsidy in its 
text.
Some commentators have claimed that, in interpreting the 
concept of export subsidy, the ITA is bound by 
international obligations to refrain from countervailing 
subsidies that are permitted under agreements such as
F. Consideration of the pre-1979 law is provided in Berger, "Judicial Review of Countervailing DutyDeterminations", 593. (1978) 19 Harvard Int'l Law Journal
130 The rules for identifying countervailable domestic subsidies were considerably altered by Section 
1312 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988.
\iV
See D. Simon, "Can GATT Export Subsidy Standards 
be Ignored by the United States in Imposing 
Countervailing Duties", (1983) 5 Northwestern Journal of 
Int'l Law & Bus., 183.
Refrigerators, Freezers and Other Refrigerating 
Eguioment From Italy. 46 Federal Register 23,512 (1981).
Spirits From Ireland, 46 Federal Register 22,632
(1981).
Dextrines and Solubles of Chemicallv Treated 
Starches From Corn Starch From the European Community.
45 Federal Register 18,414 (1980).
Amoxicillin Trohvdrate and Its Salts From Spain.
46 Federal Register 57,945 (1981).
Steel Products From France, 47 Federal Register 
26,315 (1982).
Oil Country Tubular Goods From Spain. 49 FederalRegister 47,060 (1984).
3
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the GATT and the OECD Arrangements.However, the fact
that certain types of export subsidies are not 
prohibited by international agreements does not preclude 
the United States from applying its countervailing laws 
against permitted export subsidies. Article VI of the 
GATT allows states to countervail all subsidies and any 
limitation on the interpretation of that provision is 
unilateral, although as we shall see later these self- 
imposed limitations are becoming increasingly less 
restrictive.
This would accordingly appear to give the United States 
authorities unfettered authority to countervail all 
export subsidies. Naturally, the authorities have done 
just so. Among the most common forms of export subsidies 
that are regularly countervailed are rebates of customs 
duties on the export of specified products*^^, export 
bounties^^^, export restitution payments^^, low- 
interest working capital loans on exports^^^, export 
credit insurance^ *^^ , and excessive rebates of indirect 
taxes on exports.^?
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The ITA has developed a number of principles over the 
course of its jurisprudence on the subject to 
distinguish export subsidies from domestic subsidies. 
These have been codified in the Notice on Rulemaking.^* 
The two main rules are as follows:
(a) Selective treatment, and a potential 
countervailable export subsidy, exists where 
the ITA determines that eligibility for, or 
the amount of, benefits under a programme is 
tied to actual or anticipated exportation or 
export earnings^*^;
(b) Where exportation is only one of many 
eligibility criteria for benefits under a 
programme, the inclusion of exportation as a 
criterion shall not per se constitute
selective treatment.
For a benefit to be an export subsidy, a government must 
provide special benefits to exporters, or exports, above 
and beyond what it may provide to non-exporters or non­
exported products. Where the benefit is provided 
regardless of whether the recipient is a domestic 
producer or an exporter, it is a domestic subsidy,
always subject of course to the doctrine of de facto
export subsidy developed by the ITA and its
predecessor.
On the other hand, where a number of benefits are 
offered including programmes based on export 
performance, multiple eligibility criteria are applied.
Paragraph 355.43, ITA Regulations.
See also Heavy Iron Construction Castings From 
Brazil. 51 Federal Register 9,491 (1986).
See text supra, pp. 575-579
- _______
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In such situations, the ITA evaluate all the facts of 
the case in order to determine whether a programme 
operates in such as way as to render it an export
programme. Each case must be considered on its
individual merits and the overriding criterion is the
effect of the programme with respect to the
merchandise.^!
(2) Domestic Subsidies
The treatment of domestic subsidies under United States 
countervailing law, both in the form of legislation and 
administrative practice, demonstrates how rules can be 
tightened to make the application of duties more likely. 
By constantly increasing the scope of the definition of 
countervailable domestic subsidies, the government and 
administering authorities have been able to reduce the 
number of domestic subsidisation programmes that cannot 
be countervailed.The result is that a greater and 
greater range of programmes may be subject to duties.
Originally no domestic subsidy could be the subject of 
countervailing duties. As a matter of policy, until 
1973, the Treasury Department restricted the concept of 
countervailable subsidy to export subsidies even 
although it no doubt possessed statutory authority to 
countervail domestic subsidies. Since export and 
domestic subsidies are considered to be mutually 
exclusive, as long as foreign governments ensured that 
any assistance rendered to producers fell within the 
scope of a domestic subsidy, as defined in United States 
legislation, the possibility of goods produced with such
!"!! See, for example, Carbon Steel Products From 
Austria. 50 Federal Register 33,369 (1985).
See generally, C. Lehmann, "The Definition of 
'Domestic Subsidy' Under United States Countervailing 
Duty Law", (1986) 22 Texas Int'l Law Journal 53.
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benefits being countervailed was remote.
This policy was abandoned in the Michelin Tire Case in 
1973 when the Treasury Department changed policy and 
decided that certain domestic subsidies could also be 
the subject of countervailing duties.^* There is little 
doubt that the Treasury Department was reacting to 
criticism of its self-imposed limitation of the concept 
of countervailable subsidy.^* In particular, the 
Williams Commission Report had cited the failure of the 
United States authorities to respond to European export 
subsidies as a direct cause of the perceived trade 
problems facing the United States at the time.
In the Michelin Case, the Treasury Department had to 
decide whether a grant by the Canadian government to a 
tyre manufacturer, as an incentive to locate in a 
geographical and economically disadvantaged province of 
Canada, constituted a countervailable subsidy. The 
intention of the Canadian government in providing the 
assistance was clearly to alleviate disproportionately 
high unemployment in the region and the plant provided 
a considerable number of jobs in the area.
Quite clearly, on the basis of its earlier precedents, 
the Department should have construed the assistance as 
a domestic subsidy since the assistance was not intended 
to directly promote exports. In fact, the Department 
developed, for the first time, the concept of the ^
X-Radial Steel Belted Tires From Canada. Inv. No. 
TD 73-10 (1975); reproduced in 12 ILM 208 (1973).
See Guido, "The Michelin Decision: Possible New 
Directions for U.S. Countervailing Duty Law", (1974) 6 
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 237.
S.D. Metzger, "Developments in the Law and 
Institutions of International Economic Relations", 
(1972) 66 AJIL 537, 557-58.
^       .
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facto export s u b s i d y . while the assistance was 
granted to assist domestic production, it was conferred 
on an individual enterprise and in fact:
"...a substantial majority of the tires produced 
are being and are expected to continue to be 
exported into the United States."^?
It is important to note that ostensibly the Treasury 
Department did not extend the scope of the 
countervailing laws to domestic subsidies at this point. 
Rather, the justification for the action was presented 
as being the fact that the assistance was a disguised 
export subsidy. Leaving aside the question of whether 
such a determination was possible on the facts of the 
case, the concept of de facto export subsidies opened 
the door to the Department to countervail domestic 
subsidies.
Whether or not a domestic subsidy could be considered a 
de facto export subsidy depended on whether the subsides 
were 'export-oriented'. In making this determination, 
the Department took into consideration the size of the 
subsidy, the volume of the merchandise imported into the 
United States and the effect of the subsidy on the 
volume of exports.^*
The test for determining the degree of export- 
orientation of a particular subsidy was necessarily
See G. Horlick et al, "Government Actions Against 
Domestic Subsidies: An Analysis of the International
Rules", (1986) 1 Legal Issues of European Integration 1, 
29.
147 This decision was upheld on appeal; see Michelin 
Tire V  United States. 469 F.Supp. 270 (1979).
Float Glass From Belgium. 41 Fed. Reg. 1299 
(1976); and Float Glass From Germanv. 41 Fed. Reg. 1300 (1976).
   ]
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subjective and was not based on statutory guidelines. 
However, if a subsidy failed to satisfy the export- 
oriented test, the Department did not impose duties. For 
example, in the Float Glass From Belgium Case, the ITA 
declined to levy duties where 80% of assisted production 
remained in the home market and the value of the benefit 
conferred by the subsidy was two percent of the value of 
the goods.
At this point, despite the change of policy towards 
domestic subsidies, the Treasury Department had 
exercised a degree of restraint in the application of 
the law since it possessed statutory authority to 
countervail all forms of subsidies, not only export 
subsidies. However, the judiciary was not prepared to 
entertain anything other than the rigorous application 
of the statute and in ASG Industries Inc v United 
States. the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected 
the doctrine of the export-oriented subsidy, instead 
exhorting the Treasury Department to countervail all 
subsidies.
The court held that the statute did not expressly 
authorise the adoption of such a test and it was 
therefore a creation of administrative imagination. A 
subsidy, whether export or domestic, was a 
countervailable subsidy and the only rule that could be 
justified under the terms of the statute was a de 
minimus test. The impact of this decision has 
subsequently been rendered redundant by the changes 
brought in the 1979 statute.
In the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Congress had an
149 Ibid.
ASG Industries Inc. v United States. 467 F.Supp* 
1200, 1214 (1979).
mi.
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opportunity to rewrite the law relating to the 
countervailability of subsidies. As we have already 
noted, the rules in the 1979 Subsidies Code were 
insufficient to constrain the intensions of Congress to 
extend, by statutory amendment, the definition of 
countervailable subsidy. This was essentially because 
there was no definition of countervailable subsidy 
contained in the 1979 Code. Congress therefore had 
considerable discretion in formulating an appropriate 
rule.
The rule for the application of countervailing duties to 
domestic subsidies finally enacted identified the 
following domestic subsidies as actionable:
*[d]omestic subsidies, if provided or required by 
government action to a specific enterprise or 
industry, or group of enterprises or industries, 
whether publicly or privately owned, and whether 
paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the 
manufacture, production, or export of any class or 
kind of merchandise:
(1) the provision of capital, loans, or loan 
guarantees on terms inconsistent with 
commercial considerations;
(2) the provision of goods or services at 
preferential rates;
(3) the grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to 
cover operating losses sustained by a specific 
industry;
(4) the assumption of any costs or expenses of 
manufacture, production or distribution.
According to this definition, for a domestic subsidy to
151 Section 771(5), Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
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be countervailable, it must be provided to a specific 
industry and must take one of the above forms.
(i) Forms of Countervailable Domestic Subsidies
Prima facie, the definition of actionable domestic 
subsidy appears to preclude the possibility of private 
financial assistance being the subject of countervailing 
action because the assistance must be 'provided or 
required by government action' in order to qualify. 
Accordingly, private benefits should be extraneous to 
determinations of countervailing duties.
In practice, this is not the case. The Court of 
International Trade has affirmed that the term 'domestic 
subsidy' encompasses private as well as public benefits 
primarily because the term 'subsidy' is defined by 
reference to the definition of 'bounty or grant' in 
Section 3 03 of the Tariff Act of 1930. as amended. The 
notion of private subsidies was deemed to be implicit in
the latter definition.
Some commentators have maintained that 'the American 
authorities have made prudent use of authorization'.*^ 
Since this practice is contrary to the GATT*^ ,^ this can 
be considered condonation of an illegitimate practice. 
The Department of Commerce has in fact been rather
*^2 For an example of assistance required by 
government action, see Certain Steel Products From 
Spain. 47 Federal Register 51,438 (1982).
See Bethelehem Steel Corporation v United States. 
590 F.Supp 1237 (CIT 1984).
G. Horlick, et al., "Government Actions Against 
Domestic Subsidies, An Analysis of the International 
Rules and An Introduction to United States Practice", 
(1986) 1 Legal Issues of European Integration 1, 31.
French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat 
Flour. BISD, 7th Supplement 46 (1959).
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surreptitious in its use of countervailing measures 
against private subsidies and tends not to drawn too 
much attention to the fact that such assistance has been 
countervailed. Thus, for example, in Steel Wire Rope 
From South Africa, the ITA countervailed rebates given 
by the South African Iron and Steel Industry 
Corporation, a private organisation set up by steel 
producers. But these rebates were included in an overall 
support figure instead of being singled out for 
identification as is the usual practice.
The different forms of subsidies, as identified in the 
illustrative list provided in Section 771(5), amount to 
a comprehensive category of countervailable domestic 
subsidies. Grants, loans and guarantees are included as 
are tax concessions and forgiveness of debt. The 
subsidised supply of goods and services is also caught 
by its provisions.
The source of these various types of domestic subsidies 
is Article 11(3) of the 1979 Subsidies Code, However, 
this provision is in fact part of Track II of the Code, 
which deals with the international regulation of 
subsidies and not the control of countervailing 
d u t i e s . T h i s  illustrates how countervailing duty laws 
can be employed against subsidies that are not per se 
illegal under international law. It also highlights the 
lack of symmetry in the 1979 Agreement.
The physical forms of countervailable subsidies can be 
divided into the following broad categories: grants,
loans, guarantees, equity participation, tax concessions 
and the supply of goods and services.
See J.J. Barcelo, "The Two Track Subsidies Code - 
Countervailing Duties and Trade Retaliation", in P. 
Slayton & J. Quinn, Non-Tariff Barriers After the Tokvo Round (1982), 121.
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(a) Grants
The direct provision of financial assistance to an 
enterprise is the most common form of subsidy and has 
the advantage of being the most transparent. The 
principal element in different manifestations of grants 
is the fact that there is a direct transfer of cash 
funds from the government to the enterprise involved in 
the scheme. However, even direct grants take a number of 
guises.
Direct cash payments to producers are domestic subsidies 
and, in the past, production payments to
manufacturers^*, cash payments to agricultural 
producers*^*, direct cash grants*^^, assistance for
compensating for plant operating expenses,*^ and
restitution payments from European Community guidance 
and guarantee funds*®* have all been countervailed.
Government participation in the financing of a company 
or enterprise, not through investment in production, but 
by involvement in the capital financing of its 
commercial activities may also constitute a domestic 
subsidy. Preferential financing in the form of equity
*®^ Dextrines and Solubles of Chemicallv Treated 
Starches Derived From Corn Starch From the United 
States. 45 Federal Register 18,414 (1981).
*®^ Tomato Products From Greece, 46 Federal Register 
51,425 (1981).
*®^ Steel Products From Spain, 47 Federal Register 
51, 438 (1982).
*®(* Hercules Inc v United States (1987) 3 USITR (New 
Series), 200, 203 .
*®* Molasses From France, 46 Federal Register 46,819
(1981).
' : v ’"  :---ÉiÉà- ________  . . ■ ' .  :
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infusions*®^, the assumption of financing costs by the 
central government*®^, government dividend capital*®*, 
public dividend capital and new capital. *®^government 
equity participation*®®, and the recapitalisation and 
conversion of debt to equity*®^, all qualify as domestic 
subsidies.
Similarly the ITA has considered regional assistance 
such as capital investment grants for locating in 
economically disadvantaged areas*®®, regional economic 
development grants*®^, and regional development 
incentives*”***, to be domestic subsidies.
One of the most important forms of stimulating economic 
efficient and progress - research and development aid - 
has also been targeted by the ITA as relevant domestic 
subsidies. Thus federal research and development
*®^ Comeau Seafoods v United States (1989 CIT) ; reproduced at (1990) 2:1 WTM 141.
*®^ Steel Products From Belgium. 47 Federal Register
26,300 (1982).
*®* Steel Products From the United Kingdom. 47
Federal Register 26,343 (1982).
*®^ Stainless Steel Sheet From United Kingdom. 48
Federal Register 19,048 (1983).
*®® Carbon Steel Structural Shapes From Luxembourg. 
47 Federal Register 26,331 (1982).
*®^ Steel Products From Italv. 47 Federal Register 39,356 (1981).
*®® Float Glass From Italv. 46 Federal Register
22,776 (1981).
*®^ Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes From Spain. 
49 Federal Register 47,060 (1984).
*^** Steel Products From France. 47 Federal Register 
26,315 (1982).
^      :___
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assistance*^*, financial assistance provided for the 
purpose of encouraging the introduction of new 
technology*”*^, and research and development aid for the 
establishment of institutes for research*^^ can all be 
subject to countervailing duties.
Research and development costs have been deemed part of 
the ultimate costs of products and if government 
assistance is provided for these activities, the benefit 
conferred may be countervailable.*^* Governmental 
assistance will be a subsidy in so far as such 
assistance confers a competitive advantage that has been 
acquired without the required expenditure of resources.
But, assistance by a government to a firm to finance 
research and development will not confer a 
countervailable benefit where the results of the 
research have been, or will be, made available to the 
public, including competitors of the company in the 
United States.*^® Naturally this is rarely the case in 
practice.
This extra-statutory concession granted at the instance 
of the ITA has also been attacked by the CIT. In one 
case involving research and development expenditure, the 
Court held that "it is immaterial whether the 
information is disseminated to all groups, but whether 
the research and development is targeted to assist a
*^* Steel Products From the Federal Republic of 
Germanv. 47 Federal Register 26,321.
*^  ^ Steel Products From the Netherlands. 47 Federal Register 26,335 (1982).
*”*^ Ibid
*^* Optic Liquid level Sensing Svstems From Canada. 
44 Federal Register 1,728 (1979).
175 ITA Regulations, supra note 39, 23,382.
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particular rather than a general industry",*”*® A 
confusing situation has therefore developed and it is 
not clear from the decision of the Court whether the 
general public dissemination of findings in research and 
development programmes suffices to prevent a ruling 
against the existence of countervailable subsidies.
No distinction is made between government activities in 
the economic sector and government support for commerce 
and industry. Thus, natural gas energy supplies provided 
at preferential rates have been considered domestic 
subsidies despite being an integral part of a 
government's economic strategy for the country.
Governmental activities in social affairs can also 
constitute a domestic subsidies where this impinges on 
the commercial affairs of enterprises. For example, 
European Community labour assistance payments*^® have 
been countervailed as well as other social security 
payments. *^^
The range of government agencies from which subsidies 
can be considered to emanate is also considerable. Not 
only are central, regional, local and district 
government assistance programmes domestic subsidies but 
also, in certain circumstances, government department 
assistance such as grants from ministries of defence*®** 
and payments at other than commercial rates from public
**® Aarexco v United States. 604 F.Supp 1238 (1985) .
*^  ^ Fresh Cut Flowers From the Netherlands. 51 
Federal Register 37,944 (1986),
*^® Ibid.
*^  ^Comeau Seafoods Ltd v United States. (1989 CIT) ; 
reproduced at (1990) 2:1 WTM 141.*
*®** Industrial Cellulose From France. 48 Federal Register 11,971 (1983).
    : .
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corporations. Even cross-subsidisation through sales to 
military services at artificially high prices have been 
held to be domestic subsidies,*®*
(b) Loans
Government loans at other than commercially available 
rates of interest are considered domestic subsidies. No 
distinction is made among long term, medium term and 
short term loans other than for the purposes of 
quantification. *®^
The purpose of the loan is irrelevant for establishing 
whether or not it is a domestic subsidy. So long as the 
assistance is provided from a government to a commercial 
enterprise, it qualifies as a domestic subsidy. For 
example, preferential interest rate programmes for firms 
locating in economically disadvantaged areas are still 
subsidies regardless of their function.*®®
Again the form of loan assistance can vary. On the one 
hand, it may be in the form of operating capital 
loans*®* or loans to uncreditworthy firms*®® and on the 
other hand, such assistance may take the form of 
interest rate rebates*®®.
*®* Ibid.
*®^ Float Glass From Italv. 47 Federal Register
56.160 (1982); and Stainless Steel Products From Spain. 
47 Federal Register 51,453 (1982).
*®® Float Glass From Italy. 46 Federal Register
22,776 (1981).
*®* Chains and Parts Thereof From Spain. 47 Federal 
Register 6,908 (1982).
*®® Steel Products From Belgium. 47 Federal Register26,300 (1982).
*®® Float Glass From Belgium, 46 Federal Register
30.160 (1981).
- ■ ____________________________________
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In common with grants, the range of government bodies 
capable of providing domestic subsidies in the form of 
grants is substantial. In the past,' loans from central 
and local government sources have been considered 
domestic subsidies as have loans from state 
companies*®^, from the European Investment Bank*®®, from 
the European Community*®^ and even loans under a 
European recovery programme for steel producers.*^
(c) Guarantees
Government guarantees to third parties in support of the 
commercial operations of domestic producers may 
constitute subsidies. For example, loan guarantees and 
even loans to establish housing facilities for workers 
have been held to be domestic subsidies.*^*
(d) Tax Concessions
Tax concessions constitute domestic subsidies if they 
provide an advantage to a producer because they allow a 
producer to decrease its final tax bill. Generally this 
is done either in the form of tax rebates or tax 
credits. Thus, tax credits to reduce corporation tax 
liability*^^, deductions for tax liability*^® and
*®^ Steel Products From the United Kingdom. 47 Federal Register 26,343 (1982).
*®® Ibid.
*®^ Certain Carbon Steel Structured Shapes From the 
United Kingdom. 47 Federal Register 39,384 (1982).
*^° Float Glass From the FRG. 47 Federal Register 
57,549 (1982).
*^* Steel Products From FRG. 47 Federal Register 
26,321 (1982).
Float Glass From FRG. 47 Federal Register 57,549
(1982) .
_
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corporate tax and income tax rebates*^ are all domestic 
subsidies.
There is no requirement that the tax must be a central 
government tax. Exemptions from local government taxes 
constitute subsidies.^® Similarly, the type of tax is 
not relevant in this computation. Thus, social security 
payments exemptions^® and exemptions from property 
taxes*^ constitute subsidies.
In Armco Inc v United States, the treatment of tax 
concessions was thoroughly considered by the Court of 
International T r a d e . T h e  concessions in question were 
abatements of tax under a Malaysian statute allowing 
five percent tax rebate on the fob value of a company's 
export revenues in a taxable year and tax depreciation 
allowances for plant facilities allowing deductions 
exceeding the useful lives of the assets depreciated. 
The ITA had held both of these to be non-actionable.
The CIT reversed the ruling of the ITA finding instead 
that both allowances were actionable subsidies. The 
abatement of tax was considered a countervailable 
subsidy because although its benefits accrued to a
Float Glass From Italv. 46 Federal Register 
10,971 (1981).
194 Ibid.
*^® Float Glass From Belgium. 46 Federal Register30,160 (1981).
*^® Steel Products From Italv. 47 Federal Register 26,327 (1982).
Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Belgium. 47 Federal 
Register 30,541 (1982).
Slip No. 88-05; reproduced at (1990) 2:3 WTM 176.
Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Malavsia. 53 FederalRegister 13,303 (1988).
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subsidiary company, it was nevertheless indirect export 
subsidy. Similarly, the depreciation allowances were 
held to be actionable because they constituted specific 
domestic subsidies.
(e) Supplv or services and goods
The provision of goods and services at rates less than 
those paid by other producers constitutes a domestic 
subsidy. For example, preferential rail transportation 
rates
A less obvious form of supply of goods and service is 
the issue of natural resource subsidies for the 
production of energy and raw materials. While this 
subject cannot be divorced from the issue of so-called S'S;upstream subsidies, which will be considered later^ ***.
Carbon Steel Structured Shapes From the United 
Kingdom, 47 Federal Register 39,384 (1984).
*^** See text, infra, pp. 605-607.
it should be noted that where a government subsidises 
raw materials which constitute inputs, it is difficult 
to see how this will not constitute actionable 
subsidies.
(ii) The Specificity Test
J
s
In theory, the major limitation on the application of 
countervailing duties to domestic subsidies is the so- 
called specificity test. The statute expressly provides 
that, in order to be actionable, a domestic subsidies 
must be provided to 'a specific enterprise or industry 
or group of enterprises or industries'. This distinction 
allows the separation of domestic subsidies into two 
categories: general domestic subsidies and specific
domestic subsidies. In theory, only the latter are
'■•s'-
589
countervailable under the terms of the statute.
The logic behind this apparently self-imposed limitation 
is not clear. Neither Article VI or the 1979 Subsidies 
Code require contracting parties to limit the definition 
of countervailable subsidies to a particular class of 
subsidies, although the European Community and Canada 
also apply a similar test in ascertaining 
countervailable domestic s u b s i d i e s . The motive for 
maintaining the principle is to allow a workable 
distinction to be drawn between general domestic 
subsidies such as infrastructure expenditure which could 
only be quantified with great difficult and more 
specific assistance. It is the result of pragmatism 
rather than altruism.
Ironically, ever since, both Congress and the ITA have 
attempted to restrict the category of non-specific 
domestic subsidies. The point here is that, while the 
1979 definition of countervailable domestic subsidy was 
consistent with the United States obligations, the long­
term trend has been to reduce this concession and the 
incentive for this policy has been mainly political, 
although the judiciary has provided general support for 
this policy.
The formulation of the principles behind the specificity 
test has largely been left to the ITA and there has been 
criticism that the ITA has failed to establish clear 
guidelines on this issue. One writer has suggested that 
the effort by the Commerce Department to deal with the 
issue of specificity has led to 'the creation of
See E. Vermulst, "Comment on U.S. Law and 
Practice on Subsidies", in J.H.J. Bourgeois, Subsidies 
in International Trade (1991), 49, 52.
590
arbitrary rules'.^® Similarly, the members of a Canada- 
United States binational review panel have complained 
that 'despite continuing efforts of Commerce and the 
courts to explain and clarify this issue the standards 
for finding specificity remain underdeveloped, opaque, 
contradictory, elusive and unsatisfying'.^* Yet, it has 
been this uncertainty that has allowed the Department of 
Commerce to manipulate the scope of actionable domestic 
subsidies.
In its proposed rules the ITA suggested the following 
rule as the guideline for determining specificity:
'Commerce will not act against a foreign subsidy 
program unless the program 'provides selective 
treatment to a product or firm.' Selective 
treatment is defined in 355.43 as either;
(a) a programme under which benefits are tied to 
exports or export performance; or
(b) a domestic subsidy under which the benefits 
are limited in law or in fact to a specific 
enterprise or industry within the 
jurisdiction.
The first point to note is that selective treatment 
applies to both products and firms. This distinction is 
important in the calculation of the amount of subsidy. 
Countervailable benefits must be tied to the actual 
merchandise under investigation. Thus, if the benefit is 
provided to a firm, it must be distributed over the
*^*® D. Tarullo, "Beyond Normalacy in the Regulation 
of International Trade", (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 
546, 561.
Investigation into Fresh. Chilled and Frozen 
Pork. Inv. No, 89-1904-06 (1990) 30 ILM 181 (1991).
Rule 355.43, ITA Regulations. 54 Federal Register23,366 (1989).
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whole of the relevant merchandise over a specific period 
of time. A number of other economic factors must be 
taken into account in this calculation.^® If the 
selective treatment has been applied directly to 
products, the calculation simply required the direct 
attribution of the benefit to the products in question.
Secondly, the selectivity criterion applies to both 
exports and export performance. This allows the ITA to 
countervail benefits that are paid in proportion to 
export performance as well as benefits given simply to 
stimulate exports, whether or not this in fact occurs.
The remainder of the formula deals with the application 
of the de facto and de jure specificity tests prescribed 
by statute. The principles behind this concept have been 
developed over the course of nearly a decade of 
administration and have had a controversial evolution.
Actionable domestic subsidies must meet two conditions 
before countervailing duties can be applied:
(a) The programme must benefit a specific set of 
recipients; and
(b) The programme must be preferential insofar as 
a specific recipient acquires goods or 
services on more favourable terms than other 
companies in the country.^*
In the investigations immediately following the 
introduction of the 1979 Act, the ITA interpreted the 
statutory language to mean that a domestic subsidy could 
be countervailed only if provided to a specific
See Horlick, supra note 154, 35.
*^** See S.J. Powell & J.D. Mclnernay, "International 
Energy Trade and the Unfair Trade Laws", (1989) 
University of Penn Journal Int'l Bus Law 3 39, 346.
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enterprise or group of enterprises.^® However, this 
interpretation of the law was not fully endorsed in all 
quarters, particularly in Congress and among American 
businesses.^* The matter came to a head in a series of 
cases lasting almost ten years in which American 
industries repeatedly brought actions against ITA 
decisions on specificity.
The first challenge to the ITA's interpretation of the 
specificity requirement came against its finding that 
two foreign accelerated depreciation programmes could 
not be countervailed because they were generally 
available to all eligible recipients. The question of 
specificity was referred to the Court of International 
Trade which rejected the applicants argument that 
benefits from governmental programmes could be 
considered countervailable even if they are generally 
available on a non-preferential basis in favour of the 
ITA's interpretation of the principle.^* Any other 
interpretation of the law, according to the court, would 
have resulted in an 'absurdly broad definition' of 
subsidies that could have been applied only with extreme 
difficulty.
Examining the decision of the Court more closely, the
In particular, see Steel Products From South 
Africa. 48 Federal Register 29,564 (1983); and Softwood 
Products From Canada. 48 Federal Register 24,159 (1983).
*^** See generally, L.A. Cameron & G.C. Berg, "The 
U.S. Countervailing Duty Law and the Principle of 
General Availability", (1985) 19 JWTL 497.
*^** See Anhydrous and Aaua Ammonia From Mexico. 48 
Federal Register 28,522 (1983); Carbon Black From
Mexico. 48 Federal Register, 29,564 (1983); and Portland 
Hydraulic Cement and Cement Clinker From Mexico. 48 
Federal Register 43,063 (1983).
Carlise Tire & Rubber Co. v United States, 564 
F.Supp. 834 (CIT 1983).
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presiding judge, Judge Maletz, observed that the law 
required that 'at a minimum either a regional or 
industry preference must be present in order for a 
bounty or grant to e x i s t T h e  court deferred to the 
interpretation of the concept applied by the ITA 
observing that some special or comparative advantage had 
to be conferred upon an industry or group of industries 
and, if such an advantage were available to all 
manufacturers and producers within a given country, 
there would be no element of specificity.
Within a year, a further case had been brought to 
challenge the ITA's interpretation of the principle. The 
basis for the second action was an ITA determination 
that a South African tax allowance permitting two 
hundred percent deductions in respect of certain tax 
liabilities for employment training programmes was not 
countervailable because it was generally available to 
all South African producers who satisfied the conditions 
for receiving the benefit.^®
While the Court of International Trade was prepared to 
uphold the Commerce decision, this was on the basis of 
a different rationale than in the earlier case.^** The 
ITA decision had depended on the principle that the 
deductions were available to all South African 
industries, but the Court rendered its decision on the 
ground that 'the practice in question was a tax law and 
tax laws are not subsidies to the taxpayer if their 
terms are generally available.'
212 Ibid, 837.
*^® Steel Products From South Africa. 47 Federal 
Register 39,379 (1982).
Bethlehem Steel Corporation v United States. 590 
F.Supp. 1237 (CIT 1984).
■:S,
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Nevertheless, by way of obiter, the Court of 
International Trade hinted that it would be prepared to 
reverse its earlier decision that as a rule generally 
available benefits are not subsidies. The court stated 
that 'there is no reason why a particular benefit cannot 
be extended without limitation and still be 
countervailable. This was the first indication that 
the CIT was not completely satisfied with its earlier 
decision.
A confrontation between the ITA and the Court of 
International Trade appeared imminent and occurred after 
an investigation into a complaint against Mexican 
government programmes which supplied carbon black 
feedstock to Mexican carbon black producers at prices 
below world market prices. The ITA declined to hold 
countervailable programmes which provided a limited 
number of carbon black producers access to the low cost 
feedstock from the petroleum industry which is operated 
as a government monopoly in the country.^®
This decision was made on the ground that, at least in 
law, any industry in Mexico was entitled to the supply 
of the byproducts at preferential rates, not only the 
two companies that in fact used the product. Commerce 
argued that by definition, 'programs or benefits that 
are generally available within the exporting country are 
not countervailable'.
The Court disagreed and upheld the submissions of the 
petitioner that when a government programme which is 
nominally available to all industries confers a de facto 
benefit only on specific enterprises, the programmes
Ibid, 1242.
*^® Carbon Black From Mexico. 48 Federal Register29,564 (1983).
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fall within the specificity standard set by statute for 
countervailable subsidies. While in terms of the 
relevant foreign law the programmes were generally 
available, in fact it was only the two companies under 
investigation that benefitted from the programmes.^? 
The subsidies were therefore conferred on identifiable 
producers because the commodities were actually used 
only by a limited number of producers.
The Court therefore created the principle that, if there 
was a 'bestowal upon a specific class' of a benefit 
which amounted to a 'competitive advantage' even 
although it was not a de jure generally available 
domestic subsidy, the programme could be countervailed. 
General availability was to be established on a case-by- 
case analysis focusing on the benefits provided to 
recipients rather than on the nominal availability of 
the benefit.?*®
The court gave no satisfactory explanation for the 
reversal of its earlier decisions, even although the 
cases involved differed only slightly on the facts in 
question. In fairness to the Department of Commerce, the 
ITA did not immediately endorse the view of the Court 
and continued to apply its own interpretation of the 
specificity test. However, when this decision was 
reaffirmed in a second case brought by the same 
petitioners against a different benefit the ITA 
reluctantly conceded that de facto specific subsidies
?*? Cabot Corporation v United States fCabot II . 620 
F.Supp. 722 (CIT 1986), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed Cir. 1986).
?*® See also, J.A. Restani, "An Introduction to 
Statutory Responses to Import Penetration", (1986) 18
New York University Journal Int'l Law & Politics 1087.
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could be countervailed.?**
The immediate consequence of this decision was that 
United states producers reactivated their earlier 
complaints where these had earlier led to negative 
determinations of countervailable subsidies.??**
The next case in this series was PPG Industries v United 
States which originated from a determination that 
certain products from Mexico could not be the subject of 
a countervailing duty order because the benefits derived 
by the Mexican producers of the product were generally 
available.??* The case involved imports of float glass 
from Mexican manufacturers who had acquired natural gas 
energy at below world prices.??? These supplies were 
available to all industries throughout Mexico, not only 
float glass producers.
The CIT upheld the findings of the ITA.??® In its 
arguments before the court, the plaintiffs contended 
that any programme reducing the costs of producing or 
exporting a product should be countervailed irrespective 
of whether other companies received similar benefits.??*
?** Cabot Corporation v United States fCabot 11^ . 694 F.Supp. 949 (CIT 1988).
??** Compare, Softwood Lumber Products From Canada. 48 
Federal Register 10,395 (1983) and Softwood Lumber
Products From Canada. 51 Federal Register 51,453 (1986).
??* Unprocessed Float Glass From Mexico. 48 Federal 
Register 56,095 (Dec. 1983).
??? Unprocessed Float Glass From Mexico. 49 Federal 
Register 7,264 (1984).
??® PPG Industries Inc v United States. 662 F.Supp. 
258 (CIT 1987.
??* On the implications of this argument, see J.H. 
Bello & A.F. Holmer, "The Specificity Dialogue 
Continues", (1988) 22:2 International Lawyer 563.
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In effect, this was an attempt on the part of the 
plaintiffs to remove the express words of the statute 
referring to specificity in the countervailing of 
domestic subsidies. In response, the respondent argued 
that the literal language of the statute precluded such 
an interpretation.
The Court ruling in the PPG Case provides an interesting 
insight into the conflicting interests involved in the 
application of the test. On the one hand, Judge Carman 
noted that it would be absurd to countervail generally 
available public benefits such as defence and 
educational spending but, at the same time, there was 
also a certain degree of unfairness in rendering a 
benefit non-countervailable merely because it was 
generally available. Some sort of guidelines were 
required to reach a middle ground.
In the final event, the main principle elaborated in 
this decision was whether, on a case-by-case basis, a 
competitive advantage had actually been conferred in 
fact on a specific industry or group of industries, 
rather than concentrating on the nominal availability of 
such an advantage. Applying this standard to the facts 
of the case before him. Judge Carman held that the 
application of certain eligibility requirements for 
participation in a programme does not oer se make the 
benefits conferred under the programme countervailable.
Within one month, the court was required to consider the 
whole issue again in Can-Am Corporation v United States 
which concerned the provision by the Mexican government 
of fuel oil at below world prices only to industrial 
purchaser who were willing to use the fuel in Mexico to 
produce goods.??® The court ruled that the
225 664 F.Supp. 1444 (CIT 1987).
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interpretation given to the specificity principle in 
Cabot I was erroneous and that the PPG Case should be 
followed. This required that the ITA conduct a de facto, 
case-by-case analysis to determine whether or not a 
programme provided a subsidy to a specific industry or 
group of industries. In effect, this decision reversed 
all other court decisions prior to the hearing of this 
case
The CIT decision in PPG Industries Inc v United States 
was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit which provided the final ruling on the point.??® 
In a split opinion, the majority of the court held that 
the ITA decision was correct and that the test should be 
two-fold. First, if a domestic subsidy is provided by 
its terms to a particular enterprise or industry, it is 
countervailable without further inquiry. Second, if the 
benefit appears by its terms to be generally available 
to all industries, the benefits may nevertheless be 
countervailable if, 'in its application, the programme 
results in a subsidy only to a specific enterprise or 
industry or specific group of enterprises or 
industries.???
The findings of the appeal court in the PPG Case, 
however, only apply to those cases initiated before the 
1988 Act came into force because the 1988 statute 
significantly amends the pre-existing rule.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 
adopted the amended de facto use test endorsed by the
??® PPG Industries v United States. 928 F.2d 1568 
(Fed. Cir. 1991). Reproduced, with commentary by G.N. 
Horlick, at 30 ILM 1179 (1991).
??? On this point, the Court specifically referred to 
the ITA Regulations. 54 Federal Register 23,366 (May1989).
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Court of International Trade in the Cabot I Case. While 
the original definition of actionable domestic subsidy 
is not altered by the act, a new subsection was added 
which reads:
•In applying [the specificity test], the 
administering authority, in each investigation, 
shall determine whether the bounty, grant, or 
subsidy in law or in fact is provided to a specific 
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or 
industries, '??®
The same amendment expressly instructs the ITA to 
refrain from finding that nominal general availability, 
under the terms of any law, regulation, programme or 
rule establishing a bounty, grant or subsidy is a basis 
for a finding that a bounty, grant or subsidy has not, 
in fact, been provided to a specific enterprise or 
industry.??*
The statutory history behind this amendment reveals why 
the original de facto test endorsed for the first time 
in Cabot I prevailed over the later decisions of the 
Court of International Trade. The House Report 
accompanying the bill that finally became the 1988 
statute stressed that the 'competitive advantage' 
language used by the Court in Cabot I will provide a 
basis for a substantially broader definition of 
countervailable domestic subsidy.?®** Further, the 
statute indicates that proof that a programme is 
nominally generally available is not in itself a
??® Section 771(5) (B) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended 
by Section 1312 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988.
??* Ibid.
?®** See Bello & Holmer, supra note 224, 567.
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complete defence to the application of a countervailing 
order. ?®*
From the foregoing, a number of conclusions may be drawn 
on the issue of specificity.
First, the legal basis for the rule is unsatisfactory 
despite the 1988 amendment. The rule is a creature of 
administrative practice and is inherently vague. The 
practices originally identified in Section 771(5) as 
domestic subsidies were intended to be illustrative and 
not designed to restrict the reach of the countervailing 
statute.?®? However, it is possible that the 1988 
amendment to the provision may bring about a degree of 
stability in this matter although it does not add any 
clarity to the rule.
The test also requires the ITA to examine the internal 
policies of other countries and to comment on the 
propriety of these policies in so far as the 
distribution of resources within that country is 
concerned. In one sense, a finding that a subsidy is 
countervailable is tantamount to an accusation that a 
country has adopted an improper policy. In fact, all 
that the ITA is deciding is that the country's policy is 
not based, to the same degree, on the market-oriented 
principles as the United States.
A much less confrontational strategy would be to focus 
on the international trade-distorting effect of a 
programme. However, this might not be an effective 
substitute for United States purposes because it is
?®* J.A. Ragosta & H.M. Shanker, "Specificity of 
Subsidy Benefits in U.S. Department of Commerce 
Countervailing Determinations", (1994) 25:2 Law & Pol'y 
Int'l Bus. 639.
232 Greenwald, supra note 101, 37.
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widely accepted that export subsidies have the greatest 
trade-distorting impact and that domestic subsidies have 
a much more limited comparative effect. Consequently, 
the average levels of countervailing duties applied 
against products benefitting from a subsidy would 
decline.
II
Second, the problem of the specificity principle is 
that, almost invariably some industries will benefit 
more than others from general programmes. For example, 
where energy is subsidised, energy-intensive industries 
will benefit more that industries that use less energy 
in the production of goods. But, nevertheless, most 
industries will derive some form of assistance in 
reducing their overheads. In such cases, the energy- 
intensive industries will benefit in relative terms more 
that the remaining industries, but almost all industries 
will be able to take advantage of the situation. The 
principle of specificity is of little use in drawing the 
line between those industries that in fact benefit more 
than others and in determining where that line is to be 
drawn.
An alternative approach would be not to focus on the 
form or availability of the subsidy, but to concentrate 
on its purposes and effects.?®®
Third, from a practical perspective, there are few 
guidelines on the application of the test. The proposed 
notice specifies that, in determining specificity, the 
ITA will consider:
(a) the extent to which a government acts to limit 
the availability of a programme;
(b) the number of enterprises, industries, or
233 See Cameron & Berg, supra note 209, 505.
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groups that actually use the programme;
(c) wether there are dominant users of a
programme, or whether certain industries or 
groups derive proportionally larger benefits; 
and
(d) the extent to which a government exercises
discretion in conferring benefits under a
programme.
At the same time, a programme will be specific if the 
I TA determines that benefits under the programme are 
limited to enterprises or industries located in a
specific region or regions of a country.
However, these guidelines do not cover all situations. 
For example, as regards the concept of a particular 
group of industries, in the past the ITA has determined 
that a particular agricultural sector of a country's 
economy 'could not constitute a separate groups of 
industries'.^* Yet, two years later, the ITA was 
prepared to concede that producers of separate stage 
agricultural products may in fact constitute such a 
group. 237
Fourth, there are also unresolved questions as to 
whether particular programmes can be broken up into 
smaller funding programmes and thus made actionable. If 
such practices are permitted, it is likely that the
234 Rule 3 55.43, ITA Regulations, supra note 39.
235 Ibid.
23* Fresh Asparagus From Mexico, 48 Federal Register 
21,618 (1983).
237 Live Swine and Fresh. Chilled and Frozen Pork 
Products From Canada. 50 Federal Register 25,097 (1985).
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smaller the programme, the more specific the subsidy.^* 
Thus, agencies set up to provide grants to specific 
business may find that their assistance is 
countervailable insofar as it has been tailored to meet 
the individual needs of companies.
This issue has in fact arisen in the past. In one 
complaint, the ITA was required to consider whether a 
Mexican agricultural support programme was sufficiently 
specific. 9^ The programme in question provided a broad 
range of benefits to a wide number of agricultural 
producers. The ITA rendered a negative preliminary 
determination which was appealed to the CIT which formed 
the opinion that the programme should have been broken 
down into different sections to determine
specificity.
However, the I T A  subsequently adopted the policy of 
examining separately each specific development programme 
without waiting for the decision in its earlier case to 
be r e v e r s e d ,  241 Nevertheless, the C I T  determined that 
the I T A  has failed to perform this task adequately and 
declared the applicable principle to be that all 
regional programmes should be broken down in order to 
determine 'the actual results or effects of assistance
233 This is despite the fact that Rule 355.43, 
specifically declares that the agency will not regard a 
programme as being specific merely because the programme 
is limited to small or medium-size firms.
23^ Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico. 49 Federal 
Register 4,023 (1984).
24(^ Roses Inc v United States. 743 F.Supp. 870 (CIT
1990).
24^ Fresh Atlantic Groundfish From Canada. 51 FederalRegister 10,041 (1986).
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provided... and not [its] purposes or intentions'.The 
court also reiterated that the specificity test involves 
a case-by-case analysis of the benefits conferred and is 
not dependent on the nominal general availability of the 
programme. As a result, four economic and regional 
assistance programmes were held countervailable.
The final point is that the issue of whether a subsidy 
is actionable or not is not resolved by reference to the 
definition of subsidy contained in Section 771(5) as 
amended. The section refers to their economic effect and 
form rather than their purpose. The new Draft Subsidies 
Code, in contrast, while partially adopting the 
principle of specificity, defines actionable subsidies 
by reference to their purpose. It will be remembered 
that the new Code establishes three categories of 
subsidies: (a) prohibited subsidies; (b) actionable
subsidies; and (c) permissible subsidies.Actionable 
subsidies include domestic subsidies that cause injury.
#
The primary advantage of adopting this three fold 
classification system would be that it facilitates the 
partial elimination of the specificity test. 2** 
Naturally, detailed rules would be required to identify 
which forms of assistance fall into which categories. 
However, this system has the benefit of clearly 
delineating which forms of assistance will be 
countervailed instead of leaving the resolution of this 
issue to the inconsistent attentions of the 
administering agency.
comeau Seafoods Ltd v United States. Slip Op. 89- 
155 (CIT 1989); reproduced at (1990) 2:1 WTM 141.
243 See text supra, pp. 131-141.
244 See W. Lay, "Redefining Actionable Subsidies 
Under United States Countervailing Duty Law", (1991) 91 
Col Law Review 149 5, 1516.
:
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(iii) Proposed Forms of Statutory Countervailable
Domestic Subsidies
The United States Congress has frequently adopted 
proposals that would render certain forms of government 
assistance actionable regardless of the forms, purpose 
or specificity. Their attention has mainly been drawn to 
practices deemed particularly pernicious. The common 
element in these proposed statutorily countervailable 
subsidies is that they are deemed to have inequitable 
purposes.
Thus, in 1984, the Subcommittee on Trade of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means considered 
an amendment to the Trade Reform Bill passing through 
Congress at that time. The object of this amendment was 
to render countervailable certain forms of domestic 
subsidies regardless of specificity or otherwise.
The Committee proposed that the following subsidies be 
deemed countervailable;
(a) Export targeting subsidies
(b) Natural resource subsidies
(c) Upstream subsidies.
Both the export targeting and natural resource subsidy 
amendments were removed from the final Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984. This was due to the opposition of the full 
Ways and Means Committee and the Reagan Administration, 
Nevertheless, upstream subsidies did become 
countervailable under the 1984 Act.
Under the terms of the proposed amendment for natural 
resources subsidies, such assistance would have been
245 See H. Destler, American Trade Politics: Svstem 
Under Stress (1986), 138.
.  - '  _
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rendered statutorily countervailable if, by government 
regulation, a natural resource was provided to a 
domestic user at below the export or fair market value, 
access to the resource at the low domestic price was 
denied to United States purchasers, and the cost of the 
resource at its fair market value constituted a 
significant portion of the production costs of the 
product in question.^*
This would have had the effect of eliminating the broad 
exclusion for natural resource products generally 
available as decided by the ITA in earlier c a s e s . T h e  
natural resource subsidy proposal was a flagrant attempt 
by the Committee to interfere with the existing 
processes administering the law and would have been 
tantamount to a direct attack on the policy of the ITA 
in this matter.243 it also provides an indication of the 
willingness of members of the Congress to meddle in the 
statutory processes without regard to the international 
rules.
Although the 1988 Act contains no provisions authorising 
the imposition of duties against statutory 
countervailable subsidies, this should not be seen as a 
source of comfort. The imagination of Congressional 
figures should not be underestimated although it is 
difficult to predict exactly which measures will be 
introduced in the future. However, two trends have been 
identified.
24* See Cameron & Berg, supra note 209, 502.
247 See Carbon Black From Mexico. 48 Federal Register 
29,564 (June 1983).
243 See J.H. Bello & A.P. Holmer, "Subsidies and 
Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a Lateral Attack on 
the Specificity Test", (1984) 18:2 George Washington
Journal Int’l Law and Economics 297.
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First, there have been proposals mooted that, where 
benefits accrue to a broad range of industries, rules 
should be developed to identify those producers who 
benefit disproportionately from others, and to treat 
these benefits as subsidies.
Second, there has also been proposals to create a 
special category for goods that have been produced with 
the benefit of below-world-market priced products. These 
inputs would be treated as carrying a countervailable 
subsidy .25®
(D) Quantification of Subsidies
In addition to deciding whether a subsidy is 
countervailable, the ITA is also responsible for 
quantifying the amount of the subsidy conferred. 
Naturally the value of the subsidy will determine the 
level of countervailing duty imposed.
The value of a subsidy is calculated by the ITA on the 
basis of the 'benefit to the recipient* and not the 
'cost to the government' principle as has been adopted 
by other states including the European Community.25^ The 
difference in these approaches can be demonstrated by 
means of an example.
Suppose that a government borrows finance from an 
institutional lender and makes this finance available to 
a firm that can only obtain credit at much higher rates
24® See Can-Am Corporation v United States. 664 
F.Supp. 1444, 1447-49 (CIT 1987).
25® See Cabot Corporation v United States fCabot I) . 
620 F.Supp 722, 733 (CIT 1985).
25^ See Fediol v EC Commission. Case 177/85, Judgment of July 14, 1988.
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of interest. Presume that the government pays 8% per 
annum for the funds and provided the funds to the 
enterprise at a rate of 0%. In the commercial market­
place, the firm can only obtain funds at a rate of 15% 
interest. On a cost to the government basis, the subsidy 
granted would be calculated as 8% of the loan each year, 
but on a benefit to the recipient basis, the subsidy is 
15% (ie. the difference between the commercial rate and 
the actual rate) of the loan each year.
On the whole, the benefit to the recipient methods tends 
to exceed the value of the cost to the government 
calculation in most cases. The benefit to the recipient 
sum is also a one-sided calculation. This is evident if 
regional grants are considered. If a country provides 
assistance to a company to locate in a particular 
geographically or economically disadvantaged area, the 
ITA is required to counter the full amount of any 
subsidy given and does not offset the advantages with an 
amount to compensate for the disadvantages that the 
support is designed to overcome.
The calculation of the amount of a subsidy is the most 
obvious method of manipulating the countervailing duty 
laws to provide protection. If countervailing duty 
levels are set higher than the actual levels of 
subsidisation, foreign producers would be placed at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to domestic producers. 
The GATT and the 197 9 Subsidies Code expressly prohibit 
such practices, but there are no international rules for 
the quantification of subsidy levels. The matter is 
therefore one of great administrative discretion.
The conceptual basis for the valuation of a subsidy has 
been the source of much friction between the United 
States and its trading partners, particularly the 
European Community. While the Community tends to value
609
subsidies on the basis of the cost to the government, 
the United States authorities take the view that the 
level of subsidisation is relative to the benefit 
conferred on an enterprise by the a s s i s t a n c e . i n  a 
number of cases this causes substantial differences in 
the calculation of the subsidy.
(E) Calculation of Net Subsidy and Allocation of 
Benefits
(1) Calculation of Net Subsidy
Once a subsidy has been quantified, the Commerce 
Department is required to deduct from the gross subsidy 
any factors which reduce the real value of the
subsidy. 253
According to the 1979 Act, the ITA is entitled to make 
the following deductions in calculating net subsidies;
(a) any application fee, deposit, or similar
payment paid in order to qualify for, or to
receive, the benefit of the subsidy;
(b) any loss in the value of the subsidy resulting 
from its deferred receipt, if the deferral is 
mandated by government order; and
(c) export taxes, duties, or other charges levied 
on the export of merchandise to the United
States specifically intended to offset the
232 See Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Czechoslovakia. 49 
Federal Register 19,370 (1984); and Carbon Steel Wire
From Poland. 50 Federal Register 30,125 (1985).
253 See generally, G. MacDonnell, "Offset Policy 
Under the New Countervailing Duty Law", (1982) 15
Cornell Int'l Law Journal 429.
______
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subsidy received.
Prior to 1979, the Department of Treasury has adopted a 
less rigorous approach by attempting 'to maintain 
flexibility and discretion, and to emphasize trade 
distortion effects rather than the mere conferral of a 
benefit. This discretion has been severely curtailed 
by the 1979 Act, but, on the other hand, at least 
objective criteria have been introduced for this 
purpose.
These deductions are narrowly drawn and are intended to 
be e x h a u s t i v e . 25* Also, these deductions are allowed at 
the discretion of the Department of Commerce which 'may 
subtract’ these amounts in the calculation of net 
s u b s i d y .  252 Deductions are not permitted unless 
supported by verifiable e v i d e n c e . 25®
As a consequence numerous deductions have been refused 
by the ITA. Thus, in Certain Softwood Products From 
Canada. the ITA refused to allow dislocation costs (ie., 
the costs of moving production facilities from one 
region to another) and unrebated taxes to be deduction 
from the gross amount.2*®
A more controversial practice has been to ignore the
254 Section 771(6) Trade Agreements Act of 1979
255 j.j. Barcelo, "Subsidies, Countervailing Duties 
and Anti-Dumping After the Tokyo Round", (1980) 13 
Cornell Int'l Law Journal 257, 266,
23* Horlick et al, supra note 154, 42.
252 See Rule 355.46, ITA Regulations which merely 
reiterates the provisions of Section 771(6).
233 Rail Passenger Cars From Canada. 48 Federal 
Register 6,569 (1983).
25® 48 Federal Register 24,159 (1983).
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secondary tax consequences of a countervailable benefit. 
Thus, for example, some governments treat direct cash 
grants from governmental sources as revenue for income 
tax purposes and therefore liable to tax. The Department 
of Commerce effectively ignores the fact that such 
grants may be subject to tax and will not allow this 
liability as a deduction from the amount of the gross 
subsidy.2*® This treatment is wholly artificial and does 
not reflect the fact that the actual amount received by 
the firm is reduced by the amount of tax liability.
Deductions of allowances from gross subsidies are 
critical in quantifying net subsidies. If legitimate 
deductions are not permitted, the effect is to inflate 
the net subsidy figure and ultimately the level of 
countervailing duties applicable. The maintenance of a 
strict control over deductions indicates that Congress 
is not interested in legitimate deduction, but merely 
those immediately connected with receiving the 
assistance.
(B) Allocation of Benefits
There are two aspects to the allocation of benefits. 
First, the benefits must be allocated to particular 
units of production. Second, the benefit must be 
allocated over time.
(i) Allocation of benefits to units of production
Countervailable benefits must be attributed to the 
various firms that have benefitted from the assistance. 
Therefore, for example, regional development grants must 
be isolated to individual firms or companies. 
Complications arise where assistance is given to groups
2*® See, for example, Welded Carbon Steel Pipe and 
Tubes From Argentina. 53 Federal Register 37,619.
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of companies and consortia.
In the case of international consortia, a special rule 
was introduced in the 1988 Act. If the members of an 
international consortium that is engaged in the 
production of a class or kind of merchandise subject to 
a countervailing duty investigation receive subsidies 
from their respective home countries to assist, permit, 
or otherwise enable their participation in that 
consortium, then the ITA is entitled to cumulate all 
such subsidies, as well as subsidies provided directly 
to the international consortium itself, for the purposes 
of valuing the subsidy.
It would be grossly inequitable if all merchandise 
produced by a particular firm, or group of firms, was 
subject to countervailing duties solely because 
assistance had been received for the production of 
specific goods. Government assistance should not be 
allowed to taint all production by an enterprise in the 
absence of legitimate reasons.
Should the ITA conclude that the benefit accrued to 
products other than those being investigated, no duty 
can be imposed. Similarly, if it is determined that a 
countervailable benefit has accrued on products that 
have been exported to a country other than the United 
States, no countervailing duty may be i m p o s e d .  2*2 
However, both these scenarios represent two extremes and 
it is more often than not that products under 
investigation fall between these extremes.
2*^ Section 701(d) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended by 
Section 1315 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
2*2 See Nitrocellulose From France. 52 FederalRegister 833 (1987) .
_______________
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If the subsidy has been bestowed on merchandise which is 
the subject of the investigation, but also on other 
merchandise, the ITA is required to calculate an ad 
valorem subsidy rate. This situation can arise where 
either the benefits accrue to merchandise other than 
that which is the subject of the investigation or not 
all the subsidised merchandise is imported into the 
United States.
Where the ITA determines that a countervailable benefit 
is tied exclusively to the production or sale of a 
particular product or products, it will allocate the 
benefit solely to those products. However, if the 
product or products to which the benefit accrue include 
products other than the merchandise that is the subject 
of the investigation, an ad valorem rate is calculated 
as follows;
(a) in the case of a domestic programme, the 
benefit is divided by the firm's total sales 
of the products which have received the 
subsidy; or
(b) in the case of an export programme, the 
benefit is divided by a firm's total exports 
of the product on which the subsidy has
a c c r u e d .
Alternatively, where products that have benefitted from 
the countervailable benefit have been exported to 
countries other than the United States, the ad valorem 
benefit is calculated by dividing the countervailable 
benefit by:
(a) the firm's total exports to the United States; 
or
Rule 355.47, ITA Regulations.
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(b) if the benefit is tied to exports of a 
particular product, by the firm's total 
exports to the United States of the products 
to which the benefit is tied.
On the other hand, on occasion, the countervailable 
benefit cannot be tied to a particular product. Where 
the ITA determines that a countervailable benefit is not 
tied to the production or sale of a particular product, 
or to the sale of a product in a particular market, the 
ITA will allocate the benefit to all products produced 
by the firm, in the case of a domestic programme or to 
all products exported in the case of an export 
programme. This latter process rule will, of course, 
artificially inflate the final levels of duty found to 
exist.
(ii) Allocation of benefits over time
The allocation of benefits over time requires two
separate stages. First, it is necessary determine the 
moment that a countervailable benefit accrues to a 
company. Second, the benefit must be amortised over the 
length of the production process that has gained from 
the benefit.
It is important to determine the exact time of the
receipt of the benefit since this dictates the year in 
which the benefit will be attributed or, where the 
benefit lasts more than one year, the allocation of the 
benefit over time.
The general rule is that a countervailable benefit will 
accrue at the time there is a cash flow effect on the
firm receiving the benefit.^* Both the cash flow and
264 Rule 355.48, ITA Regulations.
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the economic effect of a benefit normally occur when a 
firm experiences a difference in cash flows, either in 
payments it receives or the outlays that are made as a 
result of receiving the benefit.
Special rules have been established to accommodate 
particular subsidies. For example, grants or equity 
infusions are deemed to accrue at the time the firm 
receives the grant or equity infusion. Where a firm 
receives goods or services, the benefit is deemed to 
accrue at the time the firm pays, or would have paid, 
for the goods or services. In the case of a loan, the 
benefit accrues at the time the recipient is due to make 
payment on the loan.
However, the ITA has express authority to depart from 
these special rules where the circumstances so warrant 
so long as reasons are provided for such departure. The 
typical example is complex construction projects where 
production and delivery may extend over a number of 
years.
The benefits of a non-recurring countervailable subsidy 
must also be allocated over time. The general rule is 
that, depending on the nature of the benefit in 
question, the ITA will either: (a) expense the entire
amount of the benefit in a single year: (b) allocate the 
benefit over two or more years; or (c) calculate the 
annual benefit for two or more years.
Where the benefit can be allocated to a single year's 
production, this procedure presents little problems. In 
the typical case, the review period in an investigation
See, for example, offshore Platform Jackets and 
Piles From Korea. 51 Federal Register 11,779 (1986).
Rule 355.49, ITA Regulations.
i
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is a single calender or fiscal year. Problems do arise 
where the lifetime of the benefit extends over two or 
more years. In this situation, the ITA attempts to 
calculate the amount of the countervailable benefit 
attributable to a particular year generally by 
transforming benefits bestowed in absolute amounts into 
ad valorem equivalents.
Originally, the ITA disbursed the benefit equally over 
each year. This was changed to reflect the fact that 
a lump sum grant was much more valuable than a fraction 
of the whole sum over the course of a number of years. 
Hence, the discount rate was introduced to reflect the 
time value of money over a period when allocating 
b e n e f its.However, arguably the effect of the 
discount rate is to exaggerate the effect of a subsidy 
since the rate itself is decided by the ITA on the 
assumption that the money will be efficiently employed.
(F) The Issue of Indirect Subsidies
The production of manufactured goods requires the 
assembly of various components into the finished 
product. Occasionally, in the production of goods, the 
component parts may have benefitted from subsidies 
which, although granted to another manufacturer, will 
confer a competitive advantage on the final producer by 
reducing the final production costs of the item in 
question. The treatment of articles that have benefitted 
from such indirect subsidies is an extremely contentious 
topic in contemporary international trade law.
See, Steel Products From Belgium. Appendix B, 47Federal Register 39,304 (1982).
Ibid.
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The issue of indirect subsidies did not suddenly emerge 
as a novel concern prior to 1984. In fact, the 
authorities had investigated a number of cases in which 
petitioners has alleged the existence of assistance 
which would now be characterised as indirect
subsidisation. For example, in 1978, the Treasury
Department had investigated a complaint alleging that 
payments to firms engaged in the tanning of leather 
benefitted exports of finished leather handbags.^*
This case, which was heard on the basis of Section 303, 
which at that time had not been amended by the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979, resulted in an ambiguous
determination. While no countervailing duties were 
imposed because the subsidy was found to merely to 
equalise domestic prices with world prices for tanned 
leather, clearly the possibility of imposing duties on 
the finished products, namely the handbags, had been 
contemplated because the Treasury Department expressly 
found the amount of the subsidy on the handbags to be 
zero. Further, less than a year later the Treasury 
Department opened a second investigation, based on new 
evidence, and concluded that the assistance provided to 
the tanners exceeded the amount required to equate 
domestic prices with world prices. Duties were 
subsequently levied on the importation of the 
handbags.
There then followed a stream of cases in which the ITA, 
which succeeded the Treasury Department in the 
investigation of countervailing complaints, found 
subsidies on goods that had not benefited directly from
Leather Handbags From Uruguay, 43 Federal Register 3,904 (1978).
Non-Rubber Footwear. Handbags and Leather Wearing 
Apparel From Uruguay. 43 Federal Register 52,485 (1978).
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government assistance.^* But it was in the United 
States - European Community steel dispute of 1981-1982 
that the issue became politicised.
As we have seen, in 1981, numerous countervailing (and 
anti-dumping) complaints were brought against European 
steel producer s. 2^  ^ Allegations were made by private 
petitioners that European manufacturers had benefitted 
from subsidised coal. The ITA refused to include the 
subsidies in its final calculations of countervailable 
benefits for two reasons. First, the subsidies were not 
considered to be sufficiently significant to warrant 
inclusion in the final order. Second, this source of 
fuel was generally available and therefore did not 
satisfy the specificity test on which countervailable 
subsidies were based at the time.^^^
The CIT refused a accept that this assistance did not 
confer a countervailable benefit and in one case the ITA 
was compelled to concede to a remand from the court 
ordering the recalculation of benefits conferred on a 
German manufacturer using cheap coking coal during 
production.^
A number of other complaints were brought to the 
attention of the ITA at the same time^ ^^ , but it appears
22* See Sodium Gluconate From the European Economic 
Community, 46 Federal Register 45,975 (1981).
222 See text, supra pp. 390-397,
22® See Certain Steel Products From Belgium, 47 
Federal Register 2 6,3 00 (1982); and Certain Steel
Products From France. 47 Federal Register 26,315 (1982).
22^* See Republic Steel Corporation v United States. 
591 F.Supp 640 (CIT 1983).
226 See Forged Undercarriage Components From Italy. 
48 Federal Register 39,273 (1983); and Oil Country
Tubular Goods From Argentina, 49 Federal Register 28,289
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that it was not until the Mexican ammonia decision that 
Congressional patience with the ITA expired.
In October 1982, four American producers of ammonia 
filed a complaint with the ITA seeking relief from 
imports of ammonia from M e x i c o . The complaint alleged 
that these producers had benefitted from sales of 
natural gas at below world prices and that a competitive 
advantage had been conferred on a number of specific 
producers. It was not alleged that the ammonia producers 
had directly received subsidies. Rather, the subsidies 
alleged to confer an unfair advantage resulted from the 
subsidisation of input products in the form of cheap 
fuel.
By way of a preliminary determination, the ITA held that 
the Mexican producer had received a countervailable 
benefit. 2^ The rationale for this determination was 
that Section 771(5) did not differentiate between direct 
and indirect subsidies. The principal distinction in the 
statute was between general and specific subsidies, the 
assistance in question being considered a domestic 
subsidy. Since the price of the natural gas to the 
ammonia manufacturer was less than the price established 
by the Mexican government for other industrial natural 
gas users, an ad valorem duty of 2.95 percent was 
assessed.
This decision was, however, reversed in the final
(1984) .
226 On the background to this case, see generally, 
J.Z. Barsy, "Upstream Subsidies and U.S. Countervailing 
Duty Law: The Mexican Ammonia Decision and the Trade 
Remedied Reform Act of 1984", (1984) 16 Law & Pol*yInt* 1 Bus., 263.
222 Anhvdrous and Aqua Ammonia From Mexico. 48 
Federal Register 14,729 (1983).
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determination, not on the basis of the applicable rules 
but because of a change in the facts considered by the 
ITA.22® After consideration of the submissions of the 
respondents, the ITA held that there was no evidence 
that the Mexican ammonia manufacturer benefitted from 
any preferential rate at all. In the circumstances, the 
preliminary ruling could not be sustained.
The subsequent Congressional reaction could not be 
considered by any means to be rational, objective or 
fair. The ire of Congress was directed against the ITA 
which, by properly applying the letter of the law, had 
found the existence of no countervailable benefit. It 
was not as if the ITA had objected to the application of 
the statute to indirect subsidies, which was in itself 
a questionable contention. Rather the ITA had merely 
held that, on the facts of the case, no duties were 
warranted.
The result was the introduction of the Trade Remedies 
Reform Bill in the House of Representatives, backed 
principally by the Trade Reform Action Coalition, a 
group of industries that perceived trade benefits from 
countervailing products that had benefited from indirect 
s u b s i d i e s  . 2 2 ^  This bill eventually became part of the 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
The 1984 Act added a new Section 771A to the Tariff Act 
of 1930. as amended. According to the amendment, 
indirect subsidies could be countervailed if they could 
be considered upstream subsidies. An ’upstream subsidy’ 
was defined as any subsidy, within the meaning of
22® Anhvdrous and Aaua Ammonia From Mexico. 48 
Federal Register 28,522 (1983).
Act
22^ See D. Holmer & J.H. Bello, "The Trade and Tariff 
of 1984: The Road to Enactment", (1985) 19
International Lawyer 287.
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Section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930 that;
(a) is paid or bestowed by a government with
respect to a product that is used in the
manufacture or production in that country of 
merchandise which is the subject of as
countervailing duty proceeding;
(b) in the judgment of the ITA bestows a
competitive benefit on the merchandise; and
(c) has a significant effect on the cost of 
manufacturing or producing the merchandise,
Each of these conditions must be satisfied before a 
benefit can be considered an upstream subsidy. These are 
not alternative criteria. Nevertheless, at the same 
time, the cumulative nature of these conditions is not 
an impediment to the effective use of this provision.2®*
On the contrary, the effect of this amendment is to 
dramatically extend the scope of the countervailing 
legislation to allow action to be taken against products 
that are not ’like products' in terms of the 1979 
Subsidies Code and the validity of the amendment must be 
seen in that light.
(a) Subsidv paid or bestowed on an input product
Section 771A expressly limits the subsidies that can be 
considered countervailable input subsidies by referring 
to the definition of subsidy in Section 771(5). This has 
the effect of incorporating into the provision the
280 See also Rule 355.45, ITA Regulations.
2®* In contrast, two authors have considered that the 
provision is 'narrowly and carefully drafted’; see J.H. 
Bello & D. Holmer, "The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984; 
Principal Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Provisions", (1985) 19 International Lawyer 639, 645.
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s p e c i f i c i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t .
While the provision refers to Section 771(5), which 
includes export subsidies, in practice its terms are 
applicable only to domestic subsidies quite simply 
because it is difficult to envisage a product that 
benefits from an input export subsidy. An export subsidy 
is payable on, or in proportion to, the physical 
exportation of goods which would preclude such goods 
from being component parts of processed goods certainly 
within the same country.
Therefore, the first stage in the application of this 
test is for the ITA to determine that a countervailable 
domestic subsidy has been provided with respect to an 
input product. It appears that it is only the subsidy 
conferred on the input product that must be specific. In 
other words, it is irrelevant that the manufacturer of 
the input products sells its goods to a number of other 
producers other than the producers whose goods is 
subject to the investigation.
However, in its Proposed Rules, the ITA has attempted to 
mitigate the harshness of this effect by requiring that 
one of three situations exist before the benefit 
conferred on the input subsidy can be said to accrue to 
a finished product.2®®
First, the supplier of the input product and the 
producer of the final product are related parties. In 
other words, the supplier controls the producer, the 
producer controls the supplier, or the supplier and the
2®2 On these rules, see H.M. Giesen, "Upstream 
Subsidies: Policy and Enforcement Questions After the 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1 9 8 4 " ,  ( 1 9 8 5 )  1 7  Law & Pol'y
Int'l Bus., 2 4 1 ,  2 9 9 .
283 Rule 3 5 5 . 4 5 ( b ) ( 2 ) ,  ITA Regulations.
—   - . _
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producer are both controlled by a third party.
Second, the price for the input product is lower than 
the price that the producer otherwise would have to pay 
for the input product in order to obtain it from an 
unsubsidised seller in an arm's length transaction.
Third, the government sets the price of the input 
product so as to guarantee that the benefit provided 
with respect to the input product is passed through to 
the producer of the merchandise.
In the event of any of these three situations being 
established, the input subsidy will be deemed to accrue 
to the final merchandise.
The ITA has also developed a de minimus threshold. Where 
the ad valorem subsidy rate on the input product 
multiplied by the proportion of the total production 
costs of the merchandise accounted for by the input 
product is less than one percent, duties cannot be 
imposed under this section,
(b) Competitive benefit
The general rule for establishing competitive benefit is 
that the price of the input must be lower than the price 
that a manufacturer at arm's length would have paid in 
an identical transaction under identical terms and 
conditions.2®^  The price in an arm's length transaction 
is known as the 'benchmark price' and is the first 
choice method of establishing a basis from which to
2®'* Section 771A(b) (1) Tariff Act of 1930. as 
amended. See also Fabricated Automotive Glass From 
Mexico, 50 Federal Register 1,906 (1985).
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determine the existence of a competitive benefit.
In the absence of sales to an arm's length, where a 
subsidy has been previously found to exist on the input 
component after an earlier separate and independent 
investigation, the valuation of the subsidy reached in 
the earlier case will be applicable.
Finally, the ITA will be able to hold that a competitive 
advantage exists where the price for the input product 
is lower that the world market price for the input 
product.2®6 However, the ITA has held that, even where 
production of inputs has been subsidised, no competitive 
advantage exists if the domestic producers paid prices 
higher than those charged to foreign producer s. 2®? 
Nevertheless, this criterion confers the most discretion 
on the ITA to find the existence of a competitive 
advantage.
If, after an investigation, the ITA decides that an 
upstream subsidy has been paid on the merchandise that 
is the subject of the action, the amount of any 
countervailing duty finally reached will include the 
amount of the competitive advantage conferred by the 
input subsidy.2®®
(c) Significant effect
In order to assess whether the upstream subsidy has a 
significant effect, the ad valorem subsidy rate
2®6 See Agricultural Tillage Tools From Brazil. 50 
Federal Register 24,270 (1985).
286 See Rule 355.45(d), ITA Regulations.
2®2 Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products 
From Korea. 49 Federal Register 47,284 (1984).
288 Section 771A(c) Tariff Act of 1930.
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determined to exist on the input is multiplied by the 
proportion of the total production costs of the 
merchandise accounted for by the input product. If the 
input subsidy calculated in this way exceeds five 
percent, a significant effect is presumed. If the input 
subsidy so allocated to the merchandise is less than one 
percent, there is presumed to be no significant effect. 
Where the subsidies lies between one and five percent, 
there is no presumption and the matter will be decided 
on the facts of the case.2®*
Both presumptions may be rebutted by evidence supporting 
the proposition that, on the facts of the particular 
case, the upstream subsidy has no significant effect on 
the competitiveness of the merchandise. Factors deemed 
relevant in this calculation include quality differences 
in competing merchandise as well as demand.
The procedural aspects of investigations into 
allegations of input subsidies have been modified from 
those for normal ordinary investigations which gives 
rise to speculation whether the procedural aspects of 
this form of investigation comply with the 1979 
Subsidies Code. Whenever the ITA concludes prior to a 
preliminary determination that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that an upstream subsidy has been 
conferred, the time period within which a preliminary 
determination must be made is extended to 250 days after 
the filing of the petition.
On occasion, problems have arisen in the application of 
this provision where the ITA decides that the input 
product and the finished product are in fact the same 
product. In one case involving subsidies given by the
2®^ Rule 355.45(e), ITA Regulations.
2^® Section 703 (h) Tariff Act of 1930.
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Canadian government for the production of pigmeat, the 
petitioners argued that subsidies on pig production 
constituted countervailable upstream subsidies in 
relation to certain types of pork products.^* The ITA 
refused to distinguish between pigs and pork products, 
claiming that in fact these constituted the same 
products rather than pigs being an input into pork 
p r o d u c t s .  2^ 2 The ITA therefore allocated the entire 
amount of the Canadian subsidy on pig production to pork 
products being imported into the United States.
This decision was, however, appealed to the Court of 
International Trade which held that the Commerce 
Department had erred in ignoring the rule introduced by 
the 1984 amendment. 2^®
This case necessitated legislation clarifying the 
distinction between processed and unprocessed 
agricultural products for the purpose of the upstream 
subsidies provision. Section 1313 of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 introduced Section 77IB 
which provides that, in the case of an agricultural 
product processed from a raw agricultural product, 
subsidies provided to either producers or processors 
will be attributed to the finished product if (a) the 
demand for the prior stage product is substantially 
dependent on the demand for the latter stage product and
(b) the processing operation adds only limited value to 
the raw commodity.
2^* Live Swine and Fresh. Chilled and Frozen Pork 
From Canada. 50 Federal Register 25,097 (1985).
2^2 See N.D. Palmeter, "Agriculture and Trade 
Regulation: Selected Issues in the Application of United 
States Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws", 
(1989) 23:3 JWT 47, 64-65.
2^® Canadian Meat Council v United States. 661 F.Supp 
622 (CIT 1987).
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As we have seen, this provision was the cause of 
considerable international dispute. However, it is 
yet another example of Congress legislating to improve 
the position of domestic producers against that of 
foreign producers of competing products.
(G) Countervailing Duties on Goods From State- 
Controlled Economv Countries
The refusal of the I TA to apply countervailing duties to 
imports from countries with non-market economies, 
together with the specificity requirement, has been 
cited in one recent work as an example of the way that 
the Department of Commerce has ’limited the reach of the 
law* .295 While this may have been true in the early 
1980s, as in the case of the specificity test, this 
concession has undergone a process of gradual erosion 
and its continued relevance in the 1990s is 
questionable.
The 1979 Act makes no specific distinction between goods 
from market economy countries and goods from non-market 
economies for the purposes of applying countervailing 
duties. The source of the distinction is the definition 
of subsidy which is defined according to distortions in 
the internal market processes within a state. Since non- 
market economies operate on the basis of state 
management of the industrial sector, there is no 
misallocation of resources because the forces of supply 
and demand are not present. Since there are no 
distortions, there are no state subsidies and, in the 
absence of subsidies, there can be no countervailable
294 See text supra, pp.2 07-210.
295 j.D. Greenwald, "United States Law and Practice*', 
in J.H.J. Bourgeois (ed). Subsidies and International 
Trade (1991), 33, 34.
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benefits .29®
The first opportunity to consider the issue arose before 
the I TA after a complaint by United States producers 
alleging that producers of steel wire rod in 
Czechoslovakia and Poland had received countervailable 
benefits. 2^ In its final determination on this matter, 
the Department of Commerce held that bounties or grants 
cannot be identified in non-market economies.^* A non- 
market economy was describes as a system in which the 
allocation of resources is achieved by central planning, 
as opposed to the forces of supply and demand, and there 
is therefore no market processes to distort or subvert. 
Furthermore, there were no criteria for defining 
specific subsidies in a non-market economy and, from a 
practical point of view, the measurement of such 
subsidies would present virtually insurmountable 
difficulties.
This determination was reversed on appeal to the Court 
of International Trade. In Continental Steel Corporation 
V  United States, the presiding judge, Judge Watson, held 
that 'the Commerce Department [had] made a basic error 
in its interpretation and administration of the law' .29* 
This fundamental mistake was the belief that subsidies 
could only exist in a market economy. The court 
maintained that the economic theory behind the
296 gQQ D. Holmer & J.H. Bello, "The Countervailing 
Duty Law's Applicability to Non-Market Economies", 
(198 6) 2 0 International lawyer 319.
292 On the background to this case, see generally, 
K.A. O'Brien, "The Applicability of the United States 
Countervailing Duty Law to Imports From Non-Market 
Countries", (1986) 9 Fordham Int'l Law Journal 596.
29^ Carbon Steel Wire Rod From Poland. 49 Federal 
Register 19,374.
299 614 F.Supp. 548 (1985).
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application of the statute took second place to the 
wording of the statute. The language of the statute made 
no distinction between the different forms of economy 
and no requirement was expressed that the economy of a 
state had to be a market one before countervailing 
duties could be imposed on exported merchandise.
The question was eventually decided by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit which found in favour of 
the decision of the ITA not to apply duties to imports 
from non-market countries, The Federal Court 
reaffirmed that the purpose of the statute was to 
protect domestic industries against unfair foreign 
competition caused by subsidies that have the effect of 
distorting market forces within the economy of a 
particular state. Where these such distortions result 
in misallocated resources which confer a competitive 
advantage on domestic producers, they constitute 
countervailable subsidies if the conditions of the 
statute are satisfied. In non-market economies, central 
planners determine the allocation of resources as well 
as the price and conditions of sale. These decisions 
effectively replace the forces of supply and demand and 
therefore the required element of distortion is not 
present in planned economies.
The possibility of the exclusion of products 
manufactured in countries operating non-market economies 
from the scope of the countervailing duty law caused 
widespread consternation in both Congressional circles 
and among producers There is little doubt that
Georgetown Steel Corporation v United States. 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
301 O'Brien, K.A. 'The Applicability of the United 
States Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from Non- 
Market Countries', (1986) 9 Fordham Int'l Law Journal596, 628.
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legitimate reasons exist for such concern. Firstly, 
while it is true that centrally planned economies are 
not susceptible to distortions in the forces of supply 
and demand, certain industries are favoured over others. 
Generally, these are the industries in which hard 
currency can be earned from exports that can compete 
with western products.
Secondly, export subsidies can still be applied. 
Multiple exchange rate systems, currency retention 
programmes, adjustment and conversion coefficients that 
stimulate effective exchange rates and tax exemptions 
from foreign trade earnings are often used to promote 
exports from state-controlled economies. Yet, if these 
devices were used by states with market economies they 
would be countervailable without hesitation. For 
example, it is difficult to see why a multiple exchange 
rate lowering the cost of exports should not be the 
subject of countervailing duties on goods from China or 
North Korea, but would allow the ITA to impose 
countervailing duties if it was the United Kingdom that 
was employing the same technique.
Despite the affirmation of the ITA position by the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the events of 1990 
and 1991 have probably rendered the concession 
redundant. There has been a dramatic attempt to move 
from non-market economies to market economies in Eastern 
European and the new states of the former Soviet Union. 
As this movement gathers momentum, unwittingly less and 
less goods will be able to benefit from the concession 
derived from being goods from a non-market economy.
In fact, this development has even wider ramifications. 
Both the United States and the European Community have 
committed themselves to supporting the fragile economies 
of these state. Credit has flowed from both countries.
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as well as the IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, into Eastern Europe 
and the newly independent states of the Soviet Union, 
But the value of this credit will be severely undermined 
if these countries are unable to sell goods in the 
industrialised countries of the west due to non-tariff 
barriers such as countervailing duties.
In the absence of legislation specifically requiring the 
ITA to refrain from imposing countervailing duties in 
goods from Eastern Europe, the benefit of this 
concession will expire as far as these countries are 
concerned and they will be exposed to the full vigour of 
the countervailing legislation like any other market 
economy state. This will leave only China, North 
Korea, Cuba and the other diehard communist states 
entitled to exemption under this rule.
(3) The Application of the Material Injury Test in 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations 
by the U.S. Authorities
In both countervailing duty and anti-dumping 
investigations conducted under the Trade Agreements Act 
of 1979. as amended, the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) is instructed to arrive at a determination of 
whether a domestic industry in the United States has 
suffered, or will suffer, material injury as a result of
See generally, M.G. Egge, "The Threat of United 
States Countervailing Duty Liability to the Newly 
Emerging Market Economies in Eastern Europe; A Snake in 
the Garden?", (1990) 30 Virginia Journal of Int'l Law
941.
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subsidised or dumped i m p o r t s . The application of the 
material injury standard is, for the most part, 
virtually identical in both types of investigation. The 
main point of divergence is that the application of the 
test in countervailing duty investigations is restricted 
to exports from countries that are signatories to the 
1979 Subsidies Code, or which have assumed 
'substantially equivalent obligations' to those 
contained in the Code, or have been conferred with MFN 
privilege by the U.S. President.^*
The ITC must address a number of substantive issues in 
the course of its investigation to determine the 
existence of material injury. For either countervailing 
or anti-dumping duties to be levied against foreign 
imports, it must be established that a domestic industry 
is suffering, or will suffer, material injury as a 
consequence of the imports. The three component elements 
of the injury test are therefore 'material injury 
itself, the identification of the relevant domestic 
industry and the matter of causation.
(A) Reasonable Indication of Material Injury in 
Preliminary Determinations
The injury standards applied by the United States 
authorities differ significantly in preliminary and 
final determinations into the existence of material 
injury. In preliminary investigations, the Commission is 
instructed to decide whether, on the basis of the facts 
available to it, there is a 'reasonable indication* that 
an industry in the United States is materially injured.
Sections 701(a)(2) and 731(2), Trade AgreementsAct of 1979. 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
2°^ Section 701(b), ibid.
633
threatened with material injury or the establishment of 
an industry in the United States is materially 
r e t a r d e d . ^"5 while the Commission is instructed to apply 
the three separate tests established to determine 
injury, the requirement that there is merely a 
'reasonable indication' of injury substantially 
undermines the thoroughness of the test.
As a general proposition, this standard is generally 
viewed as favouring the petitioner over the 
respondent.This is simply because the standard for 
evaluating material injury in a preliminary 
determination is considered to be considerably lower 
than for a final determination. This has the effect of 
making a preliminary determination of injury more 
likely.
In fact the Court of International Trade rebuked the ITC 
for applying too lax a standard for assessing 
preliminary injury in Republic Steel Corporation v 
United States. Nevertheless, in the same case the 
Court ruled that the ITC was not at liberty to weigh 
conflicting evidence from sources other than the 
petitioner. Statements made in the petitioners 
complaint, after verification, therefore form the 
primary source from which the determination is made. 
This is seen as providing the petitioner with an almost 
automatic right to have an affirmative initial 
determination in its favour.
Tension has also arisen between the Commission and the
305 Sections 703(a) and 773(a), ibid.
See W.E. Perry, "Administration of Import Trade 
Laws by the United States ITC", (1985) 3 Boston Univ.
Int'l Law Journal 345, 387.
591 F.Supp 640 (CIT 1984).
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Court of International Trade in relation to the 'best 
information available' standard specified in the statute 
for preliminary determinations.^®^ In Budd Company 
Railway Division v United States, the Court declared 
that this requirement imposed a separate standard for 
the judicial review of Commission decisions.^* Judicial 
review on this basis was held competent to assess 
whether the Commission had conducted a thorough 
investigation and actually obtained the best information 
available at that time.
The Commission refused to accept this ruling, and in a 
number of cases appealed the issue to the Federal Court 
of Appeal which upheld the Commission's view on the 
subject. The Federal Court held that nothing in the best 
information rule defines a standard of investigative 
thoroughness.^® This ruling mitigates against the 
interests of the foreign producer or importer because it 
leaves the issue of the best information available in 
the hands of the Commission and, since the best 
information rule is generally used to the disadvantage 
of foreign interest groups, the removal of the means to 
ensure fair and correct review of such decisions is 
unfortunate. In fact, the Federal Court emphasised that 
the best information rule was designed as a tool which 
the ITC could wield to coerce recalcitrant parties to 
cooperate in the investigation.
(B) Material Injury in Final Investigations
Although material injury is the key to the injury test
Section 703 (b) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
507 F.Supp 997 (CIT 1980).
Atlantic Sugar v United States. 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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applied by the ITC, actual injury is not required for 
the imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing 
d u t i e s . I n  addition to actual injury, the threat of 
material injury or the material retardation of the 
establishment of an industry, will suffice for the
purposes of the injury test
(1) Actual Material Iniurv
Material injury is defined in the statute as 'harm which 
is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant*. 
Clearly, material injury is a standard less than the
'serious injury' test set in safeguard actions and
therefore a greater probability exists that, all things 
being equal, petitioners will be more successful in 
establishing injury in anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty actions. 3^ While in safeguard actions the ITC is 
instructed to examine whether 'significant economic 
retardation' has been caused by imports^ "^*, in anti­
dumping and countervailing investigations these same 
factors need only point towards an 'actual or potential' 
decline in economic performance within a domestic 
industry.
The statute directs the ITC to consider a number of 
factors in making an injury determination including:
(1) The volume of imports of the merchandise which
See generally, D.N. Palmeter, "Injury 
Determinations in Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Investigations", (1987) 21 JWTL 123; and M.S. Knoll,
"Legal and Economic Framework for the Analysis of Injury 
by the USITC", (1989) 23 JWT 95.
312 Section 701(a) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
See J.H. Jackson & W.J. Davey, International 
Economic Relations (Second edition, 1 9 8 6 ) ,  5 6 4 - 5 6 5 i
314 Section 201(b)(2) Trade Act of 1974.
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is the subject of the investigation and, in 
particular, whether there has been any
significant increase in volume, either in 
absolute terms or relative to production of 
consumption.
(2) The effect of imports of that merchandise on 
prices in the United States for like products, 
such as significant price undercutting by the 
imported merchandise vis-a-vis domestic like 
products, depressed domestic prices and the 
retardation of price increases that would have 
other wise occurred.
(3) The impact of imports of such merchandise on 
domestic producers of like products, including 
consideration of 'all relevant economic 
factors' which have a bearing on the industry, 
such as, inter alia; actual and potential 
decline in output, sales, market shares, 
profits, productivity, return on investments 
and utilisation of capacity; factors affecting 
domestic prices; and actual and potential 
negative effects on cash flow, inventories, 
employment, wages, growth, ability to raise 
capital, and investment.^*
Despite express statutory instructions requiring that 
the Commission 'shall consider' each of these factors, 
in practice the Commission does not always do so. For 
example, in one case the Commission appears only to have 
referred to the volume of imports and the impact of the
1930.
Ibid.
Sections 771(7) (B) and 771(7) (C) Tariff Act of
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imports in assessing injury.^? Here the ITC considered, 
among other factors, capacity, capacity utilisation, 
production, inventories, employment and profitability, 
but not the effect of imports on price. There was also 
limited consideration of consumption statistics. The 
result was an affirmative determination.
But, if the Commission does not need to fully consider 
all of these factors, and is allowed to pick and choose 
which it considers most relevant, injury can be found in 
virtually any investigation. The analysis of injury 
should involve a balancing, or weighing up, of the 
relevant effects against each other. If injury caused by 
increased volumes of imports is offset by a positive 
effect of the imports on prices, there is no injury. It 
would be in the interests of all third countries if the 
Commission was compelled to consider all these variables 
and to justify its decision within this context.
Further, it is unnecessary for the Commission to
conclude that all of these factors are negative. For 
example, in one case, the ITC examined domestic
consumption, domestic production, capacity, inventories, 
and financial performance before concluding that the 
financial position of the domestic industry could be 
characterised as 'very poor' throughout the period of 
investigation.The Commission held that four factors 
indicated injury. The appellants argued that the ITC 
should be required to consider all economic variables. 
However, the CIT held that the Commission 'need not find
all economic indicators to be negative to make a finding
See Color Picture Tubes From Canada. Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and Singapore. Inv No. 731-TA-367
(1987); reproduced at (1988) 22:3 JWT 95.
Japan. 
1989).
Telephone Systems and Sub-Assemblies Thereof From 
Korea and Taiwan. Inv No. 731-TA-428 (February
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of material injury'. The Court examined the legislative 
history of the 1979 Act and concluded that:
'the significance of the various factors 
affecting an industry will depend upon the 
facts of each particular case. Neither the 
presence or absence of any factor listed can 
give decisive guidance with respect to whether 
an industry is materially injured, and the 
significance to be assigned to a particular 
factor is for the ITC to decide,
Nor is the Commission’s consideration of the factors 
contributing to material injury confined to these three 
indicators. Confirming the ITC's existing practice, the 
1988 Act provides that the Commission may consider such 
other economic factors as are considered relevant to the 
determination of whether or not there is material injury 
by reason of imports.^®
It is important to note that the Commission has been 
conferred with considerable latitude in the 
interpretation and application of the three main 
indicators, as well as their interaction.But, in 
practice, each of these variables merge into each other 
in the typical analysis carried out by the Commission 
during its investigations and it is difficult to 
identify those specific factors which are deemed most 
likely to cause material injury. However, these elements
Iwatsu Electric Co Ltd & Ors v United States, 
reproduced at (1991) 2: WTM 1.
2^® Section 771(7) (B)(ii), Tariff Act of 1930. as 
amended by section 13 28 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988.
On this point, see P.W. Jameson, "Recent 
International Trade Commission Practice Regarding the 
material Injury Standard: A Critique", (1986) Law &
Pol'y Int'l Bus., 517, 523-524.
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provide us with a convenient and logical catalogue for 
attempting to analyze the issue of material injury.
(a) Volume of Imports of the Relevant Merchandise
Increases in the volume of imports
The Commission is instructed to consider increases in 
the volume of imports, in either absolute or relative 
terms. In the past, emphasis has been placed on 
increases in volume relative to domestic consumption. 
Less importance has been placed on increased imports 
where the total market for the product is expanding 
relative to both domestic and foreign production. 
Similarly, an increase in imports is less significant if 
the imports remain a relatively small portion of the 
domestic market for the product.Conversely, where 
the market share of the imported product has increased 
significantly, the Commission has tended to impute a 
high degree of injury. Naturally, an increased share of 
a domestic market by foreign goods means lost sales for 
domestic producers, even although it may be the result 
of legitimate increased competition.
Cumulation of the volume of imports
In measuring the volume of imports, the Commission 
recognises that products injuring a domestic industry 
need not originate from the same source or country. The
See, for example, Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and 
Tubes From India, Taiwan and Turkey. Inv. No. 731-TA- 
2271-3 (1986).
See, for example, Heavv-Walled Rectangular Welded 
Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes From Canada. Inv. No. 731- TA-254 (1986).
See, Live Swine and Pork From Canada, 50 FederalRegister 25,097 (1985).
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Commission analyses the volume of imports from all 
sources which are alleged to have benefited from 
subsidisation. The imports are then cumulated for the 
purposes of making an injury determination.^*
After a period of confusing and inconsistent practice, 
the ITC elaborated a number of guidelines to assist 
determine whether cumulation is appropriate in the 
circumstances of an investigation.^* For cumulation to 
be applied it is necessary for the petitioner to 
demonstrate that 'the factors and conditions of trade in 
the particular case show its relevance to the 
determination of injury'. The factors and conditions 
which are relevant in determining collective effect on 
a domestic industry include; volume of imports; trend of 
import volume; fungibility of imports; competition in 
the market; common channels of distribution; price 
similarity; simultaneous impact; and co-ordinated 
actions by importers.
However, the elements of volume of imports and the trend 
of import volume were expressly rejected by the Court of 
International Trade for cumulation calculations and, in 
one particular case, the Court attempted to substitute 
its own doctrine of cumulation. The test for 
cumulation of imports was deemed by the Court to be;
"whether subsidised or allegedly subsidised
imported products are competing with the product of
Cumulative assessment has a practice inherited by 
the ITC from its predecessor, the Tariff Commission; see 
City Lumber Co. v United States. 457 F.2d 991 (1972).
^^* Steel Products From Belcrium. Brazil. France. 
Italy. Luxembourcf. the Netherlands. Romania, the United 
Kingdom and West Germany. Inv. No. 731-TA-53-86 (1982),
Republic Steel Corporation v United States. 591 
F.Supp 640 (CIT 1983).
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a domestic industry during a period when the effect 
of these importations is being felt by the domestic 
industry".
This appears to be a less rigorous standard than that 
applied by the ITC and would also involve a less 
extensive examination of the facts of the case in 
question. Nevertheless, the ITC continued to apply its 
own version of the rule, ignoring the decision of the 
Court.
The difference of opinion between the ITC and the Court 
of International Trade was only resolved by legislative 
intervention. The 1984 Act added a new subsection to the 
Tariff Act of 1930 dealing with cumulation.^* The new 
legislation favoured the test devised by the Court of 
International Trade and required the ITC to;
"cumulatively assess the volume and effect of 
imports from two or more countries of like products 
subject to investigation if such imports compete 
with each other and with like products of the 
domestic industry in the United States market".
The application of this test requires the application of 
two separate requirements: (a) the imports from two or
more countries must compete with each other as well as 
the domestic like product; and (b) the products in 
question must be subject to investigation.
The views of the ITC were, however, taken into 
consideration in the statutory wording of the 
methodology for evaluating the need for cumulation. The 
Commission is to consider in ascertaining whether
Section 771(7) (C) of the Tariff Act of 1930 asamended by Section 612 of the Trade and Tariff Act of1984.
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imported products compete among each other and with
American products the following:
(1) the degree of fungibility between the various 
imports and the like domestic products;
(2) sales in the same geographical markets of the 
foreign imports and the like domestic
products;
(3) common channels of distribution for the
imports and the like domestic products;
(4) the price-range of the imports and domestic 
goods; and
(5) simultaneous marketing of foreign and domestic 
goods. 329
These factors are virtually identical to those used in 
the pre-amendment practice of the ITC minus the factors 
of volume of imports and the trend of imports.
The second condition - that the imports must be subject 
to investigation - presents no problem if complaints 
against the products in question originating from 
different countries have been filed simultaneously. But, 
if imports have been the subject of a terminated 
investigation, it is inequitable that they should be 
considered the subjects of a subsequent 
investigation.3^® The ITC has, however, treated recently 
concluded cases as being liable to cumulation. In one 
case the ITC cumulated the imports under investigation 
with others from Thailand despite the fact that an order
3^9 Carbon Steel Products From Austria. 
Czechoslovakia. East Germanv. Hungary. Norwav. Poland. 
Romania. Sweden and Venezuela. Inv. No. 731-TA-271/273
(1987) .
33® See N.D. Palmeter, "Injury Determinations in 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases - A 
Commentary on United States Practice", (1987) 18 JWTL
123, 152.
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had already been issued for increasing duties.
Cross-cumulation
Where imports from one country have been dumped and 
imports of the identical product, either from the same 
country or a different country, have been subsidised, 
both may contribute to the material injury of the 
industry. Prior to the 1984 amendment, the ITC had 
declined to engage in cross-cumulation between anti­
dumping and countervailing duty actions and a similar 
reluctance has characterised the post-amendment practice 
of the Commission.
A number of reasons have been advanced by individual 
Commissioners to support the argument that the 1984 
amendment does not require cross-cumulation. 
Certainly the statutory authorization for cross­
cumulation is ambiguous. While the 1979 Act introduced 
radical changes into both the United States 
countervailing and anti-dumping laws, the 1930 statute 
treats injury under both regimes in separate sections, 
although in the same title. Further, the dissimilarity 
between dumping and countervailing duty determinations 
is a factor against cross-cumulation.
In contrast to the reluctance of the Commission to 
enforce cross-cumulation, the Court of International 
Trade has explicitly held that the section added by the 
1984 amendment, without exception, requires the 
cumulation of imports from two or more countries of like
33^ Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes From India. 
Taiwan and Turkey. Inv. No. 731-TA-271/2 (1986).
332 See Carbon Steel Products From Austria. 
Czechoslovakia. East Germany. Hungary. Norway. Poland. 
Romania. Sweden and Venezuela. 50 Federal Register 186 (1985).
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products subject to investigation if they compete with 
each other and also with like domestic products, without 
distinction between dumping and subsidisation.This 
decision was based on the theory that injury caused to 
an American industry remained injury regardless of 
whether it was caused by dumping or subsidisation. The 
Court was critical of the earlier refusals of the ITC to 
apply cross-cumulation and even suggested that the non­
application of the test constituted a 'loop-hole' in the 
law for which there was no obvious justification.
The initial reaction of the ITC to this decision was 
interesting. At first, a number of Commissioners refused 
to cross-cumulate pending an appeal of the case to the 
higher c o u r t . Even after the appeal court refused to 
accept the arguments against the application of the 
cross-cumulation test, a minority in the Commission 
continued to voice dissatisfaction in the application of 
this test which was manifested in a reluctance to apply 
cross-cumulation in injury tests.*3^
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
removed all doubts as to the application of cross- 
cumulation.^* In Section 133 0 of the statute. Congress 
voted for the judiciary and against the Commission in
333 Bingham & Tavlor v United States. 627 F.Supp. 793 
(CIT 1986), affirmed 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
33^ See Brass Sheet and Strips From Brazil. Canada. 
France. Italv. Korea. Sweden and West Germany, Inv. Nos 
701-TA-269/27Q and 731-TA-311/317; and Oil Country 
Tubular Goods From Canada and Taiwan. Inv. No. 701-TA- 
255 and 701-TA-276/277.
33* See Certain Fresh Cut Flowers. Inv. No, 701-TA- 
275/278 (1987), Appealed in Floral Trade Council of
Davis. California v United States. --- F.2d (Fed. Cir.
1988) .
33* 102 Stat. 1107 (1988); reproduced in 28 ILM 16(1989).
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this matter. This section requires the ITC to cross- 
cumulate, subject only to a minor exception for de 
minimus c a s e s . T h i s  provision gives statutory 
authority to the ruling of the Court of International 
Trade in the Bingham Case and is in effect a rebuke of 
the Commission for its attempts to prevent the 
introduction of the rule.
As observed above, the cross-cumulation rule is subject 
to a de minimus exception in cases involving a small 
volume of imports. This provision has been described as 
'the only anti-dumping/countervailing provision in the
[1988] Act furthering free trade".However, the de 
minimus provision itself cannot be considered pro-free 
trade if the history of its enactment is considered and, 
in particular, the non-application of the general rule 
of cross-cumulation prior to the amendment.
The de minimus rule applies to 'negligible imports'.3*9 
In order to ascertain whether imports from a particular 
country are negligible, the ITC is required to examine:
(a) whether or not the volume and market share of 
the imports are negligible;
(b) whether sales transactions involving these 
imports are isolated and sporadic; and
(c) whether the United States market for the like 
product is price sensitive to such a degree 
that small quantities of the imports might
337 28 ILM 16, 80-81 (1989).
33* G.N. Horlick & G.D. Oliver, "Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Law Provisions of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988", (1989) 23:3 JWT 5, 36.
339 Section 1330(b), 1988 Act.
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result in price suppression.^®
No reference is made to minimum volumes of imports, such 
as a 5% rule as a maximum share of the relevant product. 
Indeed, the criteria set are relatively subjective and 
the ITC has considerable discretion in the application 
of these conditions.
(b) The Effect of Imports on Domestic Prices
The second factor taken into consideration in the 
assessment of material injury under the 1979 Act is the 
impact of import p r i c e s . T h e  Commission is instructed 
to determine whether:
(1) the prices of imports undercut United States 
prices for the same goods; or
(2) the price of the imports causes United States 
prices to decline.
As a matter of economic reality, it is likely that the 
second of these effects would follow if the first 
exists. Where foreign manufacturers are able to undercut 
domestic suppliers, this will inevitably result in the 
creation of a price equilibrium between the foreign and 
domestic producers. Since the domestic producer's prices 
are high to start with, this will entail the domestic 
producers lowering their prices.
3^^® On the application of this test, see D.B. Cameron 
& S.M. Crawford, "An Overview of the Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Amendments: A New Protectionism?",
(1989) 20:3 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 471, 486.
3^*^ Section 771 (7) (B) (ii) Tariff Act of 1930. asamended by Section 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of1979.
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The Commission determines the price of the products of 
a domestic industry at the beginning of the three year 
period habitually used for deciding injury 
investigations. Thereafter, it calculates the price of 
the domestic products after the foreign goods have been 
introduced to the market. Where such competition has had 
the effect of reducing prices, or preventing sales at 
prices sufficient to maintain profitability, material
injury may be suspected.
However, undercutting the prices of domestic competitors 
is not ipso facto injurious. The relevant injury results 
from the diversion of production from the domestic 
manufacturer to the foreign supplier. While reduced 
prices constitute evidence in favour of material injury, 
by itself it is insufficient in the absence of reduced 
sales affecting the economic viability of a 
manufacturing operation.
Although the Commission generally follows the policy 
that price undercutting is insufficient in itself to 
justify a finding of injury, this willingness has not 
been extended to complaints alleging predatory 
pricing. 3^ xn such instances, the Commission has taken 
the view that such practices necessarily result in price 
levels that are damaging for domestic producers since 
this is part of the strategy for market dominance. In 
the absence of such injury, attempts to engage in 
predatory pricing would be bound to fail.
While such a presumption itself is not repugnant, the 
methodology of the Commission in applying this test has
3"^2 See, for example. High Capacity Pagers From 
Japan. 47 Federal Register 40,679 (1982) and 48 Federal 
Register 2,682 (1983).
3‘^3 See Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes From 
India. Taiwan and Turkey, Inv. No. 731-TA-271/3 (1986).
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been such that many cases of non-predatory pricing have 
been deemed to be so. There are five pre-conditions for 
a finding of predatory behaviour;
(a) a large and increasing market share;
(b) high levels of subsidisation or dumping;
(c) homogeneous product ranges;
(d) declining prices; and
(e) barriers to entry for other foreign
products.^
The stronger the evidence of these elements, the more 
likely the finding of predatory activities/** Although 
predatory behaviour might feasibly arise from 
subsidisation, it is more likely that its application to 
the test of material injury is more relevant in dumping 
cases.
(c) Impact of Imports on Domestic Production
The third and final statutory criterion for the
determination of material injury is the impact of the 
imported goods on the economic health and productivity 
of the relevant domestic industry.**
In a somewhat cryptic amendment to the original
legislation, the 1988 Act specifically restricted 
consideration of this indicator to the impact of imports 
on domestic producers, but only in the context of
3* Certain Red Raspberries From Canada. Inv. No. 731-TA-196 (1985).
3'** For a criticism of this approach in general, see 
P.W. Jameson, "Recent ITC Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard; A Critique", (1986) 18 Law & 
Pol'y Int'l Bus., 517, 547-75.
** Section 771 (7) (C)(iii) Tariff Act of 1930. asamended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
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production operations within the United States.*? This 
effectively prevents the investigating authorities from 
taking into account production operations by United 
States firms in third countries. One possible 
explanation for the amendment is to focus on the degree 
of injury caused directly to industries located inside 
the United States.
This particular statutory indicator is defined with a 
considerable degree of specification in the statute. 
Section 771(7)(C)(iii), as amended, instructs the ITC, 
to evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a 
bearing on the state of the industry including, but not 
limited to:
(a) actual and potential decline in output, sales, 
market share, profits, productivity, return on 
investments, and utilisation of capacity;
(b) factors affecting domestic prices; and
(c) actual and potential negative effects on cash 
flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, 
ability to raise capital, and investment.
These elements are to be taken in combination and not 
individually.
The 1988 Act added a fourth criterion.** The Commission 
is now also instructed to take into consideration the 
actual and potential negative effects on the existing 
development and production efforts of the domestic 
industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or 
more advanced version of the product under
*? Section 771(7)(B)(i)(III) , ibid, as amended by 
Section 1328 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
3"** Section 1328, Omnibus Trade and CompetitivenessAct of 1988.
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investigation. This provision is merely intended to 
prevent producers from being penalised for research and 
development expenditure and to encourage production 
drives.
(d) Other Factors
The three main indicators are not intended to be the 
only factors to be considered in the determination of 
injury and to a certain extent this also works against 
the interests of foreign exporters. This is quite simply 
because the Commission prefers to consider other factors 
only where these point to a conclusion of adverse 
injury. In other words, the Commission is less likely to 
consider other factors as an element mitigating any 
injurious effects of imports but, rather, refers to 
these mainly when they are a source of exacerbated 
injury.
For example, in the Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish 
From Canada Case, three other factors were considered in 
the Commission's analysis of injury to the domestic 
inj u r y . *9 The first was the relative status of the 
United States and Canadian industries in terms of 
concentration and ownership. The second was the 
existence of an active dispute over fishing grounds in 
the George Bank sector. The final factor was an 
examination of the differences in the exchange rates 
between the Canadian and United States dollars.*®
None of these other factors can be seen, at least 
objectively, as supporting the position of the Canadian 
exporters. Further, the relevance of at least the first
349 51 Federal Register 10041 (1986).
3*® See also, S.M. Hoffer, "May Exchange Rate 
Volatility Cause Dumping Injury?", (1992) 26 JWT 61.
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factor is open to question.
It is also interesting to consider some of the factors 
that the Commission does not consider in its injury 
determination.
Most significantly, it does not consider any benefits to 
the consumers of the imported products that have 
resulted from cheap prices due to the fact that a 
product has been dumped or subsidised. No compensatory 
effect can be derived from benefits bestowed on the 
consumers because the statute does not authorise the ITC 
to consider the issue of injury in any other context 
other than to the domestic industry concerned.
Nor does the Commission consider the possible benefits 
of dumped or subsidised merchandise for producers 
engaged in further stage product manufacture. For 
example, in Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
of 256 Kilobits and Above From Japan, the Commission did 
not consider the efficiency-promoting effect of cheap 
semi-conductors in the United States computer 
manufacturing industry.Obviously the cheaper the 
component products, the more efficient such industries 
will become.
Both of these failures to consider are merely illustrate 
that an investigation by the ITC into dumped or 
subsidised products is confined to the particular 
industry claiming injury and is not considered in the 
context of the whole economy of the country.
(2) Threat of Material Iniurv
351 51 Federal Register 28,396 (1986).
3*2 In contrast, see the practice of the European 
Commission, infra Chapter 10.
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The relationship between material injury and the threat 
of material injury is simply that the former relates to 
activity in the present, while the latter relates to 
activity in the f u t u r e . A s  a result, the factors 
which would establish material injury require to be 
modified to take into account the element of time.
The ITC have been provided with a total of eight 
economic indicators to aid in the identification of such 
a threat. These are as follows;
(a) If a subsidy is involved, whether the subsidy 
is an export or a domestic subsidy.
(b) Any increase in production capacity or 
existing unused capacity in the exporting 
country likely to result in a significant 
increase in imports into the United States.
(c) Any rapid increase in market penetration in 
the United States and the likelihood that the 
penetration will increase to an injurious 
level.
(d) The probability that imports of the 
merchandise will enter the United States at 
prices that will have a depressing effect on 
domestic prices of like products.
(e) Any substantial increases in the inventory of 
the merchandise held in the United States.
(f) The presence of under-utilised capacity for 
producing the merchandise in the exporting 
country.
(g) Any other demonstrable adverse trends that 
indicate the probability that the importation 
of the merchandise will be the cause of actual 
injury,
(h) The potential for product-shifting if
Rhone Poulenc SA v United States, 592 F.Supp 1319(CIT 1984).
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production facilities owned or controlled by 
the foreign manufacturers, which can be used 
to produce the products subject to the 
investigation, are also used to produce the 
merchandise under investigation.^*
The application of many of these tests requires the ITC 
to speculate as to future trends and events. However, 
the ITC is expressly required to refrain from making 
findings other than on the 'basis of evidence that the 
threat of material injury is real'.^^ But there is 
little doubt that the investigation of allegations into 
threats of material injury to domestic industries is an 
unenviable task which is subject to considerable
criticism.
Before the amendments made by the 1984 Act, the 
Commission tended to address only briefly the issue of 
the threat of material injury. Where a negative 
determination was made, the Commissioners would point 
out the negative injury factors and tended to ignore 
those elements favouring an affirmative 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n  particular, the Commissioners 
tended to ignore information relating to production 
capacity from foreign producers.
The 1984 amendments were introduced to tighten up the
Section 771(7) (F)(i) Tariff Act of 1930. as 
amended by Section 612(a) (2) of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
Section 771 (7) (F) (ii) ibid.
See generally. Madden, "Threat of Material Injury 
Standard in Countervailing Duty Enforcement", (1984) 16 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 373.
W.E. Perry, "Administration of Import Trade Laws 
by the USITC", (1985) 3 Boston Univ. Int'l Law Journal 
345, 406.
654
requirements for finding a threat of material injury by 
providing specific criteria for rendering a decision. 
These criteria are extremely broad and tend to favour an 
affirmative finding. In particular, the 1984 Act 
specifically identifies the unused capacity of a foreign 
producer as an element for consideration in evaluating 
a threat of injury and the ITC must ask and receive this 
data from foreign producers. If information on future 
production capacity is not forthcoming, the Commission 
is allowed to draw adverse conclusions.
The general effect of codifying the requirements for 
finding a threat of material injury is to provide a 
checklist against which the factual circumstances 
surrounding a case may be assessed. If a foreign 
producer or exporter fails to meet one or more of these 
conditions, a threat of injury may exist. Undoubtedly 
the existence of this checklists cuts down the ITC 
discretion for making a negative determination and the 
large number of grounds for making a finding on this 
point suggests affirmative decisions will be more 
likely.
Not content with liberalising the requirements for 
finding a threat of injury, in 1988, Congress changed 
the law once again in order to encourage the ITC to 
encourage more affirmative determinations on the grounds 
of threat of material injury.
One of the most significant changes relates to the 
addition of two new criteria to be taken into 
consideration in assessing the threat of material 
injury. The ITC is instructed to consider:
(a) the actual or potential negative effects on 
the product development and production efforts 
of a domestic industry in anti-dumping cases;
Ï
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and
(b) the extent to which foreign merchandise has 
been sold at less than fair value in other
markets.
An additional special rule has been introduced for 
agricultural products. In investigating the threat of 
material injury in the agricultural sector, the ITC must 
also take into account the likelihood of increased 
imports by reason of product shifting in relation to raw 
and processed agricultural products.^*
The extension of the injury criteria to cover 
development and production efforts appears to be an 
attempt to promote and protect research and development. 
This includes efforts to develop derivative or more 
advanced models or variations of existing products. 
Since this provision extends to 'efforts' on the part of 
domestic producers, it is unlikely that mere plans are 
protected. This extension detracts from the real and 
imminent overarching precondition in the test.
The condition that the ITC should consider dumping by 
the same party of the same class or kind of merchandise 
in other GATT contracting parties seems designed to take 
account of previous patterns of behaviour. Previous 
dumping behaviour might provide a reasonable indication 
of future conduct.
(3) Material Retardation of an Infant Industrv
The third injury standard is the material retardation of 
the establishment of a domestic industry and is the most
Section 1329 Omnibus Trade and CompetitivenessAct of 1988.
359 Section 1326, ibid.
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vague, and potentially threatening, criterion upon which 
an injury determination might be made.
To its credit, the ITC has acknowledged this fact and, 
in practice, findings that material injury has occurred 
on this ground are infrequently made. Similarly, the 
legislature has more or less left this area alone when 
attempting to tighten up the anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty law.
The ITC has established a number of principles through 
its own jurisprudence to supplement the dearth of 
guiding statutory rules. For example, the ITC decision 
in Dried Salted Codfish From Canada, provides an 
illustration of its approach to the i s s u e s . I n  order 
to ascertain the existence of injury through material 
retardation, the ITC applied the following rules:
(a) Application of the material retardation
standard is not limited to industries that 
have not yet commenced production but extends 
to new facilities that have initiated 
production but which have not yet stabilised 
their operations.
(b) Evaluation of material retardation is made on 
a case by case basis since each new industry 
is inherently unique.
(c) If industries have not yet engaged in
production, there must be a reasonable 
indication that the industry has made a
'substantial commitment' to commence 
production.
Where these conditions are satisfied, the ITC will 
proceed to its determination of material retardation
360 Inv. No. 731-TA-199 (1985).
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resulting in injury.
This is assessed according to whether the levels of 
economic activity of the industry reflect the normal 
start up conditions of an enterprise entering a 
difficult market or whether these costs are worse than 
what might have reasonably been anticipated as a result 
of foreign competition. In the latter case, the 
establishment of an industry is deemed to have been 
materially retarded.
The lack of cases on this issue indicate on the one hand 
that material injury on this ground is infrequently 
claimed and on the other hand that the law on this 
matter is essentially unsettled. It also reflects the 
fact that, in many industries, the United States has 
traditionally maintained a competitive advantage as 
regards research and development of new products. There 
are therefore only rare instances when another country 
has a technological advantage over the United States of 
such a degree that would be sufficient to prevent the 
establishment of a counterpart industry in the United 
States.
At the same time, the lead in such areas once held by 
the United States has been progressively eroded by a 
number of states. As this lead contracts, it is likely 
that more injury determinations will be made on this 
basis. Combined with the greater pressure that will be 
placed on the ITC to render affirmative decisions for 
protectionist reasons, it is likely that this reason 
will result in the greater imposition of countervailing 
duties on this ground,
(C) Domestic Industrv
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Material injury must, of course, affect a particular 
group of producers within the United States economy and 
for the purposes of both countervailing duty actions and 
anti-dumping actions, the relevant group of producers, 
or 'domestic industry', is defined as:
'the domestic producers as a whole of a like 
product, or those producers whose collective output 
of the like product constitutes a major proportion 
of the total domestic production of that 
product '
The relevant domestic industry is therefore comprised of 
all domestic producers engaged in the production of like 
products and this is consistent with both 1979 Codes.
(1) Establishing the Category of Like Product
The identification of the relevant industry within the 
United States rests on the issue of 'like products'. 
Only those producers manufacturing like products to the 
imported merchandise subject to investigation fall 
within the scope of the relevant domestic industry. A 
like product is defined as:
'a product which is like, or in the absence of 
like, most similar in characteristics and uses 
with, the article subject to investigation.
The equivalent definition of like product in the two 
Codes is a product that is 'identical, i.e. alike in all 
respects to the product under consideration' and, in the 
absence of such a product, any other product which.
Section 771(4) (A) Tariff Act of 1930. as amendedby Section 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
Section 771(10), ibid.
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'although not alike in all respects, has characteristics 
closely resembling those of the product under 
investigation'.While the American law definition is 
compatible with the Code definition, it is in the 
application of the test that inconsistencies arise.
The first stage of the process of identifying the 
relevant domestic industry is to define the imported 
products on the basis of their characteristics and 
purposes. The second stage is to examine the 
characteristics and used of domestically produced goods 
in order to ascertain whether or not they are like the 
imported products. The third stage is to ascertain which 
of those domestic manufacturers are part of the domestic 
industry for the purposes of the investigation. The 
critical parameters for the identification of the 
relevant domestic industry are the ITC determination of 
the characteristics and uses of the merchandise being 
imported into the country.
In the first stage, the ITC examines the imported 
products which are the subject of the complaint and then 
identifies both the characteristics and uses which would 
define like products. In making this evaluation, the ITC 
focuses on the uses of the goods from a consumer point 
of view rather than upon the nature of the machines on 
the production line required to manufacture the goods. 
The demand side of the equation is therefore more 
important than the supply side. Manufacturing processes 
and machinery, i.e. the supply side, are only relevant 
insofar as they assist indicate characteristics and uses 
which the imported products may have in common with
Note 18 to Article 6(1), Subsidies Code 1979;Article 2(2), Anti-dumping Code 1979.
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domestic ones,^^
Ascertaining the specifications and features of the 
imported product involves an intense factual analysis 
which, by its very nature, must be undertaken on a case- 
by-case basis. It involves distinguishing between the 
significant and the insignificant features in the 
characteristics and uses of products.
In most complaints, it is in the interests of a domestic 
industry to argue for the existence of a number of 
separate industries so long as it can equate its own 
economic problems to that of the imported goods. This 
has the effect to allowing it to take full advantage of 
the alleged injury done to its business operations. It 
is more likely that the smaller the relevant industry, 
the greater the likelihood of injury being found since 
the more an investigation concentrates on the economic 
health of one company, the less likely that other more 
efficient and profitable companies engaged in similar 
production will be brought within the scope of the 
investigation. Hence there is a greater chance of 
proving injury.
A number of rules have been formulated by the ITC to 
assist in this task. First, 'like products' includes 
more than absolutely, or even virtually, identical 
products because the definition extends to 
'substantially similar articles'.
Second, likeness is determined on the basis of 
characteristics and uses. For this determination, the 
ITC generally considers to following factors: (a)
364 Victor, "Injury Determinations by the ITC in 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings", in F. 
Victor (ed), The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (1983)
117, 128.
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physical appearance; (b) end users; (c) customer 
perceptions; (d) common manufacturing facilities and 
employees; (e) production processes; (f) channels of 
distribution; and (f) the interchangeability of the 
product with others.Naturally, certain of these 
factors are given more weight than others depending on 
the nature of the product under investigation. For 
instance, in cases involving chemicals, investigations 
often concentrate on the interchangeability of product 
uses as well as chemical formulations.^*
A few examples will serve to demonstrate the biased 
methodology adopted by the ITC in its investigations.
The first case is typical of the problems of 
distinguishing which products are like products from 
those that are not when the merchandise under 
consideration is electrical equipment. In Color Picture 
Tubes From Canada, Jaoan, the Republic of Korea and 
Singapore, several of the respondents argued that 
television picture tubes could be distinguished into two 
groups “ those larger than 30 inches and those smaller 
than 30 i n c h e s . T h e  basis for this distinction was 
that the larger tubes used more advanced technology than 
the smaller ones. They were also considerably more 
expensive and were purchased by different consumer 
groups.
Despite these differences, the ITC held that the large 
tubes could not be separated from the smaller models
Certain Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes From 
Sweden, ITC Inv. No. 731-TA-354 (1987); reproduced at(1988) 22:2 JWT 127.
See, for example, Industrial Nitrocellulose From 
France, 48 Federal Register 11,971 (1983).
Inv No. 731-TA-367 (1987); reproduced at (1988)22:3 JWT 95.
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since 'the similarities between the large and small 
models far outweigh the differences'. In other words, 
regardless of size, the Commission considered that all 
such products were made up of the same essential parts, 
performed the same function and, for the most part, were 
all produced by a similar manufacturing process. In 
addition, while the Commission acknowledged that the 
technological requirements of the larger models were 
more advanced, both sizes were produced with the same 
basic technology.
This is merely an application of the general rule that, 
in the event that certain products have essentially the 
same general features and the same general physical 
characteristics, but differ in technical specifications, 
this last factor is not considered sufficient to allow 
the separation of each product into different g r o u p s .
In Amplifier Assemblies and Parts Thereof From Japan, 
the product being investigation was radio frequency 
power amplifiers specifically designed for transmitting 
signals from ground stations to communications 
satellites.^* The product was manufactured according to 
the specifications set in two contracts between the 
manufacturer and the Communications Satellite 
Corporation (COMSAT). Both contracts were for the supply 
of amplifiers of over three kilowatts which permitted 
the transmission and reception of both radio and 
television signals. These specifications were deemed 
sufficient to identify the purposes and uses for 
identifying like products.
In the first stage of its investigation, the ITC
Fabric and Expanded Neoprene Laminate From 
Taiwan, Inv No. 731-TA-371 (1987); reproduced at (1988) 22:2 JWT 13 7.
Inv. No. 731-TA-48 (1982) .
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attempted to identify all products that were intended 
for the purposes and use of those under investigation. 
Like products were deemed to include all amplifiers 
which satisfied the basic features required for an 
amplifier, with a distinction drawn between those with 
an output of over one kilowatt and those with an output 
of less than that level. The basis of this distinction 
was simply that amplifiers over one kilowatt were 
capable of transmitting both radio and television 
signals while those of less power could only transmit 
radio signals.
The next step was to identify like and substitutable, or 
interchangeable, products. The ITC found that amplifiers 
which bounced signals off a particular layer of the 
atmosphere (the troposphere) to relay signals could not 
be classified with those which required a satellite for 
retransmissions on the basis that 'troposcatter and 
satellite amplifiers are not interchangeable, and thus 
one could not plug a ten kilowatt troposcatter amplifier 
into a satellite system and have it work. ' Both these 
distinctions were critical because they defined the 
imported goods in terms of both their characteristics 
and uses.
This example illustrates that the greater the degree of 
specification to which a product has been manufactured, 
the easier the determination of like product. 
Consequently, in cases of high technology products, like 
products are easier to identify than products which have 
undergone basic first stage or even second stage 
manufacturing transformation. This is obvious when basic 
commodities such as steel or other metals are considered 
as opposed to products that are manufactured to 
contractual specifications. Again this distinction can 
be made clear from an example.
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In Pipes and Tubes From Japan, the ITC had to identify 
which products were like products to seamless steel 
pipes and t u b e s . T h e  petitioners argued that the like 
products included seamless stainless steel pipes and 
tubes, seamless heat resistant steel pipes and tubes and 
seamless alloy pressure pipes and tubes because of the 
seamless character of the product. In response, the 
respondents argued that the chemical composition of the 
product should define like products.
The Commission observed at the outset of its 
investigation that there could be as many as three, or 
as little as one, separate products. If the chromium 
content criterion was employed, there would be three 
industries, if the production processes were the 
important consideration there would be two, and if the 
physical property criterion was used, there would be 
only one.
Eventually, the ITC agreed with the respondents that the 
overriding characteristic was the chemical composition 
and, as a result, found three separate industries.
In the recent past, the Commission has also had to 
determine whether steel wire rope and stainless steel 
wire rope are like products^% whether galvanised and 
ungalvanised wire rope are like products^^^, and whether 
porcelain-coated carbon steel cooking pans and stainless 
steel cooking pans are like products.
Inv. No. 731-TA-87 (1982).
Steel Wire Rope From the Republic of Korea, Inv. No. 731-TA-112 (1982).
Ibid.
Porcelain-on-Steel Cooking Ware From Mexico, the 
Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan. Inv. No. 701-TA- 265/66 (1986) .
665
While there is little doubt as to the difficulties of 
applying this test, at the same time the ITC rarely 
discontinues an investigation on the ground that a 
petitioner does not manufacture like products to those 
under investigation.^* Similarly, it is widely admitted 
among practitioners that, in like product 
determinations, the petitioner is far more likely to be 
successful in his contentions than the respondent.
The issue of identifying the relevant domestic industry 
is further complicated by the existence of special rules 
for agricultural products, regional industries and 
related parties. While there are rules in the Subsidies 
and Anti-dumping Codes to deal with related parties and 
regional industries^’*, the other subject is an example 
of the United States unilaterally creating rules for the 
administration of countervailing and anti-dumping 
duties.
(2) Special Rules for Agricultural Products
The special rules in the agricultural sector are 
designed to assist determine whether producers and 
processors constitute a single industry. These rules 
have been developed in ITC practice and by legislative 
amendment. The justification for this exceptional rule 
is merely the sheer lobbying power wielded by the 
farming lobby in the United States Congress.
An example of such legislative intervention is the rule 
contained in section 612(a)(1) of the Trade and Tariff
N.D. Palmeter, "Injury Determinations in Anti- 
Dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases - A Commentary on U.S. Practice", (1987) 21 JWTL 123, 131-132.
3’* Ibid.
’^* Article 6(7), Subsidies Code 1979; Article4(1)(ii). Anti-dumping Code 1979.
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Act of 1984 which amended the definition of like product 
to allow grape producers to bring countervailing and 
anti-dumping actions against European wine 
manufacturers. The international implications of this 
measure have already been dealt with.^” However, the 
1988 Act also contained rules relating to injury that 
are applicable only to agricultural products and as such 
appear, prima facie, to violate the Subsidies Code.^’*
A number of commentators have questioned the need, and 
the legitimacy of, such special treatment. Even the ITC 
itself has reservation and one Commissioner has observed 
that ' it is not clear to me why agricultural raw 
material suppliers are necessarily in a different 
position than the raw material suppliers to any other 
group of domestic manufacturers.
Nevertheless, the ITC itself has developed rules that 
encourage favoured protection for agricultural 
producers. For example, it developed a two-part test to 
allow agricultural growers to be included within the 
definition of a domestic industry where the product 
under investigation is a processed agricultural product. 
An agricultural producer may fall within the scope of a 
domestic industry which produces the finished product 
if:
(a) the raw agricultural product enters a single, 
continuous line of production resulting in the 
end-product; and
377 See text supra, pp.213-215.
See N.D. Palmeter, "Agriculture and Trade 
Regulation; Selected Issues in the Application of United 
States Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Law", (1989) 23 JWT 47, 65.
Per Commissioner Rohr, in Frozen Concentrated 
Orange Juice From Brazil. Inv. No. 731-TA-32 6 (1987).
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(b) there is a commonality of economic interests 
between the growers and the p r o c e s s o r s .
By allowing agricultural producers to attack products 
that are not like products, greater protection is 
afforded to this sector of the economy.
A raw product producer is considered to have entered a 
continuous line of production if the raw agricultural 
product is sold almost exclusively to produce the final 
processed p r o d u c t . T h e  volume of raw product which 
must be sold for processing in order to constitute a 
single continuous line of production varies according to 
the type of product. While sixty nine percent of 
production was sufficient to establish a continuous 
process between tomatoes and tomato juice^ *^ , seventy 
percent was considered insufficient to convince the ITC 
that cling peach production was a continuous process 
ending with canned cling peaches.
A commonality of economic interest seems easier to 
establish. In applying this test, the Commission 
examines the economic integration and identity of 
interests between growers and processors. If there is 
substantial interlocking ownership, shared revenues, or 
related prices between growers and processors, it is 
likely that a commonality of interests will be found in
Ibid.
Live Swine and Pork From Canada. 50 Federal 
Register 25,097 (1985).
Tomato Products From Greece. Inv. No. 104-TA-23
(1984) .
Sugar Content of Certain Articles From Australia. 
Inv. No. 104-TA-26 (1985).
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the investigation,^^ other factors which are deemed 
relevant in this decision include the degree of legal 
interaction between growers and processors. Conversely, 
where either growers or processors benefit from higher 
or lower prices relative to the other, it is unlikely 
that each industry will share the same economic
interests.
The 1988 Act did not equate the treatment of
agricultural and industrial producers but in fact 
confirmed the practice of the ITC by adding a new 
provision based on the distinction between agricultural 
growers and processors. Now, in an investigation 
involving a processed agricultural product produced from 
a raw agricultural product, a producer may be considered 
part of the industry producing the final product if:
(a) the processed agricultural product is produced 
from a raw agricultural product through a 
single continuous line of production; and
(b) there is a substantial coincidence of economic 
interest between the producers or growers of 
the raw agricultural product and the
processors of the processed agricultural
product based upon relevant economic factors 
which may include price, added market value, 
or other economic interrelationships.^*
A single continuous line of production is deemed to 
exist where the raw agricultural product is
See Lamb Meat From New Zealand, Inv. No. 701-TA- 214 (1984).
Table Wines From France and Italy, Inv. No. 701- 
TA-167 (1984).
®^* Section 771(4) (E), Tariff Act of 1930. asamended by Section 1316(a) of the Omnibus Trade andCompetitiveness Act of 1988.
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substantially or completely devoted to the production of 
the processed product and the agricultural product is 
substantially or completely formed out of the raw 
product.
The statute also specifies economic factors that are 
relevant to the coincidence of economic interest. If 
price is taken into account, the degree of correlation 
between the price of the raw agricultural product and 
the price of the processed product is relevant. Also, if 
added market value is taken into account, whether the 
value of the raw agricultural product constitutes a 
significant percentage of the value of the final product 
is considered important.
The 1988 Act did not alter the prior ITC practice and by 
adding new provisions differentiating between 
agricultural and industrial products. Congress 
recognised that in fact this artificial distinction 
exists.
(3) Regional Industries
While in ordinary cases the ITC is obliged to apply the 
concept of domestic industry to the whole of the United 
States, in 'appropriate circumstances', the United 
States may be divided into a number of 'regional 
markets' for the purposes of material injury
determinations. If injury is found within such a ■ ■ 1restricted market, an affirmative determination on 
behalf of the whole nation is possible, notwithstanding 
that the same industries in other parts of the United 
States remain unaffected.^’
See generally, M.P. Habile, "Regional Industry 
Analysis in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Proceedings: The ITC's Evolving Approach", (1992) 32:3 Virginia J. Int'l Law 625.
'   1
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The concept of 'appropriate circumstances* is not 
defined in the statute, but the statutory requirements 
for the establishment of a regional market are that:
(a) the producers within a regional market sell 
all, or almost all, of their production of the 
like product in that market; and
(b) the demand in that market is not supplied, to 
any substantial degree, by producers of the 
product in question located elsewhere in the 
United States.^*
Material injury, the threat of material injury and 
material retardation may all be established on a 
regional basis.
In practice, the ITC has taken it upon itself to define 
the appropriate circumstances in which a regional 
industry may be found to exist. Two circumstances 
justify a finding of appropriate circumstances. First, 
a particular region must account for a significant share 
of domestic consumption and production. Second, the 
condition of producers of the like product in the region 
should be worse than that of the industry throughout the 
rest of the United States.^* Neither of these 
conditions are required by the statute and are therefore 
an interpretative gloss put on the legislation.
Both Codes call for the use of this technique only in 
'exceptional circumstances'. This implies a more onerous 
standard than 'appropriate circumstances'. Naturally, 
the more specific a domestic industry, the easier it 
will be to establish injury and so domestic industries
Section 771(4) (C) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
Steel Wire Nails From the Republic of Korea. Inv. 
No. 731-TA-26 (1980). See also Atlantic Sugar Limited v 
United States. 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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securing regional interest treatment will be more 
successful than those which have to satisfy the whole 
United States territory standard.
Further, the ITC has not even confined itself to 
consideration of only these two conditions. In fact, the 
Commission has tended to examine the behaviour of the 
industry and consumers in the local market place. 
Factors such as taste, tradition and local culture are 
relevant as is contiguity.^*®
(4) The Related Parties Rule
The final rule authorising deviation from the ordinary 
concept of domestic industry is that of 'related 
parties'. Related parties refers to the problems which 
arise from the existence of transnational company 
operations. When producers are related to foreign 
exporters or domestic importers, it means simply that 
they are themselves importers of the allegedly 
subsidised or dumped merchandise. In such circumstances, 
the term 'industry' is defined in such a way as to 
exclude these producers from being represented as part 
of the relevant domestic industry.^**
The typical situation which this concept is designed to 
tackle is the parent/foreign subsidiary relationship. 
The Commission can exclude from the relevant domestic 
industry an entity, or group, that has benefited from 
subsidisation or has engaged in dumping through its 
foreign subsidiary and has imported the products back 
to the United States.
The rules on this subject are not hard and fast. For
390 presh Potatoes From Canada, Inv. No. 731-TA-124. 
*^^ Section 771(4) (B) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
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example, in one case the Commission excluded from the 
scope of the injury investigation a domestic producer 
which was wholly owned by a Swedish company because the 
domestic company was the exclusive U.S. importer of 
products from the parent which allowed the parent to 
avoid competition with other American producers and 
because the domestic company appeared to have benefited 
from consistently lower prices of imported goods 
relative to domestic producers.This was despite the 
fact that the subsidiary was free to buy the products 
from any other U.S. producer if these could be obtained 
at prices comparable to, or lower, than those offered by 
the parent, but also because certain of the imports from 
the parent could not be obtained from U.S. suppliers.
Another major criticism is that companies producing like 
products in the United States are excluded from the 
scope of the injury investigation if they are owned by 
foreign companies involved in the production of the 
goods that are the subject of investigation. For 
example, in the ITC investigation above, the defender 
companies had production facilities in the United States 
employing a number of people in research and 
development. Nevertheless, the American division of this 
operation was excluded from the investigation into 
injury.
This policy can lead to strange results. Thus, in one 
case involving a complaint by Texas Instruments into the 
sale of semi-conductors in the United States, the ITC 
held that NEC, a Japanese company was not a domestic
Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes From Sweden; 
reproduced at (1988) 22:2 JWT 127.
But contrast with the approach taken in Rock Salt from Canada. Inv. No. 731-TA-239 and Low-FUmina Brazing 
Copper Wire and Rod From New Zealand. Inv. No. 731-TÀ- 
247 (1986).
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manufacturer of the conductors in question when NEC 
produced its chips in California (and exported a 
considerable amount of its production to Japan) while 
Texas Instruments manufactured its chips in Japan and 
the Far East Nevertheless, Texas Instruments was 
allowed to lodge a petition complaining of dumping of 
semiconductors by Japanese companies in the United 
States.
(D) Causation
A causal connection between the subsidised imports and 
the injury to the domestic industry is, of course, the 
sine qua non of the whole countervailing and anti­
dumping procedures and is an essential requirement in 
American trade law.^ **
In practice, the Commission rarely makes separate 
statements of causation because the factors which are 
taken into account in ascertaining material injury or 
the threat thereof contain elements which refer to 
causation. Thus, for example, in assessing the effect of 
imports on domestic prices, the ITC is instructed to 
consider the effect of imports on the price of domestic 
goods. Similarly, the ITC is instructed to evaluate the 
impact of merchandise on domestic production through 
such factors as actual or potential decline in output, 
sales, profits, productivity, return on investment and 
employment.
The immediate consequence of this situation is that the 
ITC tends to assume a presumption that, if subsidisation
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 
256 Kilobits and Above From Japan, 51 Federal Register 1,009 (1986).
Section 7 01(a) (2) and 731(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
^     _
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or dumping and injury are present, the latter has been 
caused by the former.^* There are clearly a number of 
factors that the ITC has, in the past, placed great 
reliance upon in establishing causation. In particular, 
three factors assist the Commission determine whether 
imports have contributed to the condition of the 
industry: underselling, lost sales and import trends.^*’
Underselling occurs when the average price of imported 
merchandise in the United States market is below that of 
competing American goods. As a general rule, 
underselling is considered to be evidence of causation 
and overselling mitigates against causation. As one 
member of the ITC has observed, in almost every case 
where the Commission has made and affirmative 
determination of injury, the price of the imported 
product has been below that of its American 
competitor.^* The rationale for this rule is simply 
that the displacement of sales by U.S. companies or 
producers strongly suggests that market share is being 
lost.
However, in considering the element of price 
undercutting, the ITC makes no reference to relative 
quality. In other words, the quality of the products may 
account substantially for the price difference and yet 
this would never be considered a factor in judging the 
degree of causation.
See Palmeter, supra note 374, at 147.
See M.S. Knoll, "An Economic Approach to the 
Determination of Injury under U.S. Anti-dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Law", (1989) 22 N.Y Univ. J. Int'l Law & Politics 37, 54.
398 See Perry, supra note 357, 408.
399 gQQ ToD-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware 
From Korea and Taiwan. 51 Federal Register 46,664 (1986).
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Price undercutting is in fact an indirect, and more 
justifiable method from, a competition point of view, of 
determining future market share of the product. This is 
because price undercutting will eventually decrease 
market shares for the U.S. industries. By selecting this 
element, the ITC avoided the need to analyze future 
trends in the market-place.
Lost sales occur when an American consumer purchases a 
foreign product in place of one made by in the United 
States, chiefly because of price differences. This is 
perhaps the most direct means of confirming that U.S. 
companies are being hurt by foreign imports.*®®
Finally, there is the element of import trends. This is 
a more nebulous concept than the other two, but 
essentially concerns an examination of the quantity and 
market penetration of imports from countries under 
investigation. In particular, the Commission examines 
increases in the indicators which favour the foreign 
exporters.
Concentration on these three elements tends to minimise 
the weight given by the ITC to other factors such as 
industrial relations problems, supply problems, changes 
in consumer preferences and fashion as well as general 
economic recession.
As a general rule, the material injury must be caused 
'by reason of the imports of merchandise' under 
investigation, whether the products have been subsidised 
or dumped. The main question is to what extent must the 
injury be attributable to the imported products. On the 
one hand, must the imports be the main cause of the 
injury, or on the other hand can they one of the causes
*®® See Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies 
Thereof From Japan, supra note 3 64.
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of injury.
The Commission in fact does not attempt to evaluate 
whether the subsidised or dumped products were the 
primary cause of the injury.*®^ The ITC, supported by 
the CIT, has required that the imports cause a 
'significant part' of the injury to the domestic 
industry.
In one particular case, the ITC had to determine whether 
the injury to the domestic industry was caused by that 
industry's own multiple cost layering as opposed to the 
effect of the imports. While the Commission made an 
affirmative determination of injury, it acknowledged 
that some of the injury occurred as a result of the 
industry's own inefficiency. This decision was appealed 
to the CIT which ruled that;
'The Court has no doubt that the state of the 
domestic industry was attributable laroelv to its 
own multiple cost layering, but this does not mean 
that LTFV imports did not cause material 
injury.... The industry was materially injured and 
ITC's determination that injury was caused in 
significant part by LTFV imports was supported by 
the record evidence on volume, market penetration 
and price depression' ,*®’
Thus, imports need only be a cause of material injury 
and not the cause, and certainly not the only case.
*®^ G. Bryan & D.G. Boursereau, "Anti-dumping Law in 
the European Community and the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis", (1984) 18 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l Law 
& Econ., 631, 681.
*®^ Iwatsu Electric Co Ltd v United States, 
reproduced at (1991) 2: WTM 1.
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In situations in which a particular industry is 
generally depressed as a consequence of national 
economic recession, despite the protestations of the ITC 
to the contrary, it is undoubtedly easier to prove the 
existence of injury or threat of injury. This was made 
clear in the steel wars episode between the United 
States and the European Community.
A number of Community producers of steel were held to 
have engaged in subsidisation, dumping and causing 
injury to the American steel industry, British Steel 
appealed against this decision on the ground that when 
American prices had declined during the investigation, 
British imports had also declined, due to the decrease 
in domestic demand through contraction caused by a 
recession. Correspondingly, when American prices 
increased so did British imports of steel. The argument 
was therefore advanced that the volume of British steel 
imports had little or no injurious effects by itself, 
but rather was proportional to the economic welfare of 
the American steel industry itself.
The Court of International trade rejected this argument, 
instead holding that foreign imports need not be the 
sole or principal cause of material i n j u r y . was 
sufficient that the imports in question contribute to 
the decline of the domestic industry.
Another major problem arising under causation relates to 
situations in which the ITC has concluded that some, but 
not all, of the imports subject to investigation have 
benefited from subsidies. In such circumstances, the ITC 
must consider only those imports from the sources that 
have been found to be recipients of subsidies.
British Steel Corporation v United States, 593F.Supp 405 (CIT 1984),
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Further problems also arise in the application of 
causation standards if the ITA determines that, although 
companies have been indulging in subsidisation, only a 
certain percentage of the goods which have been subject 
to the investigation have in fact benefited from a 
countervailable subsidy. At present, the existing 
Commission jurisprudence on this point is 
inconsistent.
Finally, there has been criticism of the application of 
the causation test in countervailing cases in 
particular. Commenting on the practice of the ITC, two 
writers have observed that;
'with a burgeoning growth in its own case evidence, 
the ITC has relegated the requirement for proving 
a causal linkage between material injury and the 
foreign subsidy to secondary importance. Of primary 
importance today is the protection of American 
industry at the expense of consumers and foreign 
competitors,
There are certainly cases in which the Commission has 
provided little or no analysis of the issue of 
causation. Further, in at least one case. Chairperson 
Stern has declared that she 'did not believe it 
necessary or desirable to make a determination on the 
question of material injury separate from the 
consideration of causality'.'*^
404 Palmeter, supra note 374, 148.
405 A.M. Rugman & A. Anderson, "A Fishy Business: The 
Abuse of American Trade Law in the Atlantic Groundfish 
Case of 1985-86", (1987) 13 Canadian Public Policy 152, 162.
Fresh Atlantic Groundfish From Canada. 51 Federal 
Register 10,041 (1986).
___
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(4) Observations
In the introduction to this chapter, the United States 
was accused of three separate abuses of the 
international rules, namely, actively promoting and 
encouraging the use of measures of administered 
protection, failing to abide by the terms and the spirit 
of GATT commitments and complicity in deliberately 
facilitating disruption of patterns of trade. It is now 
time to justify these charges after having reviewed the 
content and administration of the measures in question.
The accusation of promoting and encouraging the use of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures is 
substantiated by two facts. First, the U.S.Congress, and 
to a lesser extent the International Trade 
Administration (ITA), have both progressively 
liberalised the rules regulating these practices over 
the course of the last fifteen years. If the starting 
point for evaluation is taken to be 1979'*®^ , and 
assuming (at least hypothetically) at this point the 
creation of a GATT-consistent legal environment, U.S. 
trade laws have been manipulated and assuaged in the 
interests of domestic industries and in a manner often 
inconsistent with the GATT rules.
Consider the trend exhibited by Congress towards the 
liberalisation of these measures. Amendments have been 
made to respond to the desires of domestic industries 
through the enactment of the 1984 and 1988 statues. In 
these measures, Congress has either reversed rulings of 
the administering agencies which are objective or, in 
the worst case, refined the rules to increase the
ie. the date of enactment of the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979. when the United States was supposed to have 
incorporated the obligations of the 1979 Subsidies and Anti-dumping Code into United States law.
^___________________
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possibilities of affirmative determinations against 
foreign producers and manufacturers.^* As evidence of 
this trend, we can cite the new measures for component 
dumping, the continued removal of discretion from the 
administering agencies, the new standards for assessing 
material injury and the proposals for the creation of 
statutory countervailable subsidies. In fact, there is 
no single instance of Congress enacting a rule which 
does not favour domestic industries over foreign 
competitors.
The consequence of these amendments has been not only a 
progressive increase in the volume of complaints 
received by the ITA, particularly when innovative forms 
of relief have been involved, but also in the proportion 
of successful complaints in both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty cases. The organic cause of this 
phenomenon can be traced back to the increasing 
liberalisation of the underlying legislative base for 
these measures.
The second charge - responsibility for deliberate laxity 
in the development and application of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty rules - relates to the first. In 
liberalising access to these measures and indirectly to 
protective measures, the United States government - both 
the Executive and Legislative branches - are responsible 
for the adoption of illegal or GATT-inconsistent 
measures. In addition, advantage has been taken of loop­
holes in the terms of the international Codes to exploit 
opportunities to extend unfair protection to United 
States industries. The evidence for these propositions 
is overwhelming and is illustrated by the plethora of 
examples of illegal behaviour which will be listed in a
408 This is a more pronounced trend in procedural 
matters, such as standing, petition requirements, etc, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.
^  _
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moment,
The final charge - complicity in deliberately disrupting 
patterns of international trade to protect domestic 
industries - is an immediate consequence of the first 
two practices. According to a recent GATT report, each 
year between 2-4% of imports into the United States are 
affected by these measures.This figure is calculated 
on a trade-weighted basis and might seem insignificant 
but in dollar-terms the figure is certainly not 
insignificant and, more importantly, represents lost 
opportunities for foreign producers especially those 
from developing countries.
There is no doubt that much of the pressure on Congress 
and the Executive stems from a perception that domestic 
industries are failing, not because of national economic 
policy, but because of unfair foreign practices. It is 
easier to blame declining competitiveness on foreign 
manufacturers who are often placed at a disadvantage in 
effectively defending their positions. Congressmen often 
pander to vociferous industries within their 
constituencies and, to silence possible opposition, 
frequently introduce proposals in Congress to increase 
protect for local industries. The result is often that, 
not only is greater protection granted, but legislative 
measures are targeted against particular states 
competing with these local industries.
Illustrations of illegal behaviour abound throughout 
United States anti-dumping and countervailing duty law. 
These practices may be attributed to one of the four 
agencies involved in the administration of administered 
protection - the U.S. Congress, the ITA, the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) or the Court of
GATT, Trade Policy Review Mechanism for the 
United States (1990), 35.
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International Trade (CIT).
Among the illegal practices contrived by the U.S. 
Congress are the amended definition of domestic industry 
for wine and grape products introduced by section 
612(a)(1) of the 1984 Act'^ ®^, upstream subsidies on
agricultural products, introduced by section 77IB of the 
1988 Acb*" and the proposed statutory countervailable 
subsidies introduced in bills before Congress from time 
to time. Illustrations of Congress removing discretion 
from the administering agencies are also common and, 
among these, are the removal of discretion in the 
calculation of net subsidies, the determination of both 
the threat of material injury and material retardation 
of an infant industry and interference in constructed 
value calculations. In most of these amendments to the 
statutory rules, the Congress has demonstrated a 
pernicious disregard for the medium and long-term trade 
policy objectives promoted by the United States in 
favour of short-term political gains.
It is more difficult to assess the legality of actions 
and practices of the ITA. As a general rule, the ITA 
exercises considerable discretion in the application of 
these rules which stems from the lack of detail in the 
statutory framework. A similar lack of detail also 
characterises the international rules on the actual 
practical administration of measures of administered 
protection. Hence, the position is not so clear. 
Nevertheless, ITA practices which are likely to be 
illegal include the selection of third country
United States - Definition of Industry Concerning 
Wine and Grape Products. GATT Doc. SCM/71 (March 1986); 
GATT BISD, 39th Supplement 436 (1993).
See United States - Countervailing Duties on 
Fresh. Chilled and Frozen Pork From Canada. GATT Doc. 
DS7/R (September (1990); GATT BISD, 38th Supplement 30 
(1991).
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surrogates when determining foreign market value"*^ ,^ the 
potential extension of dumping to services, constructed 
value calculations, the methodology of comparing United 
States price with foreign market values (exchange rates, 
sampling, etc) and asymmetrical adjustments. The ITA is 
a political body and no doubt responds to prevailing 
pressures from political circles but, at the same time, 
has to contend with the trade implications of its 
actions relative to third countries.
The ITC is a politically-appointed agencies which is 
instructed to act as a reservoir of economic expertise. 
In its operations, it is intended to act impartially, 
but even its activities have caused concern among United 
States trade partners. It is responsible for a number of 
dubious GATT-consistent practices including the 
application of factors to take into account when 
assessing material injury and other indicators of 
injury, the definition of domestic industry, the 
determination of causation and the application of the 
related parties rule.
The final agency - the Court of International Trade - 
is, of course, a legal body which is instructed to apply 
legal rules. The rules which it applies are United 
States domestic laws and not international rules. In 
fact, as we have seen, the CIT is specifically 
instructed not to apply the rules contained in the 1979 
Code and is therefore manacled from conducting judicial 
review of national laws against international standards. 
For the most part, the decisions of the CIT are 
objective and the agency cannot be faulted for 
discriminating against foreign exporters in its review 
of the application of the laws of administered
United States Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon From Norway, GATT Doc. ADP/61 (October 1991).
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protection.
The causes of non-compliance are numerous and, to a 
certain extent, are merely a microcosm of the larger 
political picture painted in Chapter 6. However, the 
conflicts between these agencies are illustrative of the 
influences impinging on each to act in a certain 
fashion. These tensions can be grouped into the 
following categories: (a) Congress versus the ITA; (b)
Congress versus the ITC; (c) ITA versus Court of 
International Trade; (d) ITC versus Court of 
International Trade.
The source of much conflict in the application of 
measures of administered protection originates in the 
relationship between the Congress and the ITA. Consider 
for a moment the history of the issue of indirect 
subsidies. For a considerable period, the ITA rejected 
pressures to include indirect subsidies in the 
calculation of countervailable subsidies. This policy 
was based on a fair and objective interpretation of the 
statutory provisions. Nevertheless, Congress overruled 
the ITA’s interpretation in the 1984 Act and made 
indirect subsidies countervailable. The reaction of the 
ITA has been to accept this amendment but to apply it 
strictly which again provoked the Congress to introduce 
a further amendment. It was this amendment which 
eventually lead to the United States being brought 
before a GATT panel to justify its actions.
The episode illustrates the conflicting interests 
between the Congress and the ITA. While the Congress 
responds to internal domestic calls with little regard 
to the international commitments of the United States, 
the ITA is compelled to take into account these 
commitments as part of the Executive arm of government. 
There is little doubt that this illustrates the tendency
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of Congress to put domestic considerations before 
international obligations.
A similar result occurred when Congress decided to 
intervene in the dispute between the ITA and the Court 
of International Trade in the specificity dispute. Here, 
the Congress sided with the CIT for the principal reason 
that the CIT wished to apply a more restrictive test and 
not because of objective reasons. In fact, the House 
Report accompanying the bill expressly acknowledged that 
the amendment would provide a basis for a substantially 
broader definition of countervailable domestic subsidy. 
Other instances of the Congress overruling the ITA will 
be considered in the next chapter in relation to the 
standing requirements for petitioners and anti­
circumvention provisions.
Congress has also been in competition with the ITC and, 
on numerous instances had overruled the administrative 
practices of the agency by statutory amendment. In fact, 
between 1979 and 1988, the applicable rules to be 
applied by the ITC have been almost completely 
rewritten. In particular, the Congress has increased the 
scope of indicators of injury to be considered by the 
ITC, overruled the ITC on cumulation and cross­
cumulation, and extensively liberalised the indicators 
for threat of material injury.
The ITA has also had its confrontations with the Court 
of International Trade. The CIT has acted impartially in 
most of these confrontations. For example, the Court 
removed many of the arbitrary rules for the treatment of 
dumping from non-market economies. Hence, the CIT acts 
as a shield against impropriety and arbitrariness but 
can only be so relative to the domestic rules of law and 
not international standards. Hence, its potency is 
considerably weakened.
-_________
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The ITC and the CIT have also come into conflict in many 
instances. The Court has criticised the ITC for applying 
too lax standards for assessing preliminary injury in 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases. However, the 
ITC has also effectively ignored rulings of the CIT 
which it believes are erroneous underlying a certain 
degree of contempt for the review of its decisions by 
the court. This attitude prevails, of course, until the 
Congress decides to support the CIT in which case the 
ITC is bound by its statutory obligations.
These tensions illustrate the confusing interplay of 
participants in the decision-making process culminating 
in the application of measures of administered 
protection. The single overriding conclusion which can 
be deduced is that international obligations rarely play 
a part in the application of such measures. For the most 
part, the United States system for administered 
protection is a self-contained order functioning 
independently of the international system, with little 
interaction except for the occasional adverse panel 
ruling.
Congress, for example, is well aware that legislative 
measures will rarely be challenged at the international 
level and acts with virtual contempt for the 
international system. Quite clearly, it does not draft 
legislative measures with an eye on the international 
commitments of the United States. The lack of effective 
judicial review also removes the element of control on 
Congressional activities which would otherwise be 
present.
The simple conclusion is therefore that the practical 
application of the United States anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws escapes international 
regulation and the United States acts independently from
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international normative influence when enacting and 
implementing rules implementing these systems.
United States - Asymmetry of Procedural Rights 
in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Investigations
Illegitimate protection can be provided in the form 
procedural bias in the administration of anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty laws in much the same way as by 
manipulating the substantive rules in a manner 
inconsistent with international obligations. In fact, 
both the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Codes provide 
detailed rules on procedural requirements which must be 
implemented during investigations. Failure to comply 
with these obligations is evidence of the limited 
normative impact of the international rules not only on 
the legislative content of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty law but also in their adminstration 
by the responsible government agencies.^*
Nevertheless, again both Codes were unsuccessful in 
compelling the United States to act in a manner 
consistent with its international obligations when 
conducting investigations. In part, this was due to the 
inherent bias in anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
proceedings themselves but also manipulation by the 
United States authorities which took three forms.
First, the procedural apparatus set up to administer 
these actions operated against the interests of foreign
On the administration of United States anti­dumping and countervailing duty laws in general, see 
S.J. Powell, et al., "Current Administration of U.S. 
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws", (1990) 11
Northwestern J. Int'l Law & Bus 177; G.N. Horlick, "The 
United States Anti-Dumping System", in J.H. Jackson & 
E.A. Vermulst (eds), Anti-Dumoina Law and Practice. 99- 
165; G. Bryan & D.G. Boursereau, "Anti-Dumping in the 
European Communities and the United States", (1985) 18 
Geo. Wash, J. Int'l Law & Econ. 631, 681-690; E.A.
Vermulst, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice in the United 
States and the European Communities (1987)
____
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producers. Foreign producers were required to justify 
their commercial decisions and actions to the
administering agencies while domestic parties had the 
passive role of initiators of proceedings. In other 
words, foreign respondents had the onus of proving that
they had not been engaging in offending practices.
Once a complaint was initiated, the contest was really 
between the United States authorities, with the
resources of the state behind them, on the one hand, and 
foreign producers, often from developing countries with 
their limited resources, on the other. It is little 
wonder that, on a number of occasions, the lodging of a 
petition of a United States producer was sufficient for 
some producers to shift exports to another country in 
order to avoid the costs of defending against such 
allegations regardless of the merits of the petition.
This process was in fact rather one-sided. It operated 
to protect the interests of domestic producers at the 
expense of foreign manufacturers. Even the interests of 
other domestic groups, such as consumers, were often 
subsumed to those of industrial groups wielding 
considerable influence and power. When these laws were 
enacted, foreign producers had little direct political 
influence and were therefore ignored by Congressmen 
representing the interests of their own constituencies.
Second, the detailed procedural and administrative rules 
of the United States anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty laws were also heavily weighted against foreign 
producers. The inherent discrimination in anti-dumping 
and countervailing proceedings was reflected in the 
rules concerning time limits, disclosure of confidential 
information, the far from stringent standing 
requirements set for potential petitioners and in costs
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of defending against unsubstantiated allegations.
The third factor was the tendency of the administering 
agencies to adopt interpretations of these laws that 
have as their implicit purpose the protection of 
domestic interests.
This chapter will investigate these issues in more 
detail to demonstrate that the whole procedural system 
was, at its heart, a glorified form of protection. 
Little countenance was given to the international rules 
established in the Tokyo Round Codes. Once again, this 
analysis will not, however, involve an examination of 
the compatibility of these procedural rules with the 
terms of the Anti-Dumping Code 1994.
(1) Standing to Initiate Proceedings
Both countervailing duty and anti-dumping investigations 
are commenced whenever the International Trade 
Administration (ITA), an agency of the Department of 
Commerce, decides that, from the information available 
to it or submitted from private sources, a formal 
investigation is warranted into whether imported goods 
have benefited from foreign subsidies, or enter the 
American market at less than fair value, with the effect 
of injuring a domestic industry.
A.L. George, "Settling Anti-Dumping Cases; Practical and Policy Analysis", (1987) 19:3 Law & Pol'y 
Int'l Bus. 455.
While private petitions must be filed with the 
Department of Commerce and simultaneously with the 
International Trade Commission (ITC), it is the ITA that 
has the responsibility of deciding whether an 
investigation should be commenced.
691
The laxity of the standing requirement for the 
initiation of these investigations has, for some 
considerable time, been seen as an effective non-tariff 
barrier because of the wide range of parties (interested 
and otherwise) entitled to initiate complaints.^*
(A) United States Government Agencies
The ITA is authorised to self-initiate investigations 
into subsidised goods from: (a) states that are not
parties to the 1979 Subsidies Code (unless the state in 
question has assumed equivalent obligations)(b) 
countries that are parties to the 1979 Subsidies 
Code"^ *^. In a similar vein, the agency can self-initiate 
investigations into alleged dumping of goods from any 
country.^*
For the purposes of establishing standing to bring a 
complaint, the ITA is a privileged applicant. It need 
not establish a prima facie case of subsidisation or 
dumping and it is sufficient that the ITA deems that, 
from the informational available to it, a 'formal 
investigation is warranted'. Nor need the ITA establish 
that it represents a particular industry, its interest 
in the general economy of the United States being 
sufficient to substantial an interest in any
H, Brandt & W.A. Zeitler, "Unfair Import Trade 
Practice Jurisdiction: The Applicability of Section 337 
and the Countervailing and Anti-dumping Laws", (1980) 12 
Law & Pol'y Int'l Law 95, 109.
Section 303 (a)(3)(B) Tariff Act of 1930. as 
amended by Section 331(a) of the Trade Act of 1974.
Section 702 (a) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended by 
Section 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
Section 732 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930. asamended by Section 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of1979.
420 See text supra, pp.175-176,
421 For the purposes of cross-reference. Section 
701(c), as amended by Section 101 of the 1979 Act 
provides as follows:
"For provisions of law applicable in the case of 
merchandise which the product of a country other 
than a country under the Agreement, see Section 303 
of the Act".
Section 303 (a)(3)(A) Tariff Act of 1930. asamended.
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investigation.
(B) Private Parties Under Section 303 of the Tariff Act
of 1930
United States countervailing law makes a distinction 
between investigations into goods originating from 
states that are parties to the 1979 Subsidies Code (or 
who have assumed equivalent obligations) and countries 
that are not parties to that agreement.Section 303 
of the Tariff Act of 1930. as amended, governs procedure 
against non-parties while Section 701(a) regulates 
investigations into goods from signatory states.^*
The legal requirements for proving standing to initiate 
such a complaint are considerably more relaxed under 
Section 303 than under Section 701(a). An investigation 
under this provision is initiated upon the filing of a 
petition by 'any person setting forth his belief that a 
bounty or grant has been paid or bestowed, and the 
reasons t h e r e f o r i n  other words, to commence an 
investigation, a petitioner need only be a private or 
legal person who believes that a subsidy has been 
conferred. There is no requirement that the individual 
represents an industry or that the individual has an 
interest in the proceedings. I
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(C) Private Parties Under Sections 701fal and 731(a) of
the Tariff Act of 1930
In theory, the statutory requirements for establishing 
standing to initiate a countervailing duty action 
against goods originating in a Code signatory state, or 
against any goods regardless of origin in the case of an 
anti-dumping complaint, can be broken down into two 
components.^* The petitioner must qualify as an 
interested party and must have filed the petition on 
behalf of a domestic industry.
(1) Interested Parties 
Relevant interested parties include the following:
(1) Manufacturers, producers or wholesalers in the 
United States of like merchandise;
(2) Trade or business associations, a majority of 
whose members manufacture, produce or 
wholesale the subject merchandise or like 
merchandise;
(3) Recognised unions or groups of workers 
representative of an industry engaged in the 
manufacture, production or wholesaling in the 
United States of like products
(4) Coalitions of firms or trade associations that 
are engaged in the manufacture of like 
products.
At least one commentator has suggested that the category
See generally C.H. Cosgrove, "Technical Analysis 
of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement", (1979) 11 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 1497.
*^24 Sections 702 (b)(1) and 732 (b)(1) Tariff Act of 
1930. as amended.
425 Section 771(9), Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
694
of interested parties extends to foreign manufacturers, 
producers or exporters or the government of the country 
in which the subject merchandise is produced or 
manufactured, or from which it is exported.^* This is 
an erroneous view since, although these groups are 
classified as 'interested parties' by the statute, 
sections 702(b)(1) and 732(b)(1) identify only the above 
four groups as interested parties for the purposes of 
commencing countervailing and anti-dumping 
investigations.
The effect of this exclusion is to prevent foreign 
importers challenging dumped or subsidised imports in 
the United States market from third country sources. In 
other words, a European exporter could not initiate an 
investigation into the dumping of goods by a Taiwanese 
manufacturer of like products in the United States.
The 1988 Act added an additional, and controversial, 
category to the list of eligible petitioners. Section 
1326(c) introduced an amendment which provides that, in 
any investigation into processed agricultural products, 
a coalition or trade association which is representative 
of processors, of processors and producers, or of 
processors and growers, is deemed to be an interested 
party for the purposes of these sections.
Granting standing to groups consisting of agricultural 
commodity producers as well as first and second stage 
producers is clearly contrary to the 1979 Codes because 
only one of these parties can be producers of goods that
R.C. Cassidy, "The Procedural Rights of Private 
Parties in United States Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Proceedings", A Paper presented at the Brugges Annual 
Conference, 14-16 September 1989, p.3.
Section 771(9) (G) Tariff Act of 1930. as amendedby Section 1326 of the Omnibus Trade and CompetitivenessAct of 1988.
 - -
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are like products to those identified in the complaint. 
The dubious legality of this measure is highlighted by 
the fact that Congress qualified the continued 
application of this right with a declaration that it is 
only valid until successfully challenged at the 
international level as being contrary to the 
international obligations of the United States,
This displays the contempt that Congress has for rules 
of international trade law. It is widely known that only 
producers of like products can initiate complaints 
against foreign imports yet this provision extends that 
right to groups either making goods out of a raw product 
or providing the raw product for manufacturing into a 
refined product. Congress recognised the illegitimacy of 
the measure by acknowledging is conditional validity 
until challenged. Nevertheless the measure remains on 
the statute book until successfully challenged.
(2) Representative of a domestic industry
The second requirement is that the complainer must 
represent a domestic industry before a complaint can be 
accepted. This stems from the condition that the 
petition is lodged 'on behalf of an industry* which is 
imposed by both sections of the statute.
The Court of International Trade originally defined this 
requirement as the need for a petitioner to 'show that 
a majority of the industry backs its petition'.^* 
However, in practice, the Department of Commerce has not 
construed this condition to mean that the petitioner 
must prove that it is representative of such an industry 
but, conversely, that the respondent must prove that the
Gilmore Steel Corporation v United States. 585F.Supp. 670, 676 (CIT 1984).
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petition is not filed on behalf of an industry.^* In 
other words, the Department of Commerce deliberately 
refused to comply with the judgment of the Court of 
International Trade where its ruling would have had the 
effect to restricting its ability to determine the 
standing of applicants.
The Court of International Trade has subsequently 
reviewed this requirement in a more recent case where 
the appellants were appealing against a final 
affirmative determination of countervailing duties.'**® 
In Comeau Seafoods Ltd v United States'***, the Court 
changed its earlier policy by deciding that the ITA 'has 
discretion to dismiss, but its not required to dismiss, 
petitions that are not shown to be actively supported by 
a majority of the domestic industry'.'**^ The Court 
concluded that there was nothing in the statute, in its 
legislative history, or the ITA regulations, that 
requires petitioners to establish that they have the 
support of the majority of the producers in their 
industry. It was for the ITA and not the petitioner to 
establish that its complaint was 'on behalf of an 
industry'.
The overall effect of this interpretation is to place 
the foreign respondent at a distinct disadvantage 
because not only does this require the respondent to 
incur substantially more expense than the petitioner in 
disputing this point, but also because the respondent
Textile Mill Products and Apparel From Malaysia. 
50 Federal Register 9852 (1985).
"**® Fresh Atlantic Groundfish From Canada. 51 Federal Register 10,041 (1986),
'*** Slip Op. 89-155, reproduced at (1990) 2:1 WTM
141.
432 See also Citrosuco Paulista SA v United States. 
704 F.Supp. 1075 (CIT, 1988).
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may not have access to information to refute the claim. 
At the same time, domestic industries which will benefit 
from any such investigation are hardly likely to assist 
a foreign competitor defend its position in the United 
States market.
This disadvantage is compounded by the fact that United 
States anti-dumping law now requires both the ITA and 
the ITC to provide 'technical assistance' to small 
American businesses to enable such entities to prepare 
and file anti-dumping petitions.'*** Therefore, a
petitioner can obtain government assistance to
substantiate its position regarding standing, even 
although the ITA does not strictly require such
evidence, while foreign respondent is required to
shoulder the expense of rebutting the presumption that 
the petitioner does not have standing.
Another inequitable practice in the determination of 
standing is the practice of the ITA of excluding from 
the relevant domestic industry all domestic producers 
who are also importers. For example, in Frozen 
Concentrated Qranae Juice From Brazil, the exclusion of 
foreign producers manufacturing the product in the 
United States was critical to the finding that the 
remaining domestic producers constituted a sufficient 
proportion of the domestic industry to allow the 
complaint to proceed.'**'* The effect of this rule can be 
brutal when the excluded companies are not foreign owned 
or controlled. In any event, if a foreign enterprise has 
engaged in significant investment in the economy of the
'*** S.J. Powell et al., "Current Administration of 
U.S. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws; 
Implications for Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free Trade 
Talks", (1990) Northwestern Journal of Int'l Law & Bus., 
177, 198.
434 52 Federal Register 8324 (1987)
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United States to produce specific goods, the fairness of 
excluding that producer from the relevant domestic 
industry in such circumstances cannot be explained on 
equitable grounds particularly if the majority of 
production is sold in the domestic market. The effect of 
this rule is blatantly to discriminate against foreign 
investment.
In any event, it is clearly not the Department of 
Commerce which is in the best position to ascertain 
whether or not a petitioner represents a domestic 
industry. While the statute charges the ITA with this 
responsibility, it is the International Trade Commission 
that defines the relevant industry when assessing the 
degree of injury sustained by a specific industry. The 
Commission has the advantage of statistics to hand 
regarding the composition of particular industries as 
well as experience and expertise to decide these issues. 
In the circumstances, there is a strong argument in 
favour of passing authority to decide the necessary 
degree of representation to the Commission.
If the ITC were to assume the responsibility of 
determining whether petitioners were representative of 
a domestic industry, it is likely that many complaints 
would be rejected at this stage. The ITC is in a 
position to evaluate this requirement with a certain 
degree of objectivity, thereby removing the political 
element that is inherent in the ITA's practice on this 
matter. This is also the reason that this responsibility 
will never be passed to the Commission.
Both the ITA and the Court of International Trade have 
vigorously affirmed that jurisdiction to decide this 
question resides in the Department of Commerce and all 
determinations on this point are independent of any 
decisions made by the Commission. For example, the Court
_
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has recently expressed the view that:
"The ITA's standing determination is made within 
the first twenty day period after the filing of the 
petition and is not connected in any way with the 
ITC's like product determination.'^*
There is therefore little doubt that it is the ITA which 
has absolute discretion to decide whether an application 
should be dismissed on the ground that a petitioner does 
not represent an industry.'*** Furthermore, the 
Commission itself has been unwilling to enter into 
questions regarding standing, instead abjuring 
responsibility for such decisions to the ITA.'**^
Nevertheless, the contention that the ITC is better 
suited to answer the preliminary question of standing 
has gained some support among commentators on the 
subject.'*** Their arguments are based on the related 
points that the Commission decides the issue of the 
relevant domestic industry in the course of its injury 
determination and has the data available to decide this 
question relatively promptly.
In any event, in practice, complaints are rarely 
rejected on the basis that a petitioner lacks standing
*^** Sandvik AB v United States. 721 F.Supp. 1322, 
1329 (CIT 1989), aff'd 901 F.2d 46 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
'*** See Gilmore Steel Corporation v United States. 
585 F.Supp. 670 (CIT 1984).
'*'^ See Laser Light-Scattering Instruments From 
Japan. Inv. No. 731-TA-465 (May 1990); and Martial Arts 
Uniforms From Taiwan. Inv. No. 731-TA-424 (Dec. 1988).
'*** See E.D. Madaj & C.H. Nalls, "Bifurcation Without 
Direction: The USITC and the Question of Standing in 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Cases", (1991) 22 Law & 
Pol'y Int'l Bus. 673.
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because the evidential requirements are so low/*^. 
Indeed, there is a presumption that petitioners possess 
standing and no preliminary investigation is undertaken 
by the ITA to ascertain the exact legal position of the 
complainer as a representative of a group.
There also seems little scope for a respondent to 
challenge the standing of a petitioner because, until 
the initial twenty day period has expired, the 
respondent has no status in the investigation and it is 
during this initial stage that the determination of 
standing is made. The sole remedy of the respondent in 
such circumstances is to challenge the final decision by 
way of appeal.
(D) Private Parties Petitioning for Relief From Third 
Country Dumping
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
G.N, Horlick & F.A, DeBusk, "Commerce Procedures 
Under Existing and Proposed Anti-Dumping/Countervailing 
Duty Regulations", (1988) 22:1 Int'l Lawyer 99, 100-104,
Section 1317 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
1
:srtintroduced a procedure for American producers and 
manufacturers to seek relief from dumped foreign 
products in third country markets. A United States 
industry may petition the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) to request a country to take 
appropriate action under its laws to counter dumping 
from third countries.^® This right is reserved to anti­
dumping actions and does not extend to countervailing 
duty complaints.
The stimulus for this amendment arose from the 1986 
semiconductor dispute between the United States and
:
_____________________ _ ________________________
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Japan. In addition to allegations that Japanese 
manufacturers were dumping semiconductors on the United 
States market, United States manufacturers contended 
that third country markets were being closed to American 
suppliers because Japanese producers were also dumping 
in these areas. The third country dumping procedure 
places even greater pressure on foreign manufacturers 
than merely imposing duties on imports into the United 
States.
A domestic industry that produces goods that are like, 
or directly competitive with, merchandise produced by 
foreign manufacturers may petition the USTR to initiate 
an anti-dumping action in a third country,'*'** Standing 
is reserved to 'domestic industries', a term which will 
presumably be interpreted to producers of like and 
directly competitive products in line with the normal 
anti-dumping procedure.
There is no express requirement that the petitioners 
represent the majority of manufacturers or producers in 
a particular domestic industry and it is unlikely that 
this requirement will be implied by the USTR into the 
procedure. It should also be noted that it is the USTR 
who has jurisdiction to decide whether petitioners 
represent an industry and not the ITA or the ITC which 
brings a political element into play.
(E) Downstream Product Monitoring Applications
Another procedure introduced by the 1988 Act in response 
to domestic pressure groups is one which allows a 
petitioner to apply to the ITA for the designation of a
'*^* Section 1317(b)(1), Omnibus Trade andCompetitiveness Act of 1988.
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particular item as a downstream product.Downstream 
products are simply goods that have been made from, or 
containing, dumped or subsidised components. Naturally, 
products that have benefitted from cheaper component 
parts will have a competitive advantage compared to 
comparable domestic goods that have not. The downstream 
product monitoring provisions are an attempt to tackle 
this problem.
A producer of an article that is 'like' a component part 
or a downstream product may petition the ITA to 
designate that article as a downstream product liable 
for monitoring under Section 1320 of the 1988 Act. The 
term 'domestic producer' implies that individual 
businesses or companies have standing to lodge such a 
petition. The petitioner's interest is presumed if it is 
a product that is like a component part or downstream 
product.
There is no requirement that the petitioner must be 
acting on behalf of a domestic industry by representing 
the majority of the relevant industry. Since the 
procedure may culminate in duties that are akin to 
countervailing and anti-dumping duties, the consistency 
of this procedure with the United States international 
obligations must be questioned.
(F) Short Life Product Cycles
Without any attempt to disguise its motives, Congress 
introduced the concept of 'short life cycle products' in 
the 1988 Act to ensure that high technology products 
from Japan could be subject to effective anti-dumping
Section 780 Tariff Act of 1930. as amended bySection 1320 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of1980.
113'^
703
duties before the technological advances engineered into 
the products expired. A short life product is defined as 
•any product that the Commission determines is likely to 
become outmoded within four years, by reason of 
technological advances after the product is commercially 
available '
In contrast to the normal countervailing and anti­
dumping proceedings, it is the ITC which assumes the 
role of investigating a complaint into the existence of 
injurious short life cycle products entering the United
States market.
Any 'eligible domestic entity* is entitled to file a 
petition with the International Trade Commission 
requesting that a product category be designated as a 
short life product c y c l e . T h i s  procedure represents 
a major departure from the ordinary anti-dumping 
procedures for two reasons. First, it is the ITC and not 
the ITA that is responsible for deciding whether a 
petitioner has standing to lodge a complaint. Second, 
the concept of relevant domestic industry specified 
under normal countervailing and anti-dumping processes 
has been replaced by another concept, called 'an 
eligible domestic entity'.
An eligible domestic entity is defined as 'a 
manufacturer or producer in the United States, or a 
certified union or recognized union or group of workers 
which is representative of an industry in the United
Section 739(b) (4) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended 
by Section 1323 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
^  Section 739(a)(1)(A) Tariff Act of 1930, asamended by Section 132 3 Omnibus Trade andCompetitiveness Act of 1988.
445 Section 739(a)(1), ibid.
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States'. The emphasis is clearly on the ability of 
individual firms, companies or entities to bring 
petitions which raised confusion as to the term 
'representative'. In order to be representative of an 
industry, is an entity required to have the support of 
the majority of the domestic industry or must its 
production capacity account for the majority of output 
in the industry concerned? Alternatively, can groups of 
manufacturers or producers be deemed 'entities' under 
the provision?
Since the short life product cycle procedure, if 
successfully initiated, results in the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties, it is a flagrant violation of the 
1979 Anti-Dumping Code because it allows such 
representatives to acquire standing where they may not 
in fact represent the relevant industry.^*
(2) Slack Petition Requirements
A petition must allege the existence of the elements 
necessary for the imposition of countervailing or anti­
dumping measures. This obviously includes allegations of 
subsidisation or dumping, as appropriate, and material 
injury to a domestic i n d u s t r y . I n  addition, the 
petition must be 'accompanied by information reasonably 
available to the petitioners supporting those 
allegations.'
The 'reasonable indication' standard makes a mockery of 
any attempt to impose any semblance of an evidentiary
446 See Article 4, Anti-Dumoinq Code 1979.
See generally, N.D. Palmeter, "Injury 
Determinations in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Cases; A Commentary on United States Practice", (1989) 28:2 JWT 123, 125.
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threshold for the initiation of complaints. The degree 
of injury information required to trigger an 
investigation for example is considerably less than that 
needed to reach an affirmative preliminary
determination.Examples of the ITA rejecting
complaints on the basis of the sufficiency of the 
evidence are rare.
Although the petition is submitted on a prescribed form, 
a complainer has a distinct advantage which can be 
exploited at this stage. Specifically, the complainer 
can submit arguments which will affect how the 
Department of Commerce defines the scope of its 
investigation especially into the critical issues of 
product specification, domestic industry identification 
and quantification.
In contrast, the foreign respondent to the complaint is 
prohibited from having preinitiation contact with the 
Department of Commerce and therefore has no influence on 
the decision to initiate an investigation into its 
b u s i n e s s . while there is no sanction for attempting 
to make preinitiation contact, the ITA simply refuses to 
accept oral arguments before a decision has been made 
and will return documents containing arguments against 
commencing an investigation.Foreign companies 
attempting to engage in preinitiation contact may find 
any final decision in their favour being overturned on
These evidentary requirements were considered in 
American Lamb Company v United States. 785 F.2d 994 
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
See United States v Roses Incorporated. 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
See the Department of Commerce, Countervailing 
Duty Regulations. 51 Federal Register 29,059 (1986).
These regulations prohibit any preinitiation contact from interested parties except the petitioner.
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appeal.^*
(3) Inequitable Conduct of Investigations
The division of responsibility for the conduct of 
investigations is as follows;
(a) the International Trade Administration 
decides;
(i) if a foreign country is providing, 
directly or indirectly, a subsidy with 
respect to the manufacture, production or 
exportation merchandise into the United 
States; or
(ii) if a foreign manufacturer, producer or 
exporter is selling goods at less than 
fair value in the United States
market.
(b) the International Trade Commission 
investigates whether or not an industry in the 
United States is materially injured, 
threatened with material injury or the 
establishment of an industry is materially 
retarded by reason of such imports.
The actual delegation of responsibilities between these
451 See Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 439, 103.
Sections 701(a)(1) and 731(2), Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
Sections 701(a)(2) and 732 (a)(2), Tariff Act of1930. as amended. ■
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agencies is not absolutely clear-cut, leading the 
Federal Court to comment that 'naturally the specifics 
of who does what is for dispute and discussion'.For 
example, the ultimate power to decide which agency has 
jurisdiction over particular issues in the event of 
conflicting jurisdiction, is not expressed in the 
statute.
Similarly, there are a number of overlapping substantive 
issues. For example, is the level of subsidisation, as 
defined by the ITA, a factor that the Commission is 
required to consider in its assessment of injury and is 
the Commission bound by this figure? What about the 
pricing of goods allegedly at less than fair value. If 
the ITA finds that goods have been dumped at a 
particular price, is the ITC bound by this valuation in 
its assessment of injury.
These questions, and many more, arise simply because of 
the bifurcated nature of the United States system for 
the investigation of countervailing and anti-dumping 
complaints.
(A) Initial Petition Determination
An investigation is commenced whenever the ITA decides 
that, from the information available, a formal 
investigation is w a r r a n t e d . I n  the notice of 
initiation, it is the ITA that sets out the scope of the 
investigation. The notice itself is critical because it 
defines the product-range of the investigation, the 
countries affected by the investigation and the relevant
Alqoma Steel Corporation v United States, 865 
F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Section 702 (a), Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
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industry for the injury determination.
The fact that the ITA defines the product scope of the 
investigation can lead to conflicts between the ITA and 
the ITC where the two agencies are required to 
investigate similar matters, such as the issue of the 
relevant domestic industry or like products. In the 
past, a certain degree of inconsistency has arisen. For 
example, in Valves. Couplings. Nozzles and Connections 
of Brass. Suitable For Use in Fire Protection Systems, 
the ITA found that all these products constituted a 
single industry based on their purpose, ie, the 
prevention of fire, while the ITC held that there were 
seven separate industries of which only two were 
materially i n j u r e d .
Nevertheless, as we have seen the ITA has the final say 
on matters which fall within the mutual jurisdictions of 
the agencies although the ITA has occasionally modified 
its findings to accommodate the preliminary views voiced 
by the ITC.^ ^^
(B) Exclusion Requests
The ITA is required by statute to exclude any 
manufacturer, producer or distributer from an 
investigation if it can be shown that the party in 
question has not benefitted from any subsidies or had 
not engaged in dumping. However, in its internal 
administrative guidelines, the ITA has decreed that it 
is only required to consider a request to exclude a
Commerce Determination. 49 Federal Register 
47,066 (1984); Commission Determination. 49 FederalRegister 47,071 (1984).
This practice has been upheld; see Badger- 
Powhatan v United States. 608 F.Supp. 653 (CIT 1985).
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party 'to the extent practicable, in other words, 
such an exclusion request does not guarantee that a 
party will be excluded from the investigation even if 
the party in question is not engaged in subsidised 
production or dumping.
(C) Questionnaires
The information for making determinations by the ITA is 
derived from questionnaires dispatched to foreign 
manufacturers and exporters, as well as American 
manufacturers or producers of competing products.^* The 
questionnaire involves detailed transactional 
information for all home market sales, third country 
sales and United States during the period of the 
investigation,
Failure to complete the questionnaires accurately or 
timeously will allow the ITA to make determinations on 
the basis of the 'best information otherwise available' 
rule. The most extensive use of the best information 
rule is in the calculation of dumping margins where the 
only other source of information is the allegations of 
the petitioner. In general, a petitioner alleges the 
widest possible dumping margin and consequently the 
foreign exporter is placed at an immediate disadvantage.
In recent times, the ITA in particular has come to rely 
more upon the submission of information in the form of
Department of Commerce, ITA Regulations. 54 Federal Register 23,366 (1989).
On this subject, see G.N. Horlick & F.A. DeBusk, 
"Commerce Procedures Under Existing and Proposed Anti- 
Dumping/ Countervailing Duty Regulations", (1988) 22:1Int'l Lawyer 99, 100-104.
^ ___I___   __
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computerised data.'^ ^^  The Court of International Trade 
initially ruled that, where a respondent does not 
customarily maintain computerised records, it is
unreasonable for the ITA to demand the submission of
information in that form.'*^  ^ Such a request would
otherwise cause considerable inconvenience and raise the 
already expensive costs of defending an anti-dumping 
action.
However, the ITA has persisted in making demands that 
information is submitted in computerised tape format 
regardless of the form of the respondents business 
records. 2^ The Court of International Trade 
subsequently reversed its position on this issue by
ruling that the Commerce Department can require the 
submission of information in this format as long as the 
costs of providing the data in this form is not 
' inordinate *
This requirement presents two problems for foreign 
respondents. First, the costs of converting information 
into computer data and often translating the business 
information into English may outweigh the benefits of 
continuing exports. Second, the risk of the disclosure 
of sensitive information through accidental or 
deliberate transmission or access to such data increases 
significantly once the information takes computerised
See generally, A.P. Victor & M.F. Friedman, "The 
Submission and Release of Computer Tapes in Anti-Dumping 
Investigation: The Respondent's Perspective", (1991) 22 Law Pol'y Int'l Bus. 647.
Timkens v United States. 659 F.Supp. 239 (CIT1987).
Fishnetting of Man-Made Fibers From Japan. 55 
Federal Register 12,742 (1989).
Rhone Poulenc Inc. v United States, 710 F.Supp341 (CIT 1989), aff'd 899 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
i
See P.C. Rosenthal & N.B. Giordano, "The Impact 
of Computerisation on Anti-Dumping Practice: The
Petitioner's Perspective", (1991) 22 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 657.
r.3
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f orra."*^
(D) Failure to Protect Foreign Producers from Abusive 
Behaviour
The right to submit written views or information to the 
appropriate agencies is not limited to the parties to 
the proceedings. All interested parties are allowed to 
submit factual information within the time limits 
specified for that purpose, but it is only the parties 
to the proceedings, namely the petitioner, the 
respondents and parties joining the proceedings, that 
have the right to be heard by the agencies.
Nor are the procedural rights of the complainer and the 
respondent symmetrical under this legislation. True, 
both parties are given equal procedural rights to 
notices of proceedings, progress reports, submission of 
information and opinions, access to information, the 
right to be heard in public hearings and access to the 
complete public record of the proceedings. But, 
essentially the proceedings are inquisitorial and 
accusatorial rather than adversarial. Once the 
complainer has made his case, the ITA or the ITC 
subjects the respondent to allegations of subsidisation, 
dumping, injury and causation. It is the respondent that 
must satisfy the ITA or ITC as to the allegations while 
the role of the complainer becomes subsumed by the 
relevant agency.
The alternative to such a procedure would be for the 
administering agency to sit as a court or tribunal to
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decide impartially the merits of the allegations 
submitted for examination. The complainer would be 
required to establish his case in the same way as a 
respondent must prove his defence under the existing 
procedure. Certainly, this adversarial process has been 
adopted when domestic producers make similar allegations 
of anti-competitive practices under the anti-trust laws 
of the United States.
This would allow both parties equal procedural rights 
and could possibly decrease the likelihood of frivolous 
claims if unfounded allegations resulted in the payment 
of expenses by an unsuccessful complainer. Power to 
compel witness and to examine documents could be granted 
to parties to substantiate claims.
(4) Failure to Protect Confidential Information
The protection of industrial or trade secrets is a 
significant factor for many companies during 
countervailing and anti-dumping investigations. 
Production statistics, marketing strategies, profit 
margins and investment figures are all important 
elements in maintaining a competitive advantage over 
other producers.Disclosure of such information may 
have damaging effects on the continued competitiveness 
of a foreign producer. For example, revealing channels 
of distribution and the destination of products could 
jeopardise plans to develop new markets.
The right of confidentiality entails a trade off between
J.A. Taylor & E.A. Vermulst, "Disclosure of 
Confidential Information in Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Proceedings Under United States 
Law", (1987) 21:1 Int'l Lawyer 43-70.
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two competing interests. On the one hand, there is the 
right of the foreign party to have its business welfare 
protected by the prevention of unauthorised and 
unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information to 
parties who, by definition, are competitors. On the 
other hand, there is the right of interested parties to 
have an opportunity to view certain information in order 
to respond to the disclosure of such information.
Generally, the broader the right to confidentiality, the 
more protection offered to foreign producers while the 
narrower the right the less protection and the greater 
the exposure to competitors. The United States has 
decided that the interests of private parties to such 
information exceeds the need for protection. 
Consequently, the United States rules on disclosure 
clearly discriminate against foreign producers by 
requiring far too great a degree of disclosure than is 
strictly necessary.
The statutory requirements for the disclosure of 
confidential information have been progressively 
liberalised which operates against the interests of 
foreign exporters. The original rule in the 1979 Act was 
that information designated as confidential by the 
person submitting it could not be disclosed to any other 
person other that an official of the ITA or the 
Commission without the consent of that p e r s o n . B o t h  
agencies were required to issue administrative 
protection orders to govern access to confidential 
information by parties other than those submitting the
See J.H. Bello, "Access to Business Confidential 
Information in Anti-Dumping Proceedings", in J.H. 
Jackson & E.A. Vermulst, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice (1989), 345.
Section 777 (b) (1) Tariff Act of 1930. as amendedby Section 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
__________
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information.^*
The 1988 Act amended the 1979 regime to render all 
business proprietary information available to all 
interested parties on the basis of administrative 
protection orders.^* The result of this amendment has 
been a dramatic reduction of the right of respondents to 
have information withheld from interested parties.
New administrative guidelines have been established for 
defining the scope of the right of confidential 
information in countervailing investigations. These 
guidelines narrowly define the term 'confidential 
information' and exclude information previously 
considered confidential such as channels of distribution 
and the destination of products.
Similarly, a greater amount of information may be 
released than previously by the amendments to the 
guidelines which allow the release of information under 
administrative protective orders. Despite the fact that 
the procedure is inquisitorial and not adversarial, a 
petitioner's counsel is entitled to obtain access to the 
respondents submissions through such orders.
Both agencies allow independent counsel for both parties 
to review business data, subject to an undertaking by 
the relevant counsel strictly limiting the use of such
See also Section 619 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
Section 1325 of the Omnibus Trade andCompetitiveness Act of 1988.
On the application of this section, see Allied
Tube and Conduit Corporation v United States. 721
F.Supp. 305 (CIT 1990), aff'd 878 F.2d 780 (Fed. Cir.1990).
471 ITA Regulations, supra note 458.
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information. Although originally in-house counsel were 
prohibited from obtaining access to confidential 
information under an administrative protection order, 
this rule has been relaxed and in-house corporate legal 
advisers may gain access to sensitive information under 
certain conditions.
The disclosure provisions therefore weigh heavily 
against foreign respondents. There is little that a 
respondent can do once the requested information has 
been submitted to the ITA to protect its 
confidentiality. Disclosure of information through an 
administrative protective order is just as damaging as 
full public disclosure because the respondent is mainly 
concerned with preventing its competitions from seeing 
just such information and it is likely that it its just 
such competitors that have initiated the complaint.
At least one expert involved in the administration of 
countervailing and anti-dumping investigations has cited 
an example of the disclosure of sensitive information 
prejudicing the rights of a p a r t y . I n  one case, the 
ITA opened an investigation into the alleged dumping of 
goods from Roumanie. In the absence of comparable 
domestic prices for the less than fair value comparison, 
the ITA used statistics from Finnish producers of 
identical g o o d s . T h i s  information was supplied in 
confidence by Finnish producers to the ITA.
Subsequently, representatives of the United States 
industry manufacturing competing products filed a
■Si
Bello, supra note 466, 350.
Steel Products From Roumanie. 50 Federal Register1,254 (1985).
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dumping complaint against the Finnish producers.^* The 
statistical data for this petition was provided from the 
information submitted in confidence from the Finnish 
producers.
Steel Products From Finland. 53 Federal Register 9,651 (1988).
Added by Section 606 of the Trade and Tariff Actof 1984.
Not only can the irresponsible disclosure of information 
affect foreign parties to the proceedings, but 
information provided in investigations may provide a 
basis for dumping investigations at a later point into 
goods originating from other foreign countries.
(5) Illegal Carrying out of Simultaneous Investigations
■bi
Article VI of the GATT prohibits the levying of 
countervailing and anti-dumping duties on the same 
merchandise if both determinations arise from the same 
factual circumstances. It does not prevent the 
simultaneous conduct of two investigations to determine 
if both subsidisation and dumping has occurred.
The United States has taken advantage of this fact and 
Section 705(a)(1) of the 193 0 Act provides that when an 
investigation into subsidisation has been initiated 
simultaneously with one for dumping, and involves the 
same class or kind of merchandise from the same 
countries, the ITA is authorised to extend the date of 
the final subsidy determination until the date of the 
final anti-dumping determination.^^
This clearly envisages the possibility that private 
petitions may raise both types of action to optimise the 
opportunity of relief and, as we have seen, this has
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been the deliberate strategy of certain industries.^* 
Dual petitions ensure that the petitioner has the 
greatest possible change of obtaining the imposition of 
duties against the relevant goods.
Even more disconcerting, there is no specific provision 
in United States law to prohibit the imposition of both 
countervailing and anti-dumping duties on the same 
merchandise. However, admittedly in practice such double 
determinations are rare.
(6) Preliminary Determinations
Both the ITA and the ITC are required to render 
preliminary determinations on the issues of
subsidisation or dumping and material injury
respectively.
The preliminary determination is made on the basis of 
the 'best information available at the time of the 
determination'. The ITC, for example, relies extensively 
on information provided by the petitioner in its 
complaint to arrive at a preliminary finding as to 
injury. Although the Commission distributes 
questionnaires to relevant and interested members of the 
industry concerned and has the power to subpoena answers 
to such questionnaires, in practice little reliance is 
placed on such information compared to the data
submitted by the petitioner.
Where a petitioner has set forth a reasonable orima 
facie case, the ITC is generally satisfied that a 
reasonable indication of injury has been established and
476 See text, supra pp.388-410.
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this practice has been upheld by the Court of 
International Trade.
(7) Discrimination in Providing Relief
Within seven days after the ITC renders an affirmative 
final determination of material injury, the ITA is 
required to publish an anti-dumping or a countervailing 
duty order which: (a) directs customs officers to assess 
a countervailing duty equal to the amount of the net 
subsidy determined or estimated to exist; (b) applies to 
all merchandise of such class or kind exported from the 
country investigated; and (c) requires the deposit of 
estimated countervailing duties pending liquidation of 
entries of merchandise at the same time as estimated 
normal customs duties on the merchandise are 
deposited.^*
Countervailing duties need not apply on a country-wide 
basis. The United States law allows the ITA to make a 
company specific order if it determines that there is a 
significant differential between companies receiving 
subsidies or a state-owned enterprise is involved,^* In 
such cases, the order will allow for differing rates of 
countervailing duties on companies exporting goods 
manufactured in the same country.
There appears to be no counterpart provisions 
authorising such action in the anti-dumping legislation*
See Republic Steel Corporation v United States. 
591 F.Supp 640 (CIT 1984); and American Grape Growers 
Alliance v United States. 615 F.Supp. 603 (CIT 1985).
Section 7 06 Tariff Act of 1930, as amended bySection 607 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
Ibid.
719
However, it is unlikely that unrelated companies would 
dump goods at the same price in the same market and, in i
the absence of a coordinated pricing policy, if this did 
occur, it is unlikely that it would be for the objective 
of obtaining a monopoly in the market-place.
As an alternative to the imposition of duties, the ITA 
may enter into an undertaking with exporters. These 
agreements may require foreign exporters to maintain 
certain minimum prices and, in effect, this amounts to 
a state-sanctioned form of retail price maintenance 
which is itself anti-competitive.
On the other hand, the ITA may require the acceptance of 
undertakings which impose quantitative restrictions.
However, the ITA has recently changed its policy in this 
respect and will only enter into such agreements when 
they can be easily administered.
(8) Innovative Forms of Investigation I - Downstream 
Product Monitoring
In 1984, a new section was added to the anti-dumping 
legislation to regulate the problem of persistent 
d u m p i n g . T h i s  legislation authorised the ITA to 
establish a monitoring programme over a class of 
merchandise if the following circumstances were proved 
to exist:
(a) more than one anti-dumping order was in effect 
with respect to that class or kind of 
merchandise;
See Portland Hydraulic Cement and Clinker From 
Mexico, 55 Federal Register 29,244 (1990).
Section 609, Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
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(b) in the judgment of the ITA, there was reason 
to believe or suspect that there was an 
extraordinary pattern of persistent injurious 
dumping from one of more additional supplier 
countries; and
(c) again in the judgment of the ITA, the 
extraordinary pattern was causing a serious 
commercial problem for the domestic industry.
No time limits were set for this investigation and no 
guidelines established for a number of important 
concepts such as 'extraordinary pattern', 'serious
commercial problem', etc.
To this mechanism, the 1988 Act appended the downstream 
product monitoring s y s t e m . This system was added 
because of concerns from United States producers that 
goods that have been subsidised or dumped could be 
manufactured abroad into further stage products which 
are no longer classified as the goods subject to the 
dumping or countervailing duty o r d e r . D o w n s t r e a m  
products are simply manufactured items that have been 
imported into the United States and which incorporate a 
component part,'^ *'^
The provision applies in three circumstances:
(a) if the component part is already subject to a
monitoring programme already in existence
Section 78 0 Tariff Act of 1930. as amended by Section 1320 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
G.N. Horlick & G.D. Oliver, "Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty Law Provisions of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988", (1989) 23:3 JWT 5, 27- 
28.
484 Section 780(d)(2), ibid.
________________________
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under the bilateral arrangements on steel 
imports ;
(b) there is a large number of cases on related 
products from the same country; or
(c) there are two or more cases against the same 
company on related products.
In addition to any one of these three circumstances, 
there must be a reasonable likelihood that imports into 
the United States of the downstream product will 
increase as an indirect result of any diversion with 
respect to the component part.“**^
Upon the finding of these elements, any imported 
manufactured article which incorporates the product 
formerly found to have been dumped or subsidised can be 
subject to monitoring by the ITC upon a petition by 
domestic manufacturers of the dumped product or the 
downstream product. Therefore manufacturers of products 
that are like either the original or the final product 
can initiate an anti-dumping or countervailing duty 
complaint indirectly through this process,
. . .The implications of this development are staggering. 
Suppose that a European producer of steel products was 
found to have dumped steel on the United States market 
with a margin of dumping of more than fifteen percent. 
Thereafter, all steel products from that country, from 
cars to ballbearings, could be subject to monitoring
“*** A component part is defined as any imported article that, during the five year period immediately 
preceding the date the downstream monitoring petition is 
filed, a countervailing or anti-dumping duty order that 
requires a deposit of estimated duties of at least 
fifteen percent has been issued, or an agreement was 
entered into after a preliminary determination was made 
by the ITA of an estimated net subsidy or margin of 
dumping of at least fifteen percent.
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and, in the event that imports of such items increase, 
an anti-dumping investigations would follow virtually 
automatically.
The standards for imposing anti-dumping or 
countervailing duties are not altered and the same facts 
must be shown to exist as in normal investigations, 
namely subsidisation or dumping, material injury and 
causation. However, the provision is definitely in 
contravention of the 1979 Anti-Dumping Agreement as well 
as the Subsidies Agreement, because it has the effect of 
allowing producers of products that are not like 
products to initiate investigations.
(9) Innovative Forms of Investigation II - Short Life 
Cycle Product Investigations
The object of this type of investigation is to prevent 
foreign companies producing a range of related goods 
from persistently dumping such goods in the United 
States market. The original House and Senate versions of 
the bills which became the 1988 Act intended to expedite 
proceedings against all products found to have been 
dumped, but the version adopted in the final legislation 
was restricted to 'short-life cycle products'.^*
A short-life cycle product is defined as ' any product 
that the Commission determines is likely to become 
outmoded within four years, by reason of technological 
advances after the product is commercially 
available. It is therefore industries such as the
See Cameron, D.B. & Crawford, S.M, 'An Overview 
of the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Amendments', 
(1989) 20:3 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 471, 491.
Section 739 (b)(4), ibid.
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electronics industry that is most likely to be affected 
by this provision and in particular semiconductors 
producers.
Companies that are deemed 'second offenders' or 
'multiple offenders' under the legislation will be 
subject to an expedited dumping investigation process if 
they are found to be engaged in the product of short 
life cycle goods. A second offender is defined as a 
company that has been subject to at least two 
affirmative dumping findings of margins of fifteen 
percent or more within an eight year period in the same 
short life cycle product. A multiple offender is a 
company specified in three or more such affirmative 
findings over the same period.
In the event that the ITC deems that a second offender 
or a multiple offender is exporting short life cycle 
products to the United States and an investigation is 
initiated, the time limits for conducting enquiries are 
shortened depending on the status of the offender. For 
second offenders, a preliminary determination of injury 
must be rendered within 120 days rather than the normal 
160 days, and within 100 days in the case of a multiple 
offender. In both cases, no extensions will be granted 
for rendering final determinations unless the relevant 
United States industry agrees and certain conditions for 
a finding of critical circumstances will be deemed 
automatically present in such circumstances.
(10) The Legality of U.S. Anti-Circumvention Laws
It is in the drafting of anti-circumvention provisions 
that the determination of the United States government 
to enforce the anti-dumping and countervailing 
legislation to the fullest extent possible becomes
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evident/** Once a product from a particular foreign 
manufacturer has been identified as being susceptible to 
duties, this characterisation is fixed to the product as 
well as its components and any attempt to relocate 
production in another country, including the United 
States, will not allow a producer to escape liability.
The immediate result is that whole production strategies 
have been altered to avoid the imposition of duties. 
Anti-dumping duties in particular have been directly 
responsible for increased direct foreign investment in 
the United States as foreign companies the size of 
Nissan, Honda and BMW build factories inside the United 
States to assemble foreign parts in order to avoid 
paying duties*
The problem of the circumvention of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty orders by foreign manufacturers 
simply by breaking down their product and exporting the 
components to the United States or third countries 
resulted in the enactment of a comprehensive anti­
circumvention framework in the 1988 Act.
Before this statute was enacted, however, the problem of 
circumvention had been considered in a number of ITA 
investigations. For example, in its investigation into 
Colour Television Tubes From Korea, the ITA imposed 
anti-dumping duties on colour television receivers from 
Korea in 1984.'^ *^  Subsequently, Korean exporters
^^** Generally on these provisions, see E.A. Vermulst 
& P. Waer, "Anti-Diversion Rules in Anti-Dumping 
Procedures", (1990) 11 Michigan J. Int'l Law 1119; J.
Steenbergen, "Circumvention of Anti-dumping Duties by 
Importation of Parts and Materials", (1988) Fordham 
Journal Int'l Law 3 32; and J.H. Bello & D. Holmer, 
"Anti-Circumvention Measures: Shifting the Gears of
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws", (1990) 24:1 Int'l Lawyer 216.
489 49 Federal Register 18,336 (1984).
________________________ ________
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commenced shipping colour picture tubes and printed 
circuit boards, two of the main components of television 
receivers to the United States. While these components 
were entering the United States for assembly into 
television receivers, they were separate products from 
those identified in the anti-dumping order and were not 
like products to those covered by the order.
In a blanket ruling, the ITA determined that the
original anti-dumping order extended to both component 
parts and ordered the payment of additional duties on 
these imports. 0^ The assessment was made on the 
determination that the order covered these imports, and 
was not reached after a further investigation.^^ This 
decision was rendered despite the fact that the
difference between the customs value of the imported 
components and the final sales price in the United 
States stores was over forty percent. The Court of
International Trade affirmed the findings of the ITA,'*®^
Indeed, it has been the Court of International Trade 
that was instrumental in formulating the pre-1988 Act 
law on anti-circumvention measures. In another 
investigation, this time involving portable typewriters, 
the ITA decided that portable typewriters were not
similar products to electric typewriters which were the
Certain Colour Television Receivers From Korea. 
52 Federal Register 24,500 (1987).
On the pre-1988 practice of the ITA, see A.F. 
Holmer & J.H. Bello, "The Scope of Class or Kind of 
Merchandise in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Cases", 
(1986) 20 Int'l Lawyer 1,015.
Gold Star v United States. 692 F.Supp. 1382 (CIT
1988). But see also the subsequent decision of the GIT 
in International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers v United States. Slip Op. 92-132; reproduced in 
(1992) 4:6 WTM 187.
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subject of an earlier anti-dumping order/®* The 
petitioner appealed against this decision and the Court 
of International Trade found in its favour. According to 
the Court the ITA had drawn too narrow a classification 
by relying on the various tariff classifications and 
that, on the facts of the case, portable memory 
typewriters should have been included in the order.4** 
This case was an early precedent on the point of later- 
developed products.^*
Section 1321 establishes a title in United States trade 
legislation entitled 'Prevention of Circumvention of 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders'.^* This 
section contains four separate mechanisms to prevent 
circumvention of such orders.^?
(A) Assembly and Finishing in the United States
Addressing the most obvious form of circumvention, 
namely the export of components to the United States for 
assembly, the 1988 Act provides the Commerce Department
Certain Portable Typewriters From Jaoan. 52 
Federal Register 1504 (1987).
Smith Corona v United States. 698 F.Supp. 240(1988).
See W.J. Clinton & D.L. Porter, "The United 
States' New Anti-Circumvention Provision and Its Application by the Commerce Department", (1990) 24:3 JWT 
101, 103.
496 Section 781 Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
It should be noted that subsequent proposed 
revisions have been made in the U.S. Congress to revise 
this section to tighten alleged circumvention of anti­
dumping and countervailing duty orders; see for example, 
the proposed amendment tabled by Senator D*Amato on Sept 
7, 1992, H.R. 776, 102d Congress, 2d Session 1992. See 
also, N. Komuro, "United States Anti-Circumvention 
Measures and GATT Rules", (1994) 28:3 JWT 5, 15-20.
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with authority to include within the scope of a 
countervailing or anti-dumping order components imported 
into the United States for assembly into finished 
products.
Two conditions are specified for the extension of such 
orders :
(a) the parts and components must be imported from
a country that is the subject of an order; and
(b) the difference in the value of the finished
merchandise sold in the United States and the 
value of the imported parts and components 
must be ’small'
The first case in which the Department of Commerce ruled 
on the application of this section provided an insight 
into how the Department would tackle the many issues 
left unanswered by the terms of the section.
In February 1990, the ITA issued the final negative 
determination in its circumvention investigation into 
forklift trucks from J a p a n . A m o n g  the problems that 
the investigators had to resolve were the relationship 
between the original anti-dumping investigation and the 
subsequent anti-circumvention inquiry, the period which 
should be selected to examine the amount of value added, 
the process involved in the measurement of the value of 
the merchandise sold in the United States and the
Section 781(a) Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by 
Section 13 21 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988.
Ibid.
Internal Combustion Industrial Forklift Trucks 
From Japan. 55 Federal Register 6028 (Feb. 1990). See 
also. Internal Combustion Industrial Forklift Trucks 
From Japan [Preliminary determination], 54 Federal
Register 11,953 (June 1989),
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valuation of imported parts.
The original anti-dumping investigation was considered 
significant in defining the product that was the subject 
of the anti-circumvention inquiry which was complete 
forklift trucks. In other words, the anti-circumvention 
investigation did not extend to less complete parts of 
forklift trucks, such as frames or engines. In this 
respect, the decision complied with the requirements of 
both Codes that investigations must be confined to ’like 
products'.
However, this was a self-imposed limitation. There was 
no statutory requirement mandating the ITA to refrain 
from selecting a broader range of products. Since this 
was a self-imposed restriction, naturally the ITA is at 
liberty to withdraw it at its will and without warning. 
Further, it is unlikely that the decision on this point 
would have been upheld after judicial scrutiny from the 
Court of International Trade in light of the lack of 
statutory support.
Another omission in the statute is the failure to 
designate a specific period for the review and the ITA 
probably has absolute discretion to decide what period 
should be adopted. In the Forklifts Case, the review 
period was eighteen months. However, it is unlikely that 
this period was sufficient realistically to assess the 
behaviour of a particular company, particularly when 
large sums of investment are concerned. The assumption 
in this case was clearly that the diversification would 
occur immediately after the anti-dumping duties were 
imposed and no analysis of prior plans to engage in 
foreign investment appears from the decision to have 
been made.
See also, Brass Sheet and Strip From Korea. Inv. No. TA-580-603 (1989).
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Computation of values for United States prices was 
relatively straight-forward in this case. Simply the 
value of the completed product sold in the United States 
must be less than the value of the final product when 
constructed from the components for an anti­
circumvention order to apply. The value of the goods was 
calculated on a monthly weight-averaged ex factory 
selling price. Ex factory price was determined by 
deducting the costs of freight from the quoted price.
Valuation of the imported parts proved more difficult 
due to the fact that the buyer and seller in an anti­
circumvention investigation are generally related 
companies such as parent and subsidiary. It is more than 
likely that, in the vast majority of cases, the transfer 
price of the components is not their true price. The 
invoice price of the components in the Forklift Case was 
ignored by the Commerce Department which valued the 
parts of the basis of the price paid by an unrelated 
customer for the same component part, at the same level 
of trade, in the country of origin, in this case 
Japan.
After comparison, the Department of Commerce determined 
that the difference between the finished product and the 
component parts was not small, ranging from between 25- 
4 0%. However, the Department was clearly uncomfortable 
with having to develop guidelines in this area. In 
subsequent cases, the levels of difference required have 
b e e n  c l a r i f i e d .  T h u s ,  in G r a n u l a r
In the absence of such sales, the Commerce 
Department indicated that it would price the goods on 
the basis of one of the following methods of valuation:
(a) the price that the related company in the 
United States would pay to an unrelated 
supplier in the United States, or a third 
country, for an identical component; or
(b) the constructed cost of the part.
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Polytetraf luoroethylene From Italv °^^ and Brass Sheet 
and Strip from Canada *^, differences of 10-20% and 15% 
respectively were considered adequate for the 
application of the section.
A number of other issues raised in the application of 
this part of the anti-circumvention legislation remain 
unresolved even after this initial case. The Commerce 
Department is still required to resolve the following 
matters :
(a) what processes constitute completion and t 
assembly for the purposes of this provision?
(b) how are the related concepts of 'parts' and 
'components' to be defined?
(c) what is to be considered small variations in 
the price?
(d) what factors should be taken into 
consideration to identify relevant patterns of 
trade? I
Doubtlessly, these concepts will be more fully developed 
in later cases.
:(B) Assemblv and Finishing in Third Countries
The provisions relating to the circumvention of 
countervailing and anti-dumping orders by assembling 
components in third countries that are not the subject
58 Federal Register 28,100 (1993).
58 Federal Register 33,610 (1993).
See generally, "The United States New Anti- 
Circumvention Provision and Its Application by the 
Commerce Department", (1990) 24:3 JWT 101.
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of any such order are slightly more c o m p l e x . in 
essence, two separate situations are covered;
(a) the assembly of component parts into finished 
products in third countries prior to the 
importation of the finished merchandise into 
the United States; and
(b) the diversion of a product subject to an order 
to a third country for the purposes of making 
it into a further stage product prior to 
exporting the final product to the United 
States,
The difference between these two situations is simply 
that, in the first case, it is the product that is 
finished in the third country that would otherwise be 
subject to the order whereas in the second case it is 
the product that is diverted for further stage 
processing that is the subject of the order.
The conditions required for the extension of an existing 
order under the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
1988 product to these cases require the application of 
approximately the same two tests as before, namely that 
the value added in the third country must be 'small* and 
that the merchandise - whether components or finished 
products - must originate from the country that is the 
subject of the order. Similarly, the factors that are 
considered in making the determination as to origin are 
the same as in the previous case.
(C) Minor Alterations
Imported products that have undergone only minor changes
506 Section 781(b) Tariff Act of 1930. as amended.
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from products that are subject to anti-dumping or 
countervailing duty orders cannot evade the relevant 
orders if they have undergone only minor alterations in 
either form or appearance.This provision extends to 
both industrial and agricultural products.
There are few statutory guidelines to assist the ITA in 
the application of this rule. The only significant 
express rule is that the fact that altered merchandise 
falls into a different tariff classification than the 
merchandise already covered by the order is not 
sufficient to prevent it being considered having gone 
through only minor alteration,^*
Other than this, it is difficult to ascertain what 
changes in the character of a product are required 
before it will be taken to have undergone more than mere 
minor alteration. For example, it is relatively clear 
that dilution of a product with water would be a case 
where a good has undergone merely minor alteration. 
Similarly, repackaging of a product would not suffice as 
a major alteration. But, other than these obvious cases, 
it is difficult to discern any general rules for the 
application of this principle.
The Department of Commerce has in fact recently began to 
apply this provision in practice. The first
507 Section 781(c), ibid.
508 Ibis rule contrasts with that under the Canada- 
United States Free Trade Agreement, Article 1402, which 
provides that goods that have changed customs 
classification through processing in one country are to be considered as originating in that country for the 
purpose of the rules of origin.
See Brass Sheet and Strip From the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Inv. No. 428-602 (1990); and
Certain Electrical Conductor Redrawn Rod From Venezuela. 
Inv. No. 307-701/307-702 (1990) .
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investigation was Electrical Conductor Aluminium Redraw 
Rod from Venezuela o^ where the issue was whether wire 
of a diameter of 0.375 inches was the same product when 
drawn to 0.250 inches. Not surprisingly the answered was 
affirmative. In the second case. Brass Sheet and Strip 
from West Germany^*, the addition of small quantities 
of manganese to brass was considered too great a change 
for the application of the minor adjustment provision. 
This was due to the different applications for the two 
products and the expectations of consumers.
In both cases, a rigorous investigation was conducted by 
the ITA which focused on five factors; (a) physical 
characteristics of the products; (b) the use of the 
merchandise; (c) the expectations of the ultimate 
consumer; (d) the channels of marketing; and (e) the 
costs of modifications relative to value. The legitimate 
application of these criteria probably does give an 
objective evaluation of the situation.
(D) Later-Developed Products
The ITA is empowered to include merchandise developed 
after the initiation of an investigation within the 
scope of any final order resulting from that 
investigation if the following conditions are met;
55 Federal Register 3,434 (19900 [preliminary
determination]; 56 Federal Register 42,310 (1991) [final determination].
55 Federal Register 32,655 (1990) [preliminary 
determination]; and 56 Federal Register 65,887 (1991)[final determination].
In general, see G. Kleinfeld & D. Gaylor, 
"Circumvention of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Orders through Minor Alternations in Merchandise: Where to Draw the Line?", (1994) 28;1 JWT 77.
- '_______
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(a) the later-developed products are essentially 
the same as the original merchandise subject 
to the order insofar as general physical 
characteristics are concerned;
(b) the expectations of the ultimate purchasers of 
the later-developed products are the same as 
for the earlier products;
(c) the ultimate use of the earlier product and 
the later-developed merchandise are the same;
(d) the later-developed merchandise is sold 
through the same trade channels as the earlier 
product; and
(e) the later-developed merchandise is advertised 
and displayed in a manner similar to the 
earlier product.^*
The ITA must seek the advice of the ITC on whether or 
not the later-developed product falls within the scope 
of the order.
(E) General Observations
The anti-circumvention provisions of the 1988 Act are 
certainly comprehensive in their coverage of activities 
that might be construed as designed to evade the 
application of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. 
Both the breaking down of products and the movement of 
assembly operations to third countries, the two 
activities most frequently associated with anti­
circumvention, are vigorously addressed in the 
legislation. The measures regarding minor alterations 
and later-developed products take the idea of anti­
circumvention slightly further.
513 Section 781(d), ibid.
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One of the major effects of this legislation has been to 
expand the scope of anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
orders from particular goods from a specific country to 
include related, though by no means similar or 
identical, goods as well as goods from countries to 
which the original order did not apply. This is a 
disturbing development when it is considered that the 
only nexus between the goods to which the original order 
applies and the products that are the subject of the 
anti-circumvention investigation is the nature of the 
products themselves. Both the country of origin and, in 
the case of assembly operations, the component products 
may alter and yet remain subject to the scope of the 
earlier order.
This raises the question whether the statutory 
provisions established for anti-circumvention purposes 
are consistent with the GATT or both the 1979 Codes, As 
we have seen, the main inconsistency in the European 
Community 'screwdriver regulation' was its 
incompatibility with Article III of the GATT,'®*'* The 
anti-circumvention duties were deemed to be internal 
charges and therefore regulated by Article III. Since 
products of domestic origin were not subject to the 
possibility of such charges, the regulation 
discriminated in favour of domestic goods contrary to 
Article III of the GATT.®*®
Drawing from the logic of this precedent, it is 
difficult to see any major distinction between the 
European and the United States anti-circumvention 
legislation other than that the American laws are 
considerably more comprehensive. Certainly anti-
®*^* See text supra, pp. 189-192.
®*® European Community Anti-Circumvention Measures, 
reproduced at [1990] 2 CMLR 639; (1990) 2:3 WTM 5.
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circumvention duties under the 1988 Act are no more 
likely to be considered anti-dumping duties, as opposed 
to internal charges, than the European measures,®*®
The application of the anti-circumvention laws also 
raises difficult questions regarding rules of origin for 
determining the country where the goods were actually 
manufactured. For example, if a Japanese manufacture 
exports components worth 60% of the final value of the 
completed goods to Taiwan for assembly, where 40% of the 
cost of the final goods is labour costs, which country 
is the country of origin in the event that the goods are 
subject to a countervailing order in the United States?
The U.S. Customs Department has developed a series of 
rules for determining the origin of goods, mainly based 
on the principle 'substantial transformation'. Thus, in 
the past, U.S. Customs had ruled that assembly and 
testing operations in a particular country conferred 
origin on the country in which these were conducted.®*^ 
Nevertheless, the Commerce Department has held that it 
has exclusive jurisdiction to establish rules of origin 
in anti-dumping and countervailing investigations.®** 
Furthermore, the rules of origin applied by the ITA vary 
significantly from those applied by the Customs Service.
In the Forklift Case, the ITA held that the 'substantial 
transformation' test was only relevant to changes in 
products occurring outside the United States.®*^
®*® See the arguments made by the United States 
government to distinguish the 1988 measures from the 
Community legislation, ibid.
®*^ Palmeter, supra note 447, 7.
®** See 3.5" Microdisks and Coated Media Thereof 
From Japan. 54 Federal Register 6433 (1989),
®*^ Forklifts. supra note 500, 6031.
_________________ ______
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Furthermore, the ITA claimed that the application of 
this standard in anti-dumping investigations would 
generally understate the value of the components from 
the foreign country. However, in this case the ITA did 
not have to address the issue of origin since the goods 
were imported directly from Japan for assembly in the 
United States. Nevertheless, the ITA appears to be 
determined to develop independent rules of origin for 
anti-dumping and countervailing cases.
This raises the question of whether two separate rules 
will be developed, one for determination of origin for 
customs purpose and another for anti-dumping 
investigations. It is likely that such a development 
would be contrary to Articles I and III of the GATT.
(11) Limitations on Judicial Review and Appeal
Exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the 
ITA and the ITC is conferred upon the United States 
Court of International Trade (CIT) Appeals from the 
CIT are heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.
Only parties to the proceedings may request judicial 
review of an ITA or ITC decision on factual or legal 
grounds.^* Parties to the proceedings include any 
interested party under Section 771(9) of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended, as well as any foreign or U.S. 
importer that actively participates, through written 
submissions of factual information or arguments in the
Customs Court Act of 1980.
See W.D. Hunter & J.D. Mclnerney, "What Happens 
When the Court Reverses a Dumping or Anti-dumping Duty 
Case?", (1988) 3 Florida Int'l Law Journal 151.
I
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initial investigation or subsequent administrative 
review. Decisions by the ITA or the ITC relating to 
refusal to initiate an investigation, a declaration that 
a case is extraordinarily complicated, refusal to review 
an agreement with an exporter and negative 
determinations of subsidisation, dumping or material 
injury, may be a p p e a l e d .
The main limitation of this procedure for a foreign 
exporter's point of view is that only final affirmative 
orders imposing duties and determinations made in 
connection with the suspension of investigations are 
subject to judicial review. Review of preliminary 
determinations is not possible.^*
Judicial review can only be conducted on two limited 
grounds :
(1) on the basis of allegations that the decision 
in question is not in accordance with the law, 
or are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion;
(2) on the ground that the decision was rendered 
without being supported by substantial 
evidence on the record of the proceedings, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law.
%
See generally, T.J. Schoenbaum & D.S. Arnold, 
"Judicial Review of International Trade Law Decisions: 
A Comparative Analysis", in M. Hilf & E-U. Petersmann 
(eds), National Constitutions and International Economic 
Law (1993), 475.
See J.K. Morgan, "The Impact of Interlocutory 
Judicial Decisions Upon Anti-dumping and Countervailing 
Duty Proceedings", (1988) 3 Florida Int'l Law Journal
187.
Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930. asamended by Section 1001 of the Trade Agreements Act of1979. i
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Appeal from the Court of International Trade to the 
Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit is competent but 
only on the same grounds and thereafter to the Supreme 
Court.
(12) Observations
The administration and application of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties are inherently biased in favour or 
domestic industries and against the interests of foreign 
producers; this asymmetry is particularly evident in the 
nature of the procedural rights conferred on these two 
groups. To a certain extent, this procedural asymmetry 
is permitted under the two international Codes but the 
question is, to what extent has the United States 
exacerbated this problem by refusing to comply with the 
international standards.
The answer to this question is that the international 
rules yet again have little normative impact on the 
activities of the United States in this context. The 
international rules have not been of sufficient detail 
to prevent abusive behaviour when administering the 
procedural rules for the application of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties. Nor have they been a limiting 
influence to rectify the asymmetry which exists between 
the rights of domestic industries and the rights of 
foreign manufacturers and exporters.
Even from the initiation of an investigation. United 
States producers have the procedural upper hand. They 
are only required to lodge the complaint and thereafter
See D.W. Layton, "Interlocutory Appeal of Remand 
Orders by the Court of International Trade", (1988) 3
Florida Int'l Law Journal 167.
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it is the ITA and the ITC Commission which conduct the 
investigation. The powers and public funded resources of 
the ITA Commission are pitted against the limited 
financial resources of companies accused of dumping or 
receiving countervailable subsidies. This governmental 
intervention creates a gross disproportion in the amount 
of expenditure which must be disbursed by foreign 
producers relative to domestic industries. This 
situation contrasts unfavourably with proceedings before 
a court or tribunal where adversaries compete on a level 
basis at least from a financial perspective.
The liberal standing requirements of both anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty actions add to this imbalance. 
Standing requirements to initiate proceedings under 
Section 3 03 are extremely lax and those under Sections 
701(a) and 731(a) do not act as an effective filter for 
malicious or harassing complaints. This fact has even 
been recognised by Congress which deliberately extended 
the concept of interested parties in agricultural 
commodity investigations until this requirement is 
challenged by action by an aggrieved trading partner at 
the international level. Equally, the requirement that 
a complaint represents a domestic industry has been 
progressively diluted firstly by not requiring a 
complaint to prove this requirement is satisfied and 
secondly by manipulating the method of establishing the 
relevant domestic industry.
The more novel variants of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty actions introduced by the 1988 Act 
have even less rigorous requirements for establishing 
standing. This is so despite the fact that these are 
analogous procedures and should be subject to the 
conditions set out in the 1979 Codes for achieving 
standing. This is a violation of the terms of the Codes 
but such provisions remain valid in U.S. domestic law
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until challenged.
The evidential requirements for complaints are also 
dangerously low. The reasonable indication standard set 
by the ITA for accepting complaints is the direct cause 
of permitting some unsubstantiated complaints proceeding 
to investigations with the damaging consequences which 
follow. In addition, the burdens imposed on foreign 
producers and exporters during investigations prejudice 
their operations to such an extent that often producers 
refuse to co-operate in investigations instead 
preferring to suffer the consequences of such failure. 
If this course of action is chosen - even for legitimate 
business reasons - the information submitted by the 
complainants assumes a degree of authenticity which is 
simply not justified due to the so-called best 
information rule.
It is the need to protect business information which 
places foreign producers in this situation. Quite 
clearly, foreign producers are reluctant to place their 
trust in the procedures established to prevent abusive 
disclosure of confidential information. Administrative 
protection orders do not adequately protect the 
interests of foreign producers and even the prospect of 
disclosing sensitive information to counsels acting for 
trade rivals may discourage co-operation on the part of 
foreign producers. In addition, even when producers not 
immediately involved in the investigation assist the 
authorities, such as third country producers in a 
foreign market enquiry, they run the risk of subsequent 
proceedings being initiated against them even although 
sensitive business information is disclosed on a 
confidential basis.
Another disconcerting feature of United States law is 
the innovative forms of investigation which have
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recently evolved in anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
procedures. Downstream product monitoring systems and 
short life cycle product investigations border on 
illegal measures and the fact that proceedings have not 
been brought at the international level to challenge 
these measures stems merely from the fact that neither 
provision has been used with any great degree of 
enthusiasm by the administering authorities. However, 
the potential of these measures, especially downstream 
product monitoring systems, is disconcerting and the 
fact that these systems have been developed also gives 
cause to believe that the United States pays little heed 
to its international obligations.
Comments have already been made on the legality of 
United States anti-circumvention measures.®^® 
Unfortunately, a complaint to the GATT which would have 
reviewed the legality of these measures was settled at 
the consultations stage and therefore there is no direct 
ruling on the point. It is sufficient, however, to note 
that even the United States government has reservations 
concerning the legality of these measures otherwise it 
is highly unlikely that the United States would have 
settled this matter so abruptly.
Finally, the inability of foreign producers effectively 
to challenge countervailing duty or anti-dumping 
measures in the United States courts against 
international standards also prejudices their position. 
It is notoriously difficult of producers to convince 
their governments to bring an international claim in the 
GATT against a country as economically powerful as the 
United States. Broader economic and political rationales 
are often invoked to justify such non-action. Without 
the support of their governments, attempts by foreign
526 See text, supra pp.734-737.
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producers to defend their positions in such proceedings 
are emasculated. The inevitable result is that the 
position of foreign producers becomes irretrievably 
prejudiced.
Ultimately, responsibility for the laxity and bias in 
both anti-dumping and countervailing duty proceedings 
stems from the fact that Congress and the International 
Trade Agency have both succumbed to internal domestic 
pressures from industries and other pressure groups to 
mould the law into this shape. In addition, the 
international rules themselves contain a degree of 
asymmetry which creates bias in favour of domestic 
producers in the course of such investigations. 
Together, both these factors combine to the disadvantage 
of foreign producers in terms of procedural rights.
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,10 Abuse of Commercial Defence Instruments by the
European Union
The European Union is obliged under international law to 
respect obligations entered into with third states. It 
is also a fundamental principle that states must ensure 
that internal laws do not conflict with their 
obligations^? and this is equally applicable to the 
European Union as an international organisation 
contracting with third states on behalf of its Member 
States.
Both principles apply equally to obligations assumed by 
the European Union in relation to its commercial defence 
measures. The European Union is responsible for acts, 
measures or practices which contravene international 
obligations assumed in relation to the operation of 
these measures, particularly under the General Agreement 
and the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code. The purpose of this 
chapter is to establish whether the European Union 
ignored its international commitments in connection with 
these measures during the period under investigation, 
ie. prior to 1995.
Again, no attempt has been made to examine the 
compatibility of the European Union's new anti-dumping 
or anti-subsidy legislation with the obligations 
contained in the Uruguay Round Agreements. This thesis 
deals with the pre-1995 EU legislation and the period of 
administrative activity prior to this date. There is no 
intention to demonstrate how the new EU legislation has 
implemented the Anti-Dumping Agreement 1994.
Despite the near parallel growth in the use of measures 
of administered protectionism by both the European Union
See UN Headquarters Agreement Case (1988) ICJ Rep3.
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and the United States the two did not share a common 
philosophy towards the role of anti-dumping measures. 
The United States viewed anti-dumping proceedings as an 
extension of the commercial rights of private industries 
against foreign competitors engaging in unfair trading 
practices. In contrast, the European Union's policy 
towards anti-dumping was an integral part of its own 
overall commercial trade policy and consequently a 
balance was struck between measures to protect European 
Union industries from dumped foreign products and a 
variety of other commercial interests.®?*
This difference in policy approach is critically 
important and marks the primary point of divergence 
between the two cognate systems. It also explains many 
of the unusual features of European Union anti-dumping 
law, for example, the permeation of Community (now 
Union) interests throughout many of the commercial 
defence mechanisms of the European Union.
Another significant point is that the European Union 
relied virtually exclusively on its anti-dumping 
legislation as its principal weapon of 'commercial 
defence'.®?® Hence, its profile in the use of measures 
of commercial defence was significantly different from 
that of the United States. While the European Union 
relied heavily on its anti-dumping laws to protect 
domestic industries, few other measures were invoked. In 
particular, the European Union used its anti-subsidy and 
safeguard measures legislation relatively infrequently. 
This explains why, in this part of the work,
®?* See generally on this point, E.A. Vermulst, 
"Dumping in the United States and the European 
Community: A Comparative Analysis", (1984) 10:2 LIEI
103.
®?® See L.R. Le Lievre & G. Houben, "European 
Community Versus Japan: The Community's Legal Weapons",
(1987) 24 CMLR 427.
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considerably less discussion has been given to these 
devices than in the earlier analysis of the United 
States laws.
While the European Union's practice as regards this type 
of measure was deliberately circumspect, it is still 
worthwhile examining some of the principal features of 
this mechanism to determine if abuse occurred in any 
form during the period of investigation presently being 
scrutinised.
(1) The Evolution and Development of the European 
Union's Anti-Dumping Policy as the Principal 
Commercial Defence Measure
Protection of European Union industries from dumped and 
subsidised products is expressly recognised as an 
objective to be pursued through the Common Commercial 
P o l i c y . T h e  legal basis for the basic regulations 
authorising protection against dumped and subsidised 
imports from non-European Union countries is Article 113 
of the EC Treaty.®?* Matters relating to both these 
forms of commercial defence fall within the exclusive 
competence of the European Union and this competence is 
internally exercised by both the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers.
The basic anti-dumping regulation broadly follows 
Article VI of the GATT by requiring that, before anti­
dumping duties can be imposed, it must be established
®?** Article 113, EC Treaty. Note this provision has 
been slightly modified by Title II, Article G28 of the 
Treaty on European Union. The purpose of this 
modification is essentially to remove references to 
transitional periods.
®?* See Recital 1, Council Regulation (EEC) 2423/88. 
O.J. L209/1 (1988) .
___  _______________
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that dumping has taken place which has caused, or 
threatens to cause, material injury to a European Union 
industry. In addition, the European Union has inserted 
an additional requirement, namely that the imposition of 
such duties would be in the 'European Union 
interest' .®??
(A) Some Policy Aspects of the European Union Anti- 
Dumping Legal Regime
Commission officials have frequently voiced the opinion 
that the European Union's anti-dumping policy is fair 
and objective, particularly when compared to the systems 
of other countries. For example, in 1988, then 
Commissioner for External Relations, Willy de Clercq 
made the following assertion:
'The European Union's policy in anti-dumping 
differs from those of other countries in one 
fundamental respect, that is it is incontestably by 
far the most liberal. '®??
Similarly, the former Director-General of the Anti- 
Dumping Unit at the Commission, Hans Beseler, has stated
®?? See generally, I.V. Bael & J-F Beilis, Anti­
dumping and Other Trade Protection Laws of the EEC
(Second edition, 1990) , 178 et seq; H. Beseler & A.N.
Williams, Anti-dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law: The
European Communities (1986), 173-205; D.J. Gijlstra,
"Anti-Dumping Policy of the EEC in Practice", in J.H.J. 
Bourgeois (ed), Protectionism and the European Community 
(1983), 147-179; J.F. Beilis, "The EEC Anti-Dumping
System", in J.H. Jackson & E.A. Vermulst (eds), Anti-
Dumping Law and Practice (1990), 41-98; E. Creally,
Judicial Review of the Anti-Dumping and Other Safeguard 
Measures in the European Community (1992) ; 
and I.V. Bael, "EEC Anti-dumping Laws and Procedures 
Revisited", (1990) 24:2 JWT 5, 17 et seq.
533 Financial Times, November 21, 1988.
750
to the present writer that the European Union's policy 
on anti-dumping is merely the elimination of injury to 
domestic industries on the basis of an objective and 
consistent policy.
Despite these exhortations, questions have been raised, 
and will continue to be raised throughout this part of 
the work, as to the extent to which these statements can 
be justified. This is particularly so as regards the 
claim that the European Union's policy objectives are 
fair and equitable. Fair and equitable in this context 
can be measured against the international standards as 
a legal point of reference.
In any event, it is convenient at this point to make two 
preliminary remarks as regards the statistical profile 
of the anti-dumping measures adopted by the European 
Union.
First, the profile against particular states quite 
clearly demonstrates that certain countries are more 
susceptible to anti-dumping measures than others. At 
different times, certain states have been singled out 
for severe treatment at the hands of the European Union. 
For example, in 1987, Japan was subject to seven 
separate investigations which amounted to just slightly 
less than 2 0% of the total number of investigations 
opened by the Commission.®?'* By 1991, investigations 
against Japanese companies had climbed to 25% of the 
total number of investigations opened,®?®
®?'* European Commission, Eighth Annual Report of the 
Commission on the Community's Anti-Dumping and Anti- 
Subsidv Activities. SEC (91) 92 Final (1991).
®?® European Commission, Tenth Annual Report of the 
Commission on the Community's Anti-Dumoing and Anti- 
Subsidv Activities, SEC (92) 716 Final (1992).
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True, the issue of European Union-Japan trade relations 
is one of remarkable sensitivity and the anti-dumping 
issue cannot be divorced from the complete picture. 
Again the main source of friction is the perceived trade 
imbalance between the European Union and Japan which, in 
1986, lead the European Commission of comment:
'The sense of responsibility and strong leadership 
evidenced by the present government in Tokyo have 
not done away with the multilateral structural 
imbalance which threatens the foundations of post­
war co-operation and represents a veritable time- 
bomb within the international trading system.
Quite clearly, the aggressive use of anti-dumping 
measures is seen as one way of combatting the trade 
deficit and indeed the European Parliament has even 
blatantly called on the European Commission to 'use all 
the legal resources at its disposal to restrict imports 
from Japan' In light of these pressures, it is 
understandable that the European Commission has targeted 
Japan for rough treatment. Nevertheless, the question 
remains whether or not granting relief in this form is 
legal in terms of international law.^ ®^
Other countries have also been subjected to the rigorous 
attentions of the Commission's anti-dumping u n i t I n
European Commission, European Community - Japan 
Relations. COM (86) 60 Final 6 (1986)
European Parliament, Report on Trade and Economic 
Relations Between the European Community and Japan 
(Rapporteur J. Moorhouse), P.E. Doc. A 2-86/86 (1986).
See generally, A. Bell, "Anti-dumping Practices 
of the EEC: The Japanese Dimension", (1987) 13:2 Legal
Issues of European Integration 1.
539 See P.K.M. Tharakan, "The Sector-Country 
Incidence of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases 
in the European Communities", in L.B.M. Mennes & J. Kol
752
1990, the number of cases admitted against Korea and 
China by the Commission accounted for 12% and 10% of the 
total number of cases respectively while in 1991 and 
1992, Chinese exports accounted for 20% of these totals 
in both years. The proportion of the total number of 
investigations for these two states has remained high 
into the earlier part of this decade.
In contrast, the proportion of investigations opened 
into goods originating from other countries, 
particularly the United States, Canada and the other 
European countries has remained noticeably low. The 
notable exception to this general principle has been the 
increase in investigations into goods originating from 
the states of the former Eastern block. The explanation 
for this phenomenon is that the European Union wishes to 
isolate itself from the potential influx of cheaper 
consumer goods from these states since their conversion 
to market“driven economies.
Second, statistically, in the last twelve years, an 
average of between approximately forty anti-dumping 
investigations have been opened annually.While only 
in a minority of cases are definitive measures imposed 
after investigations by the European Union agencies, 
this statistic disguises the fact that, until 1990, most 
complaints were terminated with the acceptance of price 
undertakings. If undertakings are equated to definitive 
measures, the incidence of measures to the opening of
(eds), European Trade Policies and the Developing World 
(1988), 126.
These statistics are taken from European 
Commission, Eleventh Annual Report of the Commission on 
the Community's Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy 
Activities, COM (93) 516 Final (1993), Annex G.
On the 1981-1984 statistics, see H.J. Dielman, 
"Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Measures: The Practice of 
the European Communities", (1985) 22 CML Rev 697.
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investigations is extremely high. 542
Both these indicators strongly suggest that the European 
Union policy towards anti-dumping is not as objective as 
its administrators would like to believe. They also 
suggest that the European Union has been targeting 
particular states for special treatment under the anti­
dumping procedures. The important question is to what 
degree is this policy, and the anti-dumping laws in 
general, consistent with the European Union's 
international obligations?
(B) Legislative History and A Brief Overview of the 
Present Anti-Dumping System
The European Community was a signatory to the 1967 Anti- 
Dumping Code and the obligations contained in that 
agreement were incorporated into European Community law 
by Council Regulation (EEC) 459/68.^ 3 This regime was 
amended three times prior to the negotiation of the 1979 
Anti-Dumping Code for the purposes of strengthening the 
role of the European Community institutions in the 
process^ '*^ , to deal with the transfer of authority from 
acceding Member States to the European Community^^ and 
to clarify rules for dealing with sales made at a loss, 
dumping by state trading countries and the rules for the
See H.J. Deilmann, "Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy 
Measures: The Practice of the European Communities",
(1985) 22 CML Rev 697.
543 0.J. L93/12 (1968).
Council Regulation fEEC) 2011/73. O.J. L206/3
(1973).
Council Regulation (EEC) 1411/77. O.J. L160/4(1977) .
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calculation of export prices.However, the pre-1979 
rules have been altered to such an extent that they are 
of little more than historical significance in the 
context of the present s t u d y .
Two separate instruments were required to incorporate 
the 1979 Anti-dumping and Subsidies Codes since 
authority to enter into international commitments in 
these areas is split between the EC Treaty and the ECSC 
T r e a t y . enacting this legislation, the European 
Union took into account two major principles.^* The 
first was the terms of the Codes t h e m s e l v e s . T h e  
other was the precedent set by the United States which 
was one of the first signatories to incorporate the 
obligations of the Code into its domestic law.^*
Council Regulation fEECl 1681/79, O.J.
(1979) .
L196/1
For a review of these rules, see, I.V. Bael, "Ten 
Years of EEC Anti-Dumping Enforcement", (197 9) 12 JWTL
395.
(1979) , 
L339/15
Council Regulation (EEC) 3017/79, O.J. L339/1
3018/79/ECSC, O.J.Commission 
(1979)
Recommendation
On this legislation, see generally, I. 
J Cunnane, Dumping and Subsidies (198 3);
Forrester 
Law", in
& C. Norall, 
D. Campbell
Stanbrook 
and I.S."Recent Developments in EEC Trade 
& C . Rohwer, Legal Aspects of
International Business Transactions, Vol. II, 11-26; and
C. Norall, "The New Amendments to the 
Dumping Regulation", (198 9) 2 6 CMLR 83
EC's Basic Anti-
J.F. Beseler & A.N. Williams, Anti-Dumping and 
Anti-Subsidy Law of the European Communities (1986), 25- 
27.
See P. Didier, "EEC Anti-Dumping Rules and 
Practices", (1980) 17 CML Rev 3 49; D.J. Gijlstra, "Anti- 
Dumping Policy of the EEC in Practice", in J.H.J. 
Bourgeois (ed), Protectionism and the European Community 
(1983), 147-179. See also W.J. Davey, "An Analysis of EC 
Legislation and Practices Relating to Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties", in B. Hawk, Antitrust and Trade 
Policy in International Trade (1984), 39-128.
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The original implementing legislation was subsequently 
amended and then consolidated in 1984 After later 
amendments#\ a complete revision of the anti-dumping 
legislation was completed in 1988.^^ Council Regulation 
(EEC) 2423/88 [hereinafter 'the Basic Regulation'] 
remained the fundamental measure until Council 
Regulation 3283/94 was enacted in December 1 9 9 4
Given that no international agreements were negotiated 
at the GATT level between 1979 and 1988 the amendments 
made to the regulation enacted in 1979 must be justified 
as matters either not regulated in the Code or 
compatible with its terms. Therefore, the nature of the 
subsequent amendments to the 1979 basic regulation must 
be treated with a certain degree of scepticism as 
regards their consistency with the GATT rules.
It is also interesting to reflect for a moment on the 
views of the European Commission when enacting the Basic 
Regulation. In proposing the measure which eventually 
became Council Regulation 2324/88. the Commission 
stated:
Council Regulation fEEC) 1580/82. O.J. L178/9 
(1982); Commission Recommendation 3025/82/ECSC, O.J. 
L317/17 (1982); Council Regulation (EEC! 2176/84, O.J. 
L201/1 (1984); and Commission Decision 2177/84/ECSC,
O.J. L201/17 (1984). See generally, H.J. Dielmann,
"Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Measures: The Practice of 
the European Communities", (1985) 22 CML Rev 697.
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(1987) .
Council Regulation fEEC) 1761/87, O.J. L167/9
Council Regulation (EEC] 2423/88. O.J. L209/1
(1988) .
In passing, it is interesting to note that the 
dates of revision of the European trade remedy laws bear 
an unusual degree of similarity with the legislative 
amendments made by the United States. In fact, closer 
examination reveals that many of the amendments concern similar subjects particularly as regards procedure and 
anti-circumvention measures.
- - - ‘ - - -   ^    ^ _  ______________
.5-1,!;
■ifR;
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'It should be emphasized that the proposed 
amendments would not change the general orientation 
of the Community's anti-dumping policy which is 
based on Article VI of the GATT and the GATT Anti- 
Dumping Code. Furthermore, all the proposed 
modifications are essentially a codification of the 
consistent practice and approach of the Commission 
and Council in their application and interpretation 
of the present legislation and, as such, are 
essentially technical in nature.
Neither of these two statements confirm that the 1988 
Basic Regulation is GATT-consistent. While the measure 
may be consistent with European Union practice, quite 
simply if an illegal practice is codified in an internal 
measure, it does not absolve responsibility for illegal 
behaviour. Second, new elements and concepts were 
introduced by the 1988 regulation many of which were 
clearly not of a technical nature, for example, the 
anti-circumvention and anti-absorption measures.
Some of these amendments do deal with providing 
supplementary detail in the application of rules which 
are stated at a more general or abstract level in the 
Code. Others do not and in fact some are deliberately 
more vague. In the final analysis, this revision was 
primarily to exploit loopholes in the Code as an excuse 
for enacting more malleable rules than would have been 
the case if these matters had been dealt with taking 
into account the spirit and purpose of the Code.
556 European Commission, Proposal for a Council 
Regulation Amending Council Regulation (EEC) 2176/84,
COM (88) 112 Final, 3 (1988).
See J.F. Beilis et al., "Further Changes to the 
EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation; A Codification of 
Controversial Methodologies", (1989) 23:2 JWT 21
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As part of the WTO obligations assumed by the European 
Union, a new basic regulation has now been introduced to 
regulate anti-dumping investigations and proceedings, 
namely Council Regulation (EG) 3283/94.^ * For the first 
time, a separate regulation has also been enacted to 
regulate anti-subsidy proceedings, this measure being 
Council Regulation (EC) 3284/94^* Neither of these 
regulations are considered in any detail in the 
following text because the 1988 Basic Regulation and its 
predecessors provide the necessary evidence of EU 
practice in these areas and since the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement and Second Subsidies Code are not the primary 
subjects of this investigation such devotion seems 
unwarranted.
(2) Anti-Dumping Measures in European Union Law
The Basic Regulation states, without further 
elaboration, that;
'A product shall be considered to have been dumped 
if its export price to the [European Union] is less 
than the normal value of the like product
The procedure for determining the existence of dumping 
in European Union law involves four basic steps: (a)
determination of 'export price'; (b) determination of
O.J, L349/1 (1994) . See generally, E. Vermulst & 
P. Waer, "The Post Uruguay Round EC Anti-Dumping 
Regulation - After a Pit Stop, Back in the Race", (1995) 
29:2 JWT 53; P. Waer & E. Vermulst, "EC Anti-Dumping Law 
and Practice after the Uruguay Round: A New lease of 
Life", (1994) 28:2 JWT 5.
O.J. L349/22 (1994) .
Article 2(2), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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'normal value'; (c) a comparison of normal value to 
export price after making required adjustments; and (d) 
calculation of the margin of dumping. While this process 
is, prima facie, consistent with Article VI of the GATT 
and the terms of the Anti-Dumping Code 1979, in fact, 
only a part the process is congruous with the legal 
obligations of the European Union.
Each of the four steps involve administrative judgments 
which are imbued with an extensive degree of latitude 
and discretion for the creative application of anti­
dumping policy. In fact, the whole process is so 
arbitrary that there is general recognition that the 
European Commission can manufacture artificial dumping 
margins without straying from the express terras of the 
Basic Regulation.^! This produces an anomalous 
situation; the Commission can engage in GATT- 
inconsistent practices without actually falling foul of 
European Union law itself.
This situation has been caused mainly by the failure of 
the European Court to conduct effective judicial review 
of the administrative practices of the Commission. The 
Court has traditionally hesitated to intervene in the 
discretion exercised by the Commission in administering 
EU anti-dumping policy. This predicament has been 
compounded by depriving private individuals of the right 
to challenge anti-dumping measures against the standards 
contained in the international treaties negotiated 
within the GATT. The Court has passively acquiesced to 
the effective autonomy of the European Commission (and
B. Hindley, "Anti-Dumping Action and the European 
Community: a Wider Perspective", in M. Hilf & E-U
Petersmann (eds), National Constitutions and 
International Economic Law (1993), 371-390; I. V. Bael, 
"EEC Anti-Dumping Enforcement: An Overview of Current 
Problems", (1990) 1:2 European Journal of Int'l Law 118; 
and J.T. Kuznik, "A Community Export Price Offset",
(1988) 25 CML rev. 317.
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to a lesser extent the Council of Ministers) in this 
area of policy and must bear its share of responsibility 
for the deviation between EU anti-dumping policy and the 
international standards.
The reasons why this degree of deviation has occurred, 
and the evidence to support this proposition, will be 
set out in this section. Here, an analysis of the 
process for imposing anti-dumping measures will be made 
with a view to explaining the degree of deviation. This 
will require extensive consideration of the minutiae of 
European Union anti-dumping law. The most effective 
method of doing so is to follow the broad outline of the 
investigative process to discover the most flagrant 
abberations from the international standards.
(A) Export Price
The export price of goods is the price at which the 
goods are sold for export to arm's length customers 
inside the territory of the European Union. It is 
ascertained as either the actual price paid or, in 
certain circumstances, a price artificially constructed 
as the price which would have been paid had an arm's 
length purchaser bought goods from the foreign 
manufacturer.
(1) Actual export price
The general rule for the determination of the export 
price is that it is 'the price actually paid or payable
562 the second case, the existence of a related 
undertaking, a subsidiary or other circumstances, has 
eliminated the arm's length purchaser from being the 
first purchaser of the goods from which an actual price 
can be calculated.
___   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________________________
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for the product sold for export to the [European 
Union] .3*** Where a foreign exporter sells goods directly 
to an independent purchaser inside the European Union, 
the starting point for the determination of the actual 
export price is the invoice price of the goods.
To arrive at the true export price, deductions are made 
to the invoice price for expenses incurred in relation 
to all taxes, discounts and rebates actually granted and 
directly related to the sales under investigation. The 
greater these deductions, the lower the actual export 
price and the higher the potential margin of dumping.
The European Commission requires extensive deductions 
to be made to the actual export price to arrive back an 
the adjusted export price which, in turn, stimulates 
artificial margins of d u m p i n g . F o r  example, in Canon 
Inc V EC Council '^\. the European Court upheld the right 
of the European Commission to deduct from the actual 
selling price the costs and assumed profits of a sales 
agency controlled by a manufacturer but functioning at 
a pre-import stage.
In the event that no actual export price can be found, 
an export price is constructed. Four circumstances 
justify the abandonment of the determination of an 
actual export price in favour of a constructed export 
price^^:
(a) no export price exists;
(b) an association exists between the
:
Article 2(8) (a) , Council Regulation 2423/88.
See Gestener v EC Council and EC Commission 
(No.10 Case C156/87 [199] ECR 781, [1990] 1 CMLR 820.
Case C171/87 [1992] ECR I 1237; [1992] 3 CMLR 30.
566 Article 2(8) (b). Council Regulation 2423/88.
__
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importers and the exporters;
(c) a compensatory arrangement exists between 
the exporter and the importer or any
third party; or
(d) for other reasons, the price actually
paid or payable for the product sold for
export to the European Union is
unreliable.
If the European Commission determines that any one of 
these conditions exist - which it does in an
extraordinary proportion of investigations - it
constructs an export price. Since the construction of
prices is a more arbitrary process than calculating the
export, price from the price actually paid, a greater 
degree of latitude is conferred on the Commission to 
find dumping margins when constructed values are used.
(2) Constructed export price
Constructed export prices are based on the price at 
which the imported goods are first resold to an 
independent buyer or, alternatively, if the products are 
not sold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the 
condition in which they were imported, on 'any 
reasonable b a s i s ' . other words, the price to the 
first unrelated importer is worked back to the price at 
which the goods were first sold for export to the 
European Union.
The Basic Regulation is not specific as to the 
factors or elements which constitute 'other reasons' and 
since the Anti-Dumping Code does not authorise the 
creation of such a residual category the inference must 
be that this aspect of the Regulation conflicts with the 
terms of the Code.
Ibid.
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569The Commission frequently constructs export prices 
a practice which has aroused much controversy, and in 
fact constructed export prices have been used in some of 
the European Commission's most important investigations 
in recent time.*^° Such a calculation is invariably made 
when either an association or a compensatory arrangement 
between importers and exporters is found to exist which, 
by the Commission's own admission*^!, is in practice 
frequently the case,^^
If it is acknowledged that the degree of discretion 
exercised by the European Commission in calculating 
constructed values is immense, consider the degree of 
discretion exercised if the Commission is allowed to 
determine export values on 'any reasonable basis' which 
it is under the terms of the Regulation. At such a 
point, little normative control would be exercised by 
the Basic Regulation itself never mind the international 
standards and obligations imposed on the European Union. 
Fortunately, determinations on this basis are extremely 
rare.
This contracts with the position in the United 
Statesd were construction of export price is relatively 
rare especially in contrast to construction of normal 
value.
See, for example. Serial Impact Printers From 
Japan [provisional measures] O.J. L177/1 (1988); Dynamic 
Random Access Memories fDRAMs) From Japan [provisional 
measures] O.J. L20/5 (1990) , [199] 2 CMLR 243; and
Erasable Programmable Read Onlv Memories (EPROMs) From 
Japan [definitive measures] O.J. L65/1 (1991).
Discussions between the writer and former H. 
Wenge, Chef d'Unite Adjoint, DG IC2, European 
Commission, November 17, 1992.
See, among the host of examples, Serial-Impact 
Dot-Matrix Printers From Japan [definitive measures]
O.J. L317/33 (1988); Video Cassette Recorders From Korea 
and Japan [provisional measures] O.J. L240/5 (1988); and 
Polyester Yarn From Korea. Mexico. Taiwan and Turkey 
[provisional measures] O.J. L151/39 (1988).
__
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The first stage in the construction of an export price 
is the identification of the first sale to an
independent purchaser. To arrive at a hypothetical 
situation where the goods have been sold for export to 
an independent purchaser, the European Commission makes 
allowances for 'all costs incurred between importation 
and resale and for a reasonable profit m a r g i n ' . in 
other words, two deductions are made from this price: 
(a) all costs incurred between importation and resale; 
and (b) a sum for a reasonable (artificial) profit
margin.
The Basic Regulation provides guidance in relation to 
the deductible costs incurred between importation and 
resale such as:
(a) usual transport, insurance, handling, 
loading and ancillary costs;
(b) customs duties, any anti-dumping duties 
and other taxes payable in the importing 
country by reason of the importation or 
sale of the goods; and
(c) a reasonable margin for overheads and 
profit and/or commission usually paid or 
agreed.
The Regulation is explicit in ensuring that the costs or 
expenses to be deducted for the purposes of constructing 
the export price are not restricted to direct costs. For 
example, the allowance for overheads is a reference to 
an indirect cost. Hence, the allowances for the purposes 
of determining export price include both direct and 
indirect costs.
A violation of the terms of the Anti-Dumping Code occurs
573 Article 2(8)(b), Council Regulation 2423/88.
__________________
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if both direct and indirect expenses are deducted from 
the export price while only direct costs may be the 
subject of an allowance in the determination of normal 
value. In other words, the deductions from the 
calculation of export price are designed to decrease the 
final export price whereas the permissible deductions to 
the normal value inflate the normal value. The result is 
the creation of an artificial margin dumping.
This effect is best illustrated by means of an example. 
A United States manufacturer sells an identical product 
to its associated sales companies in the United States 
and the European Union for $100. Both sales companies 
have costs per unit of $100 consisting of salesmen's 
salaries ($40), advertising ($30) and overheads ($30). 
Similarly, both companies sell the products for $300 to 
independent resellers and therefore have a profit of 
$100.
In calculating the export price, the European Commission 
will deduct from the final resale price, all expenses 
plus profits to arrive at a final export price of $100. 
However, for the-American sales company, the Commission 
allows only directly related selling expenses - in this 
case, salesmen's salaries - and will arrive at a normal 
value of $160. The margin of dumping will be $60. The 
result of this process is therefore to create an 
artificial dumping margin and an illegitimate anti­
dumping duty.
These flagrant asymmetric deductions have been upheld by 
the European Court. In Canon Inc v EC Council '^^'*. the 
Court continued its extensive jurisprudence on refusing
574 Case C171/87 [1992] ECR I 1237; [1992] 3 CMLR 30.
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to investigate this m a t t e r . I n  rejecting the 
application on this point, the Court stated:
'the determination of the normal value and determination 
of the export price are governed by separate rules and 
therefore selling, administrative and other general 
expenses need not necessarily be treated in the same way 
in both cases.'
Again the Court has missed the point. It is not the 
rules which governed deductions which cause the 
inconsistency but the fact that the deductions made to 
the two separate prices do not allow a proper comparison 
of normal value and export price at the same level of 
trade as required by the Anti-Dumping Code.
In addition, the Basic Regulation requires that an 
allowance is built into the constructed export price to 
account for 'a reasonable margin of profit' for the 
related sales company.^* The greater the amount of 
profit imputed to the subsidiary organisation, the lower 
the export price once this has been deducted. Therefore, 
determination of the notional level of profit is 
critically related to the calculation of the margin of 
dumping. Yet, the Commission's practice in this area is 
not consistent and profit margins imputed by the 
Commission vary enormously among investigations. At 
least two writers have reported that profit margins 
imputed to related importers range from 3% to 12%
See, for example, Tovo v EC Council Case 240/84, 
[1987] ECR 1809; Nachi Fuiikoshi v EC Council. Case
255/84, [1987] ECR 1861; Nippon Seiko v EC Council. Case
258/84 [1987] ECR 1923; and Minebea v EC Council, Case
260/84 [1987] ECR 1975.
Article 2(8)(b), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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depending on the circumstances of the case. 577
(3) Duty as a cost
The notion of duty as a cost is a complex one and begins 
with the fact that applications may be made for refunds 
of anti-dumping duties after these have been imposed if 
an importer can prove that the duty collected exceeds 
the actual margin of dumping for the g o o d s . I n  
carrying out the refund investigation, the European 
Commission recalculates the dumping margin for each 
importer by comparing the true normal value with the 
true export price over the period immediately occurring 
before the request for refund.
In implementing this procedure, the Commission 
recalculates the export price and, if necessary, 
reconstructs the export price. When reconstructing the 
export price, any anti-dumping duty paid by an 
associated importer is treated as an operating cost of 
that importer which is deducted from the reconstructed 
export price thus decreasing the export price by the 
value of the anti-dumping duty.^* Hence the refund is 
reduced by the same amount. This rule is known as the 
'duty as a cost rule' and is one of the most contentious 
practices indulged in by the Commission since it quite 
clearly inflates the dumping margin by counting the 
anti-dumping duty as a cost.
To avoid the application of the rule, an associated 
importer is required to double increase the price for
I.V. Bael & J-F. Beilis, Anti-Dumoincf and Other 
Trade Protection Laws of the EEC (Second edition), 83.
578 Article 16, Council Regulation 2423/88.
See European Commission, Notice Concerning 
Reimbursement of Anti-Dumpina Duties. O.J. C266/3 
(1986).
'1 " ' y .
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the goods to arm's length customers namely, first, in 
respect of the dumping margin and, second, in respect of 
the amount of the duty. The practice therefore penalises 
related importers since the procedure is not imposed on 
unrelated importers.
The whole question of the compatibility of this practice 
with the Anti-Dumping Code was in fact considered by the 
European Court of Justice in NMB (Deutschland) GmbH and 
Ors V  EC Commission.^ ! ^ Japanese company, Minebea had 
ball-bearings manufactured by its subsidiary in 
Singapore and distributed throughout the EU by its 
German, British, French and Italian subsidiaries. An 
anti-dumping duty of 33% was imposed on ball-bearings 
imported into the European Union, the export price being 
constructed because the importers were associated with 
the exporter. The importers raised their prices to the 
first EU independent buyers by the amount of the dumping 
margin and claimed a refund. This was rejected by the 
European Commission which insisted that the prices had 
to be raised not only by the dumping margin but also the 
amount of the anti-dumping duties paid.
The applicants argued, inter alia, that this practice 
infringed Article VI of the GATT and Article 8(3) of the 
Anti-Dumping Code which provides that the amount of the 
anti-dumping duty must not exceed the dumping margin'. 
This argument was rejected by the Court on the basis 
that the Code allows contracting parties to construct 
export prices 'on the basis of the price at which the 
imported products are first resold to an independent
See, Commission Decision (NMB France Sari) . O.J. 
L1B5/35 (1992); Commission Decision TNMB Deutschland
GmbHl/ O.J. L185/38 (1992); Commission Decision (NMB UK ttdjL, O.J. L185/41 (1992) ; and Commission Decision (NMB 
Italia Sri). O.J. L185/44 (1992).
581 Case C188/88 [1992] ECR I 1689; [1992] 3 CMLR 80.
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buyer. Further, in constructing this price, the Code 
authorises allowances for costs, 'including duties and 
taxes', incurred between importation and resale.
It is suggested that the European Court is incorrect in 
its interpretation of the terms of Article VI and the 
GATT. The overriding rule is contained in Article VI 
which prohibits the imposition of dumping duties in 
excess of the margin of dumping. Regardless of the legal 
contortions of the Court and the Commission, this 
prohibited effect unquestionably occurred in this case. 
In addition, the Court's extensive interpretation of the 
term 'duties and taxes' is inconsistent with the purpose 
and the spirit of the Code which could not possibly have 
countenanced such a draconian interpretation.
The judgment of the Court was subject to an unusual 
request namely an immediate request for judicial review 
of its own decision. In addition, the Japanese 
government has taken this matter to the GATT for 
settlement and the present writer believes that the 
Japanese government will be successful in the final 
panel ruling.
(4) Sampling
The Basic Regulation also permits sampling to determine 
export prices. Sampling is 'the use of the most
582 Article 2(5), Anti-Dumping Code 1979.
Article 2(5), ibid.
NMB (Deutschland) GmbH and Ors v EC Commission 
(No.2). Case T162/94, Application loged with the 
Registrar of the Court August 22, 1992.
European Commission, Eleventh Annual Report From 
the Eureopean Commission to the European Parliament on 
the Community's Anti-Dumbing and Anti-Subsidy 
Activities. COM(93) 516 Final, 93-94.
_____ 1
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frequently occurring or representative prices' and is 
authorised when a significant volume of transactions is 
involved.^®** On the whole, Commission practice in this 
area is based on pragmatic reality. For example, in one 
case, eight companies were selected as a proportion of 
all exporters of a particular product because 
cumulatively they represented 49% of total exports to 
the European Union.^*?
However, in other investigations other factors have been 
considered more relevant than the proportion of exports 
attributable to the sample. For example, in another 
case, the Commission selected the foreign exporters on 
the basis of; (a) their volumes of production; (b) their 
volume of exports; (c) their product ranges; and (d) the
volume of their domestic s a l e s . T h e  greater the
number of factors taken into account, the larger the
Commission's discretion to select companies whose export 
prices will lead to a substantial margin of dumping.
Further, the sampled export values were applied 
according to the following principles:
(a) the actual dumping margins found for each 
company actually selected for verification
were applied;
(b) the weighted-average of the margins found were
Article 2(13), Council Regulation 2423/88.See 
Plain Paper Photocopiers From Japan [provisional 
measures] O.J. L239/5 (1986); and Serial-Imoact Dot-
Matrix Printers From Japan [provisional measures] O.J. 
L130/12 (1988).
Bicvcles From Taiwan and China [provisional 
measures] O.J. L58/12 (1993).
Cotton Yarn From Brazil. Egvot. Turkev. India and 
Thailand [provisional measures] O.J. L271/17 (1991). see 
also Polvester Yarns From Taiwan, Indonesia, India. 
Turkev and Korea [provisional measures] O.J. L276/7
(1991).
  _ ________
(c)
770
attributed to co-operating companies which 
were not selected for verification; 
best information statistics were used for non­
co-operating companies.
While a certain degree of sympathy must be extended to 
the European Commission's task in such circumstances, 
was this result consistent with the terms of the Anti- 
Dumping Code? In particular, should weighted-averages be 
applied to companies not investigated and should non^co- 
operating companies be penalised in these circumstances 
when the overall purpose of anti-dumping duties is 
compensatory not penal?
(B) Normal Value
The basic definition of 'normal value' has changed 
throughout the evolution of the European Union's system 
of anti-dumping. However, according to the present basic 
Regulation, the normal value is the comparable price for 
the like product intended for consumption in the 
exporting country or country of origin.^*
Again, the actual price paid is prima facie the ground 
rule for determining normal value. In the absence of 
circumstances allowing the selection of the actual price 
as the normal value, two alternative methods are 
authorised;
(a) the 'third market value', defined as the 
comparable price for the like product when 
exported to a third country; and
(b) the 'constructed value', which is calculated 
on the basis of the costs of production and a 
reasonable amount for profit.
589 Article 2(3)(a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
____________ ________ ___ _ __________________ __________
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According to the professed practice and policy of the 
European Commission, the actual value is to be used 
whenever possible and only if such a valuation cannot be 
made are the alternative methods to be employed. In 
reality, constructed normal values are also a common 
occurrence in anti-dumping investigations.
(1) Actual value
Actual normal value is the 'price actually paid or 
payable in the ordinary course of trade for the like 
product' for sale in the country of origin. Hence, in 
basing a normal value determination on actual value, 
three conditions must exist.
First, the normal value is the domestic price actually 
paid or payable in the home market. Second, the product 
on which this determination is to be made is the 'like 
product'. Third, the sales must be made 'in the ordinary 
course of trade' in the home market. In the event that 
one of these conditions is not satisfied, the Commission 
may opt for an alternative method of establishing normal 
value. Hence, the need to satisfy all these conditions 
allows the Commission to select alternative methods in 
a substantial proportion of cases.
The most commonly cited cause of selecting an 
alternative method of valuation is the existence of an 
insufficient volume of sales made in the ordinary course 
of trade.
Sufficient volume of sales
The European Commission generally applies the so-called 
'5% rule' in determining whether there is a sufficient 
volume of sales to allow a normal value based on actual
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sales. 0^ A minimum proportion of 5% of the volume of 
export sales made to the European Union (not total 
export sales) should be made in the home market on a 
quantity and model-by-model basis for those sales to be 
considered a sufficient volume on which to base a 
determination.
In the event that the 5% rule is satisfied, the domestic 
sales will be used for comparison with export prices as 
long as these sales satisfy the other prerequisites for 
basing normal value on actual sales. 9^%
However, in assessing the relevant ratio of domestic 
sales, sales below cost in the domestic market are 
eliminated.^®^ This rule operates against exporters by 
removing such sales from the computation of what is, 
essentially, a quantity calculation.
Sales not made in the ordinary course of trade
The most common scenario in which sales will not be 
considered to be in the ordinary course of trade is when 
the price at which the products are actually sold are 
less than the cost of production.Where there are
9^® The methodology for identifying the existence of 
representative sales for normal value calculations is 
set out in European Commission, Anti-Dumpina Note 142 
(15/6/92).
9^1 This practice was upheld by the European Court in 
Goldstar Co Ltd v EC Council. Case C105/90 [1992] ECR I 
677; [1992] 1 CMLR 996,
9^2 See Electronic Typewriters From Japan. O.J. 
L335/43 (1984).
9^3 See, for example. Serial Impact Dot Matrix 
Printers From Japan. O.J. L317/33 (1988).
9^^ A special situation in which there will be no 
sales in the ordinary course of trade is where goods are 
manufactured in non-market economy countries. In
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reasonable grounds for the Commission to believe that 
the price at which a product is actually sold is less 
than its cost of production, sales of the product at 
such prices may be disregarded as sales not in the 
ordinary course of trade.
To establish whether sales have been made at a loss, the 
Commission calculates a benchmark price against which 
other sales can be compared. This benchmark is the 
average cost of production for the products (type and 
model) during the investigation period. Once the 
benchmark price has been fixed, two principles are 
applied:
(a) When the average price is below the average 
cost of production, sales have been made at 
less than the cost of production; and
(b) When the average price is equal to, or higher 
than, the average cost of production, a 
determination of sales at less than the cost 
of production can be made if the proportion of 
transactions at prices below the costs of 
production is considered substantial.^*
In other words, in the second scenario, by manipulating 
averages sales which are in fact above the cost of 
production sales in fact above the cost of production
addition, products are not considered sold in the 
ordinary course of trade in such circumstances where:
(a) the producers are directly or indirectly state- 
owned; (b) the domestic prices are fixed by the 
government; or (c) the prices of the products in the domestic market are lower than the export prices because 
of government intervention; see Cotton Yarn From Brazil. 
Eovot, Turkev. India and Thailand. O.J. L271/17 (1991).
595 Article 2(4), Council Regulation 2423/88. 
European Commission, Anti-Dumoina Note 104596
(6/2/89)
____________________________
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can be ignored which has the overall effect of 
increasing the normal value of the goods.
Other Commission practices in deciding which sales are 
in the ordinary course of trade can be attacked as 
inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Code. For example, 
the Basic Regulation allows the Commission to consider 
sales made between interrelated companies by inter­
company transfer to be not in the ordinary course of 
trade. This has the effect of requiring the computation 
of constructed values as opposed to accepting actual 
values submitted by the companies under investigation 
and subjecting these to verification. Such parties are 
therefore denied an opportunity to prove that the prices 
in question were made on a basis equivalent to an at 
arm's length basis.
Where sales not in the ordinary course of trade are 
found to exist, the Commission has the option of 
selecting one of four alternative courses of action to 
calculate the normal value;
(a) on the basis of the remaining sales on the 
domestic market at a price which is not less 
than the cost of production (which sales must 
satisfy the 5% rule);
(b) on the basis of export sales to third 
countries;
(c) on the basis of constructed values; or
(d) by adjusting the sub-production cost price in 
order to eliminate loss and to provide for a 
reasonable profit.
Adjustment of the normal value for sales to related 
sales companies
When a manufacturer distributes products on the domestic
______________________ L____
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market through related sales companies, the Commission 
determines normal value at the level of the sale by the 
subsidiary company to the first independent purchaser. 
In other words, the manufacturer and the sales company 
are treated as a single economic unit and therefore the 
expenses of the sales company are not deducted from the 
price to arrive at the normal value. Hence the normal 
value is increased and the margin of dumping inflated.
This controversial methodology was first introduced in 
Electronic Typewriters From Jaoan*^^ and was a change 
from the previous practice of constructing the normal 
value in such circumstances at the level of the parent 
company. *9® The European Court has upheld this 
methodology even although it fails to take into account 
additional expenses incurred by a foreign producer which 
should be deducted to arrive at an ex factory price. In 
Canon Inc v EC Council the Court stated;
'the division of production and sales activities within 
a group made up of legally distinct companies can in no 
way alter the fact that the group is a single economic 
entity which organises in that way activities that, in 
order cases, are carried on by what is in legal terms as 
well a single entity. '*9*
Weighting
The principal rule is that normal values are 'normally'
597 [provisional measures] O.J. L335/43 (1985).
*9® See, for example. Electronic Scales From Japan 
[provisional measures] O.J. L80/9 (1984).
*99 Case C171/87 [1992] 3 CMLR 30. See also Brother V EC Council Case 250/85 [1988] ECR 5683, [1990] 1 CMLR 
792.
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to be established on a weighted average basis.*** 
Sampling
Sampling techniques are authorised for both normal value 
and export price calculations.**^ It is extremely 
difficult for a foreign producer to challenge the 
validity of a regulation imposing anti-dumping duties on 
the grounds that the sample is not representative 
relative to the producer or importer. The European Court 
has held that the only requirement which sampling must 
satisfy is that it is representative as regards imports 
of the dumped products *as a w h o l e * .
Conversion of normal value to a comparable currency
The price paid in the domestic market must be converted 
to a comparable currency to that in which the export 
price is set in order to allow a comparison. No rules 
are set out in the Basic Regulation for this process and 
the normal process is for the Commission to apply the 
official exchange rates applying at the time of the 
transactions during the period of investigation.**^
The Commission has been inflexible when faced with 
unusual situations involving currency fluctuations. For 
example, where the Brazilian government froze the 
exchange rates of that country as part and parcel of a 
domestic economy reform package, a Brazilian
600 Article 2(13), Council Regulation 2423/88.
Article 2(13), Council Regulation 2423/88.
Sermes SA v Directeur Des Services Des Douanes De 
Strasbourg Case C323/88 [1990] ECR I 3027; [1992] 2 CMLR 
632.
See Gerlach & Co BV v Ministry For Economic 
Affairs, Case 239/84 [1985] ECR 3507; [1986] 3 CMLR 30.
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manufacturer claimed that the exchange price should be 
adjusted to reflect the actual depreciation of the 
currency in line with the rate of inflation.** Such an 
approach would have decreased the normal value and hence 
the margin of dumping.
This argument was rejected by the Commission which 
applied the official exchange rate applied to 
international commercial transactions. Not even the 
intervention of the Brazilian authorities in favour of 
the manufacturer could move the Commission from this 
position.
The sole concession granted by the Commission to the 
realities of international exchange rate problems has 
been to establish normal values on a monthly basis in 
order to alleviate a situations which it clearly sees 
caused excessive hardship.**
(2) Third country market value
The first alternative method for the determination of 
normal value is by reference to the price of the goods 
in a third country. The Basic Regulation permits a 
determination of normal value based on the comparable 
price for the like product when exported to any third 
country.** Such a price may be the highest export price 
but it also must be a representative priqe.
Cotton Yarn From Brazil and Turkev, O.J. L82/1
(1992).
** See, for example, Semi-Finished Alloyed Steel 
Products From Turkey and Brazil [definitive measures] O.J. L95/26 (1992); and Silicon Metal From Brazil
[provisional measures] O.J. L96/17 (1992).
606 Article 2(3)(b)(ii), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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Determinations on this basis are relatively rare.*^ The 
Commission officials have stated that the preference for 
constructed values over third country market values is 
attributable to the fact that export prices to third 
countries may also reflect the price of goods dumped in 
that country.** In such a scenario, the margin between 
the third country price and the price in the European 
Union would be less than if a constructed value was used 
in the computation.
(3) Constructed value
There are two separate components in a constructed value 
calculation: the costs of production; and 'a reasonable 
margin for profit'.** In the determination of both 
elements, the Commission's practice is inconsistent with 
the GATT in many respects.
(a) Costs of production
The costs of production are computed on the basis of all 
costs, in the ordinary course of trade, both fixed and 
variable, in the country or origin, of materials and 
manufacture, plus a reasonable amount for selling, 
administrative and other general expenses.
At the outset, it should be noted that, when 
constructing normal values, the European Commission 
until recently accepted that the relevant principles of 
accounting in the country of origin should be used in
As far as the present writer is aware, only one 
case has been based on such a determination; see 
Saccharin and Saccharine Salts From South Korea 
[undertaking] O.J. L331/25 (1980).
ICI.
** Discussions between the author and members of DG
** Article 2 (3) (b) (ii) , Council Regulation 2423/88.
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calculating the constructed value. Unfortunately, there 
has recently been an important deviation from this 
practice. In DRAMs From Korea*^°. in computing the 
constructed normal value, thé Commission adopted a cost 
allocation formula which differed significantly from the 
formula normally used under the generally accepted 
accounting principles in Korea. This is an unfortunately 
precedent and indicates that the Commission is willing, 
in certain circumstances, to substitute its own 
accounting principles for those of other countries.
Fixed and variable costs
The relevant costs include the cost of materials, the 
cost of direct labour, manufacturing overheads 
(including indirect labour, supervision, depreciation, 
rent, power, maintenance and repair), financing costs 
and packaging.
Cost of materials includes the total costs of raw 
materials, including transportation, duties, and other 
expenses incurred in obtaining the materials. The cost 
of such materials is calculated on the basis of expenses 
incurred by the manufacturer.
Direct labour comprises all the expenses of labour 
directly associated with production including basic pay, 
overtime, bonuses and other employee-related expenses 
including tax.
Manufacturing overheads include all expenses incidental 
to production such as indirect labour, rent, maintenance 
and repairs, and depreciation.
610 [provisional] O.J. L272/13 (1992).
See the Standard Questionnaire From the 
Commission to Foreign Exporters.
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Originally the European Commission declined to include 
the economic effects of government subsidies for inputs 
or components into the constructed cost of the finished 
p r o d u c t . T h i s  policy was reversed in 1991 when the 
Commission decided to include subsidies for inputs and 
components in normal value constructed prices. The case 
in question was Cotton Yarn From Brazil, Egypt, Turkev, 
India and Thailand^* where the raw materials for the 
finished product were subsidised by the Egyptian 
government.
The Commission substituted a cost for the raw materials 
calculated by reference to the price of a similar 
quantity of the product when bought in the ordinary 
course of trade in the international market. This 
substitution did avoid the need to quantify the value of 
the subsidy received as a benefit. However, it also 
inflated the normal value since the price of the raw 
materials on the international market was higher than 
similar domestic products subsidised by the government. 
In fact, this will be the case in the majority of cases 
where a similar substitution has been made.
Reasonable amount for selling, administrative and other 
general expenses.
The Basic Regulation expressly states that selling, 
administrative and general expenses shall be calculated 
by reference to the expenses incurred by producers or 
exporters on the profitable sale of like products on the 
domestic market.
See, for example, Polvester Yarn From the United 
States, O.J. L358/91 (1980).
[provisional measures] O.J. L271/17 (1991) .
Article 2 (3) (b) (ii) , Council Regulation 2423/88.
I
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In the event that the calculation cannot be made on this 
basis because the relevant information is unavailable or 
unreliable, or is not suitable for use, then the 
calculation is made by reference to the expenses 
incurred by other producers or exporters in the country 
of origin or export on profitable sales of the like 
product.
If the computation cannot be made on either of these 
grounds, the expenses incurred are to be calculated by 
reference to sales made by the exporter or other 
producers or exporters in the same business sector in 
the country of origin or export. Failing computation on 
these grounds, the Commission is authorised to make the 
assessment on 'any other reasonable basis'. This 
discretion was added by the 1988 Basic Regulation and 
allows the Commission to determine the selling, 
advertising and general expenses of one producer and to 
apply these figures to calculate the constructed value 
for another producer.
Non-Operating Income and Expenses
A possible GATT-inconsistent practice is the refusal to 
allow deductions attributable to income from financial 
investments (non-operating income) even when made to 
financial commercial operations.^* This practice is 
inequitable because the Commission almost invariably 
included non-operating expenses in its calculation of 
the costs of production which has the effect of 
inflating the margin of dumping. Nevertheless, the 
Commission refuses to allow the normal value to be 
decreased by the deduction of non-operating income on 
the basis that:
*^* See, for example. Large Electrolytic Aluminium 
Capacitors From Japan [provisional measures] O.J. 
L152/22 (1992).
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'Such profits may be taken into account only if 
connected with the firm's main production activity and 
the ensuing sales and only then only to offset financial 
costs resulting directly from that production and those 
sales. This net financial profit may in no circumstances 
be offset against the firm's production costs.
A double standard is therefore created by ensuring that 
non-operating expenses are included in a manufacturer's 
production costs while disallowing non-operation income. 
This process inflates the margin of dumping by 
increasing normal value while disallowing adjustments 
which would reduce that value.
(b) Reasonable margin for profit
The calculation of a profit figure is an acutely 
contentious aspect of the computation. There are a 
number of reasons to believe that the European Union's 
practices in this respect artificially inflate the 
margin of dumping by over-estimating profit margins, 
thereby directly increasing normal value.
The Basic Regulation provides that the amount of profit 
is to be calculated by reference to the profits realised 
by the producer or exporter on the profitable sales of 
like products in the domestic m a r k e t . T h i s  provision 
was dramatically altered in the 1988 revision. 
Previously the rule had been that, provided that a 
profit is normally realised on sales of products of the 
same general category on the domestic market of the 
country of origin, the addition for profit did not 
exceed normal profit. The previous terminology followed
Silicon Metal From Brazil [definitive measures] 
O.J. L222/1 (1992).
617 Article 2(3) (b) (ii) , Council Regulation 2423/88.
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the rule in Article 2(4) of the Anti-Dumping Code 1979 
verbatim. The fact that the new rule departs from this 
terminology raises questions as to why the provision 
required amendment.
This fundamental change of method of computation has had 
a significant impact on the profit margins applied in 
constructed value computations. In the early 1980s, the 
Commission's typical practice was to select a single 
profit margin to reflect the profit figures for the 
relevant industry.^* The result was that profit margins 
applied averaged around 5% and very rarely exceeded 10%.
A new methodology was adopted by the Commission in its 
investigation into electronic typewriters from Japan. 
The profit margins were calculated by the Commission on 
the basis of the average profit made on profitable sales 
in the market, where the exporters had sufficient 
profitable domestic sales of the relevant products.
For other producers with insufficient profitable 
domestic sales, profit realised by profitable sales of 
producers of the same product were used.^^ This new 
approach was codified into the 1988 amended basic 
regulation.*! The effect of the change in methodology 
has been to substantially raise the figures for profit 
margins in constructed value calculations.
If profits cannot be determined on the basis of
618 For example, see Louvre Doors From Malaysia and 
Singapore, O.J. L135/33 (1981); and Studded Welded-Link 
Chain From Sweden. O.J. L231/10 (1980).
*!* Electronic Typewriters From Japan, O.J. L335/48 
(1984) .
620 gQQ also Plain Paper Photocopiers From Japan, 
O.J. L54/12 (1987).
*! Article 2(3)(b)(ii), Council Regulation 2423/88.
__________________________
784
profitable sales, the Commission resorts to 'any other 
reasonable basis'. This methodology is illustrated in 
Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAMs] From Korea*  ^ in 
which the Commission deemed that there were insufficient 
profitable sales and decided that a 13.5% profit was 
appropriate in light of 'the Commission's experience in 
the product sector concerned obtained in previous anti­
dumping proceedings'. Such an approach has obvious 
dangers. It implies that the Commission is imputing 
identical commercial circumstances in one country to 
production in another country. In effect, this ignores 
vital aspects of commercial practice, production and 
comparative advantage for the sake of simplicity.
There also seems little consistency in Commission 
calculations of profit in constructed value cases. For 
example, in one case the Commission concluded that a 
profit margin of six percent was reasonable for each 
production unit even during the start-up phase of an 
expansion project when the enterprise involved had 
clearly counted on making no profits at this stage.** 
The calculation of profits in this particular 
investigation was made on the profits realised by the 
parent company as a whole.
In addition, the Commission refuses to use the same 
levels of profits when calculating a constructed normal 
value and a constructed export price in the same 
investigation. To do so would be to cancel out any 
opportunity to artificially inflate the margin of 
dumping by manipulating these values. So, in one 
investigation, the Commission used a profit margin of 
18% when calculating normal value and a margin of 6%
*2 [provisional] O.J. L272/13 (1992).
** Ballbearings From Singapore. O.J. L193/2 (1984).
_______________________
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when constructing the export price.*^ In another case, 
a profit margin of 15% was used for normal value and 5% 
as the profit figure for export price.**
This methodology defies even the most fundamental 
logical rationales behind the concept of dumping. If a 
producer is truly dumping goods in a country other than 
his home market, he is supposed to be maximising his 
domestic profit and subsidising losses made on the 
dumped sales with these excessive profits. Yet, the 
Commission is constructing profit margins which render 
a higher profit figure for export sales than domestic 
sales. In other words, the export sales are more 
profitable than the domestic sales. If this is the case, 
quite clearly there is a fundamental misconception in 
the very theory of dumping itself.
Where the actual profit figure is available, the 
Commission will insert this value into its calculation, 
ignoring any special circumstances that produced 
particularly favourable results during the period of 
investigation. In one case where an undertaking realised 
profits of approximately 32% of gross sales, the 
Commission rejected the argument that this profit figure 
resulted from peculiar and special circumstances that 
existed for a particular period in the relevant 
market.** The Commission observed that no profit margin 
can be more reasonable to employ that the actual margin 
achieved and the use of such a figure 'cannot be 
challenged on the grounds that the profits made are 
exceptional, excessive or result from special
Thermal Paper From Japan [provisional measures] 
O.J. L270/15 (1991).
** 3 ' 5" Microdisks From Japan. Taiwan and China 
[provisional measures] O.J. L98/5 (1993).
** Typewriters From Japan, O.J. L163/1 (1985).
_ '____________________
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circumstances'•
Objectivity in evaluating profit in constructed cost 
calculations is important to prevent abuse of the anti­
dumping process.*? While figures for the costs of 
production may be lifted from production data and 
statistics, the determination of profit has a greater 
element of subjectivity. An excessive or unrealistic 
figure for profit would constitute a protectionist 
measure.
(C) Adjustments
Article 2(9) of Council Regulation (EEC] 2176/84** 
followed the terms of Article 2(6) of the Anti-Dumping 
Code 1979 very closely in relation to comparing export 
prices with normal values at the same level of trade.*^ 
The Code authorised certain adjustments to normal value 
and/or export price and the 1984 Regulation mirrored 
these requirements. Hence the Commission was bound by 
strict guidelines when making adjustments and, on the 
whole, its practices were consistent with the terms of 
the Code.
The 1988 Basic Regulation deleted much of the detail of 
the 1984 Regulation. In particular, it omitted reference 
to comparison of the export price and normal value
*? Yet the European Court has upheld the 
Commission's approach: see Goldstar v EC Council. Case 
C105/90 [1992] 1 CMLR 996; and Nakaiima All Precision v 
EC Council Case C69/89 [1991] ECR I 2069.
628 O.J. L201/1 (1984).
*^  Article 2(6) of the Code provides that: 'In order 
to effect a fair comparison between the export price and 
the domestic price in the exporting country... the two 
prices shall be compared at the same level of trade, 
normally at the ex-factory level and in respect of sales 
made at as nearly as possible the same time'.
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'normally...at the same level of trade, preferably at 
the ex-factory level'. The effect of this amendment is 
to eliminate the symmetry which operated in arriving at 
a comparable point in the distribution system to allow 
a fair and equitable comparison of normal value and 
export price. Quite simply, after the change, the 
European Commission has a vastly extended discretion to 
compare export prices and normal values.
This raises legitimate questions as to the GATT- 
consistency of adjustments under EU law.*° In fact, 
even the European Commission in its own internal 
administrative guidelines, notes that 'the new 
Regulation allows greater freedom in choosing the method 
for adjusting the normal value.'*! Further, the 
exercise of this discretion has not always been 
compatible with the obligations of the European Union.
Article 2(9)(a) of Regulation 2423/88 sets out the basic 
rule that:
'the normal value...and the export price...shall be 
compared as nearly as possible at the same time.'
In reality, this rule means nothing. It does not provide 
a benchmark in the distribution system to allow a 
comparison, ie ex works.** Instead the Regulation
**^ See C. Norall, "The New Amendments to the 
European Community's Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation",
(1989) 26 CML Rev. 83, 91; and P. Didier, "EEC Anti-
Dumping: The Level of Trade Issue After the Definitive 
CD Player Regulation", (1990) 24:2 JWT 103.
**! European Commission, Anti-Dumping Note 104 
(6/2/89), 4.
** In practice, the Commission does sometimes 
expressly state that he comparable level of trade is the 
ex works level but its practice is not consistent; see 
Tunsten Ores and Concentrates From PRC and Hong Kong 
[provisional measures] O.J. L83/23 (1990).
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continues to provide that, to ensure a fair comparison, 
the Commission is instructed to make due allowance, in 
the form of adjustments, for differences affecting price 
comparability. These differences related to ;
(a) physical characteristics;
(b) import charges and indirect taxes; and
(c) selling expenses resulting from sales made at 
different levels of trade, in different 
quantities and under different conditions and 
terms of sale.
Detailed guidelines are set out in the Basic Regulation 
to facilitate the application of these adjustments.
Differences in phvsical characteristics
The normal value is adjustment by an amount 
corresponding to a 'reasonable estimate' of the value of 
the difference in the physical characteristics of the 
product concerned.**
Import charges and indirect taxes
Normal value is also to be reduced by an amount 
corresponding to any import charges and indirect taxes 
borne by the like product and by materials physically 
incorporated therein.**
Selling expenses resulting from sales at different 
levels of trade, in different Quantities and under 
different conditions and terms of sale
Adjustments for differences in levels of trade and
** Article 2(10)(a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
** Article 2(10)(b), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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different quantities are only granted if they fall 
within the specific categories of the provision.** 
There are five categories of expenses; (a) transport, 
insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs; (b) 
packing; (c) credit; (d) warranties, guarantees, 
technical assistance and other after-sales services; and 
(e) other selling expenses. Expenses in each of these 
categories may be deducted from the normal value to 
approximate the normal value to the export price in 
relation tot he level of trade, quantity and the terms 
and conditions of sale.
It is a critical point to note that each of these 
adjustments is made to the normal value only in respect 
of expenses directly incurred. When the expense is an 
indirect cost, no adjustment is authorised. Hence, the 
normal value is inflates by the existence of indirect 
costs which cannot be subtracted when working back to a 
stage in the distribution chain which would allow 
comparison with export price.
This practice also contrasts with the position in 
relation to the calculation of the net export price 
where both direct and indirect expenses of this nature 
are permitted which deflates the export price and 
inflates the margin of dumping. This phenomenon is known 
as the 'Export Price Offset'.** When this process is 
considered, the fundamental distortion in the European 
Union's anti-dumping process is exposed.
If the European Commission constructs a normal value, it 
will do so by adding the costs of production which
** J.F. Beilis et al., "Further Changes in the EEC 
Anti-Dumping Regulation; A Codification of Controversial Methodologies", (1989) 23:2 JWT 21, 27.
*** See J.T. Kuzmek, "A Community Export Price Offset", (1988) 25 CML Rev 317.
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include selling, administration and other general 
expenses and a profit margin. Where the product is 
marketed in the country of origin through a multi­
layered distribution system, the expenses of the running 
this system will be taken into account. Hence, the 
selling, administration and other general expenses and 
profits of related sales companies, subsidiaries, etc 
will be included in the normal value. These expenses 
will include both direct and indirect expenses.
However, when the (constructed) normal value is 
adjusted, only direct expenses are deducted even 
although both direct and indirect expenses were added to 
the calculation to arrive at the constructed value.
When adjusting the export value, the European Commission 
deducts all related expenses (both direct and indirect) 
incurred between the exportation and the sale to an 
unrelated arm's length purchaser.*?
(D) The Margin of Dumping
(1) Comparison of normal value with export orice
In the event that the price of the goods in the European 
Union is the same for all transactions, the dumping 
margin is calculated by subtracting the export price 
from the normal value.** Dumping margins may also be 
calculated on one of the following alternative basis;
(a) on a transaction-by-transaction basis; (b) by 
reference to the most frequently occurring prices;
(c) on the basis of representative prices; and (d) by 
reference to weighted average prices.
*? Article 2(8)(a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
** Article 2(14)(a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
. . . . _ ____ y'-cl -L
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The Commission may select the most appropriate basis of 
comparison and the exercise of this discretion has been 
upheld by the European Court.** This discretion allows 
the Commission to select the basis which will yield the 
highest dumping margin and introduces an element of 
arbitrariness into this process.
The rule is that "export prices shall normally be 
compared with normal value on a transaction-by- 
transaction basis' except where the use of weighted 
averages would not materially affect the results of the 
investigation.**^
It should also be noted that calculations on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis eliminates the 
possibility of 'negative dumping margins' from being 
taken into account in determining dumping margins. In 
other words, negative margins are not permitted to 
affect the possibility of reducing the prospect of a 
negative finding. The unfairness of this process can be 
illustrated by an example.
Suppose that over the period of the investigation, three 
separate prices exist in the domestic market for a 
particular product, namely $5, $10 and $15. The
Commission may reject the price at $% as being below the 
cost of production which would leave an average of $12.5 
as the normal value. On the other side of the equation, 
suppose than the same prices existed. The Commission 
would dismiss the price at $15 as being a non-dumped 
price when compared to its counterpart normal value and 
substitute a nominal value of $12.5, being the average 
normal value. The average of all the prices would then
*** NTN Tovo Bearing & Others v EC Council and EC 
Commission. Cases 240/84, 255-257/84 & 260/84 [1987] ECR 
1809.
**° Article 2(13), Council Regulation 2423/88.
X:
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be calculated, leaving a value of $9.2. Since the 
dumping margin is the difference between the normal 
value and the export price, a dumping margin of $3.3 
will be determined.
(2) Conversion of the dumping margin into duties
The Commission also has discretion as to whether the 
dumping margin should be expressed in percentage 
terms**! a specific amount per unit.**?
The European Union has not, in the past, been receptive 
to mitigating anti-dumping duties imposed on foreign 
producers where evidence has been produced to support 
the claim that à Union industry has injured itself by 
engaging in anti-competitive practices. Although the 
Commission indicated in some cases anti-dumping measures 
if, after a formal investigation under Article 85 or 86, 
anti-competitive arrangements were proven, it practice 
it merely referred foreign producers to the procedures 
available under EU competition policy.***
The European Commission was subsequently rebuked for 
failing to take into account this factor by the European 
Court.*** However, the ratio of the Court's judgment was 
that the failure related to the determination of 
material injury to a domestic industry and not to the
641 Paracetamol From China. O.J. L348/1 (1988) .
**? See for example. Iron or Steel Coils From 
Algeria. Mexico and Yugoslavia. O.J. L188/18 (1988),
*** See Ferro-Silico-Calcium Slicide From Brazil. 
O.J. L129/5 (1987); and Calcium Metal From PRC and the 
Soviet Union. O.J. L271/1 (1989).
*^  Extramet v EC Council. Case C358/89 [1992] ECR I381.
______________
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calculation of dumping margins.*** A-G Jacobs was more 
critical than the Court in his opinion in the case. He 
stated that, in assessing duties, consideration should 
be given to the question whether the imposition of the 
duties is consistent with EU competition policy. 
However, it is not clear that the position has changed 
significantly in this respect.
(E) Input Dumping
For a considerable period, it appeared that the 
Commission did not act against finished products 
manufactured with the benefit of inputs or components 
which had been dumped. This policy was radically altered 
in 1991 when the Commission decided for the first time 
to take action to address this form of dumping. In 
Dihvdrostreptomvein From China and Japan***, a Japanese 
producer sourced raw materials for the finished chemical 
at prices which were allegedly below the comparable 
costs of the only other market economy country producer 
which happened also to be the complainant. After 
investigation, the Commission concluded that it was;
'reasonable to adjust the constructed normal value to 
take account of the fact that the Japanese producers buy 
these raw materials at a price which is lower than their 
production cost in a market economy.'
However, neither Article VI or the Anti-Dumping Code 
specifically authorises action against input dumping. 
Further, in this particular case, the Commission
*** See, G.V. Gerven, "Recent Developments in EEC 
Anti-Dumping", (1992) 7 Revue de Droit Des Affairs
Internationales 857; and Case Note on Extramet [1993] 
30:1 CML Rev 155.
646 [provisional measures] O.J. L187/23 (1991) .
___________
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effectively punished the foreign producers for having 
the commercial acumen to buy their raw materials at the 
cheapest available price. Naturally such procurement 
would result in a cost saving during the production 
process.
(F) Dumping From Non-Market Economy Countries
The European Union has special rules for the assessment 
of dumping from countries deemed to have non-market 
economies. An extremely high percentage of anti-dumping 
proceedings have been brought against such countries 
especially in the last decade and the treatment afforded 
to imports from these states is an important aspect of 
EU anti-dumping policy.
(1) The identification of countries deemed to have 
non-market economies
In the early 1980s, a considerable number of countries 
were deemed to have non-market economies.**? No 
definition of non-market economy countries is contained 
in the Basic Regulation although reference is made to 
ancillary EU legislation for assistance in this 
process.*** For these countries, special rules are 
applied particularly in relation to determining normal 
values.
The purpose of this special methodology is ostensibly to
**? See G.C. Denton, "The Non-Market Economy Rules of
the European Community's Anti-rDumping and Countervailing 
Duty Legislation", (1987) 36 ICLQ 198.
*** Council Regulation fEECI 1765/82. O.J. L195/1 
(1982) [on common rules for imports from state-trading 
countries] and Council Regulation (EEC) 1766/82. O.J. 
L195/21 (1982) [on common rules for imports from thePeople's Republic of China].
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prevent account being taken of prices and costs in non- 
market economy countries which are not the result of 
internal market forces.*** In reality, the methodology 
inflates the normal value by allowing the Commission to 
ignore prices which are charged in the markets of such 
countries.
Since the events between 1988 and 1993, many of the 
countries of Eastern Europe have been recognised by the 
European Union as having adopted to market economies. 
Recognition of these states as market economies has 
occurred on an ad hoc basis as the European Union has 
acknowledged economic reforms have been implemented in 
these states.*0
There has, however, been a lack of consistency in this 
process insofar as different measurement standards have 
been applied to different countries to assess the 
necessary degree of reform. Recognition of the necessary 
degree of reform has also often been extended or denied 
for political more than economic reasons. Nevertheless, 
as at September 1994, sixteen states remain subject to 
this special regime.®*!
Identification as a non-market economy permits the
*** Technointorq v EC Commission and EC Council Cases 
294/86 & 77/87 [1988] ECR 6077, [1989] 1 CMLR 281.
**® See, for example. Council Regulation (EEC) 
1013/93. O.J. L105/1 (1993), Which extended recognition 
of market economy status to Roumania and Bulgaria.
**! These are; Mongolia, North Korea, PRC, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzkstan, 
Moldavia, Russia, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The three Baltic states were 
removed from this category as of December 31, 1992
(Council Regulation (EEC) 848/92. O.J. L89/1 (1992).
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic have been treated as market economies under the 
term sof their association agreements with the European 
Union.
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European Commission to subject all imports from that 
country to the special rules even if a particular 
industry in a country is subject to market forces. 652
(2) Special rules for the determination of normal 
values
The determination of normal value for imports from non- 
market economies is made on the basis of one of the 
following criteria;
(a) the price at which the like product of a
market economy third country is actually sold 
either (i) for consumption on the domestic 
market of that country; or (ii) to other
countries including the European Union;
(b) the constructed value of the like product in 
a market economy third country; or
(c) if neither price nor constructed value as 
established under (a) or (b) provides an 
adequate basis, the price actually paid or 
payable in the European Union for the like
product, duly adjusted, if necessary, to
include a reasonable profit margin.®*
Which of these options is selected is subject to the 
overriding condition that the selection should be made
®* Conversely, identification as a non-NME country 
means that imports from industries which are
nationalised or otherwise excluded from the effects of 
market forces will still be treated as originating from 
a market economy country.
®* Article 2(5), Council Regulation 2423/88. See 
also Pure Silk Typewriter Ribbons From China
[provisional measures] O.J. L174/27 (1992).
___
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on 'an appropriate and not unreasonable manner'.** In 
practice, the majority of normal value determinations 
for products from non-market-economy countries are made 
on the basis of the price at which the like product is 
actually sold on the domestic market of the analogue 
country. ***
The second method has been relied on for establishing 
normal value but will not be used if export prices have 
been influenced by competition from low-cost exports 
from other countries.*®
Constructed values have been increasingly used in recent 
investigations. This causes concern because constructed 
values are the most common means of inflating normal 
values. As a general principle, the European Commission 
used constructed prices in the same circumstances are 
constructed values in market economy investigations. So, 
when there are insufficient domestic sales®*?, the 
product is sold at a loss on the domestic market®*® or 
the domestic prices do not cover all the production 
costs®**, normal values will be constructed based on 
data from the analogue countries.
®** Ibid.
®** See, for example. Synthetic Fibres of Polyester 
From the GDR. O.J, L103/38 (1987); Electric Motors From 
Bulgaria, O.J. L83/1 (1987) ; Paint, Distemper. Varnish 
and Similar Brushes From China, L46/45 (1987).
®*® See, for example. Horticultural Glass From 
Czechoslovakia, O.J. L224/26 (1984); Upright Pianos From 
the USSR. O.J. LlOl/30 (1982) ; and Ball and Tapered 
Roller Bearings from China, O.J. L152/11 (181).
®*? Silicon Carbide From China. O.J. L287/25 (1986) .
®*® Artificial Corundum From China, O.J. L255/9 
(1984).
®** Unwrought Nickel From the USSR. O.J. L159/43(1983).
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The fourth option - the price actually paid or payable 
in the European Union duly adjusted - is rarely used by 
the European Commission in making its assessment of 
normal value.*®
The selection of the analogue country is by far the most 
important and controversial aspect of the whole process 
of applying anti-dumping measures to non-market economy 
countries. It is also the process in which the greatest 
degree of arbitrariness is demonstrated by the European 
Commission.
In view of the inherent uncertainty in the selection of 
the analogue country, it is virtually impossible for 
exporters in non-market countries to decide in advance 
a pricing strategy which will avoid a finding of 
dumping. Foreign producers and exporters have little 
influence over the selection of analogue countries and 
Community institutions are not obliged to consider 
reference countries proposed by foreign producers or 
exporters.
No guidance is provided in the selection of the analogue 
country.*! In practice, the complainant and the 
responding foreign exporters both suggest analogue 
countries to the European Commission and, not 
surprisingly, more often than not, these proposals are 
not compatible. A complainant will normally be arguing 
for the most economically developed country possible in 
order to inflate the final normal value and hence the
This method was expressly rejected in Conner 
Sulphate From Czechoslovakia. O.J. L235/18 (1987).
®®! The United States legislation contains some 
guidance insofar as it requires the authorities to base 
the normal value on the prices or costs in a market 
economy country at a comparable level of economic 
development to the non-market economy country.
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margin of dumping.*? Conversely, the foreign exporters 
will argue for the least developed country possible 
since, all other factors being equal, the normal price 
will be lower than in developing countries.** The 
burden is on the party proposing an analogue country to 
convince the Commission that the proposed country is 
acceptable.®*
Several administrative factors also impinge on the 
selection of the analogue country. For example, the 
choice of analogue country is influenced by the degree 
of co-operation from producers in the third country and 
that of their government. The absence of co-operation 
from either of these parties will render verification 
impossible.** Similarly, where an investigation is 
conducted into imports from non-market economy countries 
and market economy countries, the Commission will use 
the data from the market economy country as a basis for 
an analogue,®*
The relative levels of economic development or GNP per
*? For example, in Unwrouoht Manganese From China. 
O.J. C15/12 (1992), the EU industry suggested the United 
States as a surrogate for China. Similalry, in Photo 
Albums From China. O.J. 0120/100 (1992), the EU industry 
proposed Japan as the surrogate for China. In Refractory 
Chamottes From China. O.J. 0104/8 (1993), the EU
industry also suggested the United States as a surrogate 
for China.
®®* See F.L. Fine, "EEC Anti-Dumping; The Problem of 
Imports From State-Trading Countries", (1988) 20 Law & 
Pol'y Int'l Business 91, 94-96.
®®^ See, for example. Fibre Building Board From 
Roumania. O.J. L181/19 (1982).
** See Asbestos-Cement Corrugated Sheets From 
Czechoslovakia. O.J. L259/48 (1984); and Iron Steel
Angles. Shapes and Sections From Roumania. O.J, L83/9 
(1984).
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(1983) . See Codeine From Czechoslovakia. O.J. L16/26
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capita plays virtually no role in the selection of 
analogue countries where this should in fact be a 
critical factor.
In addition, the nature of the market in the analogue 
country is, for the most part, ignored even although 
this will be a decisive factor in establishing normal 
values. Prices are governed by market forces and the 
level of competition in the market and this is an 
important factor which is ignored.*? In addition, the 
levels of sales, in terms of volume, is another 
important factor yet the 5% rule for representative 
sales in ordinary normal value is not applied in the 
circumstances of a non-market economy investigation.
The size of the production operations in the analogue 
reference country relative to the producers in the non- 
market economy country is a factor which is ignored in 
selecting the appropriate analogue country. The European 
Court has acknowledged that this might produce unfair 
results. In Detlef Nolle v Hauotzollamt Bremen- 
Freihafen. the Commission selected Sri Lanka as an 
analogue choice for the export of paint brushes from 
China even although the total production of such 
products in Sri Lanka amounted to 750,000 units when the 
total exports of the products from China amounted to 
over 60 million units.** The alternative proposed by 
the exporters had been Taiwan although this was rejected 
by the Commission.
The Court rejected the choice of Sri Lanka as a 
surrogate country and agreed that Taiwan would have been
*? The European Commission has recognised that 
ignoring this factor may be a potential defect in 
investigations; see European Commission, Anti-Dumping 
Note 135 (12/12/92).
668 Case C16/90, Judgment of October 22, 1991.
_______________
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a more appropriate selection because of the following 
factors:
(a) the volume of domestic sales in Taiwan of the 
like product.
(b) the prices in Taiwan which were established on 
the basis of sufficient competition.
(c) the characteristics of the Taiwanese industry 
which were more similar to the characteristics 
of the Chinese industry in particular with 
respect to access to raw materials.
These conditions were not established in Sri Lanka 
because of the market in Sri Lanka for the product was 
small, only two producers of like products existed in 
that country and all raw materials in Sri Lanka had to 
be imported. The fact that the Commission made the 
assessment on the basis of Sri Lankan prices in the 
first place is an indictment of the Commission's 
practices in this respect. All the factors present in 
the Sri lankan market point to a higher normal market 
value.
More disconcerting, the Commission has frequently 
selected as an analogue country a state which protects 
production and marketing of the products being 
investigated. Naturally, the existence of state 
protection, particularly in the case of a sanctioned 
monopoly, will inflate normal prices. Nevertheless, the 
Commission has deemed this factor not to be a relevant 
consideration in its choice.^*
(3) Determination of export price 
Export prices for comparison purposes are determined in
Fibre Building Board From Roumanie. O.J. L181/19(1982).
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the normal manner without distinction whether the 
country is a non-market economy country or a market 
economy countries. Adjustments are made on a similar 
basis.
(4) Adjustments to normal value and export price
The most common adjustments made by the European 
Commission are to take account of the differences in the 
physical characteristics of the product and the 
differences in the conditions of sale. However, the full 
list of allowances permissable under Article 2(9) of the 
Basic Regulation are, at least in theory, also extended 
to imports from non market economy countries.
The Commission has consistently refused to make 
adjustments for the alleged comparative advantages of a 
non-market economy p r o d u c e r . F o r  example, in 
Magnesium Oxide From China* '^^^. the Commission refused to 
make an allowance for the closer geographical proximity 
of mines to production facilities in the country of 
production as compared with the situation of the 
industry in the analogue country.
(G) The Impact- of International Agreements on the 
Application of Anti-Dumping Measures
The fact that products are subject to quantitative 
restrictions is irrelevant for the purposes of assessing 
duties. For example, in one case, where the imports were 
subject to the quota-regime of the MultiFibre 
Arrangement (MFA), the Council notes, in its definitive 
measure regulation, that neither European law or 
international law prohibited the imposition of anti-
See Beseler & Williams, supra note 550, 71-72. 
O.J. L145/1 (1993) .
_
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dumping measures on imports subject to quantitative 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . I t  does, however, seem unduly harsh 
that foreign producers should be subject to two forms of 
import-restrictions.
Bilateral quantitative restrictions are also ignored in 
this process. 3^ The Commission justifies this policy on 
the ground that quantitative restrictions protect the 
European industry from excessive volumes of imports but 
do not necessarily eliminate the danger caused by unfair 
commercial practices such as dumping. However, since in 
the vast majority of cases the imposition of quotas 
increases the EU price of goods as higher value goods 
replace lower value goods in order to reap the economic 
rents from quotas, it is highly unlikely that this 
argument can be accepted as a proper justification.
(3) The Ubiquitous Position of European Union Anti- 
Subsidy Laws
There is little doubt that anti-subsidy measures did not 
play as crucial a role in the functioning of the Common 
Commercial Policy as anti-dumping measures.^* Only 
thirteen anti-subsidy investigations were ever conducted
Synthetic Fibres of Polvester From Mexico. 
Romania. Taiwan.. Turkey. United States and Yugoslavia  ^
O.J. L348/49 (1988).
See Polyester Yarns From Taiwan. Indonesia. 
India. Turkey and Korea [provisional measures] O.J, 
L276/7 (1991).
Anti-subsidy measures should be distinguished 
from 'countervailing charges' which are imposed on 
agricultural products entering the Community from third 
countries. These relate to the entry price of goods and 
are not concerned with the anti-subsidy procedure of the 
Community; see, for example. Countervailing Charges on 
Tomatoes from Poland. O.J. L230/18 (1992).
___________________________
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by the Commission and between 1990 and 1992®^ ,^ no anti­
subsidy investigations were initiated^* and there was 
only one instance of anti-subsidy duties being 
imposed.®^ Of these investigations, the majority took 
place under the authority of the ECSC Treaty and not the 
EC Treaty, as part of the European Union's attempt to 
protect its steel industry in the early part of the 
1980s.
These statistics, of course, contrast starkly with those 
for countervailing duty investigations conducted by the 
United States over the same periods. The United States 
authorities have made roughly equal use of both the 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy procedures. As we shall 
see later, this disparity can be explained only in terms 
of the European Union's overall trade policy objectives.
The European Union's anti-subsidy measures therefore 
remained very much in their infancy, not only in terms 
of the volume of cases that were conducted but also as 
regards the rules developed in practice for their 
administration. These measures displayed none of the 
sophisticated techniques developed to tackle particular 
issues in more mature systems such as that of the United 
States or even in the EU's own anti-dumping system. In
675 European Commission, Ninth Annual Report on the
Community's Anti-Dumoina and Anti-Subsidy Activities
SEC(91) 974 Final (1991) and Tenth Annual Report on the 
Community's Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities. 
SEC(92) 716 Final (1992).
However, reviews of existing measures were conducted within this period in these cases : Certain
Ball-Bearings From Thailand. O.J. C182/6 (1992)
[initiation review]; Binder & Baler Twine From Brazil 
and Mexico. O.J. L251/28 (1993) [review termination];
and Certain Ball-Bearings From Thailand. O.J. C286/6 
(1993) [initiation review].
Polyester Fibres and Yarns From Turkey, 
[provisional duties], O.J. L137/8 (1991); [definitive
duties] O.J. L272/3 (1991).
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the absence of aggressive use of this procedure, the 
Commission was quite simply not required to consider the 
elaborate and difficult issues which have arisen before 
the United States authorities in the application of 
their countervailing laws.
In fact, at the most superficial level, an examination 
of the basic anti-subsidy legislation which applied 
during the period of investigation - which was also the 
principal legislation for the application of anti­
dumping duties^* (until superseded by Council 
Regulation (EC) 3284/94^h - reveals that there were no 
more than ten rules specifically enacted to govern the 
application of anti-subsidy d u t i e s . T h e  other rules 
of the regulation, such as those for procedure and 
establishing material injury, were shared with the anti­
dumping procedure. Taking into account the sparseness of 
the anti-subsidy complaints brought to the attention of 
the Commission, there is in fact little substantive law 
to evaluate.
The explanation for this passive policy of restraint, 
however, reveals a more sinister policy objective on the 
part of the European Union. Quite simply, the European 
Union viewed the use of subsidies as a principal tool of 
social and economic development. The widespread use of 
anti-subsidy measures could backfire on the European 
Union and therefore the Union viewed its restraint in 
this matter as a bargaining chip in the multilateral 
trade negotiations on subsidies. The two issues could 
not in fact be separated without creating a degree of 
artificiality.
Council Regulation fEEC) 2423/88 O.J.
(1988) .
O.J. L349/22 (1994) .
Article 3, Council Regulation 2423/88.
209/1
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(A) The Political and Economic Rationales and 
Contradictions behind the European Union Anti- 
Subs idv Policy
The conspicuous absence of the vigourous use by the 
European Union of anti-subsidy measures should not be 
mistaken for a benevolent attitude towards the 
subsidisation of exports by non-European Union states 
and it would be a fundamental error to believe this to 
be the case. It was not a measure of the tolerance of 
the European Union towards such activities. Rather, the 
European Union's motives for refraining from the liberal 
use of such measures were far more sinister, reflecting 
a desire to limit the international application of anti­
subsidy/ countervailing measures even at the cost of 
injury to specific European Union industries which were 
compelled to compete against subsidised foreign goods.
The dogmatic pursuit of this objective distorted not 
only the overall structure of the European Union's 
system of administered protectionism but also was 
fundamentally inconsistent with its internal state aid 
policy. It is therefore necessary to consider not only 
the actual distortion of the European Union system 
itself but also the conflicts between the European 
Union's international position and its own attempts to 
regulate subsidies granted by Member States inside the 
European Union.
(1) The Role of Subsidies/Aid in European Union 
Policies
Inside the European Union, the role of state and Union 
assistance is a fundamental part in the structure of the
■kÿ:
807
European Union i t s e l f . T h e  need to protect the 
freedom to regulate these matters without external 
interference explains many of the acrimonious disputes 
with other states, particularly the United States.
For example, the position of the Common Agricultural 
Policy within this structure explains the trenchant 
position adopted by the European Union in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations,The vagueness of the proposals 
originally submitted by the European Union and its 
reluctance to permit concessions reflect the degree to 
which the CAP has become part of the way of life for 
European farmers. Concessions and proposed cut-backs in 
support have immediate repercussions for both the 
European Union and certain Member States.
The same is true of large sectors of the industrial 
base. In these sectors it is not inaccurate to describe 
financial assistance as institutionalised. Thus, 
assistance is provided at both the European Union and 
state levels, virtually unquestioned, to the steel 
industry, the coal industry, the ship-building industry, 
the synthetic fibre industry and the motor-vehicle 
industries. To a certain extent these activities are 
beyond the scope for review of state aids conferred on 
the Commission under Article 93 of the EC Treaty.
It is generally taken for granted that there is little 
prospect of these industries surviving in their present 
shape if government assistance is not provided and these
See generally, L. Haucher et al., EC State Aids
(1993).
See B.J. McDonald, "Agricultural Negotiations in 
the Uruguay Round", (1990) 13 World Economy, 299, 306- 
308.
See European Commission, Twentv-First Report on 
Competition Policv (1992), 134-153.
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industries were required to compete unassisted in the 
international market-place. This is not, of course, to 
say that there are not socio-economic reasons justifying 
the institutionalised isolation of these industries. 
However, the legality of extending permanent and 
unlimited assistance to these sectors must be considered 
dubious even if the practice is generally unchallenged 
at the international level.
Outside these institutionalised sectors, the European 
Union sanctions a considerable number of policies 
involving the subsidisation of production. Generally 
these may be classified according to whether they 
constitute assistance authorised under European Union 
policies or state aid. The critical distinction, other 
than the sources of such assistance, is that EU aid, 
when provided to industries, benefits domestic 
industries against non-European Union producers. On the 
other hand, state aid discriminates between national 
producers within the Union and is therefore subject to 
regulation under the EC Treaty.^*
In those sectors where there is a common policy, such as 
agriculture and fisheries, the limits for granting 
national state aids are, to a large extent, determined 
by the relevant common policy. These set down the 
conditions and terms, as well as the purposes, for the 
granting of aid.
Both these forms of aid are, according to the 
Commission, provided in accordance with the 
international rules. The Commission has declared that:
'Whilst aids are obviously only one of the barriers
See generally, H. Papaconstantinou, Free Trade 
and Competition in the EEC: Law. Policy and Practice 
(1988).
_____  _ ___ __________________________
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to trade, a strict attitude in this field 
demonstrates the [European Union's] commitment to 
the international trading system. Consequently, any 
aids granted in the [European Union] must be in 
conformity with the GATT rules.
The present writer is extremely sceptical of this 
commitment. Despite the exhortations of the Commission, 
the distortion effects of assistance to European Union 
industries on the international economy is not a factor 
taken into consideration in the approval of assistance 
at the European Union l e v e l . N o r  does the European 
Union readily approve multilateral agreements reducing 
levels of subsidisation. In fact, the Commission has 
even proposed that the primary means of reducing 
international levels of state assistance is by means of 
sectoral agreements such as the EC-US Bilateral 
Agreements on Steel or the OECD negotiations on 
restricting aid to the ship-building industry.
(2) The Strateav of Minimising Restraints on 
Subsidisation at the International Level
To preserve its freedom to continue to provide liberal 
measures of financial assistance, for a variety of 
socio-economic rationales, the European Union has 
consistently advocated a liberal approach to the
European Commission, Third Survev on State Aid in 
the EC in the Manufacturing and Other Sectors (1992) , 1.
686 Commission has stated that aid directed to
exports outside the Community do not fall within Article 
92 unless the necessary effect on inter-state trade is 
established; see European Commission, First Report on 
Competition Policv (1972), Point 187; Sevëhth Report on 
Competition Policv (1978), Points 242-244.
687 European Commission, Second Survev on State Aid 
in the EC in the Manufacturing and Other Sectors (1991),
____________________________________
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question of subsidies in international trade. To avoid 
providing a basis on which its international negotiating 
position may be undermined, the European Union has 
applied its anti-subsidy laws in a manner to support 
this policy position.
However, the Commission has succeeded in tying itself to 
the rigidity of some quite absurd negotiating positions 
such as the principle that a charge to the public 
account is required for an actionable subsidy or that 
the quantum of subsidies is to be determined by 
reference to the cost to the government of providing the 
support. To apply a different rule internally, while 
maintaining a diametrically opposite international 
negotiating position would undermine the position of the 
European Union in negotiations.
A closer examination of the origins and evolution of 
this last rule provides an interesting insight into the 
perspective of the European Union on the relationship 
between its international position on subsidies and 
countervailing measures and its own anti-subsidy rules.
The origins of the cost to government rule rest in the 
1981-1982 European Union-United States steel conflict. 
During this period, a large number of anti-dumping and 
countervailing petitions were lodged by American steel 
producers against EC producers.^* In fact, over 100 
such complaints were received by the United States 
authorities.
While the dispute itself was eventually settled through 
the negotiation of a voluntary export restraint
For background, see J.J. Mangan, "Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979: A Steel Industry Perspective", 
(1986) 18 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus., 241; and F. Benyon & 
J.H.J. Bourgeois, "The EC-US Steel arrangement", (1984) 
21 CMLR 305.
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arrangement^*®, the quid pro quo for which was the 
withdrawal of the private complaints, during its 
discussions and in an attempt to mitigate the prospect 
of imposing duties, the European Union strenuously 
argued that the cost to government standard was the 
appropriate measure of subsidies. If successful, this 
argument would have had the effect of reducing the final 
level of countervailing duties.®®®
Although this position was rejected by the United States 
authorities, the European Union appears to have seen an 
advantage in maintaining this position in the subsequent 
multilateral negotiations. Any contradictory internal 
measures therefore required amendment. Hence, the 1979 
basic anti-dumping/anti-subsidy regulation was amended 
to eliminate rules conflicting with this position.
For example, the 1979 regulation originally provided, 
inter alia, that the quantification of loan or guarantee 
subsidies 'shall generally be considered as the 
difference between interest rates paid or payable by the 
beneficiary and normal commercial rates effectively 
payable on comparable loans or guarantees. *®®^ 
Subsidised loans or guarantees were therefore calculated 
on the basis of the benefit conferred on the recipient 
and not the cost to the national authorities. Yet, in 
the 1984 amended basic regulation, this provision was
®*® On this arrangement, see I. Pogany, "Steel Wars V Star Wars: The Impact of VERs on GATT", in D.L. Perott 
& I Pogany (eds), Current Issues in International 
Business Law (1988), 68-88.
®®® See M. Broncker & R. Quick, "What is a 
Countervailable Subsidy in EEC Law?", (1989) 23:6 JWT 5, 
17.
®®^ Article 3(4) (d). Council Regulation fEECÏ3017/79, O.J. L339/1 (1979).
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Council Regulation (EEC) 3017/79. O.J. L339/1
(1979).
693 See text supra, pp.126-127.
See M.C.E.J. Bronckers, "Private Remedies Against 
Foreign Subsidization: A European View", in J.H.J.
Bourgeois (ed), Subsidies in International Trade (1991), 
187, 194-195.
:kl;l
deleted.Obviously this amendment was not implemented 
independently of the fundamental change of policy on the 
part of the European Union.
The European Union has continued to hold this position 
at the international level®®^ , and has in turn 
refrained from applying its anti-subsidy laws in an 
manner which might contradict this position. This is a 
reflection of the importance to the European Union of 
reducing restraints on the use of subsidies at the 
international level.
International rules restricting the right of the 
European Union to engage in these forms of financial 
assistance are perceived as an impediment to the 
evolution of certain of the policy objectives of the 
European Union. Securing freedom to indulge in 
subsidisation at the international level has been placed 
above countering foreign subsidised goods through anti­
subsidy measures.
(3) The Internal Effects of this Policy Inside the 
European Union
There is also evidence that the Commission has actively 
discouraged private parties from applying for anti­
subsidy relief, instead recommending relief under the 
anti-dumping regulations.^* This is another indication
__________________________
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of the European Union wishing to downplay the 
significance of countervailing measures in the 
international trade system through self-imposed 
limitations on its own activities.
Further, it is significant the anti-subsidy section of 
DG IC is considerably smaller than the comparable 
section for anti-dumping investigations and is unlikely 
to be able to handle a large volume of complaints. The 
sheer lack of resources and manpower limits the number 
of investigations into allegations of subsidies that can 
be carried out effectively.
This artificial stimulation of anti-dumping complaints 
is a dangerous development. The provision of relief by 
means of anti-dumping measures and not anti-subsidy 
measures is itself a distortion which fails to directly 
tackle the cause of the problems of a domestic industry. 
It is highly unlikely that an anti-dumping measure is 
the appropriate remedy against foreign subsidisation. 
Further, the legality of this application of anti­
dumping measures is suspect*
(4) Inconsistencies Between the European Union's 
International Position and Its Own Internal 
Regulation of State Aid
The EC Treaty contains strict rules concerning state 
aid, that is assistance by the governments of the Member 
States to their own industries,®®® The prohibition on
®®® The general rule stated in Article 92 of the EC 
Treaty is that 'any aid granted by a Member State or 
through state resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade
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state aid contained in Article 92 of the EC Treaty is 
prohibition is not however absolute; there are two main 
exceptions.®®® State assistance which is considered 
compatible with the common market is ipso facto 
legitimate.®®^ Similarly, state assistance which is 
considered compatible with the common market and which 
is subject to review by the Commission.®®*
Particularly in recent years, the Commission, has seen 
its role in the regulation of state aid as a crusade 
against the distortion of the conditions of competition 
within the common market. In one of its earliest 
significant statements of this subject, the Commission 
declared state aid to be;
•a form of protectionism, to benefit national 
producers, to give them a competitive advantage, to 
avoid unnecessary structural adaptation: in short, 
to transfer difficulties on to competitors in other 
states. In view of the importance of trade in 
industrial products in the European Union, such 
aids, however beneficial they may appear in the 
short-term national point of view, could endanger
between Member States, be incompatible with the common 
market'.
®®® See generally, A. Evans & S. Martin, "Socially 
Acceptable Distortions of Competition: State Aid",
(1991) 16:2 EL Rev 79.
®®^ This includes aid having a social character granted to individual consumers and aid to rectify 
damage caused by natural disasters; Article 92(2), EC 
Treaty.
®®* This includes aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is 
abnormally low, to correct serious unemployment, and aid 
to promote a project to common European interest; 
Article 93(3), EC Treaty.
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and threaten the unity of the common market. *®®®
If these aids have such an effect inside the European 
Union, it is axiomatic that they can have the same 
effect outside. Yet the European Union is reluctant to 
restrict its use of subsidies even although it 
acknowledges that such practices have such pernicious 
effects.
The substantive law on state aid strictly defines 
permissible state aid. For example, in state aid 
regulation, the concept of aid has itself been defined 
as being wider than that of a subsidy. As the European 
Court held, 'an aid is a very similar concept to a 
subsidy, but it places emphasis on its purpose and seems 
especially devised for a particular objective which 
cannot normally be achieved without outside help. 
The concept of an aid is therefore wider than that of a 
subsidy because it embraces not only positive benefits, 
such as subsidies themselves, but also interventions 
which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are 
normally incurred by producers or manufacturers.
Since the definition of aid is wider than that of 
subsidy, it is clear that the European Union desires to 
regulate not only assistance traditionally considered to 
be subsidies, but a wider category of assistance. This 
in turn means that a greater, not lesser, scope of 
assistance programmes is subject to regulation. Yet, at 
the international level, the European Union has 
consistently argued for a restricted definition of
®®® European Commission, Twelfth Reoort on 
Competition Policy (1983), Point 158.
Steenkolenmiinen v High Authoritv. Case 50/59 
[1961] ECR 1.
See DEUFIL v EC Commission. Case 310/85 [1987]ECR 901.
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subsidy which would imply that less programmes fall to 
be regulated by the international rules.
Similarly, in state aid policy, aid may come from both 
private and public sources. As the European Court has 
held, 'aid need not necessarily be financed from state 
resources to be classified as state aid' Thus, there 
is no distinction between aid granted directly or 
indirectly by public bodies or private bodies
established or appointed to administer aid. This, of
course, was not the position of the European Union in
the trade negotiations where a charge to the public 
account was argued to be a sine qua non of a subsidy.
Finally, in the actual computation of aid, it is the 
benefit to the recipient that is employed as the
gauge. Once again, this would be an unacceptable 
proposition to the European Union negotiators at the 
international level.
The Commission has deliberately attempted to distance 
the concept of state aid from that of subsidies at the 
international level, even although this distinction is 
at best artificial. Thus, in Sova Meal from Brazil, the 
Commission considered whether the practices that were 
the subject of the complaint were subsidies 'as far as 
international trade is concerned' This distinction 
has been created to allow the Commission to argue that 
there a two separate sets of rules, one for subsidies at 
the international level and the other for state aid in 
the European Union.
EC Commission v France. Case 290/83 [1985] ECR 
439; EC Commission v Milchforderunasfonds [1985] 3 CMLR 474.
Italy V  EC Commission. Case 173/73 [1974] ECR
709.
704 Sova Meal from Brazil, O.J. L106/19 (1985), 24.
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One cannot help avoiding the conclusion that one set of 
rules is adequate for internal trade but another, 
substantially less rigorous, set is more appropriate for 
trade with the outside world. It is difficult to see why 
one set of principles is sufficient for the internal use 
but a radically different set is being propounded for 
the European Union's trading relationships with third 
countries.
-..k j
(B) The Definition of Subsidies in European Union Anti- 
Subsidy Law
The Basic Regulation provided quite simply that:
'A countervailing duty may be imposed for the 
purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed, 
directly or indirectly, in the country of origin or 
export, upon the manufacture, production, export or 
transport of any product the release of which in 
free circulation within the European Union would 
cause injury.
This provision was not an attempt to define the concept 
of actionable subsidy and only set out to establish the 
broadest parameters for the imposition of duties. The 
qualification that anti-subsidy duties 'may' be imposed 
on subsidies of this description emphasises the enormous 
degree of discretion conferred on the Commission to 
formulate the appropriate policy towards actionable 
subsidies.
In fact, only three significant rules may be derived 
from this provision relative to the issue of defining 
subsidies. First, anti-subsidy duties could be imposed
70S Article 3(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
__ ___  . _
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on direct or indirect subsidies. Second, there was no 
distinction in treatment between subsidies granted by 
the country of origin or by the country of export. 
Third, actionable subsidies could be provided at any one 
of the four stages of manufacture, production, export or 
transport. However, it will be noticed that none of 
these rules restricted the power of the Commission to 
define the scope of actionable subsidies. These were 
permissive rules rather than restrictions.
Nor did the subsequent provision of the regulation, 
which stated that subsidies bestowed on exports include, 
but were not limited to, the practices listed in the 
Annex to the regulation, assist identify the contents of 
the category of actionable subsidies. The Annex, which 
was taken from the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies 
to the 1979 Subsidies Code, was not exhaustive but 
merely served to establish that certain practices were 
definitely export subsidies for the purpose of the anti­
subsidy law.
What did the Commission do to define this concept? Again 
a distinction must be made between the treatment of 
domestic and export subsidies. However, first some 
common rules which have been established for both types 
and these will be considered.
(1) Three Prerequisite Conditions for Establishing 
Actionable Domestic/Export Subsidies
The practice of the European Commission demonstrates 
that certainly not all subsidies are considered 
actionable.^® Nevertheless, three characteristics can
706 the difficulties of such an endeavour, see G. 
Depayre & R. Petriccione, "Definition of Subsidy", in 
J.H.J. Bourgeois (ed), Subsidies and International 
Trade: A European Lawvers* Perspective (1991), 67.
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be identified, in Commission practice as being present 
when an actionable subsidy is found;
(a) The need for intervention of a governmental 
agency or body;
(b) The existence of a charge to public funds; and
(c) The bestowal of a benefit to the recipient of 
the assistance.^?
These three conditions are applicable to both 
countervailable export and domestic subsidies.?®*
(a) Government intervention
There is no express requirement in either the GATT or 
the 1979 Subsidies Code that a subsidy must involve the 
intervention of a governmental agency to provide, or 
remit or grant the financial assistance. Nevertheless, 
in the majority of cases, the Commission has required 
that such intervention is a necessary element of a 
subsidy.
In a number of cases, the Commission has terminated 
investigations because it has discovered that, despite 
the presence of financial assistance, the support 
originated from •private or quasi-private sources and 
could not be attributed to any act of governmental 
intervention.?®® But, in practice, this element probably 
does not act as a significant limiting factor in anti­
subsidy investigations simply because the vast majority
?®? See generally, K. Adamantopoulos, "Subsidies in 
External Trade Law of the EEC; Towards a Stricter Legal 
Discipline", (1990) EL Rev. 427, 434, et seq.
?®* Fediol V EC Commission [Fediol 11] . Case 187/85 
[1988] ECR 4155.
?®® See Sova Meal From Brazil. O.J. 106/19 (1985); Sova Meal From Argentina. O.J, L108/ (1985).
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of subsidies provided involve government, as opposed to 
private industry, intervention.
(b) Charge to the public account
A more significant limiting factor is the requirement 
that financial assistance will only be considered a 
subsidy if it involves a charge to public funds.
The Commission has on a number of occasions held that 
such a charge is required because the Annex to the Basic 
Regulation states, in item (1) that 'any other charge to 
the public account* may be considered an export subsidy. 
This implies, according to the Commission, that this 
element is a prerequisite to all forms of actionable 
subsidy, whether domestic or export. The Commission also 
points out that a number of the other practices in the 
list necessarily involve such a charge in their 
formulation.
This perverse interpretation has been not been rejected 
by the European Court which has observed in Fediol v EC 
Commission? ®^, that the nature of many of the subsidies 
on the illustrative list of export subsidies implies 
that a charge is required.^*
A charge to the public revenue can be either a direct 
expense on public expenditure incurred to support a
?^® Fediol V  EC Commission TFediol III . Case 187/85
[1988] ECR 4155.
?^  ^The Advocate-General in this case, A-G Mancini, 
did not share the same justification for reaching this 
conclusion. In his view, the grant of a subsidy involved two sides to an equation; a sacrifice by the state and 
a benefit to the recipient. Since the assistance was 
provided in the public interest, this should be its 
measure and not its impact on market forces despite the 
amount of distortion caused to the natural forces of 
competition within that market.
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programme or lost revenues not collected in order to 
allow remission of payment such as tax breaks. In other 
words, there are two possible permutations to a charge 
to the public account:
(1) Any financial benefit which involves budgetary 
expenditure; and
(2) Any benefit which represents a loss, or a 
failure to contribute to, public revenue.
But, this interpretation has its justification in policy 
and not legal l o g i c . T h e  Commission's stance on this 
matter is derived from its perceived need to support its 
international position on this point. Certainly, there 
are compelling legal arguments against this 
interpretation, none of which have been taken seriously 
by either the Commission or the Court.
Firstly, the list contained in the Annex is 
illustrative, not exhaustive, and there is no reason why 
Article 3(1) of the basic regulation should be construed 
restrictively in light of this list. In fact, the Annex 
provides guidance only on export subsidies and not 
domestic subsidies and therefore there is no compelling 
reason why the characteristics of export subsidies 
should be imposed on domestic subsidies before these are 
made actionable.
Secondly, in the case of services, the Commission has 
accepted that it is the commercial impact of government 
assistance that is the relevant measure of the benefit 
and not the cost on public revenues. For example, in the 
Hyundai Merchant Marine Case, after examining certain 
commercial advantages provided by the Korean government
?*? See Soya Meal from Brazil. O.J. L106/19 (1985), 
See text, supra pp.809-811.
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to Hyundai, the Commission imposed a redressive duty 
calculated not on the basis of the cost to the 
government but on the difference between the freight 
rate charged by the company and that charged by its 
competitors.
Third, the cost to government standard ignores 
commercial reality. The injury caused to an industry is 
due to the nature of the competitive benefit provided to 
the foreign producer. The measurement of this benefit is 
a microeconomic matter relating to the commercial 
business affairs of producers.?*®
Finally , as we have seen, this approach is at variance 
with the Commission's approach in state aid 
investigations which are conducted on the basis of the 
net benefit conferred on the recipient.?*®
The main problem here is that defining actionable 
subsidies involves a trade-off between economic and 
social matters. The main question is what economic 
philosophy should the European Union's anti-subsidy law 
follow? Should it be a purely economic process, or 
should it be a process which takes into account social 
and other externalities? In the final analysis, it is 
difficult to disagree with the argument that the 
Commission's purpose in establishing this rule is 
policy-oriented rather than the result of legal 
reasoning.
?** Containerized Cargo Transported bv Liner Service 
by Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. O.J. L4/1 (1989).
?*® This is the position of the International Chamber 
of Commerce; see ICC, Subsidies Subject to
Countervai1ing Duties. Doc. No, 130/120 (19/9/88).
?*® See M.C.E.J. Broncker, "Comment", in J.H.J. 
Bourgeois, Subsidies in International Trade (1991), 75.
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(c) Benefit to the recipient
The last prerequisite of an actionable subsidy is that 
it confers a benefit on an identifiable recipient.
The benefit must also accrue directly to the producer of 
the goods under investigation. Thus, for example, in one 
case the Commission declined to impose duties for a law 
exempting dividends transferred to a foreign parent 
company from tax liability, normally paid by domestic 
producers, because it did not constitute a "direct 
benefit' to the subsidiary but rather the parent 
company. ?*?
(2) Export Subsidies
Export subsidies are defined by reference to the types 
of financial assistance specified in the Annex to the 
basic regulation but these are not exhaustive. In 
practice, the Commission has not experienced 
investigations into each of these forms of export 
subsidies. The only real experience of the Commission 
with any of these has been with the following types of 
export subsidies:
(a) The supply by governments or their agencies of 
products or services for use in the production 
of exported goods. For example, the provision 
of rebates on electricity charges has amounted 
to an export subsidy under this 
classification.?**
(b) The exemption, remission or deferral of direct 
taxes. The full or partial exemption.
?*? Ballbearings from Thailand. O.J L184/1 (1990) . 
?** Ballbearings from Thailand. O.J. L152/59 (1990).
______________ ______________________________________
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remission or deferral of direct taxes, such as 
income tax, or other charges constitutes an 
export subsidy when the allowance is related 
to exports.?*® It is irrelevant whether the 
payment has been made or is payable at a 
future, date.
(c) The allowance of special deductions for direct
taxes such as corporation tax when related to 
export performance.??®
(d) The exemption or remission of indirect taxes.
For example, tax rebates on turnover taxes.??*
Further, customs duties and indirect tax 
exemptions on imports of machinery and 
material for production of goods fall within 
this category as do rebates on indirect taxes 
on domestically purchased input products.???
(e) The provision by governments of export credit
guarantee facilities.™
(f) The grant of export credit at below commercial
rates.??*
It should be noted that these practices are treated as 
export subsidies only when the benefit provided is
?*® Sova Meal from Brazil. O.J. L106/19 (1985) .
??® Ball-bearinas from Thailand, supra note 717.
??* See Seamless Tubes of Non-Allov Steel From Spain, 
O.J. C264/2 (1979).
??? Ballbearings from Thailand. O.J. L152/59 (1990) .
??* See Steel Sheets and Plates from Brazil. O.J. 
L45/11 (1983). •
??* See Polvester Fibres and Yarn from Turkey. O.J, L272/3 (1991).
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contingent on the export of goods. However, there is no 
need to establish any degree of specificity in the case 
of export subsidies. A sufficient degree of specificity 
is presumed by virtue of their character as export 
stimulation programmes.
(3) Domestic Subsidies
(a) Forms of actionable domestic subsidies
In the past, the Commission has investigated few cases 
alleging the existence of actionable domestic subsidies. 
Instead, it has reserved its main efforts, such as they 
are, to tackling the issue of export subsidies.
In the leading case on this subject, Polvester Yarns and 
Fibres from Turkey??®, the Commission identified four 
separate forms of actionable domestic subsidies which 
may serve to provide guidance to the types of domestic 
subsidies which may be countervailed in the future.
First, a utilisation support programme which provided a 
cash premium, calculated on the amount of credit used 
for total investment and the amount of natural resources 
used in production. This was considered a form of grant 
from the government in proportion to the total fixed 
investments made by producers. Second, a tax deduction 
to investors granted as a percentage of total fixed 
investment. Third, a customs duty exemption granted on 
imports of machinery and equipment used by qualifying 
investors. Fourth, low interest credit/loan facilities 
during operational phases of production.??®
725 O.J. L137/8 (1991).
??® This was considered an actionable domestic 
subsidy, but not countervailed, since its effect was 
negligible.
_____________________________________
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(b) The specificity test
Again the basic regulation fails to provide any 
reference to the’ degree of specificity required for an 
actionable subsidy.'^ This differs from the United 
States legislation which expressly requires the 
application of a specificity standard. Nevertheless, it 
is Commission policy to apply such a test in the case of 
domestic or production subsidies.^* The justification 
for this approach has been stated by the Commission in 
the following terms:
'The effects of measures of a general nature on 
international trade are difficult or even 
impossible to determine since they tend to be 
mitigated or counter-balanced by other macro- 
economic factors....In any case, any attempt to 
call a measure of a general nature a subsidy would 
be absurd because, by ignoring the fact that the 
policies of all modern states imply, to varying 
degrees, some financial intervention by the 
government,, it would make countervailable large 
sections of social and economic policy.
From this statement, it can be deduced that the 
Commission's policy rests on two justifications. First, 
there is the 'effects doctrine' which justifies the 
distinction on treatment on the economic impact of the 
different measures, domestic subsidies generally being
This is also true for earlier regulations 
concerning anti-subsidy investigations: see Council 
Regulation (EEC) 3017/79, O.J. L339/1 (1979); and 
Council Regulation fEEC) 2176/84. O.J. L201/1 (1984).
See generally, C. Lehmann, "Domestic Subsidies 
under European Community Countervailing Law; An Emerging Standard After the ECJ Soya Cases", (1988) World 
Competition 31.
729 Sova Meal from Brazil. O.J. L106/19 (1985).
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considered as having a less severe effect. Second, there 
is the 'practicality doctrine' which dictates that 
actionable subsidies must be restricted to specific 
subsidies because it is impossible in practice to 
countervail measures of a general nature.
While the motives for treating both types of subsidies 
separately are relatively clear - following both 
economic theory and the practices of other states - the 
Commission has not been as succinct in its elaboration 
of the degree of specificity required for a domestic 
subsidy to be countervailable.
There are four identifiable groups of recipients which 
are relevant when considering degree of specificity, 
namely:
(a) a specific producer or enterprise;
(b) an identifiable group of producers or 
enterprises ;
(c) an industrial or agricultural sectors; 
and
(d) an identifiable geographical territory or 
region.
As one moves down this list, it is clear that we are 
moving away from identifiable recipients and towards 
general categories.
At least at present, there is probably an insufficient 
number of decisions on this point to accurately 
determine at which stage in this list of recipients a 
domestic subsidy becomes sufficiently specific to be 
actionable. It does not seem, however, that subsidies 
provided to individual producers have been deemed 
specific by the Commission and this is the most obvious 
category. Similarly, an identifiable group of producers
_____
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may be considered sufficiently distinguishable to allow 
for the application of duties.
In Polyester Fibres and Polyester Yarns from Turkey, the 
Commission considered whether assistance given to a 
number of eligible industries could be considered 
specific if the programme declared other industrial 
sectors to be ineligible for aid.^^ The Commission 
concluded that there was reason to believe that the 
allocation of the subsidies in question was not being 
carried out on the basis of neutral and objective 
criteria. The effect of applying these criteria was to 
separate eligible sectors from those which were not 
eligible. Hence, if a subsidy is provided to one or more 
identifiable industrial sectors, and other sectors are 
excluded, the Commission is likely to treat the subsidy 
as specific.
On the other hand, there is the issue of subsidies made 
available to all sectors of the economy. Some indication 
of the European Union's policy in this regard was 
provided in the Sova Cases. Here the Commission found 
that a domestic subsidy for which twenty seven 
agricultural sectors were eligible was not sufficiently 
specific.However, in arriving at this conclusion the 
Commission observed that while not all agricultural 
commodity production was eligible for the support, those 
products for which the subsidy was intended to serve - 
in this case preparation and storage aids - were all 
eligible for assistance without discrimination among 
separate agricultural sectors.
This decision appears to support the proposition that a 
benefit made available to the entire agricultural or
O.J. L272/3 (1991) .
Soya Meal from Brazil. O.J. L106/19 (1985) .
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industrial sector of the economy of a state would not be 
considered adequately specific. But, at the same time, 
the Commission did emphasis in this decision that the 
nature of the programme was also relevant as well as the 
general nature of the programme in defining specificity.
As regards regional programmes, the general policy of 
the Commission is to consider such domestic subsidies 
not to be countervailable in the event that the producer 
is located in a specially designated assistance zone.^^^ 
A stricter approach is taken when a regional assistance 
programme is intended not to aid a disadvantaged region, 
but rather to stimulate economic activity in an already 
prosperous, industrialised and efficient region.^* This 
policy applies even when the objective of this 
discrimination was to promote efficiency.
(c) De jure and de facto soecificitv
The Commission was originally reluctant to move towards 
elaborating the distinction between de jure and de facto 
specificity. In the Sova Case, the Commission was 
unwilling to declare the programme specific even 
although, while technically the assistance was available 
to 27 producers, the production of soya beans 
represented over 30% of total agricultural production 
and accounted for a similar percentage of the financing.
The Commission eventually endorsed the concept of de 
facto specificity in Polvester Fibres and Yarns from 
Turkey which concerned, inter alia. a programme
:
Ballbearings from Thailand. O.J. L184/1 (1990) .
Polvester Fibres and Polvester Yarns from Turkev. 
O.J. L272/3 (1991).
__ ________ __________________ ____ ___ ___
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ostensibly generally available to all producers.^* It 
considered that the programme was specific because the 
allocation of resources was not carried out in 
accordance with 'neutral and objective criteria'. In 
addition, applications were vetted by the national 
authorities before funding was provided. This suggests 
that de facto specificity will be held if the aid is 
given on non-neutral and subjective criteria and there 
is not automatic entitlement.
(d) De Minimus
For practical reasons, the Commission has introduced a 
policy of ignoring subsidies considered to have an 
insignificant effect on the final production costs of 
goods. Again this principle has not been well 
elaborated, but in one case, the Commission considered 
that a scheme which had a 0.001% effect on the price of 
the goods was negligible and therefore de minimus.
It is likely that a higher minimum threshold would be 
acceptable to the Commission and the rate in this 
particular case should not be considered a binding 
guideline. It is necessary to await further rulings from 
the Commission oh this point before commenting further 
on this principle.
(C) Quantification of Subsidies
There are two alternative means of calculating the value 
of a subsidy: (a) the cost to the granting authority; or
(b) the benefit provided to the recipient. Which of 
these basis is selected has important effects on the
734 O.J. L272/1 (1991)
See Polyester Fibres and Yarns from Turkev. O.J 
L272/3 (1991).
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quantification of the subsidy. The Commission has 
favoured the cost to government approach.^* Instead of 
analyzing the micro-economic factors of individual 
businesses the Commission is concerned with the effect 
on governments.
(1) Grants and Forgiveness of Debt
The quantification of a subsidy in the form of a grant 
is simply the total amount of the grant within the 
period of investigation. Similarly, where revenue has 
been forsaken, the quantification of this benefit is 
simply the value of the revenues that should have 
accrued to the government had the programme not been in 
place.
(2) Loans and Loan Guarantees
The Commission has declined to countervail a loan at a 
commercially preferential rate since this was provided 
at interest rates higher than the long-term cost to the 
government of obtaining the f u n d s . T h i s  is in 
conformity with the general rule that the quantification 
of subsidies is made on the basis of the cost to the 
government.
However, the Commission has not been consistent in its 
approach to this matter. In earlier cases, it has 
assessed the value of loans by subtracting the amount of 
interest payable during the period of investigation from 
the amount of interest payable had the loans been 
granted at the normal commercial rate.^^®
See Steel Cases, supra note 723.
Ballbearings from Thailand, O.J. L152/59 (1990) .
Sheets and Plates of Iron or Steel From Brazil. 
O.J. L45/11 (1983).
_____ __________ ___
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This aberration may be explained by two factors. First, 
the latter investigation was concluded immediately 
before the Commission decided to alter its policy in 
support of the cost to government standard later 
advocated in international negotiations and subsequently 
incorporated into the internal legislation. Second, in 
the particular circumstances of this case, the cost to 
the government of obtaining short-term finance exceed 
the cost to the company of obtaining the loan on normal 
commercial terms. To quantify the subsidy on a cost to 
government would have enlarged the gross subsidy,
(3) Government Eauitv Participation
There are as yet no reported instances of the Commission 
quantifying assistance by the government in the form of 
equity participation such as the purchase of shares to 
bolster the viability of an enterprise or industry 
(although there have been decisions of this nature under 
the EU's state aid provisions).
(4) Tax Exemptions and Rebates
The quantification of tax exemptions and rebates for 
exports is made on the basis of the total value of the 
exports during the relevant period multiplied by the 
relevant tax concession expressed as a percentage of the 
value of the exports as adjusted where appropriate.
Thus, in one case, where the subsidy was a tax exemption 
payable on exports, at the rate of 10.15%, the 
Commission calculated the value of the subsidy on the 
basis of the FOB prices, the FOR prices and the EXW 
prices^^^, where the products were being exported by
These terms refer to the INCOTERMS used in 
international commercial transactions. FOB stands for 
'free on board', FOR stands for 'free on rail' and EXW
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ship, rail and road respectively.^* These three bases 
were the prices used by the authorities for calculating 
the rebates payable on the export prices.
Where the exemption or rebate takes the form of a 
domestic subsidy, then it is quantified on the basis of 
the relevant concession indices. Thus, if the concession 
was granted in proportion to turnover, then the 
quantification of the subsidy would be carried out on 
the basis of the text concession multiplied by the 
number of eligible units of production fabricated during 
the relevant period.
The Commission has been relatively fair in quantifying 
subsidies made available under tax exemption programmes. 
It takes into account all the relevant tax consequences 
of the programme rather than concentrating on the nature 
of the particular programme itself. Thus, in one case, 
the Commission took into consideration the fact that 
income tax was payable on exempt revenue from exports in 
calculating the subsidy rather than assessing the 
subsidy merely on the basis of the formal tax concession 
rate a l l o w e d . T h e  benefit assessed was calculated on 
the basis of the difference between the amount of taxes 
which would normally be paid by the benefitting 
companies and the reduced amounts paid under the scheme.
This is in fact an illustration of the application of 
the cost to government approach. If the European Union 
based its calculation on the benefit to the recipient, 
there would have been no need to take into account the
stands for 'ex works'; see ICC, Incoterms 1990 (1990).
Seamless Tubes of Non-Allov Steel From Spain. 
O.J. L196/34 (1980).
Polvester Fibres and Polvester Yarns from Turkev. 
O.J. L137/8 (1991).
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fact that income tax on export income was payable. The 
Commission would have been justified in treating the 
export subsidy in isolation in assessing the direct 
benefit to the recipient. Instead, the quantification 
was made on the basis of the cost to government which 
required the Commission to take into account all 
features of the programme as it affected government 
revenues.
(5) Provision of Goods and Services at Preferred Rates
There are also few cases on the quantification of 
benefits in the form of providing subsidised goods and 
services. In the single case in point, the Commission 
examined the provision of electricity at lower rates for 
the production of goods for e x p o r t . T h e  
quantification of the benefit was made on the basis of 
the rebates received in power bills from the 
nationalised electricity industry.
(D) Calculation of Net Subsidies and Allocation of 
Benefits
(1) Calculation of Net Subsidies
In establishing the amount of any countervailable 
subsidy, the following expenses are deducted from the 
total subsidy:
(a) any application fee, or other costs 
necessarily incurred in order to qualify for, 
or to receive the benefit of, the subsidy; and
(b) any export taxes, duties or other charges 
levied on the export of the product to the 
European Union specifically intended to offset
742 Ballbearings from Thailand. O.J. L152/59 (1990).
_____________________________________________________________
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the subsidy. 3^
The onus rests with the party claiming the deduction to 
establish any claim. In one case, the Commission did, 
however, allow a deduction for commission payable to a 
European company acting as a sole agent for distribution 
of the products in Germany.7**
Where the amount of subsidy paid varies among producers, 
weighted averages may be used by the Commission, For 
example, where a subsidy involved a partial rebate of 
tax liability for export goods based on the incidence of 
indirect tax assessed in the production of the finished 
goods, weighted ' averages were used to apportion the 
subsidy according to whether producers used inputs 
components which were raw or semi-finished. This was 
explained because the levels of indirect tax varied 
according to whether the inputs were raw or semi­
finished and to treatment both as being the same would 
have distorted the quantification of countervailable 
subsidies.
(2) Allocation of Benefits
(a) Allocation over time
In assessing the appropriate time basis for allocation 
of benefits, the Commission has been extremely 
inconsistent. Occasionally, it has been willing to adopt 
the normal accounting standards and practices of the 
country of origin of the goods. Thus, where a subsidy 
was provided for the purchase of capital goods, the 
Commission allocated the benefit over a period of four
Article 3(4)(b), Council Regulation 2423/88.
Seamless Tubes of Non-Allov Steels From Spain. 
O.J. L196/34 (1980).
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years since that period was the accepted normal period 
of depreciation, in the industry concerned of that 
country.
But, in other cases, the Commission has declined to 
apply these local standards. For example, in 
Ballbearings from Thailand, the Commission refused to 
apply the normal period of depreciation of assets in the 
industry concerned instead applying a lesser period on 
the ground that such periods were applied in both the 
European Union and Japan. The local period of 
depreciation was considered excessive.
Since the effect of reducing the period of allocation is 
to increase the short-term value of the subsidy granted, 
it is easy to be cynical and claim that the Commission 
is using this technique to artificially inflate the 
value of the countervailable subsidy. Further, since the 
local standards, and not foreign standards, are the ones 
for the preparation of production and costs budgets, it 
is unfair to reject the local standards in the absence 
of proof that these were being abused to artificially 
lower the value of the subsidy.
Again no guidance is provided in the Basic Regulation 
for the allocation of benefits over time. In practice, 
although limited guidance is provided in the published 
decisions, it appears that the Commission generally opts 
for the most simple method of allocation namely 
horizontal allocation. This method involves the 
allocation of the amount of the subsidy in equal annual
Polyester Fibres and Polyester Yarns from Turkey. 
O.J, L137/11 (1991).
O.J. L152/59.
747 ^ Adamantopoulos, "Subsidies in External Trade 
Law of the EEC; Towards a Stricter Legal Discipline",
(1990) EL Rev 427.
yr; , - - 'A- r,'.,
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parts over a period of time. The relevant period of time 
is determined in relation to the equipment, machinery or 
products purchased with the assistance of the 
subsidy.^*
Other techniques may be more appropriate in certain 
circumstances, but there is no evidence of the 
Commission having considered any of these alternative 
methods. For example, front loaded allocation may be 
employed where the benefit of a subsidy does not apply 
uniformly over a particular period, but in fact the main 
benefit accrues in the first years. This approach allows 
the bulk of the subsidy to be allocated over the first 
few years.
As a general policy, the Commission has tended to avoid 
taking into account the time value of money at all in 
its investigations. Thus, in one case, the Commission 
considered a duty exemption on machinery used for the 
production of export goods. For the purposes of 
allocation, the Commission allocated the benefit over a 
period reflecting the normal period of depreciation of 
the asset in the relevant industry. The Commission then 
allocated 10% of the company's total acquisitions of 
machinery to the investigation period without any 
justification or explanation in order to quantify the 
subsidy.
(b) Allocation per unit
The amount of the subsidy is determined per unit of the 
subsidised product exported to the European Union.
™  See Steel Plates and Steel Sheets from Brazil. 
O.J. L45/11 (1983).
Ballbearings from Thailand. O.J. L152/59 (1990).
Article 3 (4) (a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
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Where a subsidy is not granted by reference to the 
quantities manufactured, produced, exported or 
transported, the amount of the subsidy is determined by 
allocating the Value of the subsidy, as appropriate, 
over the level of production or exports of the product 
concerned during a suitable period, which is normally 
the accounting year of the beneficiary.
If the subsidy is based on the acquisition or future 
acquisition of fixed assets, the value of the subsidy is 
calculated by spreading the subsidy across a period 
which reflects the normal depreciation of such assets in 
the industry concerned.
(E) Indirect Subsidies
The Basic Regulation clearly provides for the 
possibility of imposing duties on upstream, downstream 
or input subsidies by expressly providing that 
actionable subsidies may be bestowed "directly or 
indirectly'.But, unfortunately, no detailed rules 
have been established to facilitate the operation of 
this rule. The matter is again one left largely to the 
discretion of the Commission and therefore involves 
strong elements of policy.
In assessing the counterva ilabi1ity of indirect 
subsidies, the Commission draws a distinction between 
subsidies on inputs physically incorporated into 
products, ie, energy, and component parts assembled into 
a finished product. The Commission considers that 
subsidies (ie. rebates of customs duties, import taxes 
and domestic sales taxes) provided for materials
Article 3(4)(c), Council Regulation 2423/88.
Article 3(4) (c) , Council Regulation 2423/88.
753 Article 3(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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physically incorporaed into finished products cannot be 
countervailed but subsidised components which are 
subsequently assembled into finished goods may be 
countervai led.
Where component products have been subsidised, the 
finished product will only be countervailable if there 
is a pass-through of benefits from the producer of the 
input to the producer of the finished p r o d u c t . A t  the 
same time, it is also likely that a test of double- 
specificity will apply requiring specificity at both the 
level of the producer of the input and the producer of 
the finished product.^*
The distinction in treatment between incorporated inputs 
and components is difficult to justify. Certainly it has 
the artificial effect of treating expenses normally 
considered to be indirect costs, such as energy, as 
countervailable while treating other expenses considered 
direct costs, such as raw materials, as non- 
countervailable. However, any restriction on the policy 
of the Commission towards countervailing indirect 
subsidies will be welcomed by foreign producers even if 
it can be unilaterally withdrawn at a later date.
(F) Anti-Subsidv Measures on Goods From State- 
Controlled Economy Countries
In the case of imports from non-market economy countries 
(NMECs), a subsidy is to be ascertained 'in an
754 Ballbearings From Thailand. O.J. L152/59 (1990).
Certain Seamless Tubes of Non-Alloy Steel from 
Spain, O.J. L322/30 (1980).
756 Beseler & A.N. Williams, Anti-Dumping and
Anti-Subsidv Law of the European Communities (198 6), 
p.125-127.
________________ ____  :________________________________
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appropriate and not unreasonable manner *, by comparing 
the export price with the normal value, both as 
calculated under the anti-dumping law.?*?
Those countries which are considered non-market-economy 
countries are defined by reference to enacted 
regulations on imports from state trading countries.?** 
Inclusion in these regulations is not definitive for the 
purpose of applying this rule. Other unspecified factors 
may be taken into account.
The method for determining the amount of subsidy 
conferred in . such situations is especially 
controversial. It involves the calculation of an 'export 
price' and a 'normal value' and, after adjustments have 
been made, the value of the subsidy is the difference 
between these figures. This is subject to the nebulous 
principle that such determinations must be made 'in an 
appropriate and not unreasonable manner' which seems to 
allow a substantial degree of discretion.
The practical effect of this process is simply to extend 
the application of the European Union's anti-dumping 
laws to cases of alleged subsidisation of production by 
non-market economy countries and is not a genuine 
attempt to directly tackle the issue. It is unclear if 
this approach has been developed to make life easier for 
the Commission or is a further illustration of 
discouraging European industries from bringing anti­
subsidy complaints if anti-dumping proceedings will have 
the same result.
To date, there have been no instances of anti-subsidy
757 Article 3(4)(d), Council Regulation 2423/88.
?** Council Regulation (EEC) 1765/82. O.J. L195/1 
(1982); Council Regulation fEEC) 1766/82. O.J. L195/21 
(1982).
_ /"A'.::
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duties being calculated on this basis. But, at a 
fundamental level, it is difficult to justify such an 
approach if it is borne in mind that all subsidisation 
of production in such countries must be of a general 
nature. In this respect the United States approach is 
more commendable than that of the European Union which 
is not at all a reasonable policy.
(G) The Impact of Trade Agreements on the Application 
of Anti-Subsidv Measures
The Commission is at pains to justify any measures in 
light of international rules. Thus, in one case, the 
Commission asserted that the imposition of preliminary 
duties was consistent with both the GATT and the 
Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association 
Agreement.^* This suggests that such measures are 
subject to judicial review not only in light of the GATT 
inspired rules but also certain applicable bilateral 
obligations. Naturally, any additional basis for review 
of measures is an important development in assessing the 
fairness of the European Union anti-subsidy rules.
In this case, it was argued that the Additional Protocol 
allowed Turkey to use aids to promote its economic 
development. In other words, the argument related to 
whether subsidies which were permissible, or accepted, 
under a bilateral agreement were exempt from the 
application of anti-subsidy measures.
The Commission held that this was not the case. The 
assistance in question violated Article 43(2) of the 
EEC-Turkey Treaty which provides that aid is only 
compatible with the agreement to the extent that it does 
not alter the conditions of trade to an extent
?** Polvester Yarns and Fabrics from Turkev. supra 
note 733.
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inconsistent with the national interests of the 
contracting parties.
In the same case, Turkey also argued that the GATT and 
the Subsidies Code provide for special and differential 
treatment for developing countries. Both created exempt 
assistance programmes for the purposes of assessing 
anti-subsidy duties. This argument was also rejected by 
the Commission since the provisions of the Code do not 
expressly restrict the possibility of a signatory 
applying duties in the case of a subsidised product from 
developing countries causing material injury to EU 
producers.
Naturally, any undertaking made by the European Union to 
refrain from imposing anti-subsidy duties on goods from 
a particular country in bilateral agreements would 
prevent the imposition of such duties. Thus, for 
example, the prohibitions on the introduction of 
measures contained in the EC-EFTA European Economic Area 
Agreement would stop anti-dumping duties on products 
from EFTA countries.?**
While the Commission and its staff may claim to assess 
its measures in light of international standards, it has 
not yet agreed to the termination of an investigation on 
the grounds that measures are inconsistent with the 
European Union's international obligations. Therefore, 
the truth of this statement can only be assessed once 
this bridge is crossed.
(H) Application of Anti-Subsidv Duties to Products
The Commission is authorised to impose an anti-subsidy 
duty to 'offset any subsidy bestowed' in the
760 See text supra, pp.324-327.
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manufacture, production, etc of any product. This 
clearly authorises the Commission to impose a duty equal 
to the amount of countervailable subsidy found to exist. 
However, the Commission has applied the lesser duty rule 
to anti-subsidy investigations.
This rule will be considered in more detailed later in 
the text.^i At this point it is sufficient to observe 
that, where a level of duty can be imposed which would 
neutralise the injury caused to the relevant European 
Union industry, this amount of duty is imposed by the 
European Union even if the actual margin of
subsidisation is higher. In other words, where the
margin of injury requires a lesser duty than would be 
permitted to offset the margin of subsidisation, the 
European Union restricts the anti-subsidy duty to the 
lesser amount.?*? This is a self-imposed rule. The
Subsidies Code does not require a signatory to apply 
this rule and in fact few states do so.
(3) The Application of the Material Injury Test in 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations 
by the European Commission
(A) The Standard of Material Injury
Both the investigation into the existence of dumping and 
material injury are conducted by the European 
Commission; there is no bifurcation in procedure similar 
to that in the United States or Canada. This procedure 
has the advantage of allowing the investigating agency
761 See text infra, pp.933-934.
?*? See for example Polyester Yarns and Fibres from 
Turkev. O.J. L272/3 (1991).
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to terminate the investigation at the moment negative 
dumping or injury determinations have been made.?*^ On 
the other hand, concentration of administrative 
authority into , one agency has the disadvantage of 
eroding any degree of objectivity or impartiality that 
may result from protectionist pressures which can be 
more easily countered by two agencies as opposed to one.
The Basic Regulation permits an affirmative 
determination of injury only if the allegedly dumped 
imports 'are, through the effects of dumping or 
subsidisation, causing injury, ie. causing or 
threatening to cause material injury to an established 
[Union] industry or are materially retarding the 
establishment of such an industry'.?*^ A sufficient 
degree of injury may therefore be manifested in any of 
these three forms; (1) actual material injury; (2) 
threat of material injury; and (3) material retardation 
of the establishment of a EU industry.
(1) Actual Material Injury
Material injury has never been specifically defined in 
any of the anti-dumping regulations but Article 4(2) of 
the Basic Regulation requires the European Commission to 
consider a number of factors in making a determination 
of injury including;
(a) The volume of the dumped or subsidised imports 
and, in particular, whether there has been a 
significant increase, either in absolute terms 
or relative to production or consumption in 
the European Union.
See, for example. Ballbearings From Singapore 
Japan and Thailand. O.J. L193/1 (1984)
Article 4(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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(b) The prices of dumped or subsidised imports 
and, in particular, whether there has been 
significant price undercutting as compared 
with the price of the like product in the 
European Union.
(c) The consequent impact on the industry
concerned as indicated by actual or potential 
trends in relevant economic factors such as, 
inter alia: production, utilization of
capacity, stocks, sales, market share, prices 
(ie. depression of prices or prevention of 
price increases which otherwise would have 
occurred), profits, return on investment, cash 
flow and employment.
The Commission is instructed to give its attention to 
each of these factors but clearly does not always do so. 
At the same time, not all these factors will be relevant 
in an investigation; some indicators will be more 
indicative of the presence or absence of injury than 
others. For example in Plain Paper Photocopiers From 
Japan?** no account was taken of the profits made by the 
EU industry and this was held to be a valid exercise of 
the European Union institutions* discretion by the 
European Court.?**
Naturally, if the Commission is permitted to select 
which criteria to consider, injury may be found in 
virtually any investigation. Further, it is not 
necessary for the Commission to conclude that all of 
these factors are negative for an affirmative 
determination of material injury.
765 [definitive measures] O.J. L54/12 (1987),
?** Sharp Corporation v EC Council Case C179/87[1992] ECR I 1635; [1992] 2 CMLR 415.
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(a) Volume of Imports of the Relevant Products
The Regulation instructs the Commission to examine 
increases in the volume of dumped or subsidised imports 
in both absolute and relative terms. Absolute increases 
in dumped imports are rarely cited in Commission or 
Council anti-dumping regulations as a cause of injury 
itself. More often, the volume of imports is assessed 
relative to two factors: production and consumption.
In assessing actual and relative increases in volumes of 
imports, the European Commission has been arbitrary in 
selecting the relevant periods for assessing trends in 
volumes of imports. The importance of selecting a 
standard period is simply that, if the Commission is 
allowed to select its own period, this discretion can be 
abused by extending this examination to time scales 
where overall increases can be taken into consideration. 
Consider the following hypothetical situation.
1993 1994
January May Sept
to to to
April August December
January May Sept
to to to
April August December
1,500
units
2,500
units
3,000
units
2,800
units
2,900
units
3,000
units
If the relevant period of investigation is September 
1994 to December 1994, the absolute increase is 
insignificant. However, if the period of investigation 
is taken as January 1993 to December 1994, then there is 
a significant absolute increase in the volume of 
imports.
Investigation periods for the examination of trends in
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the volume of imports have ranged from five months?*? to 
five years.?** In between these extremes, other periods 
have been used without adequate justification for the 
selection of the duration of the investigation.?*^ The 
arbitrary nature of this selection process gives rise to 
concerns on the part of foreign exporters.??*
Despite the fact that the Basic Regulation confirms that 
injury is to be assessed relative to the volume of 
* dumped or subsidised imports', in reality the European 
Commission rarely distinguishes between dumped and non­
dumped sales. No separation is made in the export sales 
of these companies as far as the measurement of injury 
is determined in terms of volumes of imports even when 
different prices are charged.
Another criticism of the Commission's practice in 
assessing actual levels of imports is that, despite the 
reference in the Basic Regulation to the 'volume of 
dumped or subsidised imports', the total volume of 
imports is used as the relevant statistic for this 
purpose whether or not dumped or subsidised.??^
?*? Welded Iron or Steel Products From Roumanie. O.J, L26/5 (1982).
?** Audio Cassettes From Japan and Korea. O.J, L313/50 (1990) [provisional measure], O.J. L119/35(1991) [definitive measures].
?*® See, for example. Plywood and Similar Laminated Wood Products From Canada and the United States. O.J. L338/42 (1981) [one year]; and Herbicide From Roumanie. O.J. L44/8 (1979) [one year].
??* A clear example of manipulation of the period of investigation occurred in Calcium Metal From the PRC and the Soviet Union [definitive measures] O.J. L271/1(1989).
??^ J-F. Beilis, "The EEC Anti-Dumping System", in J.H. Jackson & E.A. Vermulst, Anti-Dumping Law and Practice (1989), 41^97, 89.
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In reality, increased volumes of imports are measured in 
three separate ways; (i) in absolute terms; (ii) 
relative to EU production; and (iii) relative to EU 
consumption. The fact that the Commission can select 
from among these options also widens its discretion to 
find the existence of injury.
Increases in absolute terms
Determinations of absolute increases in volumes of 
imports sufficient to cause injury have varied widely in 
terms of both the period of investigation and the 
percentage increase required to trigger a finding of 
injury. For example, absolute increase of between 9%??? 
and 101%™ in a one year period have been deemed 
sufficient to substantiate material injury.
In fact, absolute decreases in levels of imports offer 
no protection against a finding of injury if the market 
share of a foreign exporter has increased due to 
contraction in the demand for a product in a particular 
market.™
Increases relative to EU production
The European Commission is authorised to assess 
increasing volumes of exports relative to production in 
the European Union but rarely uses this indicator to 
establish injury instead preferring to determine 
increased volume relative to consumption/sales.
??? Stvrene Monomer From the United States, O.J. L154/10 (1981).
??* Vinvl Acetate Monomer From the United States. O.J. L129/1 (1981).
™  Clogs From Sweden. O.J. L268/12 (1985); andRollerchains From the USSR and China. O.J, L217/7 (1985).
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The logic of this choice is simple. If increased imports 
relative to production was taken as the measure, the 
proportion of EU-produced goods exported outside the 
European Union be taken into account. This would dilute 
any finding of increase if export markets were growing 
and production increased to meet this demand. So, sales 
within the EU is the indicator used not production.
Increase relative to EU consumption
Increases in volumes of imports calculated as a 
proportion of consumption is the most commonly cited 
criterion for an affirmative determination of injury on 
the basis of increased imports. An increase in the 
absolute volume of imports is not necessary for such a 
determination. Consider the following illustration.
1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 I
January May September January May September
to to to to to to
April August December_____April August December
Volume of imports
1 , 5 0 0
units
2 , 5 0 0
units
3 , 0 0 0
units
3 , 0 0 0
units
2 , 9 0 0
units
3 , 0 0 0
units
Total consumption in EU market
6,000
units
7 , 0 0 0
units
8,000
units
8,000
units
6 , 5 0 0
units
6,000
units
Imports as a percentage of consumption
25% 35% 37% 37% 44% 50%
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Hence, the use of figures representing relative 
increases relative to consumption assists establish an 
artificial increase in imports when in fact absolute 
increases are declining. The use of this criterion is 
permitted under both the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies 
Codes™ but this does not justify the abusive practices 
which have been perpetrated by the European Commission.
For example, market share increases as low as 2.47% have 
been deemed to indicate injury.™ Market shares of a 
relatively small proportion which have not significantly 
increased have been held to justify such a finding,™
Cumulation of the volume of imports
Cumulation takes two forms: (a) where there are imports 
into the European Union from several exporters from the 
same country; and (b) where there are imports from 
exporters in different states.
The Commission's practice with regard to imports from 
several exporters in the same country is relatively 
standard. The Commission invariably cumulates the injury 
caused by such exporters. Two justifications are given 
for this practice. First, the possible exclusion of some 
producers from an investigation would grant these 
exporters a competitive advantage over those subject to 
the anti-dumping proceedings. Second, the practice of 
cumulation is not prohibited by the GATT and is
™  Article 3(2), Anti^Dumoinq Code 1979 and Article 6(2) Subsidies Code 1979.
™  Mounted Piezo-Electric Quartz Crvstal Units. O.J. L162/62 (1980).
™  See, for example, Asbestos-Cement Corrugated Sheets From Czechoslovakia and the GDR. O.J. L259/48 (1984), where the combined market share rose from 1.4% to 2.3% over the.course of three years.
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practised by the Union's trading partner particularly 
the United States.^*
Neither of these reasons is particularly convincing 
particularly that the Commission is protecting the 
commercial positions of exporters in other countries. 
Cumulation mainly serves administrative convenience. 
Further, it penalises smaller suppliers which would not 
have caused injury if their imports had been examined in 
isolation.
As regards cumulation from different countries, in the 
absence of an express provision in the Anti-Dumping Code 
1979 dealing with this practice, the European Commission 
claims to have adopted the practice of cumulating the 
volume of imports when the following factors are 
present:
(a) the same product is involved;
(b) the market behaviour of the different 
exporters is similar; and
(c) the volume of imports of the product is not 
negligible.
The element of market behaviour is the subjective 
element in this determination. The factors involved in 
assessing market behaviour include the market share of 
the exporters, the degree of price undercutting being 
perpetrated and the margins of dumping, if any,
™  Propan-I-ol From the United States. O.J. L106/55(1984) .
™  Discussions between the author and F.H. Wenig, Chef d'Unite Adjoint, DG1C2, European Commission (15/11/92). See also, DihvdrxostreotomvCin From China. O.J. L362/1 (1991); Disposable Lighters From Japan.China, Korea and Thailand, O.J. L326/1 (1991); and Coton Yarn From Brazil, Egypt, Turkev. India and Thailand [provisional measures] O.J. L271/17 (1991).
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established. Consider the following illustration
PRC Japan
Market share 25% increase 25% decrease
Price
undercutting
30% 0%
Margin of 
dumping
60% 110%
In this scenario, the European Commission would claim 
not to cumulate these imports because the market 
behaviour of the exporters is dissimilar. However, where 
the respective commercial practices of the parties is 
assimilated cumulation will take place if the other 
conditions stated above are satisfied and in fact 
cumulation is extremely common and can extend to the 
exporters of a considerable number of countries.
One clear deviation from this purported policy occurred 
in Audio Cassette Tapes From Japan, Korea and Hona 
Kong^ ®^  where although the same product was involved, 
the degree of price undercutting and the margins of 
dumping differed considerably. For example, the margins 
of dumping ranged from between 80.20% to 0.43%. 
Nevertheless, the Commission decided to cumulate these 
imports on the basis that 'these exporters produced a 
similar and simultaneous effect on the [European Union] 
industry which must be assessed jointly*. If this policy
See, fore example. Artificial Corrundum From the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, China,Brazil and Yugoslavia L275/27 (1991). [provisional measures] O.J.
781 [provisional measures] O.J. L313/50 (1990) ,[1991] 2 CMLR 138.
______ _______ ’i-j-i. : 1_____________________
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prevails, there will effectively be no guidelines to 
govern cumulation.
One interesting scenario which has not yet occurred is 
the Commission's practice in the event that an 
investigation into a particular product from a specific 
country has been terminated with definitive measures and 
a subsequent complaint arises for the same product but 
from a different country. Commission officials have 
indicated that, in such a case, the Commission would 
probably not cumulate imports for the purposes of 
determining injury but this point has not been 
settled.
Cross cumulation of the volume of imports
Cross cumulation occurs when the injury caused by 
imports of dumped products is assessed along with the 
injury from imports which have allegedly been 
subsidised. Since the European Union rarely imposes 
anti-subsidy measures, there is no body of principles 
for this practice.
(b) The Effect of Imports on Domestic Prices
The price of dumped imports and in particular any 
significant price undercutting (or price underselling) 
is relevant in establishing injury to a European Union 
industry. In fact, price undercutting is expressly cited 
in the regulation as an important indicator of 
i n j u r y . A  finding of significant price undercutting 
or underselling usually leads to a positive 
determination of injury.
Ibid.
783 Article 4(2) (b) , Council Regulation 2423/88
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Evidence of price undercutting includes cancelled 
orders, the suppression of prices, the prevention of 
limited price increases and the presence of cheaper- 
priced foreign i m p o r t s . O f  these factors, the most 
important are the suppression of prices and the 
prevention of price increases. However, the problem of 
relying on these factors is that the correlation between 
prices within the European Union and the imports may not 
be the direct cause of price suppression. For example, 
prices may be declining because a product has matured or 
been superseded by improved technology.
The Commission's methodology towards determining price 
undercutting is not consistent with the Code obligations 
because the European Commission employs hypothetical 
prices for European producers as opposed to actual 
prices. A target price is created in this process on the 
assumption that the dumped goods have depressed prices. 
This target price is constructed on the basis of the 
costs of production and a reasonable margin of profit. 
Indeed, this methodology has even been upheld by the 
European Court.
The extent of price cutting also plays a critical role 
in assessing anti-dumping duties under the lesser duty 
rule which authorises the Commission to assess duties on 
the margin of injury in the event that this is lower 
than the margin of dumping. The figures for price 
undercutting are used as the basis for calculating the 
levels of duties which will eventually be imposed or the 
price undertakings which will be acceptable to the
See Qrthoxvlene From the United States and Puerto Rico. O.J. L141/29 (1981); Fluid Cracking Catalvsts From the United States. O.J. Lll/25 (1982); and Aluminium Foil From Austria, O.J. L339/58 (1982).
See Tovko Electric Co v EC Council. Cases 260/85& 106/86 [1988] ECR 5855, [1989] 1 CMLR 169.
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Commission.
In addition to an amount to compensate for price 
cutting, in addition the Commission includes in this 
figure an appropriate amount for a reasonable return for 
EU producers. For example, in Serial Impact Printers 
From Jaoan"^^  ^ the Commission constructed a price to 
eliminate price cutting and calculated in such a manner 
as to provide the EU producers with a 12% minimum 
profit. This calculation required the Commission to 
calculate the duty payable to cover the difference 
between the actual price of the products and the price 
required to give the return necessary to achieve a 
profit margin of 12%. The anti-dumping duties payable by 
the foreign exporters were then calculated to ensure 
that their products would enter the European Union at 
this price which, for the majority of foreign producers, 
resulted in an anti-dumping duty of 43.2%.
The amount of profit which the Commission deems should 
be made by the European industries is determined in a 
completely arbitrary fashion. In one case a profit 
margin of 18%^ ** was deemed justified while in other 
cases margins of 12%’*^ and 6%^^ have been considered 
sufficient.
See text, infra pp.924-930.
[provisional measures] O.J. L177/1 (1988).
™  Thermal Paper From Japan [provisional measures] O.J. L270/15 (1991).
Large Electrolvtic Aluminium Capacitors From Japan [provisional measures] O.J. L152/22 (1992).
Ferro-Silicon From Poland and Egvot [provisional measures] O.J. L183/8 (1992).
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(c) Impact of imports on domestic production
The impact of the imports on the European Union industry 
is important both for the purposes of establishing 
injury and proving the existence of causation.
To assess impact, the Commission examines actual or 
potential trends in certain economic factors, such as 
production, utilisation of capacity, stocks, sales, 
market share, depression of prices or prevention of 
price increases which would have otherwise occurred, 
rates of profit, return on investment, cash flows and 
levels of employment in the industry. The Basic 
Regulation expressly declares that no single one of 
these factors will necessarily be decisive and again the 
Commission and Council have the appropriate discretion 
in this matter.
Production
Where production inside the European Union declines, or 
productive capacity is not utilised, prima facie injury 
is indicated. The Commission has not, however, 
considered this factor to be a primary indicator of 
injury.
A proper finding of declining production depends on 
accurate and precise analysis of the relevant data. 
Whether such an analysis has been is almost impossible 
to discern in most cases because the regulations 
terminating investigations rarely, if ever, provide an 
indication of the calculation of this factor. Production 
trends are described in such general terms in these 
regulations that no challenge can ever be mounted
This discretion has been upheld by the European Court: see Silver Seiko Ltd v EC Council  ^ Cases 273/85 & 107/86 [1988] ECR 5927, [1989] 1 CMLR 249.
_____________________________________________________________
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against an affirmative determination on this ground.
Where an indication of declining production is provided, 
this will generally be a general numerical figure. The 
necessary degree of decline varies considerably^ and 
in some cases stagnation of production is considered an 
adequate indicator.
In some cases, increases in production in the European 
Union industry have not been considered sufficient to 
prevent a finding of injury. For example, in Audio- 
Cassette Tapes From Japan. Korea and Hona Kona^. the 
actual productive capacity of the domestic industry rose 
from 110 million units in 1985 to 154 million units in 
1988, an average increase of 40% over three years. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent the Commission from 
finding injury despite an increasing market and a 
relatively constant level of inventories.
Similarly, in Dynamic Random Access Memories From 
Korea^^^ . the total production of the European industry 
increased by a factor of nine in the period between 1988 
and 1990 and yet was considered insufficient to prevent 
the application of anti-dumping measures.
Inventories
Accumulation of unsold stock is another factor taken 
into consideration when considering the impact of 
imports on the domestic industry. This factor is often
792 jiQj. example, a decline of 13% over a three year period was considered adequate in one case; see Phenol From the United States. O.J. L212/2 (1980).
See Standardised Electric Multi-Phase Motors From the USSR. O.J. L153/45 (1980).
[provisional measures] O.J. L313/50 (1990),[1991] 2 CMLR 138.
[provisional measures] O.J. L272/13 (1992).
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used to provide corroboration for other more tangible 
indicators rather than a factor definitively indicating 
injury.
Sales and market shares
Along with price undercutting, trends in market share 
are a significant indicator of the economic health of a 
domestic industry.
Indications of injury are the declining market share of 
a domestic industry, the failure of the sales of a 
domestic industry to rise in line with increasing 
demand^^® and domestic suppliers failing to respond to 
trends in supply and demand.
The degree of decline in market share which can trigger 
an affirmative indication of injury can be extremely 
small. For example, in one case an investigation was 
opened based on allegations that the market share of the 
relevant European industry had declined from 26% to 25% 
over a one year period.Similarly, a 4.7% decline in 
market share was held to be sufficient injury to justify 
the imposition of provisional duties.^*
Levels of Profits
Information from domestic producers concerning levels of 
profit is, of course, strictly confidential and 
therefore the Commission is justified in not explicitly 
disclosing this information in final measures. However,
Canon Inc v EC Council. Cases 277 & 300/85 [1988] ECR 5731, [1989] 1 CMLR 915.
Furfural From China, the Dominican Republic and Spain. O.J. C219/3 (1980).
Polyester Yarn From the United States. O.J.L231/5 (1981).
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this also prevents foreign producers from challenging 
measures on the. basis of an inaccurate or incorrect 
determination on levels of profits.^*
The calculation of declining levels of profit leaves 
considerable discretion to the European Commission for 
the determination of injury. Consider the following 
diagram:
Profit Levels for European Union Industrv 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
30% 28% 25% 23% 22% 20%
The first point is, again, that the period of 
investigation is critically important for assessing the 
level of decreased profits. If the period between 1992 
and 1993 is selected, the decrease in the level of 
profit is only 9% but if a five year period is chosen, 
the decline is 33%
The second point is quite simply what level of profit is 
acceptable for a particular industry? If profits fall 
from 30% to 20%, is a 20% profit margin truly an 
indication of injury since such a profit is, in 
commercial terms, quite acceptable.
Third, should levels of profit be related to particular 
areas of commercial activity. For example, a profit 
level of 5% may be respectable in some sectors but 
exceptional in others.
See, for example, Polvester Sheets and Pillow Cases From the United States, O.J. C157/2 (1981)
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Finally, should the Commission give consideration to 
projected loss of profits. For example, if an industry 
is presently making a profit level of 10% but projects 
that in five years profit levels will be 25% in the 
absence of imports but will remain the same if imports 
are allowed unimpeded access to the market, is there a 
loss of profit? In other words, is there injury because 
the potential increased profits have been lost through 
the effects of allegedly dumped products?
No answers to these questions are provided in the 
Commission or Council decisions and no challenge has 
ever been brought in the European Court on calculation 
of injury based on assessment of lost profits.
Employment
Again, employment statistics for the relevant European 
industry are only used to support other indications of 
injury.^
(d) other factors
This list of indicators provided in Article 4(2) is 
expressly declared to be non-exhaustive and hence the 
Commission may legitimately examine other indicators 
which may point to injury. This discretion does, 
however, allow the Commission considerable scope in 
picking and choosing between indicators which will 
substantiate a finding of injury.
Factors, other than those expressly identified in the 
illustrative list, which have been used by the 
Commission in determinations of injury include the 
following:
See, for example. Hydraulic Excavators FromJapan, O.J. L58/13 (1985).
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(1) The closure of production facilities, whether 
actual or threatened.
(2) The implementation of a programme for the 
recovery of an industry from structural over­
capacity which is being hampered by 
imports.
(3) Increased burdens on production aid from
European Union sources to a particular 
sector.^
(2) Threat of Material Iniurv
A determination of a threat of injury can only be made 
by the European Commission if a particular situation is 
likely to develop into actual injury.^*
In making this assessment, the Commission is expressly 
instructed to take into account three factors:
(a) the rate of increase of the dumped or
subsidised exports to the European Union.
(b) the export capacity in the country of origin 
or export, already in existence or which will 
be operational in the foreseeable future and 
the likelihood that the resulting exports will 
be to the European Union.
(c) in the case of anti-subsidy measures, the
See, for example. Copper Sulphate From Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain, O.J. L275/12 (1984); andPotato Granules From Canada. O.J. L116/11 (1981).
Acrylic Fibres From Greece, Japan, Spain, Turkev and the United States, O.J. L114/37 (1980).
Pears in Svrup From Australia^ China and South Africa, O.J. L196/22 (1983).
Article 4(3), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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nature of any subsidy and the trade effects 
likely to arise from that assistance.^*
The European Commission has rarely made injury 
determinations based on the threat of material injury 
and in those cases where the concept has been cited for 
injury purposes, this has been in tandem with a finding 
of actual material injury.
The same reluctance does not, however, apply to review 
proceedings where in a number of cases the European 
Commission has made an affirmative injury determination 
based on a finding of a threat of injury in the 
future.
(3) Material Retardation of the Establishment of a 
European Union Industrv
The Basic Regulation refers to the material retardation 
of the establishment of a European Union industry 
without further elaboration. It appears that, in 
practice, the European Commission rarely makes an 
affirmative determination on this basis.
Certainly this was the position until recently but, yet 
again, there has been a change of policy. This occurred
805 Ibid.
See Mounted Piezo-Electric Quartz Crvstal Units From Japan, South Korea and the United States. O.J. L162/62 (1980); Herbicide From Roumanie, O.J. L26/107(1988), and Methvlamine, Dimethvlamine and Trimethvlamine From GDR and Roumanie, O.J. L238/35 (1982).
807 for example. Binder and Baler Twine FromBrazil and Mexico, O.J. L34/55 (1987); and Light Sodium Carbonate From Bulgaria, O.J. L131/4 (1989)
_
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in DRAMs From Japan *^^ where the Commission relied on 
the potential retardation in conjunction with that of 
actual material injury to establish injury. This 
precedent indicates quite categorically that the 
Commission will be willing in the future to use this 
concept to protect hi-tech industries in the European 
Union which have invested resources in the production of 
advanced technological products especially electronic 
and computer based technologies which are suffering as 
a result of competition from industries outside the 
European Union.
(B) Definition of European Union Industry
The relevant European Union industry is the producers as 
a whole of like products to those under investigation or 
to those of them whose collective output constitutes a 
major proportion of the total production of the relevant
like products.
The European Commission does not conduct a special 
investigation to determine whether or not a complainant 
represents all or a major proportion of the producers 
manufacturing the product. Further, even once scope of 
the like product has been established as well as the 
relevant European Union industry, the EU institutions 
can alter, expand or contract, the scope of the 
definition even after a provisional ruling has been 
made,
[provisional measures] O.J. L20/5 (1990) , [1990] 2 CMLR 243.
809 Article 4(5), Council Regulation 2423/88.
See, for example. Potassium Chloride From Belarus. Russia and the Ukraine [definitive measures] O.J. L308/41 (1992).
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(1) Establishing the Relevant Like Product
The determination of the relevant like product is 
critical to establishing the product range that will be 
affected by the investigation. A large product range 
will tend to dilute the effect of any allegedly dumped 
products by widening the scope of the relevant European 
Union industry while a narrower range will increase the 
possibility of establishing injury.^*
A like product is defined as *a product which is 
identical, ie. alike in all respects, to the product 
under consideration or, in the absence of such a 
product, another product which has characteristics 
closely resembling those of the product under 
consideration'.There is consequently two dimensions 
to establishing like products:
(a) Identifying the product manufactured in the 
country of origin of the goods; and
(d) Identifying those products within the European 
Union which directly compete with the foreign 
goods.
While the reasoning behind Commission reasoning in like 
product determinations is often obfuscated, a number of 
relevant factors can be identified from previous 
investigations. These include the physical similarities 
in characteristics, the degree of interchangeability or 
substitutability, similar purposes, similar technical 
specifications and similar chemical composition.
811 European Commission has proposed the use ofCN Numbers from the Common Customs Nomenclature for establishing like products. The main problem with this approach is that the customs classifications are often larger than the like product definitions would allow.
Article 2(12), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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Physical similarities and characteristics
This is an important criterion. As a general rule, 
products will be considered like products if the 
differences between the products do not change their 
basic physical or technical characteristics. For 
example, car radios, car radios and compact disc players 
and car radios and audio cassette players constitute a 
like product because of the basic similarity in features 
and the technology used.*^ ^
Interchangeability and substitutability
This factor is dependent on consumer preference. A high 
degree of commercial interchangeability between the 
products will be a factor tending to assimilate these 
into like products.
Similar purposes and functions
The fact that the European Commission requires products 
to have similar purposes and functions eliminates the 
possibility that parts and components are considered 
like products to the finished product.*^* Since the uses 
of parts differ from the finished products, a general 
classification is not made.*^ ® So, for example, raw 
materials and refined products are generally not 
considered to be like products if their uses are not
Radio Broadcast Receivers of a Kind Used in Motor Vehicles From Korea. O.J. L34/8 (1992).
Plain-Paoer Photocopiers From Jaoan. supra note766.
815 This practice differs from that of the United States; see text supra Chapter 9.
816 PQ2- example, see Audio Tape in Cassettes From Hong Kong. Japan and South Korea. O.J. L313/5 (1990).
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interchangeable.
The exception to. this practice is the case of kits and 
readily assembled products.
Similar technical specifications
A specific product will often have a different range of 
technical specifications particularly as products are 
developed through research. Problems therefore arise in 
distinguishing between different models and types of the 
relevant products.^* In assessing whether different
models of the same product constitute separate products, 
the following factors are taken into account:
(a) The requirements of different types of end- 
users.
(b) The existence of characteristics which allow 
clear lines of distinction.
(c) The presence or absence of competition between 
the different classifications of the products.
(d) Whether producers themselves make distinctions 
between different models, classified into 
different market segments with regards to 
production, distribution and accounting.
(e) The existence of rapid developments and 
changes in the segmentation between the 
different models.^*
See Potassium Chloride From Belarussia. Russia and the Ukraine [provisional measures] O.J. LllO/5(1992),
See Serial Impact Printers From Japan [definitive measures] O.J. L177/1 (1988).
European Commission, Draft Master Regulation For Injury [internal memorandum] (21/12/92), 6-7.
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Factors not taken into account
The European Commission ignores a number of factors when 
determining like products. These include the following:
(a) The price of the goods is never a factor in 
like product determinations;
(b) The use of the same production lines is never 
taken into account in assimilating products.
(c) The quality of a product is rarely used as a 
like product classification factor.
Observations
The European Court has not yet overruled a Commission or 
Council determination of either a like product or a 
European Union industry. This is due to the Court's 
generally unwillingness to interfere with the margin of 
discretion enjoyed by both institutions in this 
process. 0^
(2) Regional Industries Rule
Producers in a regional market may, under special 
circumstances, qualify as a European Union industry, A 
regional industry may be found to exist where:
(a) the producers within a market sell all, or
almost all, of their production in that
market; and
(b) the demand in that market is to any
substantial degree supplied by producers of 
the product located elsewhere in the European
820 See Canon Inc v EC Council Case C171/87 [1992] ECR I 1237; [1992] 3 CMLR 30; and Sharp Corporation v EC Council Case C179/87 [1992] ECR I 1635; [1992] 2 CMLR415.
..■‘S'*
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Union.
This exceptions permits a positive determination of 
injury even in circumstances in which a certain 
proportion of the European Union industry in general 
remains uninjured.
Special conditions exist for establishing injury in a 
regional market. Injury may be established if:
(a) there is a concentration of dumped imports in 
the isolated market; and
(b) the dumped products are causing injury to 
producers in that market.
No specific geographical criteria are specified as 
relevant to this determination and the Commission has 
identified regional markets even within individual 
Member States.Economic, as opposed to geographical, 
criteria appear the most relevant.^* There must be a 
degree of isolation for the particular regional market 
which cannot be supplied by producers located elsewhere 
in the European Union.
(3) Related Parties Rule
In certain circumstances, producers in the European 
Union may be excluded from the scope of the European
821 Article 4(5), Council Regulation 2423/88.
See Certain Asbestos Cement Pipes From Turkey [undertakings/termination] O.J. L309/37 (1991).
See for example, Portland Cement From Turkey. Roumanie and Tunisia. O.J. ClOp/4 (1992); arid Flat Glass From Turkev. Yugoslavia and Romania. O.J. L51/73 (1986).
Ammonium Nitrate From Belarus. Georgia. Lithuania. Russia. Turkmenistan. Ukraine and Uzbekistan. O.J. C306/2 (1992).
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Union industry. The Basic Regulation authorises this 
restriction in two circumstances:
(a) when producers are related to exporters or 
importers allegedly engaged in dumping;
(b) when producers are themselves importers of the 
allegedly dumped products.^*
These rules, while permitted under the Anti-Dumping Code 
1979, are extensively applied by the Commission and are 
administered in a manner which causes de facto 
discrimination between the treatment of European 
companies having foreign subsidiaries and foreign 
producers having European operations. Naturally, if 
foreign producers operating in the market are excluded 
from the scope of the domestic industry the likelihood 
of establishing injury to the remaining domestic 
industry increases.
Treatment of European companies with foreign 
subsidiaries
The treatment extended to European companies with 
foreign subsidiaries producing goods which are allegedly 
dumped in the European Union is extremely liberal in 
order to retain these within the scope of the domestic 
industry. The general rules are as follows:
(a) EU companies with foreign subsidiaries 
allegedly engaging in dumping will not be 
excluded from the scope of the domestic 
industry unless they have complete control 
over the general industrial and commercial
825 Article 4(5), Council Regulation 2423/88
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behaviour of that company.®^®
(b) Producers which do not even manufacture a
product wholly within the European Union, will
be considered part of the domestic industry if
the producer carries out a 'major part' of the 
total production within the European Union, 
'major part' being undefined.
(c) European companies engaging in joint ventures 
with foreign companies will not be excluded if 
there is a proportion of EU content in their 
products.
(d) European companies importing dumped products 
will not usually be excluded from the scope of 
the industry.^*
In fact, the Commission has even disapplied the rule 
relating to the exclusion of European producers 
importing allegedly dumped products where the remaining 
operations of the European producers are 
considerable.MO This practice has even been certified 
by the European Court are permissible in certain
circumstances.Ml
M® European Commission, Draft Master Regulation For Injury [Internal memorandum] (21/12/92), 3.
M7 European Commission, Draft Master Regulation For Injury [internal Commission memorandum] (21/12/92).
Video Cassette Recorders From Japan and Korea. O.J. L57/5 (1989).
DRAMs From Korea [provisional measures] O.J. L272/13 (1992).
M® See, for example, Plain-Paoer Photocopiers From Japan, O.J. L54/12 (1987); and Capacitors From Japan[definitive measures] O.J. L353/1 (1992).
Ml Tokyo Electric Co v EC Council. Cases 260/85 &106/86 [1988] ECR 5855, [1989] 1 CMLR 169.
__________
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Treatment of foreign producers with European
subsidiaries
The European Commission is rigorous in its exclusion of 
foreign subsidiaries from the scope of the domestic 
industry and has, in the past, applied the following 
rules:
(a) Foreign-owned European subsidiaries are 
excluded absolutely from the scope of the 
domestic industry.
(b) Parties need not be legally related - such as 
in a parent/subsidiary relationship - to be
excluded.MS
(c) European companies, whether subsidiaries or 
not, will be excluded from the scope of the 
domestic industry if it is shown that they 
have operated assembly facilities for the 
purposes of facilitating the importation of 
the allegedly dumped goods.
The effect of these rules is to exclude any influence of 
efficient foreign-owned companies which would detract 
from a possible finding of injury.
The view of the ECJ 
Again the European Court will not interfere with the
M2 See, for example, Ball-Bearings From Japan. O.J. L193/ (1984); and Video Cassette Recorders From Japanand Korea. O.J. L240/11 (1988).
M3 Electronic Scales From Japan. O.J. L80/9 (1984).
Erasable Programmable Read Onlv Memories (EPROMs From Japan. O.J. L65/1 (1991); Dynamic Random AccèsMemories ÏDRAMs] From Japan. O.J. L193/1 (1990).
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institutions* judgments in this determination. As the 
Court has repeatedly stressed:
* It is for the institutions, in the exercise of their 
discretion, to determine whether they should exclude 
from the '[European Union] industry* producers which are 
related to exporters or importers or are themselves 
importers of the dumped products. This discretion must 
be exercised on a case-by-case basis, by reference to 
all the relevant facts.*m5
If this policy continues, no challenge will be 
successful on this basis unless the institution in 
question has made a manifest error of fact.M*»
(C) Causation
Throughout the Basic Regulation, the need for a causal 
connection between dumping or subsidisation and injury 
is emphasized. The Regulation specifically provides that 
injury caused by other factors such as the volume and 
prices of imports which are not dumped or subsidised, or 
contractions in demand which, individually or 
collectively, also adversely affect the European Union 
industry, cannot be attributed to the dumped or 
subsidised imports.M?
Article 4(1) contains the causation requirement and 
provides that injury caused by other factors must not be 
attributed to the dumped or subsidised product. Yet the
4European Court has agreed with the Commission that it is
M* Sharp Corporation v EC Council Case C179/87[1992] ECR I 1635; [1992] 2 CMLR 415.
M® See also Gestetner Holdings Pic v EC Council and Commission Case C156/87 [1990] ECR 828, [1990] 1 CMLR820.
837 Article 4(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
_________________ ____
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possible:
'to attribute to an importer responsibility for injury 
caused by dumping even if the losses due to dumping are 
merely part of a more extensive injury attributable to 
other factors.'M*
The question is what degree of dumping will constitute 
*a part* of the injury? At least at the most basic 
level, the dumped imports, if taken in isolation, must 
contribute to the material injury sustained. Yet the 
Commission and Council often acknowledge other factors 
have impinged to cause injury without apportioning 
degrees of injury to particular factors.M* in fact, it 
is a rare occasion when the Council or Commission 
refrain from finding actionable dumping because of a 
finding that the injury to a European Union industry was 
caused by extraneous factors.
The four main factors examined by the Commission to 
establish causation are:
(1) Parallelism - cause and effect are considered 
simultaneously.
(2) Price elasticity - this requires the 
identification of the relationship between 
price changes and increase/decrease in supply.
(3) Transparency of injury.
(4) The existence of price undercutting, if any, 
attributable due the dumped products.
Another criticism of the Commission's assessment of 
causation has been the disjointed investigations into
M3 Canon Inc v EC Council Cases 277 & 300/85 [1988] ECR 5731, Para. 62.
M9 See Asbestos Cement Pipes From Turkev O.J. L309/37 (1991).
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dumping and injury. For example, if the period of 
investigation extends to five years prior to the 
initiation of the investigation and the investigation 
into dumping takes into account the one year period 
prior to the initiation, trends will be taken into 
account which have not been affected by the alleged 
dumping. If these two periods are not the same, has 
injury over the investigation period been caused by the 
dumping? However, the Commission claims that a longer 
period is necessary to properly assess injury to the 
domestic industry.
(E) Concept of Community (European Union) Interest
Before provisional or definitive anti-dumping measures 
are imposed, the Basic Regulation requires the 
Commission and the Council to confirm that 'the 
interests of the [European Union] call for 
intervention'^^ This factor is taken into account only 
by the European Union authorities and the Canadian 
administering agencies and by no other state, including 
the United States, even although Article 8(1) of the 
GATT implores the authorities of signatories to consider 
whether or not to impose anti-dumping duties in the 
circumstances of each case.
As a general principle, the European Union institutions 
have equated the concept of European Union interest to 
that of EU producers. In the majority of affirmative 
cases (both preliminary and definitive determinations), 
the requirement of considering EU interest is settled 
with a brief statement that, in view of the economic 
situation facing the EU industry, it is in the interest
Articles 11(1) & 12(1), Council Regulation2423/88.
_
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of the EU that measures be adopted.
The interests of European producers which are taken into 
account in making this assessment are numerous and, in 
the past, have included the following:
(a) The need to maintain a viable European 
industrial basis for the production of the 
goods.
(b) The need to safeguard employment in the 
sector.
(c) The requirement of avoiding a dependency of 
foreign imports for the production of later- 
stage products.
(d) The protection of research and development and 
to maintain technological innovation.
The European Court has protected the discretion of the 
European Union institutions in making this 
assessment.M2
The European institutions effectively ignore a plethora 
of other factors which are also relevant in assessing 
whether the true interests of the European Union are 
best served by the adoption of measures. The following 
interest groups are also important but effectively
considered irrelevant in most cases;
(a) Industrial processors and users of the
Ml See, for example. Paint. Distemper. Vanish and Similar Brushes From China. O.J. L46/48 (1987); Copper Sulphate From Yugoslavia. O. J. L113/6 (1986) ; and Clogs From Sweden. O.J. L32/2 (1986).
M2 Canon v EC Council. Cases 277 & 300/85 [1988] ECR 5731, [1989] 1 CMLR 915.
 : _
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p r o d u c t s ^ *
(b) Service industries such as distributers, 
etc.
(c) Consumer s*^^
Macro-economic considerations which are also important 
include^^: (a) competition policy; (b) balance of trade 
considerations and balance of payments by sector; (c) 
monetary policy; (d) industrial policy; (e) foreign 
policy^^; and (f) national security considerations. 
With the exception of competition policy, where the 
European Court has recently compelled the Commission to 
take this factor into account in assessing injury^*.
See, for example. Sensitized paper From iapan. O.J. L124/45 (1984); Oxalic Acid From Taiwan and South Korea. O.J. L72/14 (1988); Polyester Yarn From Mexico. South Korea. Taiwan and Turkey. O.J. L151/44 (1988). On exception was DRAMs From Japan. O.J. L193/1 (1990).
^  Dot-Matrix Printers From Japan. O.J. L130/32(1988); and Plain-Paoer Photocopiers From Japan, O.J. L54/28 (1987).
Typifying the views of the Council and Commission towards the interests of consumers, the Council has stated that 'there can be guarantee that the consumers will continue to benefit from price advantages resulting from unfair competition [and] a possible limited disadvantage to consumers with respect to the higher prices of VCRs caused by the imposition of anti-dumping duties will be outweighed by the benefits of safeguarding employment and maintaining a foothold in this important technological sector.* ; Video Cassette Recorders From Japan and Korea. O.J. L240/15 (1988).
^  European Commission, Anti-Dumping Measures - Public Interest Test - Discussion Paoer (Internal Document) (5/12/92).
See, for example. Urea From Austria. Hungary. Malaysia. Roumania. United States and Venezuela. O.J. L235/12 (1988); and Deep Freezers From the USSR. O.J.L6/3 (1987). For an exception to this rule, see Atlantic Salmon From Norway. O.J. L69/32 (1991).
Extramet Industrie SA v EC Council. Case 358/89[1993] 2 CMLR 619.
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these macro-economic considerations are also ignored in 
assessing European Union interest.
In fact, the requirement of assessing European interest 
rarely prevents the adoption of measures.^* This factor 
has, however, occasionally caused the Council to decide 
the form which the relief is granted*^® or, very 
occasionally, to reduce the levels of duties to be 
imposed.
The concept of European Union interest as applied in 
anti-subsidy investigations differs slightly from that 
in anti-dumping cases although the Basic Regulation 
provides no indication of why this is the case. The main 
reason for the divergence of approach is probably that 
in anti-dumping cases, the relevant offending practice 
is carried out by private parties whereas in anti­
subsidy cases governments are directly involved since 
they provide the relevant assistance. Thus, in anti­
dumping investigations, the scope of relevant factors is 
restricted to the fact and circumstances which bear 
directly on the period during the investigation. This 
approach is considered not to be appropriate in anti­
subsidy investigations.
The involvement of governments brings an international 
diplomacy element into the Commission's considerations. 
For example, justifying its policy of accepting 
undertakings whenever submitted by governments in anti-
See the comments in J.H.J. Bourgeois, "European Community Anti-Dumping Enforcement - Second Generation Issues", (1985) Fordham Corporate Law Institute 563.
See Hydraulic Excavators From Jaoan. O.J. L176/4(1985); Pentaervthritol From Canada. O.J. L13/3 (1985), corr O.J. L20/46.(1985).
Unwrouaht Nickel From the USSR. O.J, L159/43(1983) .
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subsidy investigations while subjecting private 
undertakings in anti-dumping investigations to close 
scrutiny, the Commission has commented that the risk of 
having a subsidy which has been removed in the course of 
an investigation subsequently re-introduced is not the 
same as the subsequent re-appearance of d u m p i n g .
In considering the non-political elements in determining 
the European Union interests in applying such duties, 
the Commission weighs two opposing sides of an equation 
against each other.
In favour of intervention are factors such as the degree 
of injury sustained by the European Union industry, 
whether the continued viability of the industry is 
seriously affected by the imports, the importance of the 
European Union industry as a supplier of materials to 
other industries, the labour force involved and the 
effect on research and development expenditure.
Against the imposition of duties are the impact on 
prices for consumers of the goods and the interests of 
the European Union industries, if any, which use of the 
goods as inputs for further finished products.
(4) Observations
The lasting impression from an examination of the 
substantive anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules of the 
European Union is one of vagueness and mild astonishment 
at the degree of discretion exercised by the 
institutions at all stages of the processes. This 
discretion has been protected from interference by the 
European Court which has acted as a willing accomplice
852 Sova Meal from Brazil. O.J. L106/91 (1985).
. _________ _
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in shielding EU anti-dumping policy from rigorous 
international scrutiny. This veil has only been pierced 
by the GATT panel reports which often render a judgment 
in conflict with many of the substantive rules and 
administrative practices approved by the European Court.
Hence, the many changes in policy direction which 
operates against the interests of the foreign 
manufacturers and producers have remained unscrutinised 
particularly if the standard against which judicial 
review occurs is purportedly the applicable 
international rules.
Despite the exhortations and preachings of the European 
Commission, there is little doubt that the codifications 
which occurred in 1984 and 1988 introduced new concepts 
which fundamentally altered the anti-dumping policy of 
the European Union. These changes have been complemented 
by a series of administrative policy switches which have 
the overall effect of easing the requirements which 
European Union industries must satisfy in order to 
obtain relief in the form of anti-dumping duties or 
undertakings.
The final conclusion is that the anti-dumping policy of 
the European Union is not, except in the most broad 
terms, consistent with the obligations contained in the 
Anti-Dumping Code. At their very heart, these processes 
are deficient because they allow artificial dumping 
margins to be created by asymmetrical deductions to 
export prices and normal values. This is compounded by 
the fact that these values are very rarely compared at 
the same level of trade which distorts the size of the 
dumping margin eventually found.
A review of the anti-dumping law of the European Union
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also indicates that this regime is more policy-oriented 
and ad hoc than the rule-based legalistic approach of 
the United States authorities. The ample discretion 
conferred on the institutions is in itself evidence of 
this phenomenon. The result is a more malleable system 
than that which operates in the United States, For 
example, anti-dumping measures can be directed against 
particular states without any fundamental change in the 
structure of the system. Thus, between 1985 and 1990, 
Japan was the target of much of these measures in part 
due to the trade imbalance maintained by the European 
Union with this country. Since the late 1980s and into 
the early 1990, China and Korea have been singled out 
for heavy handed treatment. For 1992 onwards, the 
indications are that the states of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union will be the subject of the 
majority of measures. This ability strongly suggests 
that the European Union is manipulating its anti-dumping 
laws in a manner inconsistent with both the terms and 
spirit of the Anti-Dumping Code.
When the actual detail of the European Union anti­
dumping law and practice is examined, there is little 
doubt that international obligations are exerting little 
or no influence on this aspect of the Union's external 
trade policy. In the calculation of export price, 
deviation exists in the form of excessive deductions 
from actual price, excessive allowances in the 
construction of export prices, manipulation of levels of 
profit, the operation of the duty as a cost rule and the 
practice of sampling. The determination of normal value 
also reveals abuse in the operation of the 'ordinary 
course of trade criteria', the sufficient volume 
threshold and again in constructed values.
However, it is in the adjustments to the normal value 
and export prices that the degree to which abuse has
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proliferated becomes clear. The actual process of 
comparison is inherently flawed towards the creation of 
artificial dumping margins.
Other practices exist in the twilight of legality under 
the GATT regime. In these cases, no black and white 
answer to the question of abuse can be rendered because 
it is not the actual practice which constitutes abuse 
but the excessive implementation of such practices which 
constitutes illegitimate protectionism contrary to the 
Anti-Dumping Code. For example, the selection of 
analogue countries under the special rules for non- 
market countries became so arbitrary that even the 
European Court felt bound to break its avowed policy of 
abstention from intervention to relieve foreign
importers from the unfair effects of this practice.
Similarly, the failure to take into account negative
margins of dumping may not be a clear cut violation of
the terms of the Anti-Dumping Code but its overall
effect is invariably to inflate margins of dumping to 
the detriment of foreign producers. This is an 
administrative practice which is neither strictly legal 
or illegal but which at least impinges on the conscious 
of objectivity and impartiality and is certainly not 
fair play.
This conclusion leads logically to the question of the 
degree to which the European Union has abused its anti­
dumping laws to erect a Fortress Europe based on the 
protection of the internal market by a wall of duties 
(in the form of the Common Customs Tariffs) and specific 
mechanisms to counter the importation of certain 
products or the products of particular countries. This 
is not a new concern. As early as 1988, Brian Hindley, 
the noted economist, observed;
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•The architect's problem is how to construct a Fortress 
Europe that has high walls and heavy cannons pointing in 
one direction but not the other. That is the problem 
solved by the manipulation of anti-dumping measures.
In the achievement of this overall objective the rules 
of the Anti-Dumping Code have been subsumed to a higher 
ideal. International rules have been ignored and 
practices devised to take advantage of lacuna in the 
rules. Once the fine detail to anti-dumping law is 
examined closely, the normative influence of the 
international rules becomes progressively less easy to 
identify.
Of course, in ' their defence the European Union 
institutions will point to the two jewels of trade 
liberalism allegedly enshrined in the European Union's 
anti-dumping policy, namely the lesser duty rule and the 
European Union interest rule. Few countries, it is true, 
have adopted these devices in their anti-dumping laws 
and, at least orima facie, both are evidence of the pro- 
free trade attitude of the European Union's anti-dumping 
policy.
The reality is somewhat different. The lesser duty rule 
may reduce the average levels of duties imposed on 
foreign imports but traditionally the anti-dumping 
duties levied by the European Union have been extremely 
high, in many cases exceeding fifty percent. Even if the 
duty is restricted to the margin of injury, the final 
duties imposed (or undertakings required) are a cause of 
concern. Further, the method by which injury is assessed 
through measurement of the degree of price 
undercutting or underselling - is itself a measure of 
value. By setting duties at the margin of injury, the
853 Financial Times. January 6, 1989.
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European Union is constructing a price at which the sale 
of products will provide a 'reasonable* level of profit 
to European Union industries. This means of measurement 
implicitly means that margins of injury will be higher 
than if other factors were examined such an increasing 
market shares or production.
The European Union interest rule is also vulnerable to 
criticisms which reduce its credibility. In barely 5% of 
investigations is the concept seriously considered and 
in even less cases are duties not imposed because of 
this factor. Further, the interests considered are not 
those of the European Union consumer or users of the 
product, but political interests (in the case of the 
EFTA states) and those of European industries. Even the 
opposition of specific Member States cannot constitute 
a sufficiently powerful interest to prevent the adoption 
of measures under the European Union interest rule.
The fact that European Union anti-dumping policy is so 
inconsistent with the Union's international obligations 
provokes greater concern when it is remembered that over 
95% of the European Union's measures of administered 
protection take this form. The use of anti-subsidy 
measures, safeguard measures and measures under the New 
Commercial Policy Instrument are the exception rather 
than the rule. At least in the case of anti-subsidy 
measures, their lack of use by the European Union stems 
from the perspective of the Union towards the nature of 
these measures and the consequence of their use on a 
widespread basis.
While the European Union has not made aggressive use of 
anti-subsidy measures in the past, there is no guarantee 
that this policy will not change especially since the 
Uruguay Final Act contains many rules which the European 
Union wished to see regulate subsidies at the
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international level. In any event, the small number of 
anti-dumping cases should not be mistaken for a 
benevolent attitude on the part of the European Union 
institutions. The primary motivation for this policy was 
to secure international objectives. Now these have been 
attained, at least to a considerable degree, a more 
active role might be conferred on these measures.
From the analysis conducted above of the existing anti­
subsidy rules again the impression from a review of the 
European Union's anti-subsidy laws is that of general 
vagueness. The institutions have far too much discretion 
in the application and formulation of the anti-subsidy 
policy. This discretion is all the more distressing 
since the substantive rules remain at an unsophisticated 
level and their lack of use has resulted in a lack of 
refinement. For example, the specificity test applied by 
the European Union has not been fully developed and has 
been applied in a haphazard fashion. The endorsement of 
the test of de facto specificity does hint at the 
evolution of sophistication in this perspective. 
Nevertheless, the rules regulating quantification and 
allocation of benefits (over both time and units) are 
both primitive and unrefined.
However, even the present policy of the European Union 
towards anti-subsidy measures has caused distortion in 
the overall structure of the European Union's commercial 
defence system. The greatest distortion must be the 
spill-over that refraining to use such measures has 
caused in the anti-dumping regime. Anti-dumping actions 
are raised when the proper recourse should be to anti- 
subsidy procedures. This is a dangerous development not 
least because anti-dumping measures are not the proper 
form of relief against foreign subsidisation practices. 
Further, the application of anti-dumping measures in 
such circumstances must be suspect.
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The wisdom of the pursuit of the strategy of minimising 
the risks to the European Union's own freedom to 
introduce subsidy programmes at the international level 
by refraining from anti-subsidy measures must also be 
called into question. Its state aid policy operates on 
clearly distinct principles from its international 
posture. This implies that, while one set of rules is 
adequate for internal regulation another, completely 
different set of principles is adequate for the 
relationships between the European Union and third 
states.
Both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures require, as 
a prerequisite, the establishment of material injury to 
a European Union industry although in reality this 
requirement has only been refined relative to anti­
dumping measures in EU practice. The rules and 
procedures for establishing this element are so obscure 
that one European Commission official, on an off-the- 
record basis, stated to the writer that 'injury can be 
found whenever the European Commission wishes injury to 
be found'. In effect, the material injury requirement 
acts as no real restraint in an anti-dumping 
investigation.
Here, the influence of the international standards is at 
its weakest. The rules enshrined in the Anti-Dumping 
Code are far too vague to permit regulation and the 
process of discovering injury is to complex and obscure 
that arbitrary behaviour is rife. Policies and practices 
are developed by the EU institutions for the 
determination of material injury in a void of 
international regulation.
Not only can the EU institutions select the most 
appropriate periods for investigation of injury to a 
European industry. They can also find injury by relying
■ à j I
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on a host of individual factors and indicators. The 
discretion to pick and choose between volumes of import, 
the performance of European Union industries and the 
price of goods in the European Union as indicators of 
injury gives the institutions and unchallengeable 
discretion to find injury.
While the European Commission would claim that the 
process for determining injury is compatible with the 
terms of the Anti-Dumping Code again it is at the 
periphery of legality that he greatest abuses are 
committed. The over-emphasis in investigations on the 
factors of price undercutting and price underselling, 
the cumulation practices and the identification of EU 
industries through application of the related parties 
rule and the regional industry rule, points to abusive 
behaviour.
The conclusion to this part of the investigation is 
therefore self-apparent. The European Union applies its 
anti-dumping measures with little regard to the 
international standards and this approach has not been 
objected to by the European Court. Here, the breakdown 
of the normative influence of international law on the 
behaviour of a state, in this case the European Union, 
is at an apogee.
11 European Union - Asymmetry of Procedural 
Rights in Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy 
Investigations
As we have seen, the European Union has traditionally 
made little use of its anti-subsidy measures and in 
practice anti-dumping measures are by far the most 
significant instrument in its commercial defence 
arsenal. Consequently, the emphasis of this chapter will 
be on the bias in the procedural rights and duties in 
anti-dumping investigations during the period before 
1995. In any event, the procedural similarities between 
the two are sufficiently close as to allow the private 
rights of interested parties to be equated.
From a procedural point of view there are significant 
points of departure from United States practices as 
regards European Union anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
matters. Of course, it cannot be said with any degree of 
certainty that one system is fairer or more compatible 
with international obligations than the other. In some 
instances, European Union procedures offer a greater 
degree of protection than the counterpart American 
provisions but in other areas the United States system 
prevails.
In any event, the process of comparison is not the 
principal issue presently being discussed. Rather, the 
main purpose of considering these procedural rules is to 
ascertain the degree to which the European Union's 
procedures were compatible with its international 
obligations imposed prior to the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round and whether these rules equitably took 
into account the need to prevent discrimination between 
the rights of European Union producers and foreign 
producers. In other words, the main issue is where the 
balance between these interests is struck having regard 
to the international obligations of the European Union.
O.J. L209/1 (1988). Note that for basic iron and steel products the relevant legislation is Commission Decision 2424/88/ECSC. O.J. L209/18 (1988).
Council Regulation fECI 3283/94. O.J. L349/1(1994) .
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The relevant principles applied in anti-dumping 
investigations were also contained in Council Regulation 
(EEC) 2423/88^^ . as interpreted by the Council and the 
Commission in the administration of anti-dumping policy 
and, more significantly, by the European Court in the 
judicial review of the findings of these institutions. 
Of course this regulation has now been replaced with a 
new measure in accordance with the terms of the 1994 
Anti-Dumping Code**^  but this legislation is not the 
subject of this analysis since it was enacted outside 
the period of investigation which is presently being 
examined. No attempt has been made to evaluate the 
compatibility of the 1994 Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation 
with the terms of the 1994 WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement
However, the material sources of European Union anti­
dumping procedural law were not exclusively confined to 
the basic regulation. Not all procedural rights and 
duties of interested parties, and European Union 
institutions for that matter, were specified in this 
legislation. This deficiency was expressly acknowledged 
by the European Court itself which warned that, for 
procedural safeguards:
*[A]ny action taken by the European Union 
institutions must be all the more scrupulous in 
view of the fact that, as they stand at present, 
the rules in question do not provide all the 
procedural guarantees for the protection of the 
individual which may exist in certain national
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legal systems'^*
Considerable responsibility was therefore imposed by the 
European Court on the European Commission to develop an 
appropriate and effective framework for the protection 
of individual private rights. The evolution of this 
system was largely been based on the concept of general 
principles of law.®^  ^ General principles of law have 
been declared to be *a fundamental part of the European 
Union legal o r d e r * . I n  the opinion of the present 
writer the Commission failed to discharge this 
obligation effectively.
The unwritten nature of these rights had positive and 
negative aspects. It provided a degree of flexibility in 
the process of formulating procedural safeguards but, at 
the same time, the element of flexibility must be 
weighed against the uncertainty caused by the failure to 
state the exact rights of private individuals in any 
concrete form. This problem is particularly acute if the 
investigating authorities take advantage of these 
uncertainties to render arbitrary or capricious rulings.
(1) The Role of the European Union Institutions in the 
Anti-Dumping Process
As is the case with the vast majority of powers 
exercised by the European Union, the Council of 
Ministers has reserved the majority of important powers
Al-Jubail Fertilizer Companv (Samad) v EC Council. Case 49/88 [1991] 3 CMLR 377.
See, for example, A. Egger, "The Principle of Proportionality in Community Anti-Dumping Law", (1993) 18:5 EL Rev. 367.
Ibid.
____
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to itself in the area of anti-dumping. Summarised, these 
are as follows;
(1) The Council approves international agreements 
entered into between the European Union and 
other states on anti-dumping matters,
(2) The basic regulations defining the European 
Union's anti-dumping law and procedure are 
periodically adopted by the Council when 
amendments are required.
(3) The Council retains exclusive competence to 
impose definitive measures and to order the 
collection of provisional duties.*^®
In addition, the Council influences and controls many of 
the activities of the Commission by techniques such as 
the use of advisory committees and the delimitation of 
the Commission's powers in international negotiations by 
means of strictly defined negotiating m a n d a t e s . The 
use of these, and other means of influencing the 
Commission, ensures that the political content of anti­
dumping policy is not neglected.
The actual administration of the basic anti-dumping 
regulation is handled by the European Commission which 
also has a certain amount of delegated legislative 
authority to enforce European Union anti-dumping policy. 
It is the Commission that is the agency responsible for 
conducting investigations into allegations of 
dumping.
In contrast to the position in the United States, one 
agency has responsibility for all aspects of the
Article 12(1), Council Regulation 2423/88 
See text, supra pp.435-441.
Article 7, Council Regulation 2423/88.
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investigation, namely into dumping, injury, causation 
and European Union interest.Responsibility for the 
investigation of anti-dumping complaints places a great 
deal of authority in the hands of the Commission. Not 
only does the Commission examine the complaint in 
detail, but it is also responsible for verifying the 
facts alleged in the complaint, conducting its own 
investigation, hearing all interested parties and 
calculating whether or not dumping or subsidisation 
exists. The Commission also has extensive legislative 
powers to impose provisional measures, recommend the 
acceptance of undertakings^^ and, in certain cases, 
adopt regulations reviewing measures.
This centralisation of power has given rise to charges
Throughout the 1980s, the Commission staffengaged in the investigation of anti-dumping complaints has significantly increased. In 1980, the Commission had less than twenty full-time staff engaged in theadministration and enforcement of anti-dumping measures which was increased to 26 in 1986; European Commission, Ninth Annual Report of the Communitv's Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidv Activities. SEC(91) 974 Final. By 1990, the number of personnel involved in the administration ofanti-dumping policy had risen to 108, a level which hasremained consistent throughout the early part of this decade. This contrasts with the position in the United States were approximately 200 staff are employed in the ITA on anti-dumping investigations and a further 500 in the International Trade Commission, although not all the latter staff are engaged exclusively in anti-dumping investigations. The Commission has recently proposed an increase in the number of anti-dumping staff to 146 investigators, a proposal which was accepted by the Council of Ministers, subject to budgetary constraints.
The power of the Commission to accept undertakings from foreign exporters are stated in the Basic Regulation to be wholly within the scope of the Commission's discretion; Article 10, Council Regulation 2423/88. However, where objections are raised by Member States, the Commission submits a proposal to the Council of Ministers for the approval of the Undertakings; see Artificial Corrundum From the Soviet Union. Hunaarv. Poland. Czechoslovakia. China. Brazil and Jugoslavia. O.J. L275/25 (1991).
-----
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that the Commission is the de facto judge, jury and 
prosecutor in anti-dumping investigations.^* The 
argument that this centralisation of authority results 
in the more efficient processing of complaints is more 
or less irrelevant from the point of view of 
safeguarding rights and duties in the process. It is 
more pertinent to determine if this concentration of 
authority is adequately balanced by an appropriate body 
of objective administrative procedures and principles.
(2) Liberal Standing Requirements
(A) European Union Agencies and Member States
In theory at least, an investigation may be commenced at 
the instigation of the Commission. There is no express 
provision in the basic regulation allowing such a right 
but the fact that the basic regulation allows the 
Commission to proceed with an investigation even if a 
private complaint is withdrawn supports the view that 
a private complaint is not a prerequisite to commencing 
an investigation.^^ There are however no reported 
instances of investigations being carried out without a 
complaint.*^ Naturally, this is not to say that such 
investigations are precluded in the future.
The Commission has, however, self-initiated reviews of
See I. V. Bael, "Procedural Aspects of EEC Anti­dumping Enforcement", A Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the College of Europe, Brugges, September 14, 1989, 9.
Article 5(4), Council Regulation 2423/88.
European Commission, Annual Report on the Communitv Anti-Dumpina and Anti-Subsidv Activities. COM (90) 229 Final (1990), 27.
__ ' :     :__
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cases based on facts believed by the Commission to 
exist. For example, in one case, a review of anti­
dumping measures was requested by a European Union 
industry against producers from one of seven countries 
involved in an investigation.The complainers made no 
allegations justifying a review of the position of 
producers in the.other six countries. Nevertheless, the 
Commission was dissatisfied by the terms of the 
reference and extended the review to the producers from 
all the countries involved in the original 
investigation.
Member States do not need to lodge complaints with the 
Commission to initiate an investigation. If a Member 
State is in possession of sufficient evidence of both 
dumping or subsidisation and injury to a European Union 
industry, it may communicate this evidence to the 
Commission as the basis for opening an investigation.^*
(B) Private Parties
An application for an investigation by the Commission 
into allegations of dumping or subsidisation may be made 
by any natural or legal person as long as the applicant 
is acting on behalf of a European Union industry which 
considers itself injured or threatened by dumped (or 
subsidised) imports.*™ The requirements for private
Ferro-Silicon From the USSR. Iceland. Norwav. Sweden. Venezuela. Yugoslavia and Brazil, O.J, C115/2(1992) .
See also Urea From Czechoslovakia and the Former USSR. O.J* C87/7 (1993) [initiation review]; andPotassium Chloride From Belarus. Russia and the Ukraine. O.J. C175/10 (1993) [initiation review].
Article 5(6), Council Regulation 2423/88.
*™ Article 5(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
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complaints are identical for both anti-dumping and anti­
subsidy investigations save that the need to supply 
evidence of subsidies is substituted for that of dumping 
in anti-subsidy complaints.
Prima facie. it is an essential prerequisite to 
establish standing that the complainer must make the 
complaint on behalf of a European Union industry. 
European Union industry is defined as the producers as 
a whole of the like product or those of them whose 
collective output of the products constitutes a major 
proportion of the total European Union production of the 
p r o d u c t s . T h e  question of standing is therefore 
decided in relation to two primary factors, first, the 
economic size of the European Union industry and, 
second, the combined size of the producers represented 
in the complaint.
This requirement has not proved to be a significant 
factor in controlling complaints from groups not truly 
representative of a Union industry. This is because the 
requirement may be manipulated when complaints are filed 
and the Commission has, by and large, condoned such 
practices. This .manipulation stems from the fact that 
the percentage of the collective share required to 
constitute a major proportion has not been defined. The 
Commission has informally set the threshold at around 
approximately 50% of pr o du c ti o n. T h e  Commission 
defends this practice on the basis that the regulation 
refers only to a 'major proportion' of the European 
industry which does not necessarily imply a majority
Article 4(5), Council Regulation 2423/88.
872 This has not always been the relevant standard and in cases in the early 1980s the Commission initiated investigations after receiving petitions from parties representing considerably less than this proportion of the relevant industry.
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share.
Nevertheless, the Commission has, in the recent past, 
accepted complaints from parties representing less than 
50% of the European Union industry. For example, in 
Bicvcles From China*^ .^ after the Commission sent 
questionnaires to the producers listed in the complaint, 
which is in conformity with its normal practice, the 
proportion of the EU producers responding amounted to 
less than 40% of the total EU production of bicycles. 
Additional questionnaires were therefore dispatched to 
other producers in order to widen the scope of the 
representation which raised the level of representation 
to 54.3%. Had the Commission not adopted this course of 
action, the complaint would have been submitted by a 
minority of European Union producers. Quite clearly the 
European Commission deliberately facilitated in 
stimulating support for the complaint in circumstances 
where such support did not exist.
On the face of it, the requirement would appear to be a 
significant impediment to the lodging of a complaint by 
one European Union company, or a small group of 
companies. But, in fact, there are a number of ways in 
which single companies, or groups of companies, have 
circumvented this requirement.
The first technique used by European Union industries to 
reduce the size of the relevant industry for the purpose 
of a complaint is to define the relevant product as 
narrowly as possible. Thus, in one case, a single 
British company successfully lodged a complaint against 
nine Japanese producers by defining the relevant product 
in the complaint to such a degree that the Commission 
accepted that it was the only European Union producer of
873 O.J. L228/1 (1993) [definitive].
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that specific product.*^* The company was ultimately 
successful in procuring the adoption of du t i e s . I f  by 
this means a single company, or small group of 
companies, can establish that they are collectively the 
main producers of a specific product, this requirement 
becomes nothing more than a technicality.*™
In another instance, the Commission permitted the 
opening of an investigation into allegations raised by 
a Belgian producer that foreign imports were limiting 
its sales, thus threatening injury, not in the Belgian 
market but in the Italian market.*^ The complaint was 
eventually held to be unfounded both as regards the 
allegation of threat of injury and the claim that 
threats of retaliation in the form of price undercutting 
had been made to the Belgian producer by the Japanese 
producer.*™ But, the opening of an investigation into 
an allegation of dumping is an effective harassing 
tactic used by some European industries* The fact that 
the investigation proceeded at all in these 
circumstances and on the most spurious grounds gives 
rise to concerns.
A further means of circumventing the requirement is the 
practice of excluding the non-indigenous European 
producers from the definition of the relevant 
industry.*™ In other words, a distinction is drawn
*™ Thermal Paper From Japan. O.J. C16/3 (1991).
*™ Thermal Paper From Japan. O.J. L270/15 (1991).
*™ See also Unwrouaht Manganese From China. O.J. C15/12 (1992).
*™ Mica From Japan. O.J. C323/3 (1988).
*^* Mica From Jaoan. O.J. L284/45 (1989).
879 The basic regulation permits the Commission to exclude related importers/exporters from the scope of the European Union industry for the purposes of
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between European Union producers of goods and non^ 
European Union producers of the same goods which are 
subsidiaries of foreign companies.
This method of establishing the relevant industry was 
noticeably pernicious in the recent investigation into 
small screen colour televisions sets.**® In this 
investigation the Commission went much further and 
excluded all non-European Union companies, even if 
legitimate subsidiaries, producing the relevant product 
and not only those companies from the country under 
investigation, but also from other foreign countries, 
most notably Japan. The eventual result was that the 
European Union industry was defined on the basis of 
producers of solely European origin.
On the basis of this distinction, the Commission found 
that the complainers represented a major proportion of 
European Union production. In fact, had the Commission 
made this assessment in terms of true total European 
Union-origin production - ie. products manufactured in 
the European Union by both European Union and non- 
European Union producers - this assessment would have 
been significantly different and the complainers might 
have been denied standing.
On the other hand, the Commission will rarely exclude 
from the scope of the relevant industry a European 
company which imports allegedly dumped products. For
investigation. Producers are excluded from the scope of the Community industry where (a) they are related to exporters or importers of the dumped products; and (b) they are themselves importing the dumped products; See Electronic Scales From Japan. O.J. L80/9 (1984).
**® Small Screen Colour Televisions Sets From Korea, O.J. L314/1 (1989) [provisional]; O.J. L107/56 (1990)[definitive].
 : :______________________________________
example, in Capacitors From Japan881
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the Japanese
exporters were unsuccessful in having Phillips, the 
European electrical giant, excluded from the scope of 
the relevant industry even although this company had 
imported dumped products for its own consumption. Hence, 
the European Union industry will not include subsidiary 
operations of foreign companies allegedly engaged in 
dumping but will encompass European companies willingly 
importing dumped products while at the same time 
complaining against these practices. At the very least, 
any injury incurred by such companies should be 
considered self-induced but the Commission does not take 
this factor into account in this investigation.
Another common means of restricting the number of 
representatives of a particular industry required for a 
complaint is by taking advantage of the regional 
industry rule. Complainers are permitted to lodge 
petitions if they can establish that they represent a 
regional industry. In practice, this exception often 
permits national industries to lodge complaints. For 
example, in one case a complaint was accepted by the 
Commission on behalf of a Spanish organisation of cement 
producers.The- complainers claimed to represent the 
totality of Spanish producers of cement. The Commission 
accepted that the producers satisfied all the conditions 
required for proving the existence of a regional 
industry, namely;
(a) the producers sell virtually all their 
production in a single identifiable market, 
Spain;
(b) the demand for the product in Spain is not
881 O.J. L353/1 (1992).
Portland Cement From Turkev. Romania and Tunisia. O.J. ClOO/4 (1992).
_____ . . i:,; - ____
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substantially supplied by producers outside 
the European Union; and
(c) the dumped products were concentrated in that 
particular market.
This rule confers on national associations or groups of 
producers capacity to initiate complaints, thereby 
diluting the requirement that petitioners must satisfy 
the Commission that they represent a majority of 
European Union producers. Yet, complaints are frequently 
made on this basis.*** In Ammonium Nitrate From Belarus. 
Georgia, Lithuania. Russia, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan***, the Commission accepted the arguments 
of a UK producer that the United Kingdom alone could be 
considered a regional industry. This practice has the 
effect of allowing complainers to break done the 
European Union into isolated regional markets based on 
the demarcation between Member States.
In addition, the three requirements for establishing
regional industry are fundamentally inconsistent with 
the concept of the single internal market. The
requirement that the region is not supplied by producers 
outside the European Union does not exclude the
possibility that producers inside the European Union may 
supply the area under the principle of the free movement 
of goods. If there is such a flow of goods inside the 
European Union, there is no logical reason why a 
particular region should be considered sufficiently 
isolated to grant it a particular status.
Finally, the Commission has itself contributed this
circumvention by reviewing complaints to ensure that the
*** See also Portland Cement From Yugoslavia. O.J. L16/34 (1991); and Certain Asbestos Cement Pipes FromTurkev. O.J. L309/57 (1991).
*** O.J. C306/2 (1992) .
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complainers have identified the correct definition of 
the relevant product to allow standing. Where a European 
industry defines a product in terms too broad to allow 
it standing, the Commission has, on occasion, redefined 
the scope of the relevant product. To quote one example, 
in Certain Polyester Yarns From Taiwan. Indonesia. 
India. Turkev and Korea**^. the complaint defined the 
relevant product as polyester yarns. After examining the 
complaint, the Commission excluded sewing thread from 
the scope of the relevant product because a major 
proportion of the European Union sewing thread industry 
was not represented in the complaint. The application 
was allowed to proceed on the basis of the products 
redefined in the complaint.
These exceptions make a mockery of restrictions intended 
in the standing requirement. One possible means of 
emasculating manipulations of relevant product 
descriptions would be to require complainers to identify 
the relevant product by means of the CN Code Number a 
requirement which has been used by the Commission in a 
small minority of cases.**®
(3) Petition Requirement Thresholds
Investigations are meant to be commenced only if a orima 
facie case has been made of the existence of dumping and 
injury. On receipt of a complaint, the first task of the 
Commission is to verify that the allegations contained 
in the complaint are supported by factual and
**® O.J. L276/7 (1991) .
**® See, for example. Outer Rinaers of taoered Roller Bearings From Japan. O.J. L199/8 (1992); Deadburned(Sintered) magnesia From China. O.J. L282/15 (1992); and Electronic Weighing Scales From Singapore and Korea  ^O.J. L112/20 (1993).
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statistical evidence. This initial verification is 
carried out on very broad terms and, at this stage, only 
the general terms of the compliant are examined.
A complaint must contain 'sufficient evidence* of the 
existence of dumping, injury and c aus at i on . If  a 
complaint contains sufficient evidence of these factors, 
the decision on initiating the investigation is 
mandatory. The Commission has no discretion at this 
point to terminate the complaint without conducting a 
formal investigation.
It is difficult to determine how many complaints become 
investigations after this initial vetting stage. The 
European Commission will only comment that, at this 
stage *a very large number of potential complaints are 
withdrawn'.*®* The only statistics available in this 
connection are those provided to the GATT Secretariat as 
part of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.**® These 
statistics provide the following data:
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Complaints 62 46 75 57 38
Investigations 36 24 39 40 27
No reasons are provided for rejecting complaints, for
887 Article 5(2), Council Regulation 2423/88.
*** European Commission, Outline of Anti-Dumping Proceedings (1989), 1.
**® GATT, Trade Policv Review Mechanism EEC (Second Report) (1993), 76.
.
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example, because they are inchoate or not 
substantiated.*®® Nor is any indication given of the 
number of complaints withdrawn for other reasons.*®^ 
Thus, there is no means of verifying the evidential 
standards applied by the European Commission at the 
preliminary investigative stage.
It is, however, evident that, of those complaints 
admitted by the Commission, a considerable number of 
them are successful in procuring preliminary or 
definitive measures after investigation. Again the 
Commission claims that this is because of the rigorous 
vetting procedure which eliminates unjustified or 
inaccurate claims, but without adequate information, 
this is also a difficult claim to corroborate.
The European Court of Justice has commented recently on 
the sufficiency of evidence standard applied by the 
European Commission.*®^ In particular, it has observed 
that the evidence required in a complaint need not 
necessarily relate to dumping on the part of all the 
undertakings under investigation. Thus, the Commission 
is entitled to open an investigation into dumping even 
although there is no evidence of dumping from each of 
the undertakings named in the complaint as long as there 
is sufficient evidence of dumping of products 
originating in third countries.
*®® Alternatively, if 'profound changes' occur in the market place, the EU industry may withdraw the complaint; Certain Merchant Bars and Rods of Alloyed Steel From Turkey [termination] O.J. L35/12 (1992).
*®^ In fact, EU industries occasionally withdraw complaints themselves before the investigation has been concluded; see Audio Tapes on Reels From Japan [termination] O.J. 28/25 (1992)
*®^ Rima Electrometaluraia SA v EC Council. CaseC216/91 [1993] ECR I 6303.
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Investigations have in fact been initiated on the basis 
of the most superficial evidence contained in a 
complaint. For example, in Furfuraldéhyde From China*®^. 
the complaint alleged that dumping had occurred based on 
a comparison of export prices for Chinese producers with 
export prices for Argentinean producers. Nevertheless, 
the European Commission was prepared to accept this 
evidence as adequate proof of the requirements necessary 
for initiating a complaint. Similarly, an investigation 
was opened based on allegations of dumping supported by 
calculations comparing the basic import price of certain 
goods to the EU, as published by the Commission, with 
prices charged by exporters of the product to the EU.*®^
The Commission may also join complaints made by separate 
organisations at different times.*®* If such a joining 
of complaints occurs, it must be questioned whether the 
original complainers truly represented the majority of 
European Union producers.
Until 1988, the Commission was reluctant to accept 
complaints directed against specific producers in 
specific countries, preferring instead to examine all 
imports produced in the country of origin for the 
products. This policy had the inherently equitable 
quality of prohibiting a European Union producer from 
targeting the activities of a particular foreign 
producer. Further, since the Anti-Dumping Code requires 
anti-dumping duties to be imposed against states, and 
not private companies, the approach yielded results 
consistent with the Code in that any duties imposed were
893 O.J. C208/8 (1993).
*®^ Pig Iron From Turkey and the Soviet Union O.J. C246/9 (1991).
*®* See for example. Electronic Weighing Scales FromKorea. O.J. C84/14 (1992).
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against all exporters of the subject goods from the same 
country.
A significant departure in this policy occurred in 1988 
when the Commission investigated allegations that video 
cassette recorders from Korea and Japan were being 
dumped. In the complaint initiating the investigation, 
the European Union industry alleged that only specific 
producers in Japan were dumping. The main issue was 
therefore whether the Commission would investigate only 
those producers or all Japanese producers exporting to 
the European Union.
The Commission accepted the selective complaint, 
justifying its decision on the grounds that:
'The Commission is not legally required to always 
initiate anti-dumping proceedings against all 
importers in the country concerned. There is 
nothing in European Union law that requires the 
Commission to extend the scope of the investigation 
to all imports from a given country. '***
This decision ignores the obligation in the Anti-Dumping 
Code to apply dumping duties on a country-specific 
basis, which is probably why the Commission referred 
only to European Union law and not international law. 
Clearly selective complaints can be both discriminatory 
and an abuse of process since they can be used to harass 
specific foreign producers.
Another abusive practice on the part of some European 
Union industries and sanctioned by the Commission has 
been to repeatedly bring complaints if they are unable
*®* Video Cassette Recorders From Korea and Japan. O.J. L240/5 (1988) [preliminary measures]; O.J. L57/55(1989) [definitive measures].
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to secure protection on their first attempt. Thus, in 
one case, when the Commission decided that no material 
injury had occurred by reason of Korean imports of film, 
the European Union industry filed a virtually identical 
complaint against a slightly modified product eight days 
after the decision to terminate, claiming that the 
similar product was the cause of injury.*®^ Obviously, 
if no injury to the European Union industry has been 
established in the first investigation, it was highly 
unlikely to be established in the second. Nevertheless, 
the Commission allowed the complaint to proceed before 
again rendering a finding of no injury in the second 
investigation. ***
Also a non-confidential copy of the complaint is made 
available to concerned importers and exporters only 
after the investigation has been formally notified. This 
denies the defendants any genuine opportunity to 
challenge the allegations of sufficient evidence made in 
the compliant before the investigation has been 
initiated even although these may be genuine.
Finally, if a European Union industry withdraws a 
complaint, the Commission can proceed with the 
investigation if termination of the investigation is not 
considered to be in the interests of the European 
Union.*®® In faOt, this has occurred on numerous 
occasions.®®®
*®^ Polvester Film From Korea. O.J. 305/31 (1989)[termination]; O.J. C24/7 (1990) [initiation].
*®* Polvester Film From Korea (No. 2) . O.J. L151/89(1991).
*®® Article 5(4), Council Regulation 2423/88.
®®® See Audio Tapes From Jaoan and Korea. O.J. L28/25(1992); Paracetamol From China. O.J. L236/23 (1982); and Portland Cement From GDR, Poland. Yugoslavia and Thailand. O.J. 202/43 (1986).
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(4) Inequitable Conduct of Investigations
(A) Initial Determinations
Consultations are held with the Member States, in the 
form of the Anti-dumping Committee, prior to the 
official announcement of an investigation.®®^ While 
Member States are technically only advised of the 
possible opening of an investigation, in fact the 
Commission uses this opportunity to assess the strength 
of feelings among Member States as to the proceedings.
Once this period of consultations has been concluded, 
the Commissioner for External Relations has the final 
decision on whether or not to publish a notice in the 
Official Journal announcing an investigation. In 
practice, the Commissioner decides this question under 
the habilitation procedure which involves consultations 
with DG III, DG XXI and the Commission Legal Service. It 
is at this point that the political element is most 
evident.
(B) Period of Investigation
The Basic Regulation instructs the European Commission 
to conduct the investigation into dumping over a time- 
scale which 'shall normalIv cover a period of not less 
than six months immediately prior to the initiation of 
the proceedings'.®®^ Notwithstanding this rule, 
investigation periods are selected on an ad hoc basis by 
the Commission which has substantial discretion in
®®' Article 6(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
®®^ Article 7(1) (c). Council Regulation 2423/88.
_____
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choosing a particular period.®®* There is a clear lack 
of guidance in this respect and, further, explanations 
for the selection of particular periods are rarely 
provided in regulations imposing measures. The selection 
of varying periods hints at arbitrariness in the 
practice of the Commission.
(C) Penalties for Failing to Provide Adequate 
Information
In order to verify information submitted in the 
complaint, the Commission distributes questionnaires to 
interested parties. The Commission is authorised to seek 
all information 'necessary* for the investigation and to 
verify the records of importers, exporters, traders, 
agents, producers and trade associations.®®*
While questionnaires are sent to all relevant exporters, 
importers and producers, in practice the questionnaires 
are mainly used for the calculation of dumping. Tight 
deadlines are set for the return of these questionnaires 
and failure to comply with these strict requirements 
will result in information submitted outside the time 
limits being excluded from the investigation.
The right of the Commission to require the production of 
information that it deems relevant to the investigation 
is extensive. The Commission has traditionally been 
allowed considerable scope in deciding what information
®®* Twelve month period of investigation; 3.5" 
Microdisks From Japan. Taiwan and China. O.J. L95/5
(1993) [provisional]; and Electronic Weighing Scales 
From Singapore and Korea [definitive] O.J. L112/20
(1993). Fifteen month period: Ferro-silicon From Poland 
and Egypt [provisional] O.J. L183/8 (1992).
90t Article 7(2)(a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
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is relevant in an investigation.®®* The onus is on the 
party requested to disclose the information or justify 
non-disclosure when the party believes that the 
information is not strictly necessary to the 
investigation. In one case, the European Commission was 
not even prepared to discuss whether certain information 
requested from a company was in fact necessary for the 
investigation.®®* The Commission powers in this field 
are virtually absolute and do not appear to be subject 
to any limiting rule of reason or the principle of 
proportionality.
Where a foreign producer refuses to allow the Commission 
to verify information submitted, the Commission is 
instructed to make its findings on the basis of 'the 
facts available'.®®^ This determination is not made on 
the 'best' facts available, but merely those facts 
available. This means that the Commission is not obliged 
to search for better evidence than that made available 
by interested parties. While there is a natural tendency 
for Commission officials to justify this practice on the 
ground that uncooperative parties should not be 
rewarded, there still remains the question of whether 
such a rule is unduly onerous, particularly if the 
Commission would have little difficulty in discovering 
the relevant facts.
The Commission has recently adopted a number of 
practices which are deliberately intended to penalise 
foreign producers deemed not co-operating in 
investigations. For example, as a matter of policy, in
®®* In the area of competition policy, see 
Samenwerkende Elektriciteits Produktiebedriiven NV v EC 
Commission Case T-39/90 [1992] 5 CMLR 33.
®®* Compact Disc Players From Japan. O.J. L205/5(1989).
®®^ Article 7(7) (b). Council Regulation 2423/88.
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the absence of co-operation, information submitted in 
the complaint will be used in the investigation to the 
extent not contradicted. Thus, in one case nine Japanese 
producers of thermal paper were cited in a complaint as 
having dumped this product on the European Union market. 
Only four of the nine producers co-operated in the 
investigation. Three of the four co-operating companies 
were found to have been dumping and duties of 
approximately 10% were imposed.
The Commission based its findings against the other five 
companies on the 'facts available' rule.®®* These 
'facts' were drawn straight from the complaint itself. 
In particular, the Commission relied on the statement 
that these non-co-operating producers had significantly 
higher dumping margins than for those co-operating 
companies.®®® The possibility that the dumping 
calculation should have been made on the basis of the 
information submitted by the other companies was 
rejected. Eventually a dumping margin almost five times 
higher than those set for co-operating companies was 
found and the appropriate duty imposed.®*®
Another illustration of the European Commission trying 
to discourage non-co-operation occurred in rather 
bizarre circumstances. In Oxalic Acid From Taiwan and
®®* Thermal Paper From Japan. Commission Regulation 
(EEC) 2805/91 (1991) (preliminary determination), O.J. 
L27Q/15 (1991).
®®® European Commission, Tenth Annual Report on the 
Community's Anti-dumoinc and Anti-subsidv Activities. Sec (92) 716 Final (1992), 9-10.
®*® Similar treatment was given to a Japanese 
producer which co-operated in the initial stages of an 
investigation but which withdrew its co-operation in later stages; see Capacitors From Japan. O.J. L353/1 
(1992).
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South Korea®**, the producers from Taiwan co-operated 
but those from South Korea declined to do so. Hence, the 
dumping margin for the Korean industry was calculated on 
the basis of the information available to the 
Commission, ie. the allegations of the complainers.
This data resulted in a lower dumping margin for the
Korean exporters than the Taiwanese exporters. Not 
wishing to allow non-co-operating producers to benefit 
from their policy, the Council imposed the highest
duties found for the Taiwanese producers on the South 
Korean producers as well. The justification offered by 
the Council for this juxtaposition was that:
'the imposition of a lower duty on the South Korea 
product than that imposed on a product originating 
in a country which had co-operated with the
investigation would reward non-co-operation and 
make it possible to evade duties'.
Perhaps this is so. Nevertheless, this arbitrary cross­
application of duties in clearly a violation of the 
Anti-Dumping Code in so far as the duties applied 
exceeded the dumping margin found for the products in 
question.®*^
The Commission has also recently adopted a strategy of 
setting residual duties for non-co-operating companies 
at higher levels than for co-operating producers. 
Residual duties are levies imposed on goods from 
producers other than those participating in the 
investigation.®** To its credit, this strategy has only
911 O.J. L184/1 (1988).
®*^ See also Certain Polvester Yarns From Taiwan. 
Indonesia. India. Turkev and Korea. O.J. L276/7 (1991).
®** Thermal Paper From Japan, supra note 909.
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been used by the Commission where a substantial portion 
of the foreign producers elect not to co-operate.®*^
While on the one hand this may be seen as an attempt to 
encourage co-operation, there are serious questions 
whether it is fair to set duties at a higher level where 
no data has been received from a producer. Naturally, of 
course, the Commission can justify the practice by the 
argument that it gave the producers an opportunity to 
present its case and this was rejected. Certainly, the 
Commission will face insurmountable problems in 
obtaining evidence if none of the accused foreign 
producers co-operate in the investigation.®**
Not surprisingly, the European Court has expressed 
reservations concerning the application of this 
principle. In one case, the Advocate-General assigned to 
the case expressed the view that the Commission was 
required to take into account 'additional information 
other than that made available by the complainer, when 
available, if no* satisfactory response was received by 
an exporter. '®** However, the Advocate-General stopped 
short of requiring Commission officials to go to 
'inordinate lengths' to ascertain the relevant facts 
where companies are being non-co-operative.
If the Commission believes that an interested party has 
supplied false or misleading information, it is 
authorised to disregard such information and disallow
®*^* See Dihydrostretomvcin From China  ^ O.J. L362/1 (1991).
®** See for example, Silicon Metal From China  ^ O.J, L170/1 (1992). •
®** Allied Corporation v EC Council. Case 53/83[1985] ECR 1621, 1628.
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any claim which is supported by the information.®*^ The 
Commission has taken the view that it will only apply 
this provision where the information submitted is 
clearly incorrect.®** But there will obviously be 
difficulties in applying this rule, particularly to 
establish whether the false or misleading information 
was supplied in error or intentionally.
(D) Verification Practices
The Commission is empowered to conduct on-the-spot 
verification at the premises of complainants, importers 
and exporters to assess the value of information 
submitted in questionnaires.®*® No specific procedure is 
indicated for the conduct of these inspections or the 
selection of the companies whose premises are to be 
inspected.
Further, no official record of information provided by 
the subjects of the investigation is made available to 
interested parties despite the importance of such 
disclosure, hence, at subsequent disclosure meetings 
between investigated companies and the Commission 
officials, differences of opinion arise between the 
information gathered by the case-handlers and that 
contained on company records. No opportunity for 
correction of inaccurately-gathered information from on- 
the-spot investigations is therefore provided.
(E) Rights of Interested Parties
Only interested parties have rights to access the file
®*^ Article 7(b), Council Regulation 2423/88.
®** European Commission, Anti-dumoina Practice Note 
104, 7 (6/2/89).
®*® Article 7(2) (a)-(b) , Council Regulation 2423/88.
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maintained for the investigation and to make their views 
known to the Commission.®^ Interested parties, as a 
term, is not defined but is generally understood to 
relate to those parties directly concerned in the 
investigation namely the complainers, the relevant 
importers and concerned exporters as well as 
representatives of the exporting country.®^*
The European Court has been reluctant to extend the 
concept of interested parties to private parties other 
than those immediately concerned in the proceedings. In 
fact, the Court has gone as far as to tie the concept of 
interested party to that of standing to bring 
applications to challenge anti-dumping regulations. In 
other words, interested parties are those individuals 
who can establish direct and individual concern in the 
decision imposing anti-dumping measures.®^^
Until recently, the pursuit of this policy by the Court 
had the practical effect of excluding arm's length 
traders from the category of interested parties®^* as 
well as private organisations representing specific 
interest groups such as consumers.®^
(1) Access to the file
All interested parties, ie the complainers, importers 
and exporters, together with the representatives of the
®^® Article 7(5), Council Regulation 2423/88.
®^* Article 7(4) (a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
®^  ^ See Sermes v EC Commission. Case 279/85 [1987] 
ECR 3109.
®^* Ibid.
But see now. Bureau Européen des Unions De 
Consommateurs v EC Commission. Case 170/89 [1992] 1 CMLR 
820.
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exporting country may inspect all non-confidential 
information submitted to the Commission but only to the 
extent that such information is relevant to the defence 
of their interests and only provided if the Commission 
has made use of the information during the 
investigation. This process is known as 'disclosure*.
The general duty of the Commission in the discharge of 
its disclosure obligation has been stated as follows:
'In performing their dutv to provide information, 
the European Union institutions must act with all 
due diligence by seeking....to provide the 
undertaking concerned, as far as is compatible with 
the obligation not to disclose business secrets, 
with information relevant to the defence of their 
interests, choosing, if necessary on their own 
initiative, the appropriate means of providing such 
information.
This duty is balanced, to a certain extent, by the 
requirement that interested parties must make a written 
request to the Commission indicating the nature of the 
information required for the defence of their 
interests.^* Further, only submissions by parties need 
be made available. Internal documents prepared by the 
Commission, other than those for the computation of 
dumping margins and injury, need not be disclosed.
In providing access to information, the Commission has 
the difficult task of striking a balance between the 
duty to supply relevant information to interested 
parties to enable them to protect their interests and
925 Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (Samad) v EC
Council. Case 49/88 [1991] 3 CMLR 377.
Article 7(4) (a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
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the duty to protect parties submitting sensitive 
information from injury caused by insensitive 
disclosure.
The quality of the information disclosed at these 
meetings is known to vary greatly depending on the 
officials involved in the investigation. At one end of 
the spectrum, detailed calculations may be made 
available to allow interested parties to discover how 
dumping margins and injury thresholds were calculated. 
At the other end, only broad outlines of computations 
are made available. Again this has the effect of 
limiting the opportunities to interested parties to 
challenge the findings of the Commission.
The Commission has also been legitimately criticised for 
the timing of its disclosure meetings which often are 
held only after the publication of a preliminary 
determination. Naturally this practice denies importers 
and exporters an opportunity to influence the fixing of 
provisional duties. Even although the Commission does 
not collect preliminary duties until definitive measures 
have been decided, this does not diminish the fact that 
exporters and importers have a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that duties are set only after the Commission 
has heard their views on the matter.
(2) Right to receive information and to be 
informed of findings
Exporters and importers of products subject to 
investigation and, in the case of anti-subsidy measures, 
the representatives of the country of origin, may 
request to be informed of the 'essential facts and 
considerations' on the basis of which the Commission 
intends to recommend the imposition of definitive duties 
or the definitive collection of amounts secured by way
 :____________________________________
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of provisional duties, but not proposals for the 
imposition of provisional duties.®^ This process is 
also known as 'disclosure* and the actual provision 
itself was added to the basic regulation to respond to 
the views of Advocate-General Warner in NTN Tovo Bearing 
Co V EC Council®^®, who criticised the lack of regard 
for due process of law in the former anti-dumping 
procedures.
This provision was interpreted in a recent appeal to the 
European Court against the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties on imports of urea from Saudi Arabia.%® The 
applicants persuasively argued that the Council and 
Commission had failed adequately to inform them of the 
methodology employed for the calculation of the relevant 
dumping margins. In their defence, the European Union 
institutions referred to an internal Commission report 
and summaries of meetings with representatives of the 
applicants. The Court held that this was insufficient 
evidence that the European Union institutions had 
discharged their obligations adequately to supply the 
applicants with information material to their 
defence.®*®
(F) Abuse of Confidentiality
The protection of confidential information is an 
increasingly important aspect of anti-dumping 
proceedings. The disclosure of sensitive commercial
®^  ^Article 7(4) (b). Council Regulation 2423/88.
®2® Case 113/77 [1979] ECR 1185,
®^® Urea From Saudi Arabia. O.J. L137/1 (1987).
®*® A1 Jubail Fertiliser Co v EC Council Case 49/88
[1991] 3 CMLR 377. See also Case Comment in (1992) 29:2 
CML Rev 380.
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information relating to the business activities of a 
particular company to a rival organisation would be a 
serious matter in itself. But, the main concern is that 
a breach of this duty is more likely to place a foreign 
exporter at a 'disadvantage that a European Union 
industry for two reasons.
First, European Union industries have more direct access 
to Commission officials than foreign companies. Second, 
the information requested by the Commission from foreign 
producers is more explicit than that from European Union 
industries. While the Commission merely seeks 
information from European Union industries to establish 
injury, it requires detailed production information from 
foreign companies to calculate the margin of dumping as 
well as information on future production and marketing 
to assess future injury. Hence, the issue of 
confidentiality is per se one of more relevance to 
foreign producers than European Union industries.
The Commission is required to assess a request for 
confidential treatment and the general rule is that 
information will ordinarily be considered confidential 
if its disclosure would have a significantly adverse 
effect upon either the supplier of 
the information or its source.®**
If the Commission accepts that the information is 
confidential, the obligation to protect that information 
comes into effect. The problem arises when the 
Commission disagrees that the information is 
sufficiently sensitive to warrant confidential 
treatment. If it appears that a request for 
confidentiality is not justified and if the supplier of 
the information is unwilling to provide a non-
931 Article 8(3), Council Regulation 2423/88,
--
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confidential summary of it, the information may be 
disregarded by the Commission.®*^ This rule operates 
against foreign producers because, in the absence of 
submissions, the Commission is instructed to use any 
alternative source available to it.
Where the Commission uses confidential information in 
its calculation of dumping, interested parties are not 
entitled automatically to review that information 
regardless of how critical it is in the determination of 
duties. Therefore, for example, when the Commission used 
confidential information to construct a normal value for 
a foreign exporter's product, the European Court upheld 
the Commission decision denying the exporter access to 
related information provided by another party even 
although this related to establishing prices for the 
exported goods.®**
This rule makes the possibility of challenging a measure 
much more difficult, in particular for exporters since 
they are the interested parties most likely to be 
raising proceedings for the review of the Commission 
measures. Complainers and European Union industries 
would only initiate proceedings to challenge a decision 
of the Commission terminating the investigation without 
measures.
(5) Blatant Disregard of Time Limits
The basic regulation requires that proceedings should be 
concluded within one year of initiation in the absence
5855.
®*^ Article 8(4), Council Regulation 2423.
®** TEC V EC Council, Cases 260/85, 106/86 [1988] ECR
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of special circumstances.®*^ In fact the Commission has 
had difficulties regularly complying with this time 
limit even when no special circumstances justified the 
additional delay. The Commission reported that the 
average investigation is approximately nine months.®** 
But, although the average period may fall within the one 
year limit set in the regulation and the Anti-dumping 
Code, often investigations take considerably longer than 
this period.®*®
The Commission justifies the time taken to conclude 
cases by reference to the fact that a full and thorough 
investigation is conducted before preliminary measures 
are adopted. While this may be true, it implies that the 
bulk of the investigation is carried out at the 
preliminary stage before definitive measures are 
adopted. Hence, there would be little justification for 
excessive delay between the preliminary finding and the 
final measure.
There is little doubt that the length of investigations 
is also caused by other factors. The Commission has 
complained that it lacks sufficient manpower efficiently 
to process the average annual caseload and there is also 
the element of the increasing complexity in 
investigations.®*'^ In one investigation the annual value
934 Article 7(9)(a). Council Regulation 2423/88.
®** European Commission, Sixth Annual Report on the 
Community Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidv Activities. COM 
(89) 106 Final (1989), 7.
®*® For example, in Electronic Weighing Scales From 
Japan. O.J. L104/4 (1993), the investigation lasted 24 months. In 3 ' 5" Microdisks From Japan. Taiwan and China. 
O.J. L95/5 (1995) even the provisional duty
investigation extended to a 21 months period.
®*^ See, European Commission, Fifth Annual Report on 
the Community Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidv Activities. 
COM (88) Final (1988), 3-4.
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of imports affected was more that 1,000 million ECU and 
approximately one hundred interested parties were 
involved.®*®
Yet the European Court has not been prepared to support 
applications contending that the period of investigation 
is too protracted. In one case, the Court considered 
that an investigation period of thirty two months was 
not unreasonable since the peculiar circumstances of the 
case prevented the Commission from completing its 
investigation within the prescribed period.®*®
The twelve month limit was considered only to be a 
'reasonable period' for the conclusion of an 
investigation. The Court expressed the view that this 
was only a guide and was not mandatory and, further, 
where external factors require consideration, the period 
may be extended as is reasonable in the circumstances. 
In this particular case, the thirty two month period was 
considered justified considering the political events 
and currency depreciation in the exporting country.
In another case, a protracted period of four years was 
held not to vitiate a measure.*® This decision was 
rendered despite the fact that the 1979 Anti-dumping 
Code requires that investigations are concluded, in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances, within a one 
year period.
The European Commission recently proposed the 
introduction of time limits for the conclusion of
938 Photocopiers From Japan. O.J. L54/12 (1987).
®*® Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft Erhard-Renken 
GmbH V Hauptzollamt Munchen-Wëst. Case 246/87 [1991] 1 
CMLR 761.
®*® Etaireia v EC Council. Case 1 2 2 / 8 6  [ 1 9 8 9 ]  ECR
3959.
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investigations due to the pressure exerted by such 
criticisms.** This proposal was adopted by the Council 
in part on March 7, 1994, and the following periods have 
been introduced:
a maximum one month period from receipt of the 
complaint to initiation or rejection of the 
complaint.
a maximum nine months period between 
initiation of the investigation and the
decision on provisional measures, 
a maximum fifteen months period between
initiation of the investigation and the
decision on definitive measures.*%
However, the fifteen months total period envisaged is 
still longer than the one year period recommended by the 
Anti-Dumping Code and as practised by the EU*s trading 
partners including the United States.
(6) Bias in Providing Relief
(A) Provisional Measures
In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, if the 
three elements of dumping are found to exist, the 
Commission will propose the publication of a regulation 
imposing provisional anti-dumping duties.** No actual 
duties are imposed at this stage. Collection of
** European Commission, Proposal to Improve 
Procedures and Management of the Community's Instruments 
of Commercial Defence. Com Doc SEC (92) 1097 Final(1992).
*^  Council Regulation 521/94/EEC amending Council 
Regulation 2423/88/EEC on the Introduction of Time 
Limits for Investigation Procedures Carried Out Against Dumped and Subsidised Products.
943 Article 11(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
_______ -----
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provisional duties only occurs if the definitive 
determination is affirmative.** Preliminary measures 
are valid for four months although the measures may be 
extended for an additional two months.**
The imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties, in the 
form of a Council regulation, completely supplants any 
provisional measures adopted by the Commission. In 
effect, this means that proceedings cannot be brought to 
annul a Commission regulation imposing provisional 
duties.*®
In the event that such a duty is imposed, the release of 
the products under investigation into free circulation 
within the European Union becomes conditional on the 
provision of security for the amount of provisional 
duty. Usually, the Commission requires the posting of a 
bond for the amount of duty assessed under the 
provisional measure.
When an order for collection is made at the definitive 
stage for the collection of provisional duties, it comes 
into effect for all products which have not cleared 
European Union customs at that point in time. Thus, 
even if the exports have been despatched by the producer 
before the date on which the measure came into force, 
they will be subject to duties if in transit to the 
European Union but not yet customs cleared.*? This has
** See European Commission, Fifth Annual Report on 
the Community Anti-Dumoina and Anti-Subsidv Activities. 
COM (88) 92 Final (1988), 6,
** Article 11(5), Council Regulation 2423/88.
*® Brother Industries v EC Commission. Case 250/85
[1990] 1 CMLR 792.
*? See Gas Fuelled Non-Refillable Pocket Lighters 
From Japan. China. Korea and Thailand. O.J, L326/1
(1991).
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the effect of imposing the duties on goods which a 
producer has sent out only in the knowledge that an 
investigation is in process.
The Commission's argument in support of this policy is 
two-fold. First, the basic regulation does not allow any 
exceptions to the rule that anti-dumping duties are to 
be applied at the moment goods enter into free 
circulation in the European Union. Second, producers are 
notified of the proceedings and periodically updated of 
the stage of the proceedings which has been reached.
The levels of preliminary duties do not always 
approximate the levels of definitive duties adopted even 
although the emphasis of the investigation after the 
preliminary determination is into the question of injury 
sustained by the European Union industry and not 
dumping. For example, in one investigation, the levels 
of preliminary duties were five times higher than the 
levels of definitive duties,*® It is extremely 
difficult to see how such a large variation could have 
occurred without some error having been made by the 
Commission, admittedly at either the preliminary 
determination or definitive stage of the investigation.
(B) Undertakings
It is a noticeable feature that a high percentage of 
anti-dumping investigations are concluded by the 
acceptance of undertakings by the Commission from 
parties found to have engaged in dumping.*® The primary
*® Video Cassettes and Video Tape Reels From Korea 
and Hong Kong, O.J. L356/47 (1988) [provisional duties]; 
O.L. L174/1 (1989) [definitive duties].
*® It is possible that the significance of price 
undertakings will gradually decrease in the future to be 
replaced by definitive measures. This is because 
products under investigation are becoming increasingly
I
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rule is that where, in the course of an investigation, 
undertakings are offered which the Commission, after 
consultations, considers acceptable, an investigation 
may be terminated without the imposition of provisional 
or definitive .duties.®*® The Commission is also 
authorised to suggest appropriate price undertakings.®**
Undertakings can be imposed for a retrospective period. 
Thus, in Seamless Pipes and Tubes of Iron or Non-Alloy 
Steel From Hunaarv. Poland and Croatia** the Commission 
published its decision accepting undertakings on May 15 
although the measure applied to all shipments released 
for free circulation in the European Union as from 
January 1.
In the past, the Commission maintained a relatively 
liberal policy towards the acceptance of undertakings. 
This was justified on two grounds. First, anti-dumping 
and anti-subsidy-measures are designed to relieve injury 
and are not intended to raise revenue or to penalise 
exporters because of past pricing behaviour. Second, the 
1979 Anti-Dumping Code requires administering 
authorities to explore the possibilities of 
'constructive remedies' before applying duties.®**
The basic regulation does not establish any substantive
sophisticated. The more complex the product, the more 
difficult undertakings are to administer.
®*® Article 10(1), Regulation 2423/88.
®** Article 10(3), Council Regulation 2423/88.
®*2 O.J. L120/42 (1993) .
®** Thus, in Certain Acrvlic Fibres From Mexico. O.J. 
L301/1 (1989), the Commission accepted undertakings
from the Mexican companies as a 'constructive measure* 
to take account of the country of origin's position as 
a developing country.
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criteria or conditions to bind the Commission to offer 
undertakings or to accept or reject undertakings 
submitted by a company. The Commission's policy towards 
undertakings revolves around two conditions:
(a) the acceptance of the price undertakings must 
be administratively feasible in view of the 
number of importers involved; and
(b) there are grounds for believing that the 
undertakings will be respected.
Thus, the Commission has declined to accept undertakings 
which proved administratively cumbersome in terms of the 
number of exporters involved®**, the number of models of 
the relevant products exported, the variations in 
possible features of the products and the frequent 
renewal of models,®*® The Commission will also refuse 
undertakings if these would require frequent adjustment 
to fluctuating prices.®*?
While these two rules form the core of the policy, it 
cannot be said that these are the only conditions that 
must be satisfied. For example, the Commission will 
refuse to accept price undertakings offered by producers 
which have failed to co-operate during the 
investigation.®*® Similarly, the Commission has declined
®** European Commission, Sixth Annual Report on the 
Community Anti-Dumpina and Anti-Dumoina Activities. (89 ) 
106 Final (1989), 5.
®** Capacitors From Japan [definitive measures] O.J, 
L353/1 (1992).
®*® Compact Disc Plavers From Japan and Korea. O.J, 
L13/21 (1990).
®*? Silicon Metal From Brazil [definitive measures] O.J. L222/1 (1992).
®*® Oxalic Acid From Korea and Taiwan [definitive 
measures] O.J. L184/1 (1988).
:
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to accept undertakings from Japanese producers due to 
'the current state of European Union relations with 
J a p a n ' . A n  even more maverick justification for 
rejecting offers of undertakings from Canadian producers 
was because Canadian anti-dumping law does not permit 
the possibility of the Canadian authorities accepting 
undertakings from European Union producers in such 
investigations.^ In light of these rulings, can it be 
said that Commission policy is impartial?
The Commission has also recently refused to accept 
undertakings for no express reason and instead applied 
anti-dumping duties against the exporters.^* However, 
the truly arbitrary feature of this policy is exposed if 
the incidence of the country of origin from which 
exporters' undertakings are accepted is considered. The 
occasions in which the Commission has been willing to 
accept undertakings from Japanese producers has decline 
sharply in recent years. Further, in circumstances 
where the European Union maintains a negative trade 
balance with a state, even over a short period, the 
incidence of failure to accept undertakings increases as 
the Commission views undertakings as a softer option 
than the introduction of duties.
If undertakings are accepted by the Commission, the 
investigation into injury is nevertheless continued if
Hydraulic Excavators From Japan. O.J. LlOl/24
(1988).
Pentaerythritol From Canada. O.J. L13/1 (1985).
Gas Lighters From Thailand, O.J. L267/2; and Corrundum From China. Russia and the Ukraine. O.J, 
L235/1 (1993).
See P.K.M. Tharakan, "The Political Economy of 
Anti-Dumping Undertakings in the European Communities",
(1991) 35 European Economic Review 134.
Ibid.
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the Commission so decides or if such a request is made 
by exporters representing a significant percentage of 
the trade involved.^* In such cases, if the Commission 
makes a determination of no injury, any undertakings 
given automatically lapse.
Where an undertaking is withdrawn by the Commission 
provisional anti-dumping duties may be applied 
immediately on the basis of the facts established before 
the undertaking was accepted.^ A similar result may be 
achieved when the Commission has reason to believe that 
undertakings have been violated as long as European 
Union interests require the adoption of such measures.
The Commission also has considerable discretion to 
review, and if necessary revoke, an acceptance of price 
undertakings in the course of later investigations even 
if no complaint has been made against the company in 
question or if the review takes place as a result of a 
complaint against other companies involved in the 
investigation.
There is no appeal against a refusal by the Commission 
to accept undertakings until the Council has adopted 
definitive duties. Even then, the appeal can only be 
made as part of the general appeal against the 
definitive measures.^? This makes judicial review of 
the Commission's discretion to accept or reject 
undertakings virtually impossible to appeal and, in
964 Article 10(4), Council Regulation 2423/88,
See Potassium Permanganate From Czechoslovakia. 
O.J. C216/7 (1989); and Non-Refiliable Pocket Flint
Lighters From Thailand. O.J. L267/2 (1993).
^  NTN Tovo Bearing Co v EC Council. Case 240/84
[1989] 2 CMLR 76.
Nashua Coro v EC Commission and EC Council. Case 
133/87 [1990] 1 CMLR 6.
_ ---  ;
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terms of substantive law, few appeals if any have been 
successful. For example, in Nachi Fuiikoshi v EC 
Council^* the European Court rejected outright three 
potential grounds on which to invalidate a refusal to 
accept undertakings namely: (a) the request for
undertakings was rejected without having had proper 
individual consideration; (b) the reasoning behind the 
rejection was defective; and (c) that the substantive 
legal requirements had not been satisfied. The Court 
rejected the application because, it claimed, they had:
'not shown that the reasons for refusing the 
undertakings ...exceeded the margin of discretion 
conferred upon the institutions'.
Quite clearly the Court was not willing to deviate from 
a strict and non-teleological construction of the Basic 
Regulation.
The conclusion reached as regards undertakings is that, 
even although such measures are permitted under the 
Anti-Dumping Codé, the policy of the European Commission 
has been arbitrary, discriminatory and inconsistent. 
Advantage has been taken of the vagueness of the rules 
for undertakings, for trade policy purposes and not as a 
legitimate alternative to counter dumping.
(C) Definitive Measures
Where dumping, injury and causation have been 
established, and if European Union interests call for 
intervention, definitive anti-dumping duties may be
968 Case 255/84 [1989] 2 CMLR 76.
See also Minebea v EC Council Case 260/84 [1989]2 CMLR 76.
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imposed by the Council.^* Regulations imposing 
definitive duties require only a simple majority in the 
Council for their adoption, acting on a proposal 
submitted by the Commission after consultations with the 
Anti-dumping Committee.
Definitive duties can take a number of forms, but the 
most common is an ad valorem duty. The European Union 
has also imposed duties at fixed amounts calculated 
relative to quantity or volume where special 
circumstances prevail. For example, in certain Sheets 
and Plates of Iron or Steel From Yugoslavia^, specific 
duties of 48 ECU/tonne were imposed because of the 
•specific circumstances of the market and in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of the measure*. In fact, 
specific duties' are most commonly encountered in 
investigations into metal products and chemical 
products. 3^ In other cases, duties are imposed in the 
form of a mixture of minimum prices and fixed duties^"^, 
or variable duties.
An extremely controversial practice adopted by the 
Commission with regard to the setting of definitive
Article .12, Council Regulation 2324/88.
At the General Affairs Council Meeting of 
December 15, 1993, it was agreed that future decisions 
on definitive measures in anti-dumping cases would be 
taken by simple majority voting. Previously voting was 
by qualified majority which allowed a blocking majority 
of 23 votes.
O.J. L188/14 (1988).
See also Certain Iron or Steel Coils From 
Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia. O.J. L188/18 (1988).
Dihvdrostreptomvcin From China. Council Regulation L362/1 (1991).
Video Cassettes From Hong Kong. O.J. L139/1
(1992).
'  : ! ' '  .......
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measures is that of setting residual duties for 
producers not parties to the investigation. In the past, 
residual duties were previously established at the 
level of the highest dumping margins found for any 
producer co-operating in the investigation and these 
were applied to non-identified or non-cooperating 
producers also exporting to the European Union.
Nevertheless, residual duties generally penalize 
importers which may not have any intention of engaging 
in dumping but which are, coincidentally, producers from 
the same country of origins and of the same goods as 
other producers subject to duties. These producers are 
automatically attributed the highest dumping margins in 
the investigation. This practice is GATT-illegal because 
no investigation into dumping or injury has been 
conducted prior to the imposition of these duties on the 
new products.
(D) Miscellaneous Forms of Relief
The Basic Regulation specifies only a limited number of 
means of terminating an investigation and, on the whole, 
the European Union institutions have complied with this 
specification. Thus, in very few cases are 
investigations concluded by means other than termination 
of proceedings, definitive duties or undertakings.
The most interesting illustration of an exception to 
this rule occurred in a recent investigation which was 
fraught with political implications and undertones. In 
1990, a complaint was lodged by a European Union 
industry alleging that Norwegian producers were engaging 
in dumping in the European Union market.^* The 
investigation itself came at an embarrassing time
Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Norway. O.J. C25/6(1990).
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because Norway was one of the EFTA states negotiating 
the European Economic Area Treaty. One of the articles 
of this treaty restricted the right of the European 
Union to impose anti-dumping duties since the 
competition law of the European Union was to apply 
inside the new structure.
The investigation revealed a dumping margin of 
approximately 11.3% and a margin of injury of 29.6%.^ 
Nevertheless, no measures were adopted by the European 
Union because the Norwegian government introduced a 
series of measures to restrict the volume of salmon 
reaching the European Union market. The Commission 
proposed that these measures were sufficient subject to 
close supervision of imports. This proposal was opposed 
by the UK and Irish delegates in the Anti-dumping 
Committee but eventually the proposal to terminate was 
forwarded to the Council. Since the Council was unable 
to agree on an amendment to the measure, it was adopted 
after the one month period specified in the regulation 
for amendment.
This settlement amounts to an informal voluntary
restraint agreement. The Norwegian government imposed 
measures which . were accepted indirectly by the
Commission. Yet, there is no provision in the basic
regulation for such a resolution and, there is evidence 
to suggest that political pressure from inside the 
European Union and outside - the Norwegian government - 
lead to this settlement.
This form of settlement of an anti-dumping case is not 
unprecedented. In the so-called steel war of the early 
1980s, in exchange for the suspension of duties, most 
countries exporting steel to the European Union and
^  Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Norwav. O.J. L69/3(1991).
' ' ' ""' i: :  “ ■ ■ •' " - ' ' ■ :
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whose exports were subject to duties, entered into 
•steel arrangements* which were essentially voluntary 
restraint agreements.^* Similarly, in certain areas of 
the electronics industry, voluntary restraint agreements 
are in operation after anti-dumping investigations. For 
example, in 1983, anti-dumping proceedings against 
Japanese imports of VCRs were terminated at an early 
stage in exchange for a three year unilateral VRA 
offered by Japan.
(7) The Lesser Duty Rule
The amount of the anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duty, 
whether provisional or final, cannot exceed the dumping 
margin and * should be less* if such lesser duty would be 
adequate to remove the injury.®*® In the event that the 
injury margin is higher than the dumping margin, the 
dumping margin applies.®*^
Two commentators have estimated that in approximately 
44% of investigations, duties are imposed at the level 
of injury and not the margin of dumping.®*^ However, 
this statistic disguises two facts. First, where duties 
are restricted to the margin of injury, the amount of 
the duties imposed tends to remain extremely high. 
Second, in the same cases, some producers may have
®^* See text, supra pp.475-481.
®^® Television Image and Sound Recorders From Japan. O.J. L86/23 (1983).
®*® Article 13(3), Council Regulation 2423/88.
®*^ See Dihvdrostreptomvcin From China. O.J. L187/23
(1991); and Electronic Weighing Scales From Singapore 
and Korea. O.J. L112/20 (1993).
®*^ E. Vermulst & P. Waer, *'The Calculation of Injury 
Margins in EC Anti-Dumping Proceedings'*, (1991) 25:6 JWT 5.
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duties set at the dumping margin and others at levels 
set at the margin of injury opening the Commission to 
charges of discrimination when this is practised on a 
country-wide basis.®**
(8) Simultaneous Imposition of Anti-Dumping and Anti- 
Subsidy Duties
The GATT is quite explicit in its condemnation of the 
simultaneous imposition of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
duties. This prohibition states that;
•No product of the territory of any contracting 
party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be subject to both anti­
dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for 
the same situation of dumping or export 
subsidisation, *®*^
The Commission has not accepted this prohibition as 
absolute.®*^ Parallel investigations into dumping and 
subsidisation for the same goods, while not a common 
occurrence, have in fact taken place. More specifically, 
the application of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties 
does not preclude a later investigation into allegations 
of the other practice.
For example, in one case where anti-dumping duties 
applied, the Commission conducted an investigation into
®** See Small Screen Colour TV receivers From Hona 
Kong and China [definitive measures] O.J. L195/1 (1991) .
984 Article VI(5), General Agreement.
®*^ See European Commission, Anti-Dumping Practice 
Note 30 (5/1/83).
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the existence of subsidies for the same products.^* 
True, the Commission did not actually impose anti­
subsidy duties equivalent to the subsidies found to 
exist but rather suspended their application in light of 
the protection already in place for the industry. 
Nevertheless, conducting both anti-dumping and anti­
subsidy investigations into the same product only makes 
sense if the Commission intends to impose additional 
duties if certain facts are found to exist.
The Commission has recently indicated that, in certain 
circumstances, the application of both types of duties 
may be justified. The general rule, as devised by the 
Commission, is that simultaneous imposition is 
permissible to the extent that a subsidy - either export 
or domestic - has no effect on the amount of the dumping 
margin,®**
In Polvester Yarn and Fibres From Turkev®*®. anti­
dumping duties were imposed after an investigation. 
Subsequently the Commission conducted an anti-subsidy 
investigation of the same products and found the 
existence of export subsidies. These subsidies were held 
not to have been granted during the earlier anti-dumping 
investigation and therefore could not have had any 
impact on the dumping margins found to exist. In the 
regulation imposing measures, the Council stated that:
®*^ Sheets and Plates of Iron and Steel From Brazil. 
O.J. L45/11 (1983); and Steel Plates From Brazil. O.J. 
L205/29 (1983). '
®*^ See also. Seamless Tubes of Non-Allov Steel From 
Spain. O.J. L196/34 (1980) ; and Binder and Baler Twine 
From Brazil and Mexico. O.J. L251/28 (1993).
®** European Commission, Anti-dumping Practice Note 
130 (2/4/92).
®*® O.J. L137/1 (1991) .
__ _____ I________________________________________ I_________   I---—
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'The Council..-confirmed that Article 13(9) (of the 
basic regulation) does not preclude the imposition 
of countervailing duties in addition to anti­
dumping duties against the domestic subsidies 
found, as well as against export subsides which 
cannot have influenced the anti-dumping duty since 
the companies concerned benefitted from them after 
the anti-dumping duties were imposed.'
In the circumstances, the Commission felt able to apply 
an additional anti-subsidy duty to countervail the 
subsidies found to exist.®®®
Justifying the imposition of both types of measures in 
a later investigation, the Commission provided a more 
detailed rationale for its practices.®®^ First, it 
pointed out that, where the normal value is constructed, 
there are two components in this computation - the costs 
of production and a reasonable profit margin. The effect 
of the duty under consideration - a duty and tax 
exemption on imports - was to reduce the cost of 
production element in the calculation of normal value 
which subsequently produced a drop in the export price. 
Consequently, the fall in the export price could not be 
greater than the reduction in the normal value.
A second subsidy, however, was not considered to have 
such an equitable impact. The Commission considered that 
a corporate income tax exemption affected only the 
export price and consequently the profits on sales to 
all third countries. Since the element of the 
constructed value attributed to the reasonable margin of 
profit element in the normal value calculation had been
®®® Polvester Yarn and Fibre From Turkey. O.J. 
L272/92 (1991). '
®®^ Ballbearings From Thailand. O.J. L152/59 (1990) .
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calculated on products sold in the country of origin via 
a first independent customer located in Singapore, it 
followed that the subsidy affected the reasonable margin 
of profit element of the component costs by the same 
amount as the export price.
The Commission therefore concluded that the 
countervailable subsidies found to exist affected the 
normal value in the same manner as the export price. The 
elimination of those subsidies by the imposition of a 
countervailing duty or by an undertaking would have no 
effect on the dumping margin found. Consequently the 
Commission considered that it was appropriate to impose 
an anti-dumping duty in addition to the anti-subsidy 
measures already applying.
The Commission has therefore set itself out on a 
collision course not only with the terms of Article VI 
of the GATT but also the express terms of its own basic 
regulation. The term 'the same situation' is being 
interpreted narrowly to allow a distinction to be drawn 
between the circumstances of dumping and the fact of 
granting subsidies. The main question is whether this is 
a permissible distinction to be drawn. If the GATT 
allows this interpretation, the prohibition contained in 
Article VI will .become, for all intents and purposes, 
worthless.
(9) Innovative Forms of Investigation - Anti-Absorption 
Duties
In the mid-1980s, the Commission began suspecting that 
a number of foreign manufacturers were absorbing the 
costs of anti-dumping duties imposed on exports and not
Anti-subsidy measures were imposed in the 
investigation. Ballbearings From Thailand. O.J. L152/30(1990).
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passing this cost on to the European Union customers. If 
producers or exporters were prepared to accept the full 
charge of this duty, the price of the goods entering the 
European Union would be exactly the same as before the 
duties were imposed.
The Commission • took the view that this practice 
neutralised the objective of imposing duties in the 
first place, namely to raise the price of the foreign 
goods to European Union customers. At the same time, 
prices would not rise to a sufficient degree to remove 
the injury found to have been caused where price 
undercutting was found to be present.
To counter this development, the 1988 basic regulation 
introduced a new rule to allow for the imposition of so- 
called anti-absorption duties in such circumstances.®®* 
In the event that the Commission finds that the duty has 
been absorbed it may impose an additional duty 
commensurate with the amount of duty found to have been 
borne, in whole or part, by the exporter.®®^ There is no 
requirement that the duties originally imposed have been 
applied on the basis of a definitive measure. The rule 
applies equally to provisional and definitive duties.®®*
If duties are being allegedly absorbed in this manner, 
a party 'directly concerned' may submit a complaint to 
the Commission accompanied by sufficient evidence to 
show that the duty has been borne by the exporter.®®® A 
further investigation is conducted by the Commission
®®* Article 13(11), Council Regulation 2423/88.
®®"* See Silicon Metal From China. O.J. C273/20
(1991).
®®* See Silicon Metal From China. O.J. L170/1 (1992).
®®® See, for example. Woven Polythene Baas fromChina. O.J. C157/5 (1991).
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into these allegations. But this investigation is 
conducted at the instance of a directly concerned party 
not an interested party. Further, there is no need for 
the complainer to establish that it represents the 
relevant European Union industry and that it was a party 
to the original complaint which resulted in the 
imposition of the anti-dumping duties in the first 
place.
While exporters and importers have an opportunity to 
defend themselves by showing that the absence of any 
price increase is due to reductions in costs incurred, 
the onus is on the exporter to prove the existence of 
these changed circumstances. There is no provision for 
justifying price maintenance against developments in the 
European Union market-place. For example, it is not 
clear that reduced European Union prices, caused for 
example because research and development expenditure has 
matured, or if European Union producers have become more 
efficient, can justify non-increasing foreign export 
prices.
The standard of evidence submitted for such 
investigations is also unreasonably low. For example, in 
one case evidence that the average retail prices in the 
European Union of goods had neither increased or 
decreased was considered sufficient by the Commission to 
initiate an investigation.®®^
The levels of duty imposed can be considerable. In one 
case the amount of absorption found by the Commission 
was 178%, although obviously a duty in excess of 100% 
could not be imposed because this would be over-
®®^ Compact Disc Plavers From Japan and Korea. O.J.C174/15 (1991).
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compensating for the absorption.®®* In another case, the 
Commission found levels of absorption of duties of 
97.6%, expressed, as a percentage of the amount of duty 
paid and, as a result, increased the original duty from 
43.4% to 85.7%.®®®
The application of the provision also leaves a number of 
issues outstanding. First, it is not clear whether 
complete absorption of the duties is required or whether 
partial absorption will suffice. Second, the process 
through which the Commission establishes that the non­
movement in prices has been caused by absorption and not 
other factors such as increased supplies from other 
countries, competition in the market place, or another 
form of unrelated factors is far from clear.
In any event, the provision places foreign exporters at 
a distinct, and even deliberate, disadvantage. The 
Commission, for its part, has generally recognised that 
this is the case and has made infrequent use of this 
provision, more likely to avert controversy rather than 
out of benevolence.
Nevertheless, the application of the provision has 
provoked at least once country to protest in the GATT 
against the continued use of its terms. Similarly, 
the use of the measure provoked one exporter to request 
a European Court judgment which in fact eventually 
supported the continued use of the measure but only on 
the grounds of European Union law.^ ®®^
998 Silicon Metal From China. O.J. L170/1 (1992).
®®® Woven Polvolefin Sacks From China, O.J. L215/1 (1993).
1000 Japan v European Community.
Cartorobica v Ministero delle Finanze. Case189/88 [1991] 2 CMLR 782.
940
Since the complaint to the GATT, the Commission has 
surreptitiously adopted an alternative strategy. In one 
case, the Commission changed the terms of an 
investigation being carried out from an anti-absorption 
investigation into a full review under Article 14 
This change of strategy allows the Commission to achieve 
the same objective, ie a review of the duties, through 
a less controversial procedure.
(10) The Legality of European Union Anti-Circumvention 
Measures
Originally, the European Union's anti-circumvention 
legislation was enacted in June 1987^ ®®*, but this 
provision was subsequently incorporated into the 1988 
basic regulation.This provision, which has now been 
superseded by new measures contained in Council 
Regulation (EC) 3283/94 ®^®*. was enacted because the 
Commission formed the view;
•Experience had shown that for certain products 
circumvention can be achieved by importing 
component parts of a product rather than the 
finished product itself, and assembling the parts 
within the European Union by what is known as
®^®* See Compact Disc Plavers From Japan and Korea. 
O.J. C334/8 (1991).
®^®* Council Regulation (EEC) 1761/87. O.J. L167/9(1987).
1004 Article 13(10), Council Regulation 2423/88.
1005 Article 13, Council Regulation 3283/94.
1006 European Commission, Sixth Annual Report on 
Community Anti-Dumoing and Anti-Subsidv Activities. COM (89) 106 Final (1989), 12.
See generally, P.J. McDermott, "Extending the 
Reach of Their Anti-Dumping Duties: The EC's Screwdriver 
Assembly Regulations", (1988) 20 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus, 315.
On the rule of origin requirement, see N.A. Zaimis, EC rules of Origin (1992), 108-113.
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* screwdriver operations '.
The purpose of the legislation, as expressed in the 
preamble to the basic regulation, was to prevent 
circumvention of the collection of anti-dumping 
duties.
The regulation provided that definitive anti-dumping 
duties may be imposed on products that were introduced 
into the commerce of the European Union after having 
been assembled or produced in the European Union when 
three conditions were satisfied:
(a) the assembly or production is carried out by a 
party which is related or associated to any of the 
manufacturers whose exports of the like product are 
subject to a definitive anti-dumping duty;
(b) the assembly or production operation was started or 
substantially increased after the opening of the 
anti-dumping investigation; and
(c) the value of parts or materials used in the
assembly or production operation and originating in 
the country of exportation of the product subject 
to the anti-dumping duty exceeds the value of all
other parts or materials used by at least 50%.^ ®®*
In applying the provision, the Commission was instructed 
to take account of the circumstances of each case and, 
in particular, the variable costs incurred in the
1 .
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assembly or production operation and of the research and 
development carried out and the technology applied 
within the European Union.
The rate of anti-circumvention duty to be assessed is 
the rate applicable to the manufacturer in the country 
of origin of the like product subject to the anti­
dumping duty to which the party in the European Union 
carrying out the assembly or production is related or 
a s s o c i a t e d . T h e  duty is normally a flat-rate one 
imposed on each assembled unit.^ ®^ ^
Assemblers accused of anti-circumvention are given very 
limited procedural rights analogous to those contained 
in the basic regulation i t s e l f . The facts must be 
established by means of a formal investigation. A 
complaint from an interested European Union industry 
must be received in order to initiate an investigation. 
All interested parties are given an opportunity to 
defend their interests. Yet, as we have seen a number of 
the basic procedural safeguards are themselves
®^®® On this subject in general, see I. V. Bael, 
"Japanese Investment in the EC: Trojan Horse or
Hostage", (1987) Int'l Financial Law Review 10; R. 
Bierwagen, "Input, Downstream, Upstream, Secondary, 
Diversionary and Components of Sub-Assembly Dumping",
(1988) 22:3 JWT 27; D. Griffith, "Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Parts in the EEC", in J.H. Jackson & E.A. Vermulst 
(eds), Anti-Dumping Law and Practice (1989); J. 
Steenbergen, "Circumvention of Anti-Dumping Duties by Importation of Parts and Materials", (1988) 11 Fordham 
Int'l Law Journal, 382; and 0. Grolig & P. Bogaert, "The 
Newly-Amended EEC Anti-Dumping Regulations; Black Holes 
in the Common Market?", (1987) 21 JWTL 79.
i®io Article 13(10) (c). Regulation 2423/88.
®^^  ^ See Hydraulic Excavators From Japan. O.J. 
LlOl/24 (1988).
®^^* See Electronic Weighing Scales From Japan. O.J.LlOl/1 & 28 (1988) [definitive measures]; O.J. L189/27(1988) [undertakings].
__
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unreliable which gives no good reason for believing that 
these rights 'will protect the interests of 
assemblers.
As we have seen, on May 16, 1990, the GATT Council
adopted a panel report condemning the use of these 
provisions and holding that measures imposing anti­
dumping duties on products assembled within the European 
Union was contrary to the terms of the GATT,^ ®^ '^  In 
response, the European Union indicated that it will not 
amend this legislation pending the outcome of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations but that it is 'unlikely* to 
apply the provisions in the interim. ^®^*
But, the fact that the anti-circumvention provisions of 
the basic regulation have not been immediately amended 
raises a number of interesting points, particularly 
should the matter be brought before the European Court. 
True, the collection of duties under the authority of 
this provision has been suspended, but the period for 
the review of the measures already in force is about to 
imminently expire. Should the Commission revive the 
duties in any manner during the review, it is likely 
that an immediate application would be brought to the 
European Court.
®^^* See Electronic Typewriters From Japan. O.J. L 
191/4 & 26 (1988) [definitive measures]; L203/1 & 25(1988) [undertakings].
®^^"‘ On the Community's reaction to this ruling, see 
Buchan, 'Brussels Attacks Narrow GATT Dumping Ruling', 
Financial Times, March 30, 1990; Montagnon, 'EC Refuses 
to Adopt GATT Report on Dumping', Financial Times, April 
4, 1990; Dullforce, 'Brussels At Odds with GATT over
Judgment', Financial Times, April 4, 1990.
*®^* See Ninth Report on the Community Anti-Dumping 
and Anti-Subsidv Activities. SEC (91) 974 Final (1991), 
24; and Dullforce, 'EC Defers to Screwdriver Ruling', 
Financial Times, May 17, 1990.
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The principal point is that, if the Commission decides 
to collect these duties and an application is made, 
which course of action will the Court follow. As far as 
the present writer is concerned, the Court only has two 
viable choices. First, the Court can implement the 
findings of the panel. This would, of course, be an 
express recognition of the authority of GATT panel 
rulings over the provisions of the basic regulation.
The alternative is for the Court to decide that the 
panel decision is irrelevant and to ignore it. This 
would have a number of consequences. First, from a 
constitutional point of view, the judicial arm of the 
European Union would be interfering in matters that are 
traditionally within the power of the executive, namely 
by dictating the policy to be followed in the European 
Union's external relations. The European Union would 
again find itself before the GATT and would be unable to 
justify its position because its hands would have been 
tied by the Court. The Commission and Council would have 
no alternative but to amend the offending provisions and 
resolve the matter by legislative intervention which is 
a course of action that these organs clearly do not want 
to follow at the moment.
It is unlikely that the Court would opt for such a 
confrontational position in this matter. The Court has 
traditionally tried to avert direct conflicts with 
international obligations.^^ But, what would be the 
legal consequences of following this course? At the very 
minimum, the Court would have recognised that the rules 
of the GATT are relevant to the review of European Union 
measures. There is a fine distinction between applying 
the GATT rules directly and applying them only after a 
panel has resolved a dispute through application of the
Inter food GmbH v Hauotzollamt Hamburg. Case 
92/71 [1972] ECR 231.
■ I
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rules.
In fact, it is more likely that recognizing the validity 
of GATT panel reports would usurp the constitutional 
position of the Court more than applying the rules 
directly since the later course at least allows the 
Court an opportunity to conduct the judicial review of 
the matter itself.
Although investigations under the anti-circumvention 
legislations has been suspended, European Union 
industries have adjusted to this fact by initiating 
complaints against the parts being imported for 
assembly. This strategy has the effect of increasing the 
costs of parts from foreign sources. Naturally, if a 
European Union industry can establish the dumping of 
parts, injury and causation, a duty may be levied on the 
parts.
The basic regulation does not expressly deal with the 
problem of assembling in a third country for the 
purposes of evading the application of duties. Since 
anti-dumping duties are both product-specific and 
country-specific, moving assembly from the true country 
of origin to a third country may, under certain 
conditions change the origin of the finished goods and 
therefore avoid the application of the duties.
The European Union has adopted the view that this is a 
matter to be determined under the European Union's rules 
of origin rather than as a matter to be dealt with under
See Parts of Gas-Filled Non-Refillable Pocket 
Lighters From Japan. O.J. C202/4 (1991); Capacitors From 
Japan. O.J. L353/1 (1992); Outer Rings of Tapered Roller 
Bearings From Japan. O.J. L199/8 (1992); Small-Screen
Colour Televisions From Korea. Turkey. Thailand. 
Singapore. China and Malavsia. OtJ. C307/4 (1992); and 
Television Camera Svstems From Japan. O.J. C67/8 (1993) .
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the anti-dumping legislation.^^ The general rule for 
identifying the country of origin of a particular good 
can be stated as follows:
'A product in the production of which two or more 
countries were concerned shall be regarded as 
originating in the country in which the last 
substantial process or operation that is 
economically justified was performed, having been 
carried out in an undertaking equipped for the 
purpose, and resulting in the manufacture of a new 
product or representing an important stage of 
manufacture.
These four criteria determine the origin of goods not 
only for customs purposes but also for the application 
of the basic anti-dumping regulation.^®*® The general 
result is that the European Union has a less draconian 
approach to assembly in third countries than its trading 
partners such as the United States which has adopted 
specific measures to combat this practice.*®*^
(11) Sunset Procedure and Review
Subject to review by the Commission, anti-dumping 
measures automatically lapse after the expiry of a
®^^* See generally, E.A. Vermulst & P. Waer, "EC 
Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments",
(1990) 24:3 JWT 55.
®^^® Article 5, Council Regulation (EEC) 802/68. O.J. L (1968).
®^*® Article 13(7), Council Regulation 2423/88. See 
generally, N.A. Zaimis, EC Rules of Origin (1992), 93- 119.
®^*^ See Brother International GmbH v Hauotzollamt 
Giessen Case 26/88 [1988] ECR 5655; [1990] 3 CMLR 658.
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period of five years from the date that they entered 
into force or, if a review has been conducted, when they 
were last modified or c o n f i r m e d . S i n c e  1985 almost 
25% of measures imposed have been renewed under the 
review mechanism established by the sunset 
provision.
Together, the Council and the Commission have an 
extensive discretion in considering whether measures 
should be allowed to lapse or not and often these 
decisions have been made on ambiguous grounds. For 
example, in one case, where the market share of the 
producers under investigation had dropped from 17% to 4% 
after the imposition of duties, the Council extended the 
measures not because an actual threat of injury existed, 
but because the 'threat of injury' persisted,*®*^ The 
proper question to have asked was not whether a threat 
of injury existed but rather how remote this threat of 
injury could be assessed.
Further, in the same case, the duties imposed were not 
assessed on the basis of the dumping margin found to 
exist, but rather on the basis of the difference between 
a series of minimum prices and the prices charged by the 
relevant exporters.
Reviews are conducted at the request of interested 
parties in the event that 'changed circumstances' are 
alleged. Changed circumstances include evidence that
1022 Article 15, Council Regulation 2423/88.
®^** Tenth Annual Report on the Communitv Anti- 
Dumoinq and Anti-Subsidv Activities, SEC (92) 716 Final 
(1992), 15. The longest applied duties lasted from 1977 
to 1992; see Nuts of Iron and Steel From Taiwan  ^ O.J. 
L197/1 (1992).
®^*^ Light Sodium Carbonate From Bulgaria, the GDR. 
Poland and Rumania. O.J. L131/4 (1989).
948
exports are no longer being made at dumped prices^®** or 
that the EU industry no longer manufactures or produces 
the product.^®*® However, where exports to the European 
Union have completely ceased after the imposition of 
duties, the Commission will refuse to review the duties 
on the absurd rationale that there are no exports on 
which to base the review and therefore it is impossible 
to verify the claim of no dumping.i®*?
When conducting a review, the Commission does not feel 
itself bound by the product definition in the original 
determination. It has ample discretion to both expand 
and contract the product scope of the review. For 
example, in Outboard Motors From Jaoan. at the request 
of the European Union industry, the Commission extended 
the product scope of the review from outboard motors of 
up to 63 KWs to the complete range of such motors.*®** 
This practice is questionably GATT-consistent since the 
additional products being reviewed are not subject to 
the full scale rigours of an investigation as required 
by the Anti-Dumping Code.
There is a procedure in European law for the conduct of 
newcomer reviews when a foreign producer did not export 
products at the time when an anti-dumping investigation 
was undertaken. Such producers may request the European 
Commission to reconsider the application of definitive 
measures or undertakings to its activities. However, the
1025 Polvester Yarn From Mexico O.J. L275/21 (1991).
*®*® Typewriter Ribbon Fabric From China, O.J. C12/5
(1992).
*®** See Urea From Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobaao. 
O.J. L272/10 (1991).
*®** O.J. C204/4 (1992). See also Plain Paper
Photocopies From Japan. O.J. C207/16 (1992), where high­
speed and more advanced photocopiers were also included in the review.
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conditions for eligibility are rigorous. A company must 
fulfil three conditions;
(a) it must not have exported, either directly or 
indirectly, the product under investigation 
into the European Union during the period of 
investigation;
(b) there must be no 'links' with the companies 
involved in the original proceedings; and
(c) the company must have the intention to export 
the products to the European Union or have 
exported to the European Union after the 
termination of the investigation period.
The concept of ' links' has been interpreted extremely 
broadly to deny this right to exporters.*®*®
(12) Bias in Refund Procedure
Where an importer can show that a duty collected exceeds 
the actual dumping margin, consideration being given to 
the application of weighted averages, the excess amount 
must be reimbursed.*®*® The procedure for reimbursement 
has been set out in a Notice published by the Commission 
in 1986 which must be read in conjunction with the terms 
of the basic regulation.*®**
Unfortunately for exporters, refunds are only made if
*®*® See Monosodium Glutamate From Indonesia and 
Korea. O.J. L299/1 (1992).
*®*® Article 16(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
*031 European Commission, Notice Concerning the 
Reimbursement of Anti-Dumping Duties. O.J. C266/2
(1986).
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the dumping margin is less than the duty imposed.*®** 
The fact that the calculation is based on the margin of 
dumping also means that where the margin of injury is 
smaller than the margin of dumping, no refund will be 
permitted if prices of the product exceed the margin of 
injury but not the margin of dumping.*®**
Applications for refunds are made to the Commission 
which is responsible for conducting the review. But, 
refund claims will only be accepted by the Commission if 
they have been filed by an importer. Exporters are 
illegible to make such applications. In the event that 
exporters do not co-operate in providing information, 
such as the normal value of the goods in the home 
market, or prices charged to other customers, claims 
cannot be supported by sufficient evidence. If, for 
whatever reason, this co-operation is not forthcoming, 
the Commission will not authorize the refund.
This amount is calculated in relation to the changes 
which have occurred in the dumping margin which were 
established in the original investigation for the 
shipments to the European Union of the importer's 
supplier. Often a review reveals that the European Union 
has grossly overcharged duties. For example, in one 
investigation, the actual dumping margin on refund 
review was found to be 5.2%. However, the original 
definitive measures imposed rates of 32%.*®*^  In other 
words, the rate imposed was approximately 600% of the 
actual rate found to exist.
*032 This has resulted in a complaint being lodged 
with the GATT by Japan against the Community practice.
*®** NMB (Deutschland) GmbH v EC Commission. Case 188/88, [1992] 3 CMLR 80.
*®*"* Compact Disc Plavers From Jaoan. O.J. L298/16(1991).
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While the refund procedure establishes a mechanism to 
ultimately compensate for such discrepancies, during the 
period for which the anti-dumping duties are being 
applied, the foreign producer is unquestionably being 
penalised by the European Union by having to have its 
imports suffer a considerable financial penalty.
Refund calculations are made in the same manner as 
normal calculations of dumping margins. But, no interest 
is generally paid by the European Union on any levies 
reimbursed after a refund review. In addition, the 
processing of refund applications is not subject to any 
time limit. In the event that the Commission opts to 
review the matter, a refund application may take several 
years before finances are received.
Finally, the method of computing refunds in 
questionable. It is the stated practice for the 
Commission to deduct anti-dumping duties paid in 
constructing the export price for associated importers. 
In other words, the duty is considered as a cost and the 
effect of the deduction is to reduce the level of refund 
made available. This practice has been upheld by the 
European Court as valid^“ ,^ but has provoked Japan into 
lodging a complaint with the GATT into the practice.
(13) Judicial Review and Appeal
Judicial review of anti-dumping measures until recently 
remained within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice. While the proposed original jurisdiction of 
the Court of First Instance included review of anti-
NMB (Deutschland) GmbH v EC Commission Case 
188/88 [1992] 3 CMLR 80. See also Case Note [1993] 30:1 CML Rev. 155.
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dumping matters*^^^, this proposal did not appear in the 
final statute of the However, the CFI has
recently assumed jurisdiction in this area.^ °^ ®
It is widely believed that the CFI will be prepared to 
scrutinise more carefully the measures adopted by the 
Commission and Council, and some commentators have 
suggested that this was the reason that the proposal was 
originally withdrawn. Certainly this would be a 
positive development as far as exporters and importers 
are concerned. But, while the CFI has been meticulous in 
competition matters, it is no guarantee that it will 
follow the same policy in anti-dumping r e v i e w s .
(A) Standing to Seek Judicial Review
Regulations imposing anti-dumping duties may be 
challenged by any natural or legal person who can 
establish that the measure is a decision which is of 
direct and individual concern to t h e m . B u t ,  anti-
1036 now see Proposal For A Council Regulation on 
the Harmonisation and Streamlining of the Anti-DumPing 
Decision-Making Procedures. O.J. C181/9 (1992).
Council Decision (EEC) 88/591. corr. O.J. C215/1
(1989); [1989] 3 CMLR 458.
Council Decision 93/350 Euratom, ECSC. EC. O.J. 
L144/21 (1993)■ as amended by Council Decision94/149/ECSC, EC. O.J. L66/29 (1994).
1039
1040
See Van Bael, supra note 1009, 12
See for example PVC Cartel Case. Case T79, 84- 
86, 89, 91-92, 94, 96, 98, 102 & 104/89 [1992] 4 CMLR 357.
Article 173(2), EC Treaty. See generally, A. 
Arnull, "Challenging Anti-Dumping Regulations: The
Problem of Admissibility", (1992) 2 ECLR 73; J.F.
Beilis, "Judicial Review of EEC Anti-dumping and Anti- 
Subsidy Determinations After Fediol: The Emergence of a 
New Admissibility Test", (1984) 21 CML Rev. 539; and R. 
Greaves, "Locus Standi under Article 173 EEC When
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dumping measures take the form of r e g u l a t i o n s . &  
private party seeking to challenge an anti-dumping 
measure must therefore satisfy two conditions:
(a) the measure is, in substance, a decision 
which, for reasons of convenience, has the
form of a regulation; and
(b) the measure must be of direct and individual 
concern to the interested party.
(a) Regulations and Other Acts of the European
Union Institutions as Decisions
Since at least 1979, the European Court has recognised 
the possibility that an anti-dumping regulation may be 
'considered to be a decision...adopted in the guise of 
a regulation'.
This in fact leads to a tautology. The basic regulation 
requires that all anti-dumping measures are given the 
form of regulations. But, does it not automatically
follow that, if the Court finds a measure to be a
decision, albeit a conglomeration of decisions, for the 
purpose of establishing standing, the measure is not a 
regulation but a decision and therefore ultra vires the 
powers of the Council or the Commission under the basic 
regulation? In other words, if the Court holds that an 
application for review is admissible, is this not an
Seeking and Annulment of a Regulation", (1986) 11 ELR119.
1042 Article 13(1), Council Regulation 2423/88.
See generally, J. Dinnage, "Locus Standi and 
Article 173 EEC", (1979) 4 EL Rev 15; and H. Rasmussen, 
"Why is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private 
Plaintiffs", (1980) 5 EL Rev 112.
See NTN Tovo Bearing Co v EC Council. Case113/77 [1979] ECR 1185.
954
admission that the measure is in fact a decision and 
therefore an instrument in an improper form?
The Court has engaged in considerable legal contortions 
to avoid the obvious. It has adopted the policy of 
admitting complaints alleging that regulations are 
decisions without addressing the fundamental problem. No 
doubt, this approach has advantages for the applicant. 
If the Court held that anti-dumping measures were 
invariably proper regulations and never decisions, 
judicial review of the merits would be absolutely 
excluded. Yet, one cannot help by wonder whether the 
Court has made the proper choice in refusing to 
acknowledge the contradiction in its own jurisprudence.
(b) Direct and Individual Concern
A measure is of direct concern to a private party if it 
is the immediate cause of a particular legal effect on 
that person without the intervention of another party in 
the application of the measure.^* But since national 
authorities have no discretion in applying a measure the 
issue of direct concern is rarely an important matter in 
challenges to anti-dumping measures.
The same is not true of establishing the requirement of 
individual concern. The onus is on the applicant to 
prove that, due to certain circumstances or 
characteristics that are particular to its position, the 
application of the measure has particular and specific 
implications to its position. The Court and Commission 
have both been reluctant to recognise the class of
See the opinion of A-G Verlorn van Themaat, in Allied Corporation v EC Commission. Cases 239/82, 275/82 
[1984] ECR 1005, 1041.
See ARPOSOL V EC Council. Case 55/86 [1988] ECR13.
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applicants that may satisfy this requirement.
In the late 1970s, the Court distinguished among the 
standing of producers, exporters, importers, 
complainers, traders and other interested parties. The 
abilities of these parties to establish individual 
concern has changed over time.
The individual concern of producers and exports in an 
anti-dumping measure has long been recognised. Since 
these two groups are frequently expressly identified in 
anti-dumping regulations they are, in general, 
individually c o n c e r n e d . B o t h  of these groups have 
therefore been granted standing by the Court.
Partially more difficult to explain, complainers have 
also been recognised as having an individual concern in 
anti-dumping measures because they participate in the 
procedure initiating an investigation under Article 5(1) 
of the basic r e g u l a t i o n . I s  this consistent with the 
general policy of the Court in other areas of European 
Union law, for example competition policy? In fact not. 
While a complaint may be made by a private individual 
under Articles 85 and 86 EC Treaty, the Commission has 
absolute discretion whether or not to pursue the 
matter.
Allied Corporation v EC Commission. Cases 239/82, 275/82 [1984] ECR 1005.
Continental v Hauotzollamt Munchen-West, Case 
246/87 [1989] ECR 1151; [1991] 1 CMLR 761 and SA Sermes
V  Services des Douanes. Case 323/88 [1992] 2 CMLR 632.
Fediol V  EC Commission (No 1) . Case 191/82 
[1983] ECR 2913. See also Timex v EC Council and EC 
Commission, Case 264/84 [1985] ECR 849.
Groupement Des Industries De Matériels 
D'Equipment Electrique Industrielle Associée (Gimelee)
V  EC Commission, Case 315/90, Judgment Of November 27,
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If private party complainants do not have the right to 
standing in competition decisions, is it consistent that 
such parties have access to proceedings in anti-dumping 
investigations or is this an instance of the Court 
determining that the interests of the European Union 
could not allow the denial of European Union industries 
of this right?
For a number of very dubious reasons, the Court adopted 
a much stricter attitude towards the admissibility of 
applications for review by importers using the 
requirement of .individual concern to block such 
applications. While the Court recognised the individual 
concern of related importers, ie companies linked to 
exporters or producers, it was reluctant to 
acknowledge the individual concern of unrelated 
importers. For a long time, this policy was a serious 
impediment to the judicial review of anti-dumping 
measures at the instance of such p a r t i e s . T h i s  was 
even the case if the importer had participated in the 
investigation itself.
There are two points raised by this approach that cause 
unwarranted discrimination against foreign products. 
First, the failure to allow independent importers to 
challenge anti-dumping measures impedes imports because 
it denies parties directly involved in the importing 
process an opportunity to challenge the validity of
1991; and Automec SrL v EC Commission. Case T64/89[1991] 4 CMLR 177.
Canon Inc v EC Council. Cases 277/85, 300/85[1989] 1 CMLR 915.
See, for example, Alusuisse v EC Council and ECCommission, Case 307/81 [1982] ECR 3463.
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measures.Second, it is dubious legal reasoning to 
draw a distinction between complainers, who are not 
directly affected by the application of measures and 
importers who have to bear the cost of increased prices 
for the g o o d s . B o t h  these factors work against the 
interests of foreign producers and the policy itself has 
been severely criticised.
The Court has very recently reversed its policy 
significantly in this respect. In Extramet Industries SA 
V  EC Council^^, the applicant was an unrelated 
importer who had participated in the investigation and 
had been specifically named in the final measure. The 
Court, supported by the opinion of the Advocate- 
General^^, declared the action admissible.
However, much of this policy reversal depended on the 
fact that the applicant had successfully established 
that its position could be differentiated from that of 
the other parties involved. As the Court found:
'The applicant is the largest importer of the
See for example, Nuova Cearam SrL v EC
Commission. Case 205/87 [1987] ECR 4427; SA Sermes v EC
Commission, Case 279/86 [1987] ECR 3109; and R. Frimodt
Pedersen AS v EC Commission Case 301/86 [1987] ECR 3123.
See P.J. Kuyper, "Judicial Protection and
Judicial Review in the EEC", in Jackson & Vermulst,
supra note 1009, 97.
1055 M. Mataraso, "The Independent Importer's
Right of Review of Anti-Dumping Regulations Before to 
Court of Justice of the European Communities", (1989) 12 
Fordham Int'l Law Journal 682.
105® Para. 17 Case 358/89 [1993] 2 CMLR 691. See also Case Note (1992) 29:2 CMLR 380.
1057 Advocate-General Jacobs found that the
application was inadmissible based on the Court'searlier jurisprudence, but asserted that change wasnecessary.
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product forming the subject-matter of the anti­
dumping measure and, at the same time, the end-user 
of the product. In addition, its business 
activities depend to a very large extent on those 
imports and are very seriously affected by the 
contested regulation in view of the limited number 
of manufacturers of the product concerned and of 
the difficulties which it encounters in obtaining 
supplies from the sole Community producer, which, 
moreover, is its main competitor for the processed 
product.*
There is little doubt that these circumstances were very 
specific and that the future business activities of the 
applicant were directly affected by the measure. But 
direct effect is not the same as direct concern as 
defined in earlier decisions. Hopefully, this decision 
signals a move away from the strict formal requirements 
set by the Court in earlier decisions. Recognition of 
the injustice caused by the rigorous approach to the 
issue of direct concern is welcomed if the Court is 
prepared to move towards assessing how a measure affects 
a party as opposed to individually concerns that party 
stricto sensu.
As it stands this judgment is not completely 
satisfactory. It does not mean that all other unrelated 
importers will be equally as successful in future cases. 
In fact, this * is unlikely. Only those unrelated 
importers in a similar position, which the Court itself 
acknowledged was unusual, will be guaranteed standing.
(B) Standards for Review
Applications to the Court are also hindered by the fact 
that in many measures, both the facts and the 
methodology applied by the Court, are stated extremely
959
briefly. There is consequently often insufficient detail 
to allow a successful challenge to be made on a final 
measure.
In any event, the policy of the European Court has been 
to focus on the legal issues involved and to avoid 
review of disputed factual matters. For example, in NTN 
Tovo Bearing Co. Ltd v EC Council, the Court extended 
the policy applied in the review of competition cases to 
anti-dumping cases and stated that it would only engage 
in limited factual review of cases.
The approach of the Court contrasts unfavourably with 
that of its Advocates-General in a number of cases. For 
example, A-G Verloren van Themaat conducted an extremely 
precise and detailed analysis of one case in particular 
including consideration of the economic implications of 
dumping, price alignment and Community interest. 
Nevertheless, the Court did not follow this approach and 
contented itself with following only one point raised by 
the Advocate-General as a justification for annulling 
the measure. Similarly, A-G Mancini also carried out a 
detailed legal analysis of an anti-dumping regulation 
while avoiding the more economic implications of the 
case.w^ However, in this case the Court followed the 
logic of his submissions without delving too deep into 
these aspects.
The result of this approach is that, statistically at 
least, the European Court rarely finds in favour of a
1058 The competition case cited in support of this 
proposition was Remia BV & Vereniade Bedriiven NutriciaV EC Commission Case 42/84 [1985] ECR 2545.
Allied Corporation Demufert & TranscontinentalV EC Commission (Allied III Case 53/83 [1985] ECR 1621.
NTN Tovo Bearing Corporation v EC Council. Cases240, 255-256, 258 and 260/84 [1987] ECR 1809.
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foreign manufacturer or exporter seeking to review a 
particular measure.
(C) Suspension of Measures Pending Review
The European Court has been noticeably reluctant to 
grant interim relief to foreign producers subject to 
anti-dumping measures pending judicial review of the 
findings of the Commission.
Foreign exporters have also experienced considerable 
difficulty in obtaining damages from the European Union 
for the wrongful application of anti-dumping 
measures.Further, the conditions established for 
obtaining such relief are generally recognised as being 
quite onerous.
Applications for interim review are most often made by 
European Union importers of the product subject to duty. 
Thus in Extramet Industrie SA v EC Council, a French 
importer of calcium metal requested the Court to suspend 
the application of an anti-dumping regulation pending 
the outcome of the r e v i e w . The application was 
rejected because the petitioner had not demonstrated the 
necessary degree of urgency in its application.
Technointorg v EC Council. Cases 294/86, 72/87
[1987] ECR 1793; [1989] 1 CMLR 281; Nakaiima v EC
Council. Case 69/89 [1989] ECR 1689; and Extramet v EC 
Council. Case 358/89 [1990] ECR 431.
S3 Q Epikhirisecon Metalleftikon Viomikhamikon 
Kai Navtiliakon AE v EC Commission and EC Council. Cases 
121-2/86, Order of June 27, 1986 [1986] ECR 2063, nodecision yet on the merits.
See Technointorg v EC Council. Case 72/87 [1987] 
ECR 1793; and Brother Industries v EC Council. Case 
229/86 [1985] ECR 3459.
Cases 133/87, 150/87, Order of February 14,
1990, not yet reported.
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(D) Consequences of a Successful Challenge
A successful challenge to an anti-dumping regulation has 
the effect of nullifying the measure. In practice, the 
European Commission also issues a measure formally 
repealing the nullified m e a s u r e . H o w e v e r  a decision 
in favour of an applicant does not prevent the 
Commission from opening a new investigation into the 
same subject-matter with a view to reimposing 
recalculated duties.
But, as regards provisional or definitive duties which 
have already been collected, importers are required to 
request refunds from the various national customs 
authorities in accordance with their respective national 
customs rules. Naturally, this process involves 
considerable delay while the necessary customs 
formalities are settled.
No interest is payable on such sums even although duties 
may be held in such circumstances for periods of more 
than one year since the provisional measures were 
introduced.
(13) Observations
Procedural rights and duties in anti-dumping and anti­
subsidy investigations are not dealt comprehensively by
“^5 See, for example. Urea From Saudi Arabia, O.J. 
L334/1 (1991); and Paint. Distemper. Varnish and Similar Brushes From China. O.J. C332/5 (1991).
1066 for example. Calcium Metal From China and
Russia, O.J. C298/3 (1992).
Paint. Distemper. Varnish and Similar Brushes From China. O.J. C322/5 (1991).
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either the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code or the 1979 Subsidies 
Code. Hence, states have some latitude to decide which 
protections private individuals will be entitled during 
investigations. However, even this latitude fails to 
account for the immense disparity between the letter and 
spirit of these two agreements on the one hand and the 
practice of the European Union on the other hand. In few 
other areas so far examined has behaviour deviated to 
such a substantial degree from the prescribed rules and, 
where no relevant rules exist, the European Union has 
taken advantage of such lacuna to erect a protectionist 
mantle.
Much of the breakdown in normative efficacy of the Code 
provisions relating to procedural safeguards can be 
attributed to the pivotal role played by a single agency 
in the process. The European Commission is responsible 
for the conduct of investigations, for applying 
provisional measures, for negotiating undertakings and 
for proposing definitive measures to the Council of 
Ministers. It is therefore hard to refute the claim that 
the European Commission is the judge, jury and 
prosecutor in anti-dumping investigations. While the 
Council of Ministers is responsible for certain 
violations of the terms of the Code, such as enacting 
anti-circumvention legislation and anti-absorption 
procedures, the European Commission has been the source 
of much of the abuse mainly when conducting 
investigations, '
The European Court, despite its own acknowledgment of 
the dangers presented by abuse of procedural rights, has 
failed to check or balance many of the abuses 
perpetrated by the Commission and, to a lesser extent, 
by the Council. The margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
the European Commission in appraising the rights of 
interested parties is substantial and the Court has been
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unwilling adversely to interfere with the exercise of 
this discretion.
The prospect of review by the Court of First Instance 
has excited some commentators into speculating that the 
CFI may reverse this policy and assume a more 
interventionist approach based on its experience in the 
area of competition law. Certainly in the area of 
competition law the Tribunal has rolled back the 
discretion enjoyed by the European Commission in 
conducting competition investigations but this is no 
guarantee that the CFI will do the same in the case of 
anti-dumping investigations.
The authority exercised by the European Commission will 
also grow organically as the Commission has eroded the 
authority of the Council by successfully proposing to 
the Council the diluting of the qualified majority 
voting requirement for the adoption of definitive 
measures. With this new voting requirement in place, the 
Council of Ministers will become little more than a 
rubber stamp for the adoption of proposals for 
definitive measures advanced by the Commission. A 
proposed measures would have to be extremely 
controversial before eight Member States would block its 
adoption.
Turning to a comparison between European Commission 
practices in this field and the terms of the 1979 Code, 
the simple conclusion is that the incidence of deviation 
is high illustrating the extremely low degree of 
normative influence exercised by the international 
provisions. This can be attributed for the most part to 
the failure of the European Union institutions to 
enshrine a complete statement of procedural rights in
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the Basic Regulation.*^* Instead, the law relating to 
procedure is a complex amalgam of a few specific rules 
contained in the Basic Regulation and general principles 
of law (ie. the principle of proportionality).
The liberal standing requirements practised by the 
European Commission for admitting anti-dumping 
complaints is one obvious area of apparent deviation. 
Scrutiny of complaints for prima facie compliance with 
the essential requirements for an anti-dumping complaint 
is a critical safety valve to prevent an explosion of 
unjustified claims for relief. If the standing 
requirements are too lax, unfounded complaints may be 
accepted and measures adopted without proper 
investigation. Such a flaw would strike at the very 
heart of attempts to achieve international regulation.
The most obvious Code violations committed by the 
European Commission in this area involve the techniques 
approved by the Commission to decrease the economic base 
for the identification of the relevant EU industry. The 
Commission facilitates the admission of complaints 
through the application of the related parties rule and 
the regional industries rule, both of which are 
sanctioned by the 1979 Codes but neither of which should 
be abused to alleviate the requirements for standing. 
Taken to extreme, the standing requirement can be 
manipulated to such an extent that a single producer can 
be considered representative of an EU industry.
In conjunction with the loose standing requirements, the 
standards for assessing petitions are also suspect. The 
most superficial evidence of dumping and injury has been
1068 This differs significantly from EU competition 
policy where the Basic Regulation (Council Regulation 
(EEC) 17/62 (1962)) is supplemented by another measure 
setting out the procedural rights of interested parties 
in detail; Commission (EEC) Regulation 99/63 (1963).
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accepted by the Commission as grounds for initiating an 
investigation. However, the most dangerous change of 
policy is the recent practice of permitting selective 
complaints, first allowed in Video Cassette Recorders 
From Korea and Japan, and now standard practice on the 
part of the European Commission. The Anti-Dumping Code 
clearly specifies that anti-dumping investigations are 
to be conducted against specific countries and not 
particular manufacturers or producers.
Many aspects of the actual conduct of the Commission in 
investigations are inequitable and entail infringements 
of the 1979 Code., For example, the Commission has turned 
the 'best information available' rule contained in the 
Code into a mechanism for penalising foreign producers 
who fail to co-operate during the proceedings. Failure 
to co-operate will result in more extensive duties even 
in those situations where such measures cannot be 
objectively justified. For example, the Oxalic Acid From 
Taiwan and South Korea case illustrates that the 
Commission believes higher duties than those actually 
found are justified in order to prevent foreign 
producers from being rewarded for non-co-operation.
Another area of controversy has been the European 
Commission's blatant disregard of time limits for 
investigations. During a period of investigation, quite 
clearly market conditions are subjected to a degree of 
uncertainly which will compromise the commercial 
interests of manufacturers. The greater the period of 
uncertainly, the more extensive the damage to these 
interests. Hence, a period of three years until the 
conclusion of an investigation will have substantial 
commercial ramifications for a producer. Nevertheless, 
many investigations pursued by the Commission have not 
been concluded within the one year period recommended 
under the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code but have extended for
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periods of up to four years. Again, this appears to be 
a prima facie violation of the Code when it occurs on a 
regular and recurring basis.
The method of granting relief after an affirmative 
determination is also a controversial matter. It is the 
arbitrary fashion in which relief is decided which is 
the source of dispute as to whether the Commission's 
practices in this area are compatible with the terms of 
the Code. For example, the policy regulating the 
acceptance of undertakings is unstable despite the 
exhortations of Commission officials. Increasingly, 
undertakings are rejected for political reasons when 
offered by producers from certain countries. Similarly, 
the Commission's willingness to accept undertakings has 
declined in recent years as such mechanisms have become 
increasingly difficult to administer.
The setting of residual duties is also difficult to 
reconcile with the terms of the Anti-Dumping Code. These 
duties are set at the highest dumping margin found and 
are applied to producers or exporters not yet in the 
process of exporting goods to the European Union. These 
producers are automatically attributed the highest 
dumping margin even although no full investigation into 
dumping has been made with respect to the new producers.
The sunset procedure has also been abused to allow the 
continued extension of measures and to provide quasi­
institutionalised protection to some sectors. Since 
1986, approximately 25% of measures have been renewed 
under the review mechanism which has been allowed 
because of the extensive discretion of the Commission 
and Council to grant extensions in situations involving 
changed circumstances. Substitution of the threat of 
material injury for actual material injury for example 
allows renewal of measures on different substantive
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grounds from those on which the original determination 
was made. Similarly, the power of the Commission to 
extend the scope of the relevant product in reviews also 
is questionably GATT-consistent since additional 
products falling within the scope of the review are not 
subject to the full rigours of an investigation as 
required by the Anti-Dumping Code.
The most flagrant violation of the Code is, however, the 
simultaneous imposition of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
duties despite the express terms of Article VI of the 
GATT. Here the European Commission is explicitly 
infringing the international obligations of the European 
Union and has done so with relative impunity. At this 
point the limitation of influence of the GATT and the 
1979 Codes is most evident. If the European Commission 
is unwilling to respect the most fundamental principles 
of the international obligations regulating this area of 
activity, there is little prospect of peripheral 
obligations having adequate normative influence unless 
the European Commission deemed compliance to be 
expedient.
These are examples of inconsistencies between the 
express terms of the GATT and the 1979 Codes. Two 
mechanisms exist in the twilight areas of regulation, 
namely anti-absorption and anti-circumvention measures.
Anti-absorption measures appear to infringe the 1979 
Code on a number of technical grounds. First, the scope 
of the group entitled to initiate such proceedings is 
not confined to an interested party but rather extends 
to a 'directly concerned party' which has been 
interpreted as a more extensive category. Second, there 
is no need for a directly concerned party to establish 
that it is part of the relevant EU industry. Third, the 
standards of evidence required for such investigations
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are unreasonably, low. Finally, in reality, the size of 
duties found to have been absorbed is extremely high, in 
some cases exceeding 100%. Whether or not anti­
absorption measures are consistent with the terms of the 
GATT and the Anti-Dumping Code will ultimately be 
resolved once the findings of the panel requested by 
Japan at the GATT are made public.
The anti-circumvention procedures operated by the 
European Union have already been found to be 
inconsistent with the terms of Article VI although this 
finding was on extreme technical grounds rather than on 
a clear-cut violation of the GATT. Although the European 
Commission has refrained from initiating investigations 
under the authority of Article 13(10) of the Basic 
Regulation, it has now done so under the authority of 
the new 1994 Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation.
The conclusion to this part of the investigation is 
therefore that the normative influence of the 
international legal obligations imposed on the European 
Union's agencies is insufficient to compel those 
institutions to behave in a manner compatible with the 
terms of these obligations. The influence of non-legal 
factors is too pervasive. Pressure from domestic 
industries for protection is too great. Hence, when 
conducting investigations, the European Commission acts 
independently from the framework of legal obligations 
within which it ostensibly operates.
The evidence fot this conclusion is derived not only 
from the most inconsistent administrative practices but 
also from the terms of the Basic Regulation itself which
Commission Regulation (EC) 2451/95. initiating 
an investigation into circumvention of anti-dumping 
duties on imports of 3.5" microdisks originating from 
Japan, taiwan and the PRC, O.J. L252/9 (1995).
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inadequately protect the rights of foreign exporters in 
investigations. Supplementing these obligations with 
general principles has not been a successful process and 
the European Court has completely failed to protect the 
rights of interested foreign parties. The result is that 
an overall asymmetry exists in the procedural rights of 
EU and foreign interested parties in anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy investigations.
PART E
CONCLUSIONS
12 Conclusions
(1) General Conclusions
In terms of the specific international rules selected 
for analysis, namely those governing subsidies, 
countervailing duties and anti-dumping measures, the 
institutional and substantive legal framework for the 
regulation of trade, as organised under the GATT during 
the period prior to 1995, failed to exercise sufficient 
normative influence over the relevant aspects of the 
trade policies of either the United States or the 
European Union. Both were to a degree impervious to the 
authority of the prescribed legal norms relating to 
these activities and which were intended to prescribe 
the form and content of policies for all states 
participating in the international field regulated by 
the GATT.
The ramifications of this conclusion have broader 
implications for the whole of the international legal 
system in general. How this situation arose provides 
insight into the functioning of international rules as 
a determinant of state behaviour and the shortcomings of 
the international legal system itself. The findings 
explain, in part at least, why certain states felt able 
to disregard or ignore the application of international 
rules in particular circumstances as well as the 
pressures exerted by legal and non-legal factors on the 
decision-making processes inside states.
Unfortunately this study has not yielded definitive 
answers to resolving the issue of the efficacy of 
international law and its influence on state behaviour. 
It has, however, provided indications why these 
particular rules had such a circumscribed impact on the 
behaviour of the two particular states in the period of 
investigation. At least we have arrived at a starting
9 7 2
point which permits general observations to be made on 
this important phenomenon.
Broadly speaking, the following factors played a crucial 
role in circumscribing the efficacy of the selected 
rules on the conduct of the United States and the 
European Union;
(a) The limited normative efficacy of the international 
trade legal order itself.
(b) The degree to which the substantive rules
themselves embody an adequate consensus in relation to 
their content.
(c) The extent to which these international rules are 
compatible with the policy objectives and goals sought 
to be achieved by states (in this case the United States 
and the European Union) in terms of commercial policy.
(d) The ability of these rules to permeate the
decision-making processes inside states and to prevail 
over non-legal factors and considerations.
(e) The strength of such rules in terms of their
ability to withstand dilution or avoidance when 
incorporated at national level and the degree of 
effectiveness exercised by such rules when applied by 
national (or supranational) agencies.
By categorising . each of these factors into separate 
classifications we do, of course, run the risk of 
oversimplifying what is undoubtedly a complex picture 
but, on the other hand, each of these factors also 
provides, to a greater or lesser degree, a standard by 
which efficacy can be measured as well as an explanation 
why, at least in the course of the present study.
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international rules have played such an ineffectual 
function in the determination of state behaviour.
<l) The Limited Normative Efficacy of the International 
Trade Legal Order
The root cause of the lack of normative influence 
exercised by the international trade legal order on the 
behaviour of thé United States and the European Union 
lies in the structure of the legal order itself. This 
order was originally conceived by a small group of 
states in which only a meagre commonality of interest 
existed as to the shape which the international trade 
legal order should assume. From this starting point, 
this consensus dissipated as the economic environment in 
which the international trading system functions evolved 
and the legal structure of international trade changed.
International trade is an activity which occurs in the 
general context of the global economy. Put another way, 
the international economy can be equated to the societal 
environment in which trade functions. The shape and 
content of the international trade legal system is 
influenced by the totality of economic relationships 
conducted by states which collectively constitute the 
international economy. Trade cannot be divorced from 
economic considerations and the prevailing structure of 
the economic system as it alters over time.
The GATT, as established in 1947, was inappropriate, 
even then, to regulate trading relations because it 
reflected the artificial and transient economic 
conditions which existed immediately following the 
Second World War. More significantly, the contracting 
parties later failed to adopt the system to adjust to 
fundamental changes in the international economy and the
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consequence of this was the undermining of the 
effectiveness of the organisation in imposing sufficient 
normative influence on the behaviour of the two more 
significant participants in the system.
The economic environment which existed immediately after 
the Second World War had a number of distinctive 
features, the most obvious of which was the unopposed 
economic superiority of the United States. This single 
state exercised sufficient influence in the 
international economic community to create a trading 
order which was, for all intents and purposes, an 
instrument of United States commercial policy. The four 
fundamental principles of the GATT constitute the 
classical laissez faire model for international trade 
which reflected the policy of trade liberalisation 
promoted by the United States during this period.
While the proposed ITO Charter did contain elaborate 
institutional provisions, its demise was merely a 
reflection of the nature of the international economic 
environment in which it was conceived. The United States 
no longer wished to participate in such an elaborate and 
potentially effective organisation and therefore 
withdrew its consent and consigned the ITO Charter to 
the international scrap heap. Regulatory mechanisms 
would hinder the formulation of United States trade 
policy and therefore were undesirable. The result was an 
international agreement - the GATT - which promoted 
general United States trade policy ambitions and yet, at 
the same time, was sufficiently vague and emasculated to 
never offer the prospect of impeding the implementation 
of these objectives.
Within the first decade of the GATT's operations, two 
landmark events occurred which fundamentally altered the 
structure of the international economic system in which
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the world trading system operates. First, Japan was 
permitted to accede to the GATT which sent many 
contracting parties searching for the protection of the 
opt out clause contained in Article XXXV(1). Second, and 
in retrospect the most significant event, the European 
Community was established under the Treaty of Rome. This 
created the possibility of a departure from the single 
state centric structure of the international economy and 
the prospect of a bipolar or even tri-polar paradigm. 
This transformation has now happened and the power to 
control the shape of the international economy, and the 
legal structure which regulates it, has been lost from 
the grip of the United States.
The international economy has now expanded 
geographically and horizontally with the 
industrialisation of those states described loosely as 
newly industrialised which are able to produce goods 
more competitively than their developed counterparts. 
This has caused developed states - particularly the 
United States and the European Union - to adopt their 
economic and commercial policies in order to inhibit or 
limit the degree of import penetration into their 
markets thereby engendering greater state intervention 
and distortion in the international economy.
Along with these profound changes in the international 
economy has come a growing sophistication of the 
transactions taking place in the economy itself. Trade 
in goods is no longer the single most significant 
element in the international economy. Trade in services, 
investment, interest rates, exchange rates and the 
protection of intellectual property rights have become 
prominent issues of the international economy.
The result is that, since 1947, there has been a 
gradual, yet perceptible, evolution in the shape of the
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international economy measured both horizontally (in 
terms of geographical spread of power) and vertically 
(in terms of the complexity of the functioning of the 
system itself).
From an institutional perspective, how did the 
contracting parties of the GATT responds to these 
significant changes? Until January 1, 1995, the main 
plenary organ was the CONTRACTING PARTIES, an unwieldy 
body with little real power to institute change or to 
respond to the needs of the international trading 
system. The Council effectively ceased to operate other 
than as a forum for the exchange of views among the four 
main participants of the trade system. The panel process 
all but lost its credibility as an effective means of 
resolving disputes.
From a substantive point of view as well, the efforts of 
the contracting parties to recognise the need for new 
rules to tackle emerging economic problems such as 
subsidies, dumping, technical barriers to trade, 
government procurement, licensing procedures and so on, 
have been limited to the negotiation of side agreements 
which represent poor compromises among the interests of 
the main trading nations.
The contracting parties have also done little to stem 
the growth of illegal activity being perpetrated by the 
United States and the European Union. The consequence is 
that trade in important sectors of the international 
economy is conducted through bilateral agreements and 
arrangements. The steel industry, the textile industry, 
the agricultural sector and the motor vehicle industry 
are only a few of the areas of economic activity which 
function de facto outside the control of the GATT. 
Similarly, the GATT has stood by and watched the 
undermining of the principle of multilateralism through
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the negotiation of free trade areas and other agreements 
creating preferential trading rights on a bilateral 
basis.
The failure to adapt the GATT's institutional structure 
and substantive rules to the changing international 
economic environment can be attributed to four critical 
factors.
First, the soft law regime established in the original 
General Agreement, and which reflected the interests of 
the United States, was never transformed into a 
legalistic system which allowed rights and duties to be 
fixed, applied and enforced. Ultimately, this lead to a 
failure to circumscribe the rights of the contracting 
parties to interfere with patterns of trade. Since the 
system was, at its heart, a soft law system, attempts to 
rectify this system by creating black letter side 
agreements could never succeed without fundamental 
rectifications to the core of the system.
The same vagueness in international obligations has 
encouraged states to introduce new notions into 
international trade law which are more appropriate to 
the field of competition policy. The unilateral 
development of such concepts, especially by the United 
States, has been a pretext for abusive behaviour 
justified as a means to counter such practices. 
Ascribing the epithet of 'unfair* to foreign commercial 
practices, creates artificial concepts without legal 
justification, certainly in terms of the GATT scheme of 
legal obigations.^^
Second, all trading nations, but in particular the
See text, supra pp.37-40.
See text, supra pp.41-42.
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United States and the European Union have demonstrated 
a traditional reticence to delegate the prerogatives of 
formulating national economic and commercial policy to 
an international organisation. As a consequence of the 
fact that national economic policy remains jealously 
guarded within the sovereign prerogatives of most 
states, the international economic system has no 
coherent or immutable basic policy objectives. The 
co-ordination in macro-economic policy within the Group 
of Seven is no surrogate for a stable international 
economic foundation on which to build trade rules. 
Similarly, some of the activities of the OECD greatly 
affect the international economic environment but create 
a separation of interests between the developed 
countries and the rest of the international economic 
community.
Third, most states, but again notably the United States 
and the European Union, have been reluctant to enter 
international obligations which will require a 
compromise to be reached between the operation of these 
principles and a host of non-economic factors and 
national policies which have become increasingly 
relevant in the national decision-making processes. In 
the implementation of trade commitments, both the United 
States and the European Union have been unable to 
exclude the influence of externalities in the 
formulation and application of national economic and 
commercial policy. The clearest example must be that of 
the Common Agricultural Policy which, for more than 
thirty years operated outside the rigours of the GATT 
system and which was justified, inter alia, on the need 
to protect agricultural communities inside the European 
Union, mainly on socio-economic grounds. The 
accommodation of non-economic factors into the
1072 See text, supra pp.33-34.
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formulation of national economic and commercial policy 
has become a reality of political life but the fact 
remains that such considerations limit the normative 
influence of international trade obligations.
Those aspects of national policy which interact - or 
interfere - with a state's willingness to comply with 
its international obligations are myriad. For example, 
the pursuit of an industrial policy promoting research 
and expenditure will necessarily entail a trade-off 
between industrial policy objectives and international 
trade obligations. The same applies to measures designed 
to promote a national environmental protection policy. 
Other national policy matters which conflict with 
trade-related obligations include monetary policy, 
employment policy, protection of infant industries, 
foreign investment policy and the protection and safety 
of workers and the consumer. In each of these cases, 
national officials are required to make trade-offs 
between these interests and international trade 
obligations.
A clear instance of the conflict between industrial and 
economic strategic planning and international 
obligations occurred in the dispute over subsidies to 
the Airbus Industrie consortium. The European Union 
identified the promotion of the aerospace construction 
industry as a major priority of its industrial planning 
and chose to allow this programme to receive assistance 
outside the scope of the Subsidies Code 1979. 
Notwithstanding the GATT panel report, the dispute was 
settled by a compromise agreement between the European 
Union and the United States which effectively disapplied 
the panel's findings. The fact that the United States 
agreed to settle the affair in this manner is tantamount
1073 See text-, supra pp.48-51.
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to implicit acknowledgment, even by the United States, 
that legal principles must bend to the realities of such 
pressures. In other words, in certain circumstances, 
legal principles cannot prevail over important strategic 
non-legal considerations.^*
Fourth, the institutional structure of the organisation, 
once fixed in the form prescribed in 1947, proved 
impossible to adapt in light of the consensus which 
would have been required to overhaul the system. To a 
certain extent, this also explains why, in the final 
stages of the Uruguay Round negotiations, it was 
eventually realised that the existing GATT institutional 
structure would collapse under the administrative needs 
of implementing the new agreements and that, however 
reluctantly states might be to concede this point, a new 
institutional structure would be required.
The need to overhaul the institutional structure of the 
GATT has existed for more than twenty years without 
effective action being taken until 1995. If effective 
rules were to be established to stem deviation by 
contracting parties from the precepts of the system, the 
efficacy of the institutional structure required radical 
improvement in terms of rule-making, rule-identifying 
and rule-applying mechanisms. An integrated 
institutional structure for these purposes was always 
the most obvious alternative. Instead, the horizontal 
devolution of these functions to committees with limited 
powers, particularly as regards enforcement, was a 
second rate compromise which inevitably produced 
inferior results. The United States and the European 
Union relied extensively on this fact to evade their 
international obligations.^^
See text, supra pp.108-112.
See text, supra pp.52-59.
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A number of factors cumulatively explain this result. 
The committees were created by codes in which only a 
limited number of contracting parties participated. The 
international agreements which they were instructed to 
enforce were generally the product of excessive 
compromise during negotiations on their content. The 
dispute settlement procedure was inherently defective 
and the absence of a mechanism to facilitate the 
automatic adoption of panel reports circumscribed any 
normative influence such reports might have. With few 
exceptions, the only reports which were implemented were 
non-contentious and were given effect on the most 
limited basis possible.
The impossibility of overhauling the original 
institutional structure proved to be another
significant factor in circumscribing the power and 
authority of the organisation to exercise adequate 
normative influence on the behaviour of the United 
States and the European Union. There was never any 
permanent mechanism in the organisation to facilitate 
the creation of new international commitments as and 
when the need for such disciplines arose. No means of 
adjudicating disputes between states was ever 
substituted for the discredited panel process. The only 
effective method of enforcing adverse decisions required 
unilateral action in the event of remedial action being 
refused by a recalcitrant state, despite the absolute 
incompatibility of unilateral action with the principle 
of multilateralism which stands at the heart of the 
system.
The enforced debilitation of the GATT legal structure, 
at the instance of its most influential contracting 
parties, itself produced changes in the nature of the
1076 See for example, text, supra pp.93-99.
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international trade system as the United States and the 
European Union took greater advantage of the inability 
of the GATT to restrain their behaviour. The main change 
is the growth in free trade areas sparked by the 
perception of some states of an inability to achieve 
policy objectives on a multilateral basis. Even although 
these arrangements are arguably permitted under Article 
XXIV of the GATT, they have increasing sophistication in 
terms of both organisational structure and the scope of 
their coverage. Many, such as the NAFTA, transcend the 
traditional conception of a free trade area by 
encompassing additional fields such as investment, 
services and intellectual property rights.
On a less intensive level, but still equally foreboding 
for the effective regulation of state behaviour, has 
been the rise of bilateral understandings to limit the 
exports of one country to another. Whether these are 
called voluntary export restraint agreements, voluntary 
restraint agreements or orderly marketing arrangements, 
their effect is the same; to create illegitimate, but 
almost generally accepted, restraints on trade. Their 
existence is an anathema to the GATT-system for a number 
of reasons but mainly because they fundamentally 
undermine the operation of the principle of 
multilateralism. Not surprisingly, it has been the 
United States and the European Union which have had most 
frequent resort to such measures.
The United States and the European Union have been able 
to evade their international trade commitments because 
of these limiting factors which operate to circumscribe 
the normative influence of the GATT rules. If the system 
for the application and enforcement of obligations is
See text, supra pp.39-40.
See text, supra pp.38-39.
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out-of-step with the environment in which it operates, 
unable to respond to change and unable to prevail over 
the host of competing interests influencing the 
decision-making, it will always be inherently 
ineffective. This situation has been compounded by an 
insipid institutional structure which has been unable to 
contain the pressures exerted by the competition of 
interests among the major players.
It is therefore a valid conclusion that the fact that 
the United States and the European Union often formulate 
trade policy divorced from international legal 
commitments can be attributed to the limited normative 
efficacy of the international trade legal order itself.
(2) The Degree to Which the Rules Embody an Adequate 
International Consensus
The formulation of international rules requires a 
compromise to be struck between the rights of states to 
regulate their own domestic economic and commercial 
policies, subject to the rules of international law, and 
the legitimate interests of other states to mitigate or 
limit injury which might be sustained as a consequence 
of other states exercising their right to formulate such 
policies. These conflicting interests are best 
reconciled by negotiating principles and rules which 
delimit these respective interests.
The key to successfully striking this balance is to 
create principles based on a genuine consensus among the 
participating states. Indeed, rules of law must be based 
on a minimum degree of consensus and if negotiating 
states are unable to arrive at such an accommodation.
1079 See text, supra pp.52-54.
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the outcome will be inefficacious rules. Behind this 
consensus is implicit acknowledgement that compliance 
with the terms of a rule is in the long-term strategic 
interests of the participating states. This 
self-interest provides the primary motivation for 
abiding by the terms of the rule.
Further, international rules increase in normative 
efficacy in proportion to the degree of consensus 
underpinning their content. Conversely, international 
agreements which incorporate too many compromises during 
their negotiation embody a limited degree of consensus 
and as a result, their obligatory content will have a 
circumscribed normative effect. The rules themselves 
will be vague and may contain unworkable formula; in the 
worst case scenario, these rules will be inchoate and 
underdeveloped. Such agreements are rarely accompanied 
by mechanisms or processed which facilitate 
rectification of these short-comings which, in reality, 
ultimately contribute to their demise.
Of the agreements considered in this study, the most 
graphic illustration of an agreement embodying an 
inadequate consensus is the Subsidies Code 1979. This 
agreement substituted compromise as a surrogate for 
genuine consensus among the parties. The United States 
and the European Union settled for a set of rules which 
both knew did not represent a statement of their 
consolidated mutual policy interests. The United States 
desired rules which could be mustered to attack the 
subsidisation policies of specific states, most notably 
the European union, in the event that their policies did 
not converge with the United States * perception of 
appropriate financial contributions. The primary 
objective of the European Union in the negotiations was 
to dilute the prospect of other states attacking its 
subsidisation policies. In these circumstances, the
985
prospect of consensus between these parties was 
virtually non-existent and this failure permeated the 
whole of the agreement. The inevitable consequence was 
that, within a few years, the 1979 Code rules fragmented 
and became unworkable.
The difficulties of reaching the necessary degree of 
consensus may be attributed to the reality that the 
negotiating positions of states are essentially 
extensions of their domestic policies and are therefore 
stigmatised with self-interest. When this element is 
prevalent, the negotiating positions of states become 
increasingly intractable and the prospect of compromise, 
on which a consensus may be constructed, diminishes. 
Negotiating positions serve to achieve political 
objectives and, in the absence of common objectives, the 
creation of effective rules is rare.
In the field of international trade, these interests, 
and the traditional prerogatives of states to conduct 
national economic and commercial policy, have largely 
contributed to the general reluctance of states to agree 
to rules which will interfere with the exercise of 
sovereign rights. This reluctance has had two 
consequences. First, this has resulted in the 
perpetration of weak rules to regulate international 
behaviour. Second, there has been a general reticence to 
confer on international bodies the necessary 
jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of these 
sovereign rights. For example, the United States took 
extensive advantage of the protocol of Provisional 
Application to grandfather its laws, especially its 
countervailing and anti-dumping laws. The failure to 
acquiesce to the application of the material injury test 
created a serious imbalance in the global application of
1080 See text, supra pp.112-116.
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this standard as other nations gradually amended their 
laws to comply with the rigours of Article VI. The 
United States then used this non-compliance as a 
bargaining counter at the Tokyo Round MTNs to achieve 
more precise rules governing the perceived misuse of 
subsidies by other states.
Another attribute of rules based on an effective absence 
of consensus is that they rarely embody any mechanism 
for compulsion. In such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that states cannot be relied on to refrain 
from taking advantage of the vagueness in the rules to 
avoid their obligations no matter how weak these 
obligations might be. Vagueness also encourages 
unilateral interpretation especially in the absence of 
a centralised body or agency to provide direction and 
guidance. Experience throughout this study has shown 
that, given any discretion to unilaterally determine 
their rights and duties, the United States and the 
European Union will opt for the interpretation which 
permits a construction in favour of the policy which 
they wish to adopt. The same tendency also occurs in 
relation to any loop-holes which exist in the fabric of 
international agreements.
The Subsidies Code is replete with instances of 
consensual lacunae. At the most basic level, the 
negotiating parties were even unable to arrive at a 
consensus on a definition of a subsidy even although 
failure to reach a workable formula for identifying 
financial assistance in this form had been recognised as 
a fundamental flaw in the original Article VI and XVI 
provisions. The inability of the signatories to agree on 
the definitive attributes of this concept also
1081 See text, supra pp. 175-176.
1082 ggg text’, supra pp. 183-187, 207-219.
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fundamentally retarded progress on the development of 
the disciplines contained in the agreement itself.
The definition agreed at the Uruguay round negotiations 
is an improvement but still a solid core of convergence 
in the negotiation positions of the United States and 
the European Union on this point is absent. 
Consequently, the definition itself and its related 
concepts are neither unambiguous or sufficiently 
precise. The definition, for example, does not address 
the issue of whether or not a failure to regulate a 
particular economic sector would constitute a subsidy 
for the purposes of the Agreement. Equally, is the 
refusal or failure of a government to impose minimum 
safety, employment conditions or wage conditions a 
subsidy? These questions arise simply because of the 
non-comprehensive nature of the formula agreed which, in 
the absence of effective international dispute 
settlement, allow both the United States and the 
European Union to draw their own conclusions and develop 
their own principles. The addition of the requirements 
that a subsidy must involve a financial contribution and 
must satisfy the specificity standard will not, of 
themselves, rectify this problem.
The terms of the 1979 Code regulating to the use of 
domestic subsidies also reflect a total absence of 
consensus between those signatories advocating the 
imposition of restraints on such subsidies and those 
states which took the view that the social and political 
benefits of domestic subsidies outweigh the adverse 
economic repercussions. As a direct consequence, the 
provisions relating to domestic subsidies add little, if 
any, clarification to the terms of Article XVI as 
amended, and in fact perpetuate, and even exacerbate.
1083 See text, supra pp.121-122.
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the ambiguities of the original GATT provisions.
Similarly, the artificial rationale for distinguishing 
between agricultural and industrial export subsidies on 
the basis of an economic distinction can be traced back 
to a profound disturbance in the initial consensus for 
regulating subsidies. This formula arose originally as 
a political attempt to reconcile the formulation of 
restraints on the use of export subsidies with the 
internal policies of the United States. The European 
Union later hijacked the distinction in order to 
preserve the integrity of its own Common Agricultural 
Policy. In both cases, the impetus for maintaining the 
distinction was political and the consequence was to 
prevent the formation on any genuine consensus around an 
effective prohibition on the use of export subsidies. 
These interests again surfaced at the Uruguay Round to 
such a degree that they threatened to jeopardise the 
success of the whole round of MTNs.
Even the most explicit provision of the Code - the 
prohibition of export subsidies on industrial products 
- proved to be based on the misconception that the 
provision could be effectively enforced. In the United 
States complaint against European Union subsidies on 
exports of pasta, despite a clear finding of prohibited 
subsidies, the European Union managed to avoid having to 
change its policy by effectively vetoing the adoption of 
the report. Even although stated in the clearest terms 
possible, the normal consequences of a legal obligation 
of this sort did not follow.
The jurisprudence of dispute settlement under the Code's
See text, supra pp.91-97. 
See text, supra pp.438-441. 
See text, supra pp. 106-112.
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provisions additionally provides evidence of the 
failure to arrive at an adequate consensus on the terms 
of the Code. One of the earliest panels adjudicating on 
the contents of the Code expressed its contempt to such 
a degree that it declared itself 'unable to conclude* 
whether a breach of Article 10 of the Code has occurred 
in a complaint lodged by the United States against the 
European U n i o n . O t h e r  panel reports on the 
application of the terms of the Code were ignored in 
practice either by the refusal of the signatory found in 
violation to accept the adoption of the report or by 
bilateral settlement of the matter in terms which rarely 
reflected the findings of the panel.
It cannot be said with certainty that the terms of the 
Subsidies Code 1993 are based on a sufficient degree of 
consensus between the two protagonists - the United 
States and the European Union. In effect, the 
classification of subsidies into the prohibited, 
actionable and permissible categories remains open 
pending definitive discussions on the matter. Here there 
exists an open battle-field for conflict between the two 
parties once the moratorium on complaints contained in 
the so-called 'peace clause* has lapsed. There is little 
doubt that this issue has not been satisfactorily 
resolved and the vagueness and overlap between the 
categories allows considerable for unilateral 
interpretation.
Therefore, the failure of the 1979 Code at the technical 
level can largely been attributed to establishing rules 
on an inadequate consensus. The result was grey areas 
which were perpetually exploited by the United States 
and the European Union in order to avoid their
See text, supra p. 105.
See text, supra pp. 140-144.
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obligations. Similarly, the prohibited/actionable/ 
permissible classification being introduced in the 
Subsidies Code 1994 is a primary weakness in this 
regime. There are inadequate rules to categorise 
specific programmes into each of these baskets because 
there was an inadequate consensus underpinning the 
formulation of the rules in the first place.
Turning to the rules of the Subsidies Code 1979 relating 
to countervailing duties again the same phenomenon 
appears. The original purpose of countervailing duty 
measures, it will be recalled, was to prevent injury to 
a domestic industry due to foreign subsidies granted on 
competing products. However, few rules were agreed in 
the GATT, other .than those in Article VI, to regulate 
these measures quite simply because their use was not 
considered to be prevalent at that time.
As pressure for greater protectionism through the use of 
these mechanisms has grown, so to has the need to 
regulate their use through international constraints. 
Here, the competition of interests emerges. On the one 
hand, the policy of the United States has been to resist 
attempts to curtail the discretion of states to resort 
to such measures. On the other hand, a number of states, 
including the European Union and Japan, have colluded to 
counter this propensity. The inevitable consequence is 
an inability to arrive at an effective consensus on 
which to build international rules which will have 
sufficient normative impact.
An illustration of this tension was the proposal 
espoused by the European Union at the Tokyo Round to 
confine the use of countervailing measures to subsidies
See text, supra pp. 131-142
See text, supra pp.177-187
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prohibited at the general level by the Subsidies Code 
itself. The impact of this would have been to restrict 
the use of countervailing measures to export subsidies 
on industrial products. The United States, of course, 
resisted the proposal to assimilate the treatment of 
subsidies and to co-ordinate the treatment of particular 
subsidies, and the proposal was never adopted.
In contrast to the position of the European Union 
vis-a-vis subsidies, the United States successfully 
resisted the attempts to impose shackles on its 
countervailing duty laws. No consensus was reached on 
the scope of a number of key terms, including the 
concept of countervailable subsidy, quantification 
rules, guidelines for establishing specificity, 
anti-circumvention measures and the standards for 
assessing material i n j u r y . I n  addition, by once 
again depending on the reliability of the PPA, the 
United States was only required to apply this new regime 
to the minority of contracting parties which became 
signatories to the Code.
In the dispute settlement process, this time it was the 
United States which was on the defensive, continuously 
blocking the adoption of adverse reports and refusing to 
amend its legislation retrospectively particularly when 
cash deposits had already been lodged. The United States 
was, by far, the respondent in the majority of 
complaints brought before panels for resolution and yet 
few amendments liberalising these laws in favour of 
foreign producers have been implemented. This is further 
testimony to the extremely ineffective nature of the 
dispute resolution procedure and the limited normative 
nature of the substantive rules contained in the Code
1091 text, supra pp. 1 2 6 - 1 3 7 .
See text, supra pp.1 8 3 - 1 8 7 .
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itself.
The position vis-a-vis the Anti-Dumping Code 1979 is 
more complex quite simply because the opposing parties 
were not so clearly defined. Hence, the nature of the 
vested interests bringing about the collapse of the 
necessary consensus cannot be readily identified. The 
starting point is, however, recognition that 
anti-dumping measures cannot be justified by economic 
argument and are therefore, in reality, a political 
mechanism used by Western developed countries to limit 
the volume of imported products into their markets. 
Since these countries exercise the greatest negotiating 
power inside the GATT, an agreement to regulate this 
matter will probably embody their interests which are 
primarily to allow the greatest degree of flexibility 
and manoeuvrability possible when administering and 
adopting anti-dumping measures.
The 1979 Code provisions on procedure, determinations of 
dumping and adjustments are deliberately extremely vague 
as are the rules for establishing material i n j u r y .  
The Code even failed to establish a common standard for 
the application of the injury test between the United 
States and the European Union. Nevertheless, it is in 
the extensive scope of issues not regulated by the 1979 
Code that absence of consensus is apparent. No rules 
were agreed to regulate indirect dumping (input and 
sub-assembly dumping), cumulation and cross-cumulation 
of injury, the problem of exchange rate volatility, 
anti-circumvention measures and anti-absorption 
techniques.
With one or two minor exceptions, the vast majority of
See text, supra pp. 178-184.
See text, supra pp. 184-189.
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complaints brought under the Anti-dumping Code have been 
levelled against either the United States or the 
European Union. Nevertheless, neither the United States 
or the European Union has shown any deference to the 
authority of panel reports ruling against their policies 
or activities. Legal technicalities, blocking the 
formation of consensus and a host of other techniques 
have all been mustered to justify procrastination in 
adopting panel r e p o r t s . T h e  European Union did not, 
for example, amend its anti-dumping laws to comply with 
the ruling of the panel in the Screwdriver Case. The 
United States, on the other and, preferred to enter into 
a phase of bilateral discussions designed to reach a 
'mutually satisfactory solution* rather than change its 
anti-dumping laws.^°^ It is therefore a justifiable 
conclusion that the panel system exercised no genuine 
normative influence over the behaviour of these two 
states.
Establishing a sufficient degree of consensus in the 
rules of the 1979 Codes was not aided by the fact that 
the patterns for many of the rules had already been 
entrenched even before the Tokyo Round commenced. 
Building on flawed concepts proved to be profoundly 
dangerous particularly in the case of the Subsidies 
Code. Instead of constructing the new regime on the 
unworkable formula contained in Article XVI, the 
negotiators would have been better starting with a fresh 
page. This was the approach adopted a decade later 
during the Uruguay Round negotiation and which gives the 
final text of the Second Subsidies Code more credibility 
than its predecessor. However, the task of the Uruguay 
Round negotiators has been made more difficult.
1095 See text, supra pp.187-192, 194-201.
For example. United States Anti-Dumoinq Duties 
on Imports of Cement from Mexico, supra pp.195-197.
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particularly in developing rules for subsidies, by the 
fact that the preceding agreement was inept at 
controlling the proliferation of unlawful subsidies. In 
order to obtain credibility the revised Code must now 
reign in this abuse and bring state aid inside the 
domain of normative influence which will impose an 
immense strain on the new system from the very outset.
Constructing regulatory regimes on an inadequate 
consensual basis creates its own consequences both for 
circumscribing the normative influence of such rules and 
undermining the credibility of the system as a whole.
The most obvious adverse consequence is that such a 
deficiency can only lead to the creation of unworkable 
rules which will ultimately render the whole edifice of 
normative regulation ineffective. Both the Anti-Dumping 
and the Subsidies Codes are replete with unworkable 
formula and rules, but this quantity is most evident in 
the Subsidies Code. For example, the 'seek to avoid* 
formula adopted in Article 8(3) of the Code diluted the 
normative influence of this rule to such a degree that 
no signatory could be confronted for failing to prevent 
injury Through the introduction of a domestic 
s u b s i d y . T h i s  interpretation is confirmed by the 
fact that the provision never formed the basis for a 
complaint by any signatory against another. Similarly, 
mere 'recognition* that subsidies other than export 
subsidies may cause injury to a domestic industry was 
tantamount to acknowledgement that the rule contained in 
Article 11(2) was a formulation based on the concept of 
'regulation without observation*.
Many more instances of unworkable rules permeate the 
Subsidies Code. The test of 'equitable share*, when
1097 See text, supra pp.91-92
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applied by the panel in EU Subsidies on Exports of Wheat 
Flour, was subject to overt criticism. This was a clear 
endorsement of the view that the formula could not be 
effectively applied in light of the complex interplay of 
economic factors at work in the international 
market-place. Even the explicit prohibition on export 
subsidies on industrial products proved difficult to 
apply and caused one panel member to issue an 
unprecedented dissenting opinion in the first test case 
brought. Each of these formulations proved to be too 
vague to be proper systems for the effective 
identification of legal obligations, a phenomenon which 
can be directly attributed to the fundamental lack of 
consensus which existed when these formulae were 
conceived.
A further consequence of rules conceived on an 
inadequate consensus is that the rule-identification and 
development mechanisms established under these 
agreements suffered from a thrombosis brought about as 
a result of the difficulties of applying and evolving 
the existing rules. The Subsidies Committee, in 
particular, was unable to escape this condition 
particularly in 'relation to developing rules for the 
uniform interpretation and application of the Code 
despite this function being an express role of that 
agency. Indeed, inside the Committee itself, 
fragmentation occurred in the membership as a result not 
only of divergent opinions as to its role but also in 
relation to formulating recommendations providing 
guidance on the rules. Although the Anti-Dumping 
Committees was more successful in this task, the 
guidelines which it produced were mere recommendations 
which were not binding on signatories and implementation 
of these recommendations could only be achieved on a
1098 See text, supra pp.56-57.
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voluntary b a s i s . i n  fact, the common response of 
signatories to the publication of these recommendations 
was to assert that their existing national laws and 
administrative procedures complied with the terms of 
these recommendations and therefore no subsequent 
amendments were necessary.
The demise of the organisational structure behind the 
Codes inevitably resulted in the failure to secure new 
rules to tackle the more complex and exotic measures and 
practices devised by the United States and the European 
Union for applying anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties. Anti-circumvention and anti-absorption measures 
were never specifically regulated by Code provisions or 
recommendations from the Anti-Dumping Committee and were 
only controlled through the application of general 
principles. Similarly, signatories were left on their 
own to develop national laws to deal with indirect 
dumping, indirect subsidies, cumulation and 
cross-cumulation, exchange rate fluctuations and the 
definition of countervailable s u b s i d i e s . other 
words, the failure to arrive at a proper consensus on 
the basic principles produced a knock on effect when the 
signatories came to address the issue of regulating new 
techniques.
The cumulative impact of these factors was to relegate 
the role of the Code rules in terms of both their 
normative efficacy and their credibility. This is 
evidenced by the fact that gradually contracting parties 
which were also signatories to the Code based complaints 
on the general principles of the GATT rather than the 
tailored provisions of the Code. For example, the United 
States complaint against European Union subsidies to
See text, supra p.57.
See text, supra pp. 183-188.
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producers of certain types of canned fruit was brought 
under Article XXIII of the GATT and not Article 8 of the 
Code."^ Equally, the United States complaint against 
European Union oilseed subsidies was brought under 
Article III of the GATT."^ Likewise, the Japanese 
complaint against the European Union's 
anti-circumvention measures was initiated on the basis 
of Article III and not the relevant provisions of the 
Anti-Dumping Code. This abandonment is proof that both 
Codes, but especially the Subsidies Code, lost their 
credibility as their normative influence was eroded.
In turn, this process led to the eventual abandonment of 
compliance with the terms of both agreements especially 
by the United States and the European Union. The fact 
that the Subsidies Code provided no effective remedy to 
a complaint was recognised as early as 1985 and, as 
panel reports were increasingly prevented from being 
adopted, fewer complaints were lodged with the Subsidies 
Committee. As for the Anti-Dumping Code, although use 
was made of the complaints procedure much of this 
activity can be attributed to attempts to place pressure 
on states during the Uruguay Round negotiations. This is 
certainly true of the majority of complaints lodged 
after 1989.
The decline in the normative impact of these agreements 
has much broader implications which also merit 
consideration in the context of this discussion. The 
most noticeable effect is that disputes which should 
have been resolved through the channels set up under 
these agreements became increasingly acrimonious as the 
parties attempted to arrive at a settlement outside the 
framework provided by the agreements. Once the dispute
See text, supra pp.93-95.
See text-, supra pp.95-98.
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was removed from the proper forum for resolution, 
peripheral issues and concerns were introduced by the 
antagonists in order to defend their policies and 
positions. This explains why complaints alleging 
violations of Code provisions were regularly met with 
counterclaims accusing the complaining state of 
equivalent conduct in different guises. Such accusations 
were not confined to the immediate proeedings in each 
case. For instance, the United States complaint against 
European Union subsidies on wheat flour was immediately 
followed by a EU complaint against the United States 
alleging unlawful subsidisation of wheat sales to 
E g y p t . T h e  rationale for this tactic was simply to 
place pressure on the United States to justify its own 
positions when castigating or condemning those of 
another state. Similarly, the U.S. complaint against the 
Airbus programme was met by a counterclaim that American 
companies receive equal indirect assistance through 
government-financed military and space research 
p r o g r a m m e s . This again was a spoiling tactic by the 
European Union to divert international criticisms of its 
policies.
Opening up disputes by introducing peripheral, and often 
unrelated issues, has its own consequences. Disputes 
become more protracted and intense as each side defends 
its position by reference to external considerations and 
factors. Trade disputes escalate as growing frustration 
enters the process. The prevalent tendency is for 
diplomacy to play a greater role in the process. Of 
course, diplomacy and legal resolution are two distinct 
processes and once the former element enters the 
equation the whole process tends to stagnate. For 
example, even although the panel in the Airbus dispute
See text, supra p. 115. 
Ibid.
999
ruled against the European Union and the Union 
expressed the view in the Council that it would not 
stand in the way of the adoption of the report, its 
position was qualified by the rider that the Union would 
only fulfil the panel's findings in the context of the 
implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round. This 
allowed the European Union sufficient breathing space to 
achieve a bilateral settlement with the United States, 
the results of which were eventually incorporated in the 
Uruguay Round Final Act as the Agreement on Civil 
Aircraft. This agreement embodies the diplomatic 
settlement sought by the European Union which, by that 
stage, clearly no longer felt compelled by the decision 
of the panel on this matter. In other words, the 
European Union had avoided implementing the panel's 
conclusions and effectively renegotiated the rules 
governing this matter, modelled on a greater degree of 
convergence with its own policies.
Rules based on inadequate consensus also do not properly 
channel internal pressures within states into the proper 
conduits. Faced with unsatisfactory rules, procedures 
and processes, governments feel a greater need to 
respond to internal pressures. This occurred, for 
example, where the failure to enact effective 
international rules caused the United States to rely on 
its countervailing duty rules as a means of providing 
relief to its agricultural and industrial producers."^ 
Effective international structures relieve these 
pressures and facilitate the creation of channels 
whereby legitimately aggrieved industries can obtain 
effective remedies in accordance with the international 
rules. Failure to release these pressures, as we shall 
see later, merely encourages illegal unilateral 
behaviour on the part of states especially the United
1105 See text) supra pp.378-388.
1 0 0 0
States and the European Union,
These pressures also affect the shape of state policies. 
For example, the need to respond to internal pressures 
compelled the United States to adopt a two pronged 
strategy for tackling foreign subsidies.First, the 
United States attempted to persuade trading partners to 
remove subsidies at both the multilateral and bilateral 
levels. This emphasis later changed significantly 
towards bilateralism in the form of the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreements and similar understandings. 
The second prong of this strategy was to resort to its 
own countervailing and anti-dumping laws. The problem 
here was that, while anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty measures can relieve the problem of subsidised 
imports, the concerns of United States producers 
relating to unfair competition in foreign export 
markets, caused by government assistance to domestic 
producers, cannot be similarly placated. This problem 
could only be addressed, in the view of the U.S. 
government, through unilaterally imposed pressures and 
hence the eventual use of section 301 measures.
The final outstanding matter that falls to be considered 
when analysing the consensus behind the international 
rules regulating subsidies, countervailing duty and 
anti-dumping measures is whether the new system 
established at the Uruguay Round will rectify the system 
by embodying a sufficient consensus behind the rules. 
There are a number of reasons for being skeptical even 
although the new agreements represent a significant 
movement towards the promotion of legalism in 
international economic affairs and a regression from the 
diplomacy-oriented system that characterised the first 
three decades of the functioning of the GATT.
1106 See text, supra pp.255-263.
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A number of technical difficulties exist in the terms of 
the Second Subsidies Code caused by failure to arrive at 
a proper consensus. The Subsidies Committee, or a 
subsidiary organ, should have been given power to create 
additional principles and rules to facilitate the 
evolution of the terms of the Code. However, the main 
contentious and unresolved issue is the types of 
subsidies which will be included in the so-called 'green 
box' and which will therefore be non-actionable.^^ 
Similarly, the terms of the Code relating to 
countervailing duties are not a radial overhaul of the 
original agreement and, in many respects, the defects 
which existed in that agreement have been repeated.
The negotiation of the new Anti-Dumping Agreement 1993 
proved to be an exacting task because of the tension 
between the major importing nations, such as the United 
States and the European Union, and the major exporting 
countries. No consensus materialised on the terms of a 
final document until the 'Dunkel draft' and even the 
final text of the third Anti-Dumping Agreement has some 
glaring textual omissions reflecting lapses in 
consensus. The final agreement itself therefore reflects 
probably none of the policy objectives of any of the 
major negotiating states which highlights its inadequacy 
and its future inability to effectively influence the 
behaviour of the United States or the European Union.
(3) The Compatibility Between the Policy Objectives of 
States and the Content of International Rules
(A) The United States
A number of alternatives have been espoused as the main 
policy objectives of U.S. trade policy. The U.S.
1107 See text, supra pp.140-142.
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government, at least the Executive, would claim that 
the general goal of its commercial policy is 
international trade liberalisation akin to the dogmatic 
concept of 'a level playing field*. The evidence 
suggests, however, that its trade policy pursues a 
different agenda namely the reduction of the trade 
deficit with other countries and the protection of U.S. 
economic and commercial interests abroad. This 
conclusion is difficult to avoid if the shape of U.S. 
trade policy is examined in detail.
If the United States seriously advocates the promotion 
of international trade liberalisation, why has so much 
erosion occurred within its own internal commercial 
policy undermining its commitment to the fundamental 
principles of the GATT/WTO trading system? Governmental 
agencies have systematically manipulated U.S. import 
laws and administrative practices to reduce the level of 
imports entering the territory. Unilateral 
reclassification of imports has occurred on a widespread 
scale. Much of the impetus for this practice has stemmed 
from political sources and has the effect of providing 
de facto protection to certain industries.
The illegal introduction of custom users* fees is 
another example of declining adherence to international 
standards. Panel reports have been issued condemning the 
arbitrary nature of such charges as being inconsistent 
with the obligations of the United States under Articles 
11(2) (c) and VIII(l)(a) of the GATT.^‘®® Instead of 
implementing the findings of the panels, the United 
States has been content to maintain such illegal 
practices albeit on a reduced level.
"08 See text, supra pp.246-247.
See text, supra pp.248-249.
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Equally, the United States has been found guilty of 
introducing discriminatory internal taxes in 
contravention of Article III of the GATT. This was the 
conclusion of the panel established to investigate the 
so-called SuperFund tax introduced at rates which 
blatantly discriminated between domestic and foreign 
producers. Similarly, excise taxes, the burden of which 
falls more heavily on domestically-produced goods, are 
a common feature of United States budgetary 
measures.
There is also a plethora of other indicators of the 
change in the direction of U.S. trade policy. Imports 
are restricted through discriminatory measures taking 
the form of quantitative restrictions, discriminatory 
product standards, pro-American public procurement 
policies and barriers in certain service sectors. 
Many of these national measures are flagrantly 
inconsistent with the terms of the Tokyo Codes.
Ample evidence therefore exists of the undermining of 
the United States commitment to the fundamental 
principle of the GATT from the manipulation of its 
customs laws, its internal tax system and other devices 
which limit imports. There can also be little doubt that 
the motive behind many of these measures is to improve 
the overall trade deficit which the United States has 
maintained with certain countries over the last fifteen 
years. In reality, the United States has not even 
attempted to disguise this motive in many of these 
measures.
This evidence debunks the claim that the United States 
is attempting to create some form of 'level playing
See text, supra pp.249-251.
See text, supra pp.252-255.
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field'. The United States engages in equally pernicious 
trade practices as its trading partners and many of 
these practices flout the international standards set 
down in the General Agreement.
In these circumstances, it is more credible that United 
States trade policy seeks to reduce its trade deficit 
and to protect United States economic and commercial 
interests in foreign markets. Proof of the obsession of 
the United States government, both in Congress and in 
the Administration, with its trade deficit abounds in 
government records. For example, it will be recalled 
that the principal negotiating objective identified in 
Section 1101(b) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988 was to;
'develop rules to address large and persistent global 
account imbalances of countries, including imbalances 
which threaten the stability of the international 
trading system, by imposing greater responsibility on 
such countries to undertake policy changes aimed at 
restoring current account equilibrium, including 
expedited implementation of trade agreements where
feasible and appropriate".
In addition, the numerous proposals from Congress to 
reduce the trade deficit through draconian measures also 
evidence this objective. The first Gephardt amendment, 
which would have required a country with a trade surplus 
with the United States to reduce this surplus by ten 
percent annually, is a fine illustration of 
Congressional views on the manner as is the second 
Gephardt bill which would have required mandatory 
measures to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with Japan by
1112 See text, supra p.377.
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20% in each of the following five y e a r s . in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, mandatory retaliation against 
countries with trade surpluses had bipartisan support in 
Congress with both Democratic and Republic supporters 
favouring such action.
Most of these proposals were never adopted simply 
because of their impracticality. The United States 
cannot force foreign consumers to purchase United States 
goods any more easily than it can force its own 
consumers to purchase American-manufactured products 
instead of foreign-produced goods. However, these 
proposals had the virtue of allowing their proponents to 
posture before the electorate as being men of action.
On the other hand, at a practical legal level, the 
influence of the increasing trade deficit and the need 
to protect United States commercial interests abroad, 
has created two noticeable phenomenon in the direction 
of United States trade policy. The first is the movement 
away from the traditional policy of multilateral trade 
diplomacy towards bilateral trade diplomacy. The second 
is the increased penchant of the United States to use 
unilateral measures to seek to achieve trade policy 
objectives.
There is substantial evidence pointing to a change in 
emphasis in United States trade policy from multilateral 
to bilateral diplomacy. Although not explicitly 
inconsistent with any of the general obligations of the 
GATT, the manifestation of this phenomenon is 
disturbing. For historical reasons already noted, the 
United States has traditionally been a supporter of the 
GATT s y s t e m . B e i n g  the original dynamo behind the
See text, supra pp.261-262.
See text, supra pp.28-29.
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system, the GATT represented an extension of both the 
content and shape of United States commercial trade 
policy. In the event that this support is eroded, or 
lost, the normative influence of the trading order in 
general would suffer a serious setback.
Broadly speaking. United States bilateral strategies for 
pursuing trade policy objectives can be classified 
according to whether the aim is the negotiate primary 
commercial agreements, secondary commercial agreements 
or tertiary understandings.
Primary commercial agreements are comprehensive free 
trade agreements with trading partners. At present, the 
main example is the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). This agreement will serve to ensure that United 
States trade policy objectives are secured on a 
bilateral basis, as far as that term can be used to 
describe a multi-party agreement of limited membership. 
Like the original GATT agreement, NAFTA is an extension 
of the policy objective of ensuring long-term access to 
foreign markets for United States goods and services, in 
this case in neighbouring or adjacent s t a t e s . T h e  
agreement provides insight into the model of trading 
environment which the United States seeks to promote on 
the international plane.
Already the United States has been the driving force in 
extending the system established under this system 
further south. In the event that more countries are 
included within this framework, it is likely that a 
regional economic bloc will be created with the United 
States at the centre as its dynamo. In such 
circumstances, NAFTA would place the United States in 
the same position relative to the participating states
1115 See text, supra pp.257-259.
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(present and future) as was the case in the immediate 
post-war international trading community, Th aims and 
objectives of U.S. trade policy will then be complete 
albeit on a less grand scale.
Nowadays, bilateral trade agreements between the United 
States and other countries tends to be sector-specific 
and hence they have assumed a secondary character. The 
bilateral agreements between the United States and the 
European Union in trade in civil aircraft and 
co-operation in the field of anti-trust/competition law 
enforcement, for example, illustrate the modern approach 
adopted by the United S t a t e s . I t  is possible that 
these secondary agreements may assume a greater function 
in the near future with possible bilateral trade 
agreements being entered into between the United States 
and the Pacific Rim states.
Tertiary understandings and agreements are the loosest 
form of international agreements used by the United 
States. The most prominent example of such a medium is 
the Declaration on European Union - United States 
Relations of November 1 9 9 0 . Such understandings 
provide a series of mutually-agreed, yet vague, 
principles for conducting both economic and political 
relationships.
The negotiation of free trade agreements, bilateral 
accords and understandings may be an expeditious means 
of conducting international trade relations but, in the 
short term, the establishment of a network of such 
agreements at the expense of full participation in the 
multilateral system will damage the international 
trading system and may lead to polarisation and even
See text, supra pp.260-261.
See text, supra p.260.
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fragmentation of.the system. This is especially the case 
when the European Union makes such extensive use of such 
arrangements. In the event that the WTO is unable to 
function as designed, it is feasible that there will be 
a gradual polarisation of the North American markets and 
the European market simply because of the tendency of 
both states to resort to comprehensive bilateral trade 
agreements to achieve their trade policy objectives.
That said, it is the propensity of the United States to 
resort to unilateral measures when its trade policy 
objectives are being frustrated that is the most 
condemning evidence of the breakdown of the normative 
influence of the international trade legal system when 
its rules collide with the promotion of the policy 
objectives of the United States. Subjectivity and 
coercion are the two main components of unilateral 
measures and it is these two factors which indicate that 
the United States pays little attention to international 
rules when engaging in such practices.
The United States has pioneered the use of unilateral 
measures because it perceives that the objectives and 
goals of its trade policy are being frustrated at the 
international level. Section 301 and analogous measures 
are unequivocally intended to impose diplomatic pressure 
on trade partners to reduce or remove commercial trade 
practices which are considered undesirable by the U.S. 
trade policy-makers. The main point is that Section 301 
and the related measures operate independently of any 
objective assessment of the legality or otherwise of the 
behaviour of the state against which the measures will 
be directed. The primary consideration in the process is 
the degree to which the national laws and administrative 
practices of the foreign state frustrate the objectives
Ills See text, supra pp.264-265.
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and goals of U.S. trade policy and, in particular, by 
restricting market access for United States producers.
Section 301 has changed the shape of United States trade 
policy, if not in terms of content, then certainly in 
the way that trade policy goals and objectives are 
secured. Hence, its functioning is an anathema to the 
international trade legal system and highlights the 
separation of United States policy interests from the 
international rules established under the General 
Agreement,
Examining the evolution of U.S. unilateral retaliatory 
measures over the course of the last twenty years 
provides an insight into the breakdown of the normative 
influence of legal principles on the formulation of 
trade policy. Quite clearly. Section 301 is incompatible 
with many of the principles of the GATT.*“® The 
mechanism frustrates the proper functioning of the 
dispute resolution procedures mandated by the GATT and 
the Tokyo Round Codes. Unilateral coercion and the 
settlement of disputes through consultations and 
conciliation are poles apart. Although the General 
Agreement authorises the use of retaliation in Article 
XXIII(2), this sanction may only be applied when the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES formally approve of such action. 
Individual contracting parties are not at liberty under 
the General Agreement to engage in unilateral 
retaliation without this approval. The same principles 
apply to super section 301 and special special 301 
measures except that, as we have seen, these mechanisms 
are an aggravation of the illegality of this situation.
The impetus for the aggressive use of unilateral 
measures has originated primarily from the U.S.
1119 See text, supra pp.286-289.
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Congress. It was Congress that devised the original 
measure and it was the same organ of government that 
refined the mechanism into its present lethal form.“ ®^ 
Congress insisted on improvements to this legislation 
with the passage of every significant trade measure 
since its enactment. These amendments achieved the 
desired effect. Between 1979 and 1984, twenty nine 
Section 301 investigations were launched. Between 1985 
and 1988, a total of thirty three investigations were 
conducted and retaliation authorised in nine instances. 
Similarly, between 1988 and 1992, twelve investigations 
were opened and of the six investigations concluded as 
at January 1, 1993, retaliation was approved in two
cases.
From these statistics, two conclusions can be drawn. 
First, the annual number of investigations has increased 
reflecting the success of the amendments made by 
Congress, Second> retaliation has been authorised in an 
increasing proportion of cases. These trends are 
disturbing particularly during the 1988-1993 period when 
the Uruguay Round negotiations were continuing which 
required the United States to exercise a degree of 
sensitivity in implementing trade policy. Delicate 
negotiations can easily be unravelled by the clumsy use 
of retaliatory measures.
However, it is the proposals made by Congress that 
reveal the greatest contempt for international trade law 
in general and the General Agreement in particular. 
There is little doubt that through the 1980s, Congress 
has been utterly determined to move the device of 
unilateral retaliation from the background of trade 
policy to the foreground. This is evidenced not only by
^^ 20 gee text, supra pp.266-273.
See text, supra pp.268-272.
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the amendments actually made to the legislation but also 
the proposals suggested by individual Congressmen, such 
as those in the Gephardt amendments, to strengthen the 
unilateral and automatic nature of the measure. 
Unilateralism is construed by Congress as underpinning 
a successful trade policy and Congress has, to a 
significant degree, achieved its objective, first, by 
removing many of the discretionary powers from the 
Executive and, secondly, by creating super and special 
Section 301 designed to facilitate automatic retaliation 
against specific countries,
Nevertheless, it is not only the existence of the 
measure that substantiates the breakdown of the
normative influence of international law on United 
States trade policy; the international rules have played 
little influence on shaping the continued refinement of 
the mechanism. The movement towards mandatory measures 
introduced by the 1988 Act and the scope of 
'unreasonable practices' for the purposes of
discretionary action both illustrate that strict trade 
policy considerations are no longer paramount.
Similarly, both super and special 301 were enacted with 
a minimum of reference to international legal 
principles. The automatic nature of any retaliation, had 
any been required, would have violated the consultation 
and conciliation obligations of the General Agreement 
and the degree of unilateralism involved would have 
infringed the Most-Favoured-Nation principle,
A further disconcerting development in this context is 
the proposals presently being considered in United 
States governmental circles to use this type of 
mechanism to unilaterally pursue non-WTO regulated isues 
such as 'blue 301 measures' to sanction loose labour
1122 See text, supra pp.290-297
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laws and human rights and 'green 301 measures' to ensure 
states protect the international environment."^ This 
separation of trade policy from non-commercial 
considerations raises legitimate suspicions that the 
United States will employ any pretext to distort trade 
with foreign manufacturers and producers.
The inference is therefore that multilateral trade 
diplomacy does not play a central role in the conduct of 
United States trade policy when the policy objectives 
and goals of the government are not best served through 
this medium. In other words, where the legal obligations 
and procedures of the international legal system 
conflict with these objectives, the United States will 
switch the means of conducting trade policy to 
unilateral measures and bilateral diplomacy. In making 
this switch, the United States pays little attention to 
the international rules prescribed in the General 
Agreement.
True, the United States continues to participate in the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and in the committees
and organisational structure of the GATT but this
participation does not contradict the fundamental 
assertion that multilateral trade diplomacy is a second 
string in the United States negotiating bow, the first 
two strings being unilateral measures and bilateral
diplomacy. In fact, the rationale for the continued 
participation of the United States at this level is 
simple; certain trade policy objectives can only be 
effectively secured through multilateral 
negotiations.
For example, the reductions in levels of export
See text, supra pp.298-299.
"24 See text-, supra pp.299-306.
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subsidies, continually preached by the United States can 
only be achieved to a limited extent through unilateral 
measures or bilateral negotiations. International 
co-operation is the most effective method of achieving 
such reductions, a fact grudgingly acknowledged by the 
United States placing such a high degree of priority to 
the issue during the Uruguay Round. Improved market 
access for U.S. goods is another example where a broad 
approach must be taken in order to achieve success. The 
assault on pirated products and copyright theft is yet 
another illustration of the same phenomenon. Although 
the United States has employed the threat of unilateral 
measures against'states failing to protect intellectual 
property rights, in particular the Peoples' Republic of 
China, there is widespread recognition in governmental 
circles that only unilateral negotiations can achieve 
the necessary degree of international protection for 
such rights.
The final conclusion is therefore that rules of 
international law are only effective in regulating the 
trade policy profile of the United States when there is 
a degree of congruence between the policy objectives and 
goals of the United States and the content of the 
international rules. Where international rules conflict 
with the overall aims of reducing the trade deficit or 
the protection of United States trade interests in 
foreign markets, the normative value of such rules is 
circumscribed.
(B) The European Union
The European Union is composed of fifteen sovereign 
states whose commercial interests are diverse. 
Consequently, external trade policy is not the 
embodiment of the commercial interests of a single state
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but rather a compromise among the interests - internal 
and external - of the various Member States. These 
commercial and economic interests vary immensely despite 
the over-arching goal of economic integration among the 
Member States. A diffuse spread of interests impinge on 
the processes inside the European Union which are 
designed to harmonise the formulation of a consistent 
commercial policy towards third states."^
Different economic sectors are considered by different 
Member States to have a greater priority than others 
either from the point of view of protection from 
international competition or the promotion of products 
or services in the international market-place. At the 
same time, the significance of external trade links with 
non-European Union states is a matter of greater 
national priority for some Member States than for 
others. This melting pot of economic and commercial 
interests is an important factor behind both the shape 
and content of European Union external trade policy 
because it is the trade off of these interests that 
becomes the final policy.
The institutional processes enshrined in the EC Treaty 
are intended to focus these interests and to allow the 
European Union to conduct a single consistent policy 
when negotiating with other states. Reality is, of 
course, quite different. The external trade policy of 
the European Union is fragmented and inconsistent due to 
the inability of the institutional mechanisms to 
reconcile these i n t e r e s t s , T h i s  produces two 
consequences. First, external trade policy is the 
product of a bare minimum of consensus possible under 
these circumstances. Second, the trade policy goals and
"25 See text, supra pp. 312-314.
"2® See text, supra pp.314-319.
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objectives of the European Union are quite basic and 
unambitious. There is no hidden agenda to the European 
Union's trade policy because balance of payments 
deficits, for example, remain the concern of individual 
Member States.
Nowhere is this conflict of interests more evident than 
in the Council of Ministers which, together with the 
European Commission, has responsibility for the 
formulation and implementation of external trade policy. 
For example, the inability of France and Germany to 
agree with other Member States on the levels of 
subsidies to be provided to their farming communities 
was the immediate cause of postponing the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round in December 1990 and again threatened 
the successful conclusion of the round in December 
1993."^
This inability to agree on an effective and consistent 
external trade policy has not only had serious 
repercussions at the international level but is also 
the primary reason why the European Union places such 
great reliance on bilateral trade diplomacy. Bilateral 
agreements are much more easy for the Council of 
Ministers to swallow than multilateral trade agreements 
or even the negotiating mandates of the Commission at 
such discussions. Bilateral diplomacy has therefore been 
an extremely important ingredient in the European 
Union's trade policy. In this context, bilateral trade 
diplomacy is synonymous with dialogue with individual 
states or groups of states with a view to placing 
commercial relationships on a formalised legal basis. 
Only when the structure of this edifice of bilateral 
trade agreements is examined can the genuine trade 
policy objectives of the European Union be identified.
1127 See text, supra pp.438-441.
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The primary trade policy objective of the European Union 
is to manage trade with states or limited groups of 
states to suit its own economic and commercial 
interests. This explains the compertmentalisation of 
trading partners according to different geographical 
areas.Proceeding on this basis allows the European 
Union to regulate the precise nature of its commercial 
relationships with trading partners by tailoring each 
individual agreement to suit the economic strategies of 
the Union. Further, during such negotiations, the 
European Union generally has considerable ability to 
influence the final content of such agreements due 
largely to its size and importance in the international 
market-place.
Thus, in the European Economic Area Agreement, the 
European Union was able to extend the application of the 
acquis communautaire to many of the remaining countries 
of Western Europe."^ As a result, from a legal 
perspective, the important EFTA states (with the 
exception of Switzerland) no longer remained a part of 
the external commercial trade relationship with the 
European Union but rather a partially integrated element 
of the internal market programme initiated under the 
aegis of the Union. This objective was considered 
desirable not only because these states were the most 
likely prospective future members of the European Union 
but also because of their pre-existing close economic 
and commercial relationships to the European Union.
The extension of the web of comprehensive commercial 
agreements eastwards with the negotiation of the series 
of the 'Europe Agreements' with Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic is further
"28 See text, supra pp.322-337.
"2^  See text, supra pp.324-327.
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corroboration of the penchant of the European Union to 
pursue trade policy objectives on a bilateral basis. 
These treaties allow the European Union to exercise 
considerable influence over the future economic 
development of these countries. There is little doubt 
that the Union considers these states to be inside its 
economic sphere of influence; this is evidenced by the 
fact that these agreements constitute a microcosm of the 
EC treaty itself although safeguards have been installed 
to facilitate the undisrupted integration of these 
states into the Union's economic and commercial fold. 
Thus, for example, the complete introduction of the 
principle of free movement of goods is delayed for a 
transitional period to prevent a flood of inexpensive 
basic goods from these countries undercutting European 
Union producers while a similar arrangement has been put 
in place for the principle of free movement of labour to 
forestall large-scale migration of workers into the 
European Union.
A similar phenomenon has occurred in relation to the 
northern Mediterrean states with association agreements 
being negotiated with Turkey"^^, Cyprus and Malta. 
These agreements provide for the creation of an 
environment for the unrestricted movement of goods while 
preventing a migration of labour by denying the right of 
free movement of persons.
The major omission in this structure is, of course, 
comprehensive trade agreements with the United States 
and Japan. The explanation for this state of affairs is
1130 See text, supra pp.327-331.
In 1995, the European Union and Turkey agreed 
the terms of a free trade agreement to regulate their 
commercial relationship which was approved by the 
European Parliament in November 1995.
1018
two-fold. First, the European Union would not be able to 
exercise the negotiating leverage against these states 
in order to obtain an agreement which would accommodate 
its precise economic and commercial interests. This 
factor is the main stumbling block preventing the 
opening of the necessary negotiations. Second, the 
magnitude of such agreements would signal the demise of 
the multilateral trading system in its present form 
since the three main trading blocks would effectively 
regulate their economic and commercial relationships 
without reference to the principles embodied in the 
GATT/WTO, The same factors do not, of course, impinge on 
the possibility of negotiating sector-specific 
agreements.
In light of the construction of this comprehensive legal 
edifice, which is an integral and fundamental external 
trade policy objective of the European Union, the 
limited normative influence of the international trade 
legal order on the formulation and functioning of the 
trade policy of the European Union can be explained. The 
existence of this superstructure allows the European 
Union to pursue its own agenda relatively unconstrained 
by the norms and obligations set down in the GATT. 
Further, as consensus at the multilateral level, for a 
variety of reasons, becomes more and more difficult to 
obtain, there is little doubt that the European Union 
has come to rely increasingly on bilateral/regional 
agreements to manage its trade policy objectives and 
goals.
The existence of this labyrinth of international 
agreements conflicts with the principles of the GATT on 
a number of technical legal grounds. Article XXIV 
permits the negotiation of free trade agreements but 
subject to a number of strict criteria. First, free 
trade agreements must not• increase the pre-existing
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average levels of tariffs or duties applicable to trade 
between the countries entering the free trade agreement 
relative to third countries. Second, national 
regulations governing commerce existing prior to the 
agreement also cannot be increased. Third, free trade 
agreements must comply with the definition set out in 
Article XXIV(8)(b) for special treatment and, in 
particular, must eliminate all duties and restrictions 
on 'substantially all trade* between the parties to the 
agreement. Fourth, free trade agreements must be 
notified to the CONTRACTING PARTIES in order to allow 
the preparation of the necessary reports and 
recommendations as may be deemed appropriate. The 
customary practice is for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to 
establish a working party to investigate implementation 
of the terms of such agreements and to recommend 
adjustments if necessary. Finally, contracting parties 
are required, under Article XXIV(7)(a) not to maintain 
or put into force any such agreement unless they are 
prepared to modify them in accordance with the 
recommendations.
Other than in the case of accession agreements, there is 
very little evidence that the European Union has 
complied with this notification procedure when entering 
into such agreements. Nor is there convincing evidence 
that these agreements comply with the substantive 
requirements of Article XXIV particularly in view of the 
variations which-exist among them in terms of content.
At an even more fundamental level, the creation of this 
sub-structure beneath of multilateral system undermines 
the principle of multilateralism enshrined in the 
General Agreement and permit the European Union to 
pursue its own trade policy agenda largely independent
1132 See text, supra pp.336-337.
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of multilateral constraints. Hence, even the very 
existence of this structure raises legitimate concerns 
as to the normative impact of the international trade 
legal order on the formulation of basic European Union 
trade policy.
With such an extensive array of bilateral commercial 
agreements behind it, it is not difficult to explain the 
relatively limited resort to unilateral measures made by 
the European Union. The European Union can afford to 
adopt a more passive approach to achieving trade policy 
objectives. Disputes with countries which have bilateral 
commercial accords can be settled by reference to the 
principles set out in such agreements. In the more 
advanced commercial agreements, especially those with 
European countries, there are even institutional 
mechanisms to facilitate the settlement of trade 
disputes.
It is only when the bilateral commercial links with 
states are weak that the prospect of unilateral measures 
is raised. Hence, investigations under the NCPI were 
confined to states such as Argentina, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Jordan and the United States."^ None of 
these countries maintained an effective bilateral 
agreement with the European Union and hence the need for 
a more active response once bilateral diplomatic 
overtures proved fruitless.
Now that the European Union has adopted a new regulation 
to replace the NCPI, this chapter in the European 
Union's trade policy is now closed. In retrospect the 
NCPI seems to have been more of a bluff than a measure 
of substance. The instrument had two main policy 
objectives. First, to secure protection for EU producers
1133 See text, supra pp.337-349.
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from foreign imports produced with the benefit of some 
form of unfair competitive advantage other than 
subsidies or dumping. Second, to dissuade the European 
Union's trading partners from engaging in, or 
permitting, certain types of illicit commercial 
practices. However, the main strategy of the Union in 
its use of the measure was to ensure that its trading 
partners were aware of the existence of the mechanism 
rather than in its actual employment.
The almost immediate redundancy of the NCPI can also be 
explained against the historical background against 
which it was conceived. The Union perceived the possible 
need for such an instrument when the threat of Section 
301 was at an apogee. In the event that Section 301 was 
to be applied in the manner considered by Congress to be 
appropriate, the best response would be to counter with 
the threat of measures under the NCPI. The motives for 
the creation of the device did not therefore centre 
around a genuine belief that it could be a useful tool 
to achieve trade policy objectives. On the contrary, the 
rationale for its enactment was to protect the European 
Union in the pursuit of its own internal policies and to 
threaten and posture with countermeasures if these were 
being hampered by extensive use of Section 301,
The inability of the European Union Member States to 
arrive at any more than a fragile consensus on trade 
policy objectives also explains why, at the multilateral 
level, the principal aim of the organisation was to 
secure such unambitious goals especially in comparison 
to the extensive agenda pursued by the United States. 
The main objectives of the European Union were 
extensions of traditional GATT principles (ie. cuts in 
tariffs, reduction of non-tariff barriers, and the 
application of GATT rules to unregulated sectors) and 
the protection of intellectual property rights. As if
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to emphasise the defensive nature of the European 
Union's position at these negotiations, the final 
principal aim was to achieve a revision of the GATT 
rules 'to prevent the use by the United States of 
unilateral trade measures'."*
These circumscribed objectives reflect the lack of 
enthusiasm that the European Union generated for the 
multilateral trade negotiation process. This lack of 
enthusiasm may also explain why the European Union was 
unsuccessful in preventing the adoption of many of the 
rules which operate against its interest such as those 
for the elimination or reduction of agricultural 
subsidies, the tightening of anti-dumping measures or 
the restraints on assistance for the production of 
commercial aircraft. This result confirms the statement 
that the European Union tends to view trade negotiations 
as an opportunity to defend existing policies, laws and 
practices rather than as an opportunity for attacking 
foreign trade measures considered to be detrimental to 
European Union interests."*
In the long-term, the continued commitment of the 
European Union to the principle of multilateralism may 
decline as the network of trade agreements which it 
maintains becomes geographically more extensive and, in 
terms of subject-matter, more comprehensive."* To a 
certain extent, such a trend will reflect an existing 
antipathy and contempt for the multilateral trade legal 
system which stems from reassurance that the fundamental 
trade policy objectives of the European Union can be 
guaranteed by the existing, and future, bilateral 
commercial and trade agreements. In these circumstances, 
there are few reasons to believe that the European Union
"* See text, supra pp.349-351, 
"* See text, supra pp.351-352, 
"* See text, supra pp.336-337.
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will mould its external trade policy to conform with the 
multilateral rules unless there is an element of 
congruence between these policy objectives and the 
international rules. Where the international rules 
conflict, the European Union will continue to formulate 
external trade policy by ignoring the normative 
influence of such rules.
(4) The Ability of Rules to Permeate the 
Decision-Making Processes Inside States
(A) The United States
The ability, or inability, of international trade rules 
to permeate the decision-making processes inside the 
United States which lead to the creation of a uniform 
trade policy is a decisive factor in ascertaining the 
normative impact of such rules. If the participants in 
the decision-making process take cognizance of the 
influence of international rules, a substantial degree 
of normative efficacy could be demonstrated. However, in 
reality, for a spectrum of reasons, international rules 
play an almost negligible role in the decision-making 
processes which eventually culminate in the formulation 
and implementation of U.S. trade policy.
The constitutional framework for the creation of trade 
policy itself is a substantial limiting factor which 
promotes the dissipation of the potency of international 
rules by disbursing constitutional authority to 
formulate and apply trade policy to different 
governmental branches. This disbursement actively 
encourages conflicts between the various organs of 
government and in this competition the authority of 
international rules is diluted as organs compete with 
each other to increase their influence over trade
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policy. International rules become subsumed to these 
interests and their effect circumscribed.
While at least in formal constitutional terms Congress 
has primary responsibility for both the formulation and 
implementation of trade policy, the reality is that the 
Executive is, generally speaking, an equal partner in 
this process. This is for two reasons. First, the 
Executive has the important organic constitutional 
responsibility to negotiate international treaties 
including international trade agreements. In the 
discharge of this function, the President also is 
endowed with an inherent foreign affairs power to 
conduct international diplomacy in the pursuit of trade 
policy objectives and goals. Second, substantial 
delegated authority has been conferred on the President 
to implement trade policy. The consequence of this 
bifurcation is that the government organs charged with 
formulating trade policy are in direct competition with 
each other and, in this competition, neither organ is 
primarily concerned with compliance with international 
obligations.
Notwithstanding the degree of influence possessed by the 
Executive, since 1974 the Congress has made a determined 
effort to regain its constitutional mantle as the 
principal organ responsible for shaping trade policy. 
This has goal has been substantially achieved, first, by 
limiting the prerogatives of the Executive to negotiate 
international agreements and, second, by insisting on an 
unprecedented level of Congressional participation in 
subsequent multilateral trade negotiations. Together, 
these developments signal increased intervention on the 
part of Congress in the conduct of trade policy."*
"* See text, supra pp.374-376."* See text, supra pp.365-374.
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Increasing the participation of Congress in the 
formulation of trade policy is synonymous with a decline 
in compliance with international rules quite simply 
because Congress is more prone to domestic pressures 
when enacting policy than the Executive quite simply 
because the President is more isolated from direct 
domestic pressures than individual Congressmen."* 
Equally, direct contact by the President with foreign 
government officials tends to counter, to a limited 
extent, the domestic pressures for protection from 
foreign competition. Congress, on the other hand, tends 
to react to currents of domestic opinion with the result 
that legislative proposals are framed with the 
short-to-medium ‘ term effects in mind and largely 
ignoring the long-term impacts of such proposals. This 
propensity is all the more disturbing in trade policy 
matters as Congress acquires greater and greater 
authority in this sphere.
Examples of Congress acting in total disregard of 
international rules are replete throughout the history 
of trade policy decision-making process. The 
circumstances surrounding the enactment and tightening 
of Section 3 01 and its related measures proves that the 
project was an initiative originating in Congress. When 
setting up the mechanism, little consideration was given 
by Congress to the international repercussions of 
establishing a mechanism which so obviously flouted the 
international obligations of the United States. 
Similarly, in 1984, Congress enacted legislation on 
overrule undesirable decisions by Executive-controlled 
agencies in the field of administered protectionism and 
introduced draconian measures to protect certain 
economic sectors, such as agriculture, from 
international competition.""
"* See text, supra pp.374-376.See text, supra pp.266-273."41 See text, supra pp. 662-666,
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While neither the Executive or the ITA can be said to be 
bastions for the protection of the international rule of 
law in trade matters, nevertheless in reversing their 
findings Congress attacked both the little integrity in 
international trade matters which the Executive and the 
ITA maintained as well as the objectivity of these 
organs. In other words, even assuming that these organs 
invariably complied with the international rules, an 
assault of this nature is clearly designed to deny any 
relevancy of international law in the formulation of 
trade policy.
The proposals made by Congress during the 1984 to 1988 
period well illustrate the degree of contempt which that 
institution maintained for international rules. In 1985, 
over three hundred trade bills were introduced in 
Congress to change areas of trade policy considered by 
individual Congressmen to be unfavourable to American 
p r o d u c e r s . I n  the following year, the Omnibus Trade 
Bill proposed by the House of Representatives contained 
so many illegal measures that President Reagan described 
it as 'Kamikaze legislation'. The majority of the 
provisions of the bill were framed in a manner which 
enshewed reference to the rules of the GATT such as, for 
example, measures designed to permanently exclude 
foreign producers from the United States market if they 
were caught by trade protection measures, the automatic 
imposition of safeguard measures after an affirmative 
injury determination, the unilateral expansion of the 
definition of actionable subsidy and the liberalisation 
of the anti-dumping rules to allow greater relief for 
American industries.
A very limited bulwark to these proposals, and other 
draft measure, has been offered by the Executive. While
1142 See text, supra pp.271-273.
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the last three Administrations have presided over a 
considerable growth in protectionist measures, at least 
these Administrations have been prepared to filter out 
the most draconian proposals made in Congress. On other 
occasions, however. Administrations have agreed that 
measures are necessary to respond to the strategic 
commercial objectives and goals of U.S. trade policy, 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 being 
the most obvious example.
This struggle between institutions for control over the 
formulation of trade policy is the most apparent 
limitation on the normative influence of international 
law on the decision-making processes inside the United 
States. There are, of course, a host of other limiting 
factors stemming from the institutional structure of the 
process. Of these, one can cite as particularly damaging 
the inability of the United States government (both the 
Executive and Congress) to reconcile national economic 
and industrial policy with an internationally-consistent 
trade policy.
The components of national economic policy are both 
diverse and complex but nevertheless the composition of 
this policy exercises considerable influence over the 
profile of trade policy. Fiscal policy, the control of 
inflation, interest rates, trade imbalances, budget 
deficits and control over levels of foreign investment 
all impinge on the shape of trade policy because they 
are elements of national economic policy. As noted, of 
these elements, rectifying the U.S. trade deficit has 
been the single most influential factor."* For at 
least twenty years, the U.S. government has directly 
linked the merchandise trade deficit with the need to 
restrict foreign imports and to prise open foreign
See text, supra pp.375-388."* See text, supra pp.377-380.
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markets. The impact of this obsession on the use of
measures of administered protection has been charted in
two chapters of this work and little more needs to be 
said on the point excep to note that the U.S. government 
has consistently deflected responsibility for the trade 
deficit away from its own domestic policies, the
relative competitiveness of U.S. industries and the 
preferences of consumers and towards the practices and 
policies of trading partners. No attribution of 
responsibility has been placed on these important 
domestic factors or on budgetary controls, interest 
rates or industrial policy. This problem is compounded 
by the government attempting to rectify the balance of 
payments deficit by resorting to trade policy measures 
which infringe the international obligations of the 
United States. This behaviour is justified by
governmental sources as a legitimate attempt to solve a 
pressing internal economic problem.
Reconciling domestic economic policies with an 
internationally-consistent trade policy is a difficult 
task for any government. Nevertheless, the immense ambit 
of the task should not disguise the fact that the United 
States government is faced with a simple dilemma; should 
it opt for a strategy which would placate American 
citizens by introducing controls which affect foreign 
p r o d u c e r s  or s h o u l d  it c h o s e  an 
internationally-consistent trade policy which would 
require adjustment of internal economic factors which 
might impose rigours on American citizens? For at least 
the last fifteen years, the United States has, on the 
whole, opted for the first course of action thereby 
curtailing the impact of international rules on the 
formulation of policy by allowing domestic economic 
policy considerations to prevail.
If the inability to reconcile international trade policy
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and domestic economic and industrial policy was not 
enough to circumscribe the influence of international 
law, then the strategies of non-governmental 
participants in the decision-making process is 
sufficient to achieve the isolation of the process from 
international influence. Non-governmental participants 
in the process consist, on the whole, of domestic 
producer interest groups and individually influential 
corporations. Importers and consumers have a nominal 
influence in the process in comparison to U.S. 
manufacturers which are, on the whole, better organised, 
better financed and, above all, have better channels of 
communication with government officials.
Notwithstanding the direct influence of private interest 
groups on the governmental decision-making process 
through, for example. Congressmen, such groups have 
direct access to the enforcement of U.S. trade policy by 
virtue of the extensive array of trade protection 
measures authorised under American law. With the 
exception of Section 301 and 337 measures, anti-dumping, 
countervailing duty and safeguard measures are, of 
course, internationally-approved means of commercial 
defence and, if operated in a manner compatible with the 
international rules, there can be no question of their 
legitimacy. But it is not the use by United States 
industries of occasional resort to measures of 
contingent protection that distorts U.S. trade policy in 
relation to international obligations; on the contrary, 
it is the systematic abuse of these mechanisms by 
American industries to harass foreign competitors and 
importers. Of course, it is a question of degree when 
the use of such measures becomes harassment. 
Nevertheless, U.S. industries have manipulated the 
system of trade protection laws to attain almost 
permanent isolation of these industries from the
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international trading system."^
There is little doubt that the American steel industry 
is suffering major structural difficulties but this 
industry is a prime example of one which has abused its 
position as a strategic domestic industry by repeatedly 
invoking almost every conceivable trade protection 
measure to safeguard its own interests."* Anti-dumping 
and countervailing complaints are periodically lodged 
until quotas are negotiated with foreign governments to 
restrict the levels of steel imports. When attempts to 
procure protection through this strategy are 
unsuccessful, the industry resorts to safeguard actions 
to impose pressure on the Executive to act to restrain 
imports. The fruit of this strategy has been 
quasi-permanent protection for the industry through 
multilateral restraint arrangements with the European 
Union and South East Asian governments. The legitimacy 
of such arrangements under the GATT is, of course, 
dubious but legal considerations appear to be a 
negligible factor in the creation of these barriers to 
trade.
Similar strategies for harassment have been adopted by 
the motor vehicle, motor cycle, consumer electronic and 
semi-conductor industries* Each has used trade 
protection measures to compel foreign competitors to 
enter into quantitative restrictions."^ Many of the 
U.S. consumer electronic industries have even enlisted 
the aid of U.S. anti-trust laws to limit market 
penetration by foreign competitors. American 
semi-conductor manufacturers are, however, an 
outstanding example of an industry abusing these 
mechanisms having resorted to Section 301 applications.
"* See text, supra pp.388-390."* See text, supra pp.390-397.See text, supra pp. 397-410.
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Section 337 petitions as well as the standard plethora 
of anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard 
measures.
The influence of American industries resorting to these 
tactics should not be discounted when assessing the 
contribution of private interest groups to the 
enforcement of United States trade policy. American 
trade protection laws have traditionally granted greater 
access and rights of participation in the process than 
other contracting parties. However, this philosophy has 
had two major consequences. First, industries are 
abusing their right to participate in the process to 
harass foreign competitors and, second, the protections 
which are eventually conceded at the international level 
quantitative restrictions - are frequently 
incompatible with the standards set in the GATT.
If the rules of international trade law could be 
enforced in United States courts, the normative 
influence of these laws would be immensely enhanced. 
Such rights would both discourage the enactment of 
legislation inconsistent with international obligations 
and would allow interested parties - mainly foreign 
producers - the right to challenge inconsistent 
legislation and administrative practices with a prospect 
of obtaining effective redress. Indirectly, this would 
allow foreign producers a limited right of participation 
in the decision-making process enforcing trade policy. 
At the same time, denial of these rights prejudices 
foreign producers and benefits domestic industries 
which, more often than not, are the beneficiaries of 
applications of policies, laws and decisions which 
infringe the international obligations of the United 
States. Since the GATT dispute settlement procedures are
1148 gg0 text, supra pp.402-410.See text, supra pp. 408-410.
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not open to private parties, the granting of such rights 
are even more imperative to redress the imbalance which 
exists in the decision-making process in favour of 
domestic industries.
The United States Federal courts have consistently 
denied direct effect in domestic law to the principles 
and rules of the GATT. In United States v Yoshida 
International Inc. the Federal Court even acknowledged 
that an import surcharge violated the express terms of 
the GATT but denied paramount to the agreement over the 
Federal statute because of the constitutional 
requirement that at treaty must be approved by Congress 
before it can prevail over legislation."^® Of course, 
the question whether the United States could 
gratuitously act contrary to general principles of 
international law was never submitted*
The remote prospect of international trade obligations 
prevailing over Federal laws caused Congress to 
expressly renounce this possibility in the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979. Not only did Congress 
deliberately merely 'approve* the Tokyo Round 
agreements instead of ratifying their terms which is the 
normal course of action for international agreements but 
also an express provision was inserted into the statute 
which provided that no term of a trade agreement could 
prevail over any statute."" Similarly, rights of 
action for private parties were expressly denied.
Hence, the sole rights, duties and remedies of private 
individuals are contained in the 1979 Act. Thus, if an 
administering authority imposes countervailing or 
anti-dumping duties in a manner which contravenes the 
international rules, an American court will not review
See text, supra pp.414-415."" See text, supra pp.419-423.
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the domestic legislation against the international 
standards. Since it is axiomatic that the overwhelming 
majority of such actions will be brought on behalf of 
foreign nationals a fundamental asymmetry is created by 
allowing nationals to rely on a body of laws, 
superficially modelled on international agreements but 
which in practice bear little resemblance to the 
international rules, while refusing to allow foreign 
interested parties to challenge the consistency of these 
national rules against the international standards. In 
effect, this is tantamount to an absolute exclusion of 
foreign groups from the decision-making processes which 
formulate and enforce United States trade policy.
(B) The European Union
European Union interests, individual Member State 
interests and private group interests all converge on 
the labyrinth institutional structure put in place to 
accommodate and reconcile these interests into a 
consistent external common policy."" In competition 
with these interests, international law has a 
circumscribed normative value which fails to exercise a 
substantial influence over the final content of the 
policy and indeed its enforcement.
The decision-making process inside the European Union is 
infused with vested interests which can, broadly 
speaking, be categorised into those of Member States, 
embodied in the Council of Ministers, and those of the 
European Union, which for present purposes are 
represented and protected by the European Commission. 
This competition of interests gives rise to two points 
of tension, the first among Member States themselves in 
the Council of Ministers and the second between the
1152 See text, supra pp.430-441.
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Council of Ministers and the European Commission.
Despite membership of the European Union, the commercial 
policy objectives of the Member States are seldom 
absolutely harmonised for the reasons discussed in the 
last section. Fractious dispute occur on a regular basis 
inside the Council of Ministers when Member States 
believe that their national interests are being 
threatened or compromised by the formulation of 
particular aspects of the common commercial policy. For 
example, the refusal of the French government to 
implement the second GATT panel report on oilseed 
subsidies isolated France in the Council, with other 
Member States recognising that imminent retaliatory 
action by the United States was inevitable in the 
absence of a consensus inside the Council on a proper 
course of action to respond to the threat."" 
Similarly, France objected to the terms of the Blair 
House Accord and the final terms of the Agreement on 
Agriculture which effectively emasculated the Council at 
a time when a response was necessary to conclude the 
Uruguay Round Final Act. It was only when France 
successfully procured concessions from other Member 
States that the rift was closed and action possible to 
conclude the negotiations.""
Such difficulties rarely occur within a single sovereign 
state even although different organs of government may 
be divided on a proper course of action in trade policy. 
These difficulties highlight the unique institutional 
problems of European Union participation in the 
international trading system and also that a common 
position in the Council of Ministers is often the result 
of internal compromises and trade offs which produce a 
'lowest common denominator* approach to the formulation
"" See text, supra pp.440-441."" See text, supra p.440.
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of the common commercial policy. In these, often 
embittered, internal disputes, international law is not 
a fundamental factor in shaping the final policy or 
measures adopted'.
The competition of interests between the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission is often equally 
destructive from the point of view of compliance by the 
European Union with its international obligations. The 
113 Committee, for example, gives Member States an 
opportunity to inject their own national interests into 
the Commission's formulation of proposals on trade 
policy."" From the personal experiences of the writer, 
inside this organ individual Member State interests are 
paramount and Member States are far more interested in 
asserting these interests and having them recognised by 
the Commission than ensuring that consistency with 
international obligations is maintained.
Similarly, inside the Anti-Dumping Committee, again from 
the present writer's experiences, national 
representatives are unconcerned with ensuring the 
consistency of the Union's anti-dumping procedures with 
the term of the Anti^Dumping Code. The main objective of 
national representatives in this Committee are to 
convince the Commission of the need for action if a 
national industry is being adversely affected by 
international competition or to persuade the Commission 
that measures are not justified if these would 
compromise the ' commercial interests of national 
manufacturers who, for example, uses the allegedly 
dumped products as inputs for their own finished 
products.
These institutional conflicts are a chief cause of the
1155 See text, supra pp.432-434.
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lack of consistency between the European Union's 
external commercial policy and its international 
obligations but another central factor is the influence 
of other European Union policies in the formulation of 
an internationally-consistent common commercial policy. 
Five policies directly impinge on the content of the 
common commercial policy, namely the Common Agricultural 
Policy, the internal market programme, competition 
policy, regional and state aid policy and industrial 
policy. The changes made to the EC Treaty by the Treaty 
on European Union will introduce even more potentially 
conflicting policies due to the introduction of common 
policies in the areas of energy, consumer protection and 
the protection of the environment. However, at present, 
it is the Union's policies in agriculture, the internal 
market and competition which most undermine a 
GATT-consistent common commercial policy.
The CAP is the embodiment of the conflict between legal 
principles and hon-legal, and in fact non-economic, 
forces. The rationales for the original policy were not 
primarily economic but rather the protection of supplies 
of agricultural produce to consumers and the 
preservation of standards of living of the farming 
community."" Economic considerations played a 
subsidiary role in establishing the framework of the 
policy and international legal considerations even less. 
Hence, the main opposition of the United States to the 
creation of the European Community in 1957, as expressed 
in the GATT working parties convened to examine the 
matter, was that the CAP increased the levels of trade 
barriers for imports entering the customs union when the 
organisation was required under Article XXIV of the GATT 
to ensure that these barriers were lower than those 
existing prior to the creation of the customs union.
1156 See text, supra pp.442-443.
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Hence, the CAP has never been approved by the GATT as 
being a policy consistent with the express terms of the 
General Agreement.
The United States has persistently attacked the CAP as 
illegal on justifiable grounds. The findings of the 
panels in the Pasta Case and the Oilseeds Case reaffirm 
the view that the basic and fundamental principles of 
the CAP contravene a host of provisions of the GATT 
including Articles II and 111(4)."" Nevertheless, the 
European Union has equally persistently ignored adverse 
panel findings and international protests and complaints 
and refused to adjust the CAP to comply with the 
international rules. Even the reforms recently made to 
the CAP are questionably consistent with the new rules 
of the Agreement on Agriculture. The fact that political 
compromises were reached on a bilateral basis between 
the United States and the European Union on the 
progressive implementation of the new rigours on 
agricultural subsidies supports this assertion. In 
addition, the révisais to the CAP do not extend to all 
agricultural produce and the reforms do not include 
changes to the concept of tarrification which also 
indicate a lack of future consistency with the 
international rules.""
Incompatibility also abounds between the internal market 
programme and the international rules. The pursuit of 
the single market agenda has brought the European Union 
into direct confrontation with many states, especially 
the United States, quite simply because many of the 
measures have been framed in total disregard of the 
applicable international rules. European Union measures 
harmonising the use of hormone treatments in cattle, 
technical standards for telecommunication equipment, the
"" See text, supra pp.443-446."" See text, supra pp.450-451.
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so-called 'Television without Frontiers* directive and 
the public procurement regime established as part of the 
programme all flagrantly infringe the European Union's 
long-established international obligations. This leads 
to two possible conclusions."" Either the Council of 
Ministers and the European Commission deliberately 
ignored the international standards and flouted 
international law when this course ofaction suited their 
purposes. Alternatively, neither organ was aware of the 
obligations imposed at the international level when 
enacting the measures. In both scenarios, quite clearly 
the influence of international law was negligible, 
especially in light of the fundamental and obvious 
nature of the infringements.
The incompatibilities between European Union competition 
policy and international obligations are more subtle in 
comparison to the straight-forward violations committed 
in the implementation and operation of the CAP and the 
single internal market programme. Nevertheless, there is 
a fundamental inconsistency in the operation of aspects 
of this policy with the general principles underpinning 
the international trade legal system. The main 
inconsistency is that different rules can apply to 
European Union producers and foreign producers even 
although both sets of manufacturers are engaged in the 
production of the same goods and are indulging in the 
same commercial practices.
The main instances of such distortions occur in the 
different treatment of Union industries and foreign 
producers when both are alleged to have engaged in 
practices amounting to dumping in the economic sense of 
that term. As far as Union producers are concerned, 
intra-Union dumping is permissible as long as such
1159 See text, supra pp.451-463.
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practices do not involve any element of predatory 
pricing which would infringe Article 86 of the EC 
Treaty. Foreign producers are, of course, subject to the 
rigours of the anti-dumping regime operated by the 
Union. In other words, even although two suppliers - one 
Union, one foreign - are engaged in identical commercial 
practices, from a legal perspective two separate 
concepts are applied to their activities. The important 
point, and the one which causes the distortion, is that 
the preconditions for establishing dumping are 
considerably less onerous than for proving the existence 
of predatory pricing.""
The inconsistent methodologies applied to anti-dumping 
and competition investigations are also a source of 
harassment for foreign producers. Different tests are 
applied by the anti-dumping and competition authorities 
inside the Commission to determine the relevant products 
subject to scrutiny. The immediate consequence of this 
dual standard is that foreign companies deemed to have 
been dumping may be subject to different rules when 
attempting to comply with the relevant standards of 
competition policy. This phenomenon, while not contrary 
to any express rule of international law, has a 
substantial harassment effect which could arguably be in 
violation of the obligation to treat domestic and 
foreign products equally as regards 'laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting the sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of the 
products' under Article 111(4) of the GATT.
There is, consequently, ample evidence that the European 
Union takes little cognizance of international standards 
in the complex decision-making processes which are part 
of its institutional structure. Again, however, the
1160 See text, supra pp.470-472.
1040
decision-making processes are also impregnated by the 
influence of European Union non-governmental groups 
whose interests rarely lie in compliance by the Union 
with its international obligations. Non-governmental 
groups have multiple means at their disposal to 
influence the shape of European Union trade policy as 
both national representatives and Union officials 
participate in the trade policy decision-making process. 
At the same time, direct access of trade policy 
enforcement is provided through the commercial defence 
system although/ for the most part, the main form of 
relief takes the form of anti-dumping measures as 
opposed to anti-subsidy duties or measures under the New 
Commercial Policy Instrument. Even although access of 
the whole spectrum of commercial defence measures is not 
always available, the European Union's anti-dumping 
legislation in itself provides a potent weapon for 
European industries to level against foreign 
competitors.
The profile of anti-dumping relief granted between 1980 
and 1990 substantiates the claim that certain European 
Union industries, in common with their American 
counterparts, use anti-dumping complaints as a means of 
obtaining institutionalised protection from competition. 
The three most notable industries resorting to 
strategies of harassment through the use of anti-dumping 
complaints are the steel, chemical and consumer 
electronics industries. Of all anti-dumping measures 
imposed by the European Union in this ten year period, 
over half concerned chemicals and allied products 
followed by consumer electronics and steel products."^
The influence exerted by these three manufacturing 
sectors on the decision-making process has been profound
1161 See text, supra p.475.
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from the point of view of obtaining protection from 
foreign competition. The European steel industry, for 
example, has been successful in abusing its strategic 
position in the European Union economy to extract 
comprehensive bilateral quantitative restrictions and 
extensive anti-dumping duties. The industry has also 
been successful in coordinating its efforts in the 
decision-making process; thus, between 1977 and 1992, 
three separate barrages of anti-dumping complaints were 
lodged to impede imports."®^
The European chemical industry has adopted a different 
strategy when using the trade policy decision-making 
process to its advantage. The chemical sector is one of 
the most heavily regulated areas in terms of 
anti-dumping measures applied, indicating that the 
industry has made strenuous use of trade protection 
laws. Most protection has been granted to industries 
producing basic chemical compounds and tertiary 
chemicals and the majority of complaints have been 
launched against the countries of Eastern Europe, the 
Soviet Union, China and Korea. However, it has been the 
tendency of these companies to link the use of 
anti-dumping complaints with anti-competitive practices 
that has helped to protect some sectors of the chemical 
industry from international competition."" Production 
of many of these chemicals is in the hands of very few 
companies which facilitates the deployment of cartels to 
regulate supply and demand. Anti-dumping measures are 
used to isolate the European Union market and to 
underpin anti-competitive behaviour. While relying on 
anti-dumping measures to redress so-called 'unfair trade 
practices *, the same companies have been found guilty of 
indulging in anti-competitive practices contrary to 
European Union competition policy. Such strategies are
"" See text, supra pp.475-481."" See text, supra pp.481-486.
1042
blatant exploitation of the anti^dumping process and 
discriminate against the interests of foreign 
manufacturers,
No counterbalance to GATT-inconsistent behaviour in the 
trade policy decision-making process has been provided 
by the incorporation of the international trade 
obligations contained in the GATT system into European 
Union law. The European Court of Justice has rejected 
attempts to allow private parties to rely on the rules 
enshrined in the General Agreement or the Tokyo Round 
Codes in the judicial review of trade policy measures 
although its legal reasoning on this point is spurious 
at best. While the Court has allowed private individuals 
to rely on the direct effect of bilateral trade 
agreements, it has refused to grant the same privilege
in relation to the General Agreement."*
The methodology relied on by the Court in its decisions 
on this point has been criticised on justifiable legal 
grounds and can only be explained on the basis of policy 
as opposed to the strict application of principles of 
the Court's jurisprudence. To allow the General 
Agreement direct effect would have profound
repercussions on trade policy formulation and 
implementation. Trade policy measures could be reviewed 
against the GATT for compatibility and, if found
wanting, could be annulled. Similarly, other aspects of 
European Union policy, such as the CAP and the single 
internal market programme, could be undermined by 
granting such rights. In order to preserve the integrity 
of the European Union in formulating both trade policy 
and other central policies, the European Court 
considered itself as having no option but to deny direct 
effect to the erms of the General Agreement.
1164 See text, supra pp.489-495.
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The same limitation was endorsed by the Court in 
relation to the incorporation of the Tokyo Codes in EU 
law. Through skillful legal side-stepping, the Court 
managed to avoid directly answering the question whether 
trade protection.measures could be assessed against the 
standards set down in the Tokyo Codes."" This 
reluctance lead to the existence of two separate and 
contradictory decisions, one allowing reliance on the 
Anti-Dumping Code's provisions to challenge a trade 
protection measure (although the facts of the case 
indicate that the applicant had little prospect of 
success) and the other refusing such relief (when the 
prospects of success were arguably greater).
The Council of Ministers and the European Commission 
have now taken steps to ensure that review of trade 
policy measures against the international principles 
contained in the Uruguay Round Final Act will not 
occur."" By adopting this approach, the two organs 
have agreed that such review is undesirable and have 
forestalled any future reversal of the Court's 
jurisprudence.
The combined resistance of the Council, the Commission 
and the Court, to grant direct effect to international 
trade law to counter GATT-inconsistent behaviour is an 
indication of a deliberate policy of preventing the 
effective enforcement and compliance by the European 
Union of its international obligations. The most 
important repercussion of this denial is that no 
effective counterbalance exists to protect the position 
of foreign producers from abusive behaviour by European 
Union agencies. By denying the application of 
international rules inside the European Union legal 
system these producers are placed at a disadvantage and
"" See text, supra pp.495-501."" See text, supra pp.501-503.
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in the unenviable position of being emasculated when 
defending their positions against illegal measures. This 
circumvention indicates that the normative efficacy of 
international trade law in the formulation and 
enforcement of European Union trade policy is 
effectively circumscribed.
(5) The Strength of Rules and Their ability to 
Withstand Dilution or avoidance When Incorporated and 
applied at National Level by National (or Supranational) 
agencies
The last observable phenomenon which has emerged from 
this study is that the limited normative impact of 
international law on the formulation and implementation 
of the trade policies of the United States and the 
European Union can be measured in terms of the ability 
of such rules to withstand avoidance or dilution at the 
hands of national (or supranational) agencies and 
officials charged with responsibility for performing the 
functions which the international rules purportedly 
regulate. The method of measuring the effectiveness of 
the rules is to compare and analyse the degree of 
consistent application of the international obligations 
contained in the'General Agreement, the Anti-Dumping and 
the Subsidies Codes against the substantive rules of 
national law and the administrative practices conducted 
by national officials. In this analysis, in order to 
obtain a complete picture of the interface between the 
two legal regimes, it is necessary to examine both the 
substantive and procedural aspects of anti-dumping and 
countervailing investigations carried out in the United 
States and the European Union.
(A) The United States
Only at the most superficial level are the anti-dumping
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and countervailing duty laws and administrative 
practices of the United States consistent with the rules 
contained in the General Agreement, the Anti-Dumping 
Code and the Subsidies Code. The basic legal framework 
is broadly compatible, at least in conceptual terms, 
with the international models for the application of 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures. However, it is 
in the detailed implementation and administration of 
these mechanisms that divergence occurs between national 
laws and practices, on the one hand, and the relevant 
international rules and principles on the other hand. 
Particularly since 1979, the United States has enacted 
numerous rules which are blatantly inconsistent with the 
international standards. This illegal behaviour has been 
compounded by administrative practices which also fly in 
the face of the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
international trade rules engendered under the auspices 
of the GATT.
The United States has also taken advantage of almost 
every loophole and deficiency in the international 
system of regulation to liberalise its anti-dumping and 
countervailing laws to make relief available to its 
domestic industries. In other words, at national level 
these rules have been manipulated for non-legal 
rationales, almost invariably without reference to the 
international rules. The evidence to support this 
proposition is overwhelming.
The United States authorities have expanded the basic 
definition of dumping to include not only trade in goods 
but also the supply of services relating to the 
manufacture and • sale of products if the inclusion of 
such an element is convenient to inflate the margin of 
dumping."" In addition, the calculation of foreign
1167 See text, supra pp.524-526.
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market values is subject to dubious practices which have 
the overall effect of increasing margins of dumping. 
Calculating weighted-averages, sampling, the choice of 
applicable exchange rates, the selection of third 
countries for valuation purposes and the practices 
perpetrated when constructing foreign market values all 
disclose degrees of arbitrariness which contravene many 
of the terms of the Anti-Dumping Code 1979."" 
Adjustments to both the U.S. price and the foreign 
market value also are carried out which artificially 
inflate the margin of dumping.""
In developing more exotic variations of anti-dumping 
measures, the United States has also fallen foul of the 
terms of the Anti-Dumping Code. The legislative 
provisions concerning component dumping, sub-assembly 
dumping and product monitoring all sit uncomfortably 
beside the international obligations of the United 
States under the Code."™
The use by the United States of its countervailing duty 
laws follows the same profile. Again there can be few 
doubts that the United States has steadily increased its 
use of countervailing measures for protectionist motives 
and not because of an indigenous growth of complaints. 
Liberalising access to relief will always encourage 
domestic industries to lodge an increasing number of 
complaints. Since 1979, U.S. countervailing legislative 
amendments have consistently favoured United States 
industries and penalised foreign manufacturers and 
exporters. When framing these amendments the U.S. 
government pays little attention to its international 
commitments in this field.
"" See text, supra pp.528-539."" See text, supra pp.539-544."™ See text, supra pp.545-551.
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There is a plenitude of evidence to support this 
statement. For example, the failure of the United States 
to introduce a test of injury, despite having amended 
its countervailing legislation in 1974, is inconsistent 
with the fundamental principles of the General Agreement 
itself and the Protocol of Provisional Application."" 
The definition of countervailable subsidy has also been 
progressively expanded to include a greater and greater 
number of programmes."" In fact, the United States 
authorities have now removed all self-limiting 
interpretations of countervailable subsidies and are 
encroaching into territory which will inevitably lead to 
a conflict with the terms of the Subsidies Code. The 
proposals for the creation of new categories of 
countervailable subsidies to counter export targeting 
subsidies, natural resources subsidies and upstream 
subsidies are proof of this tendency.""
In both anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
investigations, a determination of injury is required. 
If this standard is set too low, the result will be an 
affirmative determination whenever dumping or 
subsidisation is found. In other words, by neutralising 
this requirement-, more anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties can be applied even although no injury is caused 
to the domestic industry. Although this practice is 
contrary to Article VI of the GATT and the terms of both 
Codes, nevertheless this has been the broad policy of 
the United States in this area.
The preliminary indication of injury standard has even 
been rebuked by the Court of International Trade as 
being too lax."" Nevertheless, the authorities have
"" See text, supra pp.563-566. 
"" See text, supra pp.570-604. 
"" See text, supra pp.605-607. "" See text, supra pp.633-634.
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persistently failed to reverse their policy in this 
regard. The consequence is that complaints which lack 
adequate evidence of injury nevertheless proceed to 
examination which has a harassing effect on foreign 
competitors exporting to the American market. The ITC 
has also been guilty of manipulating the standards in 
actual material injury investigations. It selects the 
indicators of injury which are most suitable to an 
affirmative finding of injury and ignores factors which 
mitigate the effects of injury."" This has happened on 
too many occasions to be mere coincidence. The approach 
of the ITC in this matter has been approved by Congress 
which, in the 1988 Act, authorised the ITC to consider 
other relevant •economic factors as well as those 
expressly stated in the pre-existing legislation, the 
purpose being to relax the injury standard as far as 
possible and therefore encouraging affirmative 
determinations.
The doctrines of cumulation and cross-cumulation have 
also been used to great effect by the ITC to exaggerate 
the effects of injury on a domestic industry. The 
precedent set by the ITC in this area was subsequently 
incorporated into U.S. legislation to allow the agency 
almost unlimited authority to investigate cumulation and 
cross-cumulation in the search for an affirmative 
finding of injury.""
Even the basic" concepts which the ITC has been 
instructed to apply, namely increasing volumes of 
imports, the effect of imports on domestic prices and 
the impact of imports on domestic production, have been 
diluted in their application to such an extent that the 
ITC can find injury if and when it wishes. Congress has 
also greatly facilitated this process. Hence, by
"" See text, supra pp.634-646."" See text, supra pp.643-651.
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statutory enactment, the ITC can examine 'actual* and 
'potential* as well as 'absolute* and 'relative* 
economic indicators."" The use of these concepts 
provides the ITC with a larger scope for subjectivity 
and discretion. This trend contradicts the express terms 
of both Codes which stipulate the economic indicators 
which must be taken into account when assessing injury 
in an anti-dumping or countervailing duty investigation.
Although the concept of 'threat of material injury* is 
necessarily more vague than that of 'actual injury*, 
again U.S. trade law in this area appears to be abusive. 
In 1984, Congress introduced new broad criteria for 
establishing the existence of such a threat in an 
attempt to encourage greater use by the ITC in injury 
determinations. In 1988, again Congress changed the law 
once it became apparent that its 1984 amendments had not 
achieved the intended effect."" Special rules were 
also introduced at the same time to facilitate an 
affirmative determination of a threat of injury in 
agricultural cases. Again, the criteria for determining 
the existence of a threat of material injury in United 
States law bears only a passing resemblance to the 
requirements and*disciplines contained in both Codes.
'Like product* findings are also a potential source of 
abusive behaviour on the part of the United States 
authorities. The principles applied in this process 
illustrate a biased methodology. Where expansion of the 
like product range is desirable to include industries 
which are suffering decline, the ITC as demonstrated a 
willingness to identify a wide like product range. 
Conversely, where a specific industry has demonstrated 
injury, the ITC will restrict the definition of like 
product as far as possible to that industry in order to
"" See text, supra p.638."" See text, supra pp.653-654.
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exaggerate the injury and to prevent the economic health 
of other industries producing similar products from
damaging the possibility of establishing injury,""
In addition, although required under both Codes to 
establish a causal connection between subsidised or
dumped imports and injury, the investigating authorities 
rarely provide express evidence of such a link in their 
findings."™ Such a finding is an express and essential 
requirement under both Codes and is not satisfied merely 
through a presumption after an affirmative finding of 
injury. Quite clearly, in many cases the authorities 
have tended to assume that, if dumping or subsidisation 
is found to exist, injury has been caused as a
consequence of such practices. This situation is
exacerbated if the ITC finds particular practices, such 
as price underselling and negative import trends, and 
assumes that these conditions invariably cause injury to 
domestic industries. This undermines the need to satisfy 
an express condition contained in the Codes and results 
again brings the United States authorities into conflict 
with the international obligations of that state.
The same observations apply as regards the procedural 
rights of parties in such investigations with the 
additional comment that there exists a fundamental 
asymmetry in the rights of domestic producers and 
foreign manufacturers/exporters during this process. The 
procedural apparatus set up to administer these 
mechanisms operates against the interests of foreign 
producers who are required to justify their commercial 
decisions and behaviour to the administering agencies 
while domestic parties have the passive role of 
initiators of investigations."" Once a complaint has
"" See text, supra pp.661-665.H80 text, supra 673-678."" See text’, supra pp. 688-690.
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been initiated, the competition is between the United 
States authorities, with unlimited financial resources, 
and foreign producers with limited resources.
Illegitimate protection can be provided in the form of 
a failure to comply with the procedural law requirements 
set out in the Codes in much the same way as by 
manipulating the substantive rules in a manner 
inconsistent with international obligations. Both Codes 
specify procedural requirements which should be
implemented in national law and evidence of failing to 
comply with these obligations is further proof of the 
limited normative impact of the international rules not 
only on the legislative content of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws but also in their
administration.
The laxity of ■ the standing requirements for the 
initiation of investigations has, for some considerable 
time, been seen as an effective non-tariff barrier 
because of the wide range of parties (interested and 
otherwise) entitled to initiate complaints. The 
definition of eligible complainers has been continuously 
enlarged to permit access to the procedures to related 
interest groups which are not producers of like products 
but manufacturers of products associated with the 
imported g o o d s . F o r  example, the addition of
agricultural commodity producers to the list of eligible
petitioners for processed and finished agricultural 
goods in the 1988 Act is a clear contravention of the 
1979 Codes because standing is restricted by these 
agreements to producers of like products. Congress was 
under no delusion when enacting this legislation that 
the measure contravened the terms of the Codes and hence 
the clause restricting its application in the event that
U82 See text, supra pp.690-702.
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the measure is successfully challenged at the 
international l e v e l . T h i s  is a sound illustration of 
the circumscribed role of international obligations when 
Congress is engaged in legislating in the area of trade 
law and policy.
Both the ITA and the ITC also stand accused of 
inequitable and illegal conduct in the course of 
conducting investigations. The most flagrant example of 
such conduct is in the application of slack petition 
requirements. The 'reasonable indication* standard makes 
a mockery of any attempt to impose a semblance of an 
evidential threshold for the initiation of 
c o m p l a i n t s . T h i s  is confirmed by the fact that 
examples of the ITA rejecting complaints as manifestly 
unfounded on the basis of the insufficiency of evidence 
are rare. Failure to properly review the evidence 
contained in a complaint encourages United States 
producers to abuse anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
procedures for the purposes of harassing foreign 
exporters.
Failure to properly apply the procedural rules contained 
in both Codes also occurs when the ITA applies the rules 
relating to exclusion requests, in the application of 
the 'best information available* rule and in the general 
lack of symmetry between the rights of a complainer and 
a foreign producer accused of dumping or manufacturing 
subsidised products. The rules relating to the 
protection of confidential information operates against 
the interests of foreign producers by granting domestic 
producers liberal access to all business proprietary 
information on the basis of administrative protection 
orders. Finally, the onus of disclosure imposed on
See text, supra pp.694-695.See text, supra pp.704-706.See text, supra pp. 712-716.
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foreign companies is excessive and, once requested 
information has been submitted to the ITA, there is 
little that a respondent can do to protect its 
conf identiality.
The same inconsistent behaviour when the novel forms of 
applications introduced by the 1988 Act, such as 
downstream product monitoring and short life cycle 
applications, are considered.Both procedures do not 
require the establishment of a link between the 
complainer and the relevant domestic industry. Since 
both procedures may culminate in duties akin to 
countervailing and anti-dumping duties, the consistency 
of these procedures with the international requirements 
is open to question.
The operation of downstream product monitoring and short 
life cycle application procedures is also inconsistent 
with the international rules of the Codes. Downstream 
product monitoring procedures infringe the Codes because 
of the excessive right of petition granted to 
complainers, the failure to establish the necessary 
relationship between the complainer and the relevant 
product and the circumvention of the injury requirement. 
Similarly, the short life cycle product procedure has a 
penal nature which contravenes the basic premise of both 
anti-dumping and countervailing mechanisms which is 
intended to be compensatory rather than penal.
The legal principles introduced by Congress to prevent 
the circumvention of anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures are also, in many respects, incompatible with 
the rules of the General A g r e e m e n t . T h e  implementing 
legislation expands the scope of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty orders for particular goods from
1186 gQQ text, supra pp.701-704, 719-723.See text, supra pp.723-737.
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specific countries to include related, though by no 
means similar or identical, goods as well as goods from 
countries to which the original order did not apply. In 
other words, the measure breaks the link between 
products manufactured or produced by the complainer and 
foreign imported goods which is an infraction of a 
fundamental rule of the General Agreement and both 
Codes, namely that complainers must be producers of like 
p r o d u c t s . T h e r e  is also a strong argument that the 
United States anti-circumvention rules relating to 
assembly and finishing in the United States infringe 
Article III of the General Agreement in the same way 
that the rules of the European Union were held to be 
incompatible because they imposed discriminatory 
internal charges on foreign products.
At the level of implementation and administration of 
U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty law the most 
subtle infractions are committed. For example, the 
failure to properly apply the rule that a complaint must 
be representative of a domestic industry has been 
manipulated to allow groups which are obviously not 
representative of the majority of producers in the 
sector to submit complaints."^ The grant of financial 
and technical assistance to American industries to 
enable them to prepare and file anti-dumping complaints 
aggavates this situation.
Similarly, many of the practices of the Department of 
Commerce in identifying the relevant industry do not 
withstand scrutiny under the international rules. The 
exclusion rule for domestic producers who are also 
importers of the relevant products is arbitrary and 
e x c e s s i v e . E v e n  if a non-U.S. company has
See text, supra p.735.See text, supra pp. 695-700,See text, supra pp. 708-709.
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established production facilities in the United States 
and sells all its production in that market, it can 
still be excluded from the scope of the domestic 
industry because of its foreign associations. This is an 
over-indulgent application of the related parties 
principle contained in the Codes and the effect of this 
practice is not only to artificially restrict the scope 
of relevant domestic industry to probably less efficient 
producers but also to blatantly discriminate against 
foreign investment.
(B) The European Union
The European Union relies virtually exclusively on its 
anti-dumping legislation as its principal weapon of 
commercial defence almost to the complete exclusion of 
anti-subsidy and'safeguard measures. Hence, its profile 
in the use of administered protectionism differs 
significantly from that of the United States, It is 
therefore appropriate to concentrate on the degree of 
consistency between the Union's anti-dumping regime on 
the one hand and the General Agreement and the 
Anti-Dumping Code on the other hand when ascertaining 
the strength of the international rules and their 
ability to withstand dilution or avoidance when 
incorporated and applied at the supranational level by 
European Union institutions.
The main characteristic of the 1988 basic regulation is 
that the principles, rules and guidelines contained 
therein are stated in the most vague terms which allows 
exclusive latitude and discretion for the creative 
application of anti-dumping policy. In fact the basic 
regulation is so vague that there is general recognition 
that the European Commission can manufacture artificial 
dumping margins without deviating from the express terms
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of the regulation itself. This produces an inherently 
unsatisfactory situation in that the Commission and the 
Council can indulge in GATT-inconsistent practices 
without actually falling foul of European Union law. 
This unfortunate paradigm has been perpetuated by the 
refusal of the European Court to conduct effective 
judicial review of the anti-dumping legislation and 
administrative practices under the standards set out in 
the European Union's international obligations in this 
f i e l d . I n  effect, the approval of this position has 
meant that the Court has passively acquiesced to the 
effective autonomy of the European Commission (and to a 
lesser extent the Council of Ministers) in this critical 
area of trade policy implementation.
The shape of the basic regulation originally enacted to 
incorporate the disciplines of the 1979 Anti-Dumping 
Code - Council Regulation (EEC) 3017/79 - broadly
follows the general conceptual model for the imposition 
of duties as set out in the Code. From the outset, 
reservations may be expressed whether the terms of this 
measure imposed sufficient disciplines on the European 
Commission to comply with the obligations imposed by the 
Code in terms of the administration of the Union's 
anti-dumping regime. The major criticism was the 
excessive discretion given to that agency to develop and 
evolve inconsistent principles and practices through the 
administration of the system.
This legislation was subsequently amended on a number of 
occasions before consolidation in the 1988 basic 
regulation which.has formed the backbone of this part of 
the s t u d y . T h e s e  amendments occurred despite the 
fact that between 1979 and 1988 no major international 
agreements were negotiated under the GATT to regulate
See text, supra pp.486-504.See text, supra pp.753-757.
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anti-dumping. As an initial observation, therefore, it 
appears that the 1988 basic regulation was the product 
of politically-motived amendments being made to the 
original implementing measure which itself was subject 
to the significant criticism that its terms only broadly 
followed the conceptual framework of the 1979 
Anti-Dumping Code.
Hence, it is no surprise that the anti-dumping law and 
administrative practices of the European Union 
significantly deviate from the Union's international 
obligations under both the General Agreement and the 
Anti-Dumping Code. However, since the 1988 Basic 
Regulation has such a vague nature, in terms of both 
substantive and procedural content, the actual 
anti-dumping legislation itself is not the main source 
of inconsistent behaviour. On the contrary, it is in the 
administration and application of anti-dumping law and 
policy that the most abusive practices are perpetrated 
quite simply because of the excessive discretion enjoyed 
by the European Commission in the performance of its 
functions under this policy.
Starting first with the computation of dumping margins, 
only part of this process is congruous with the 
international legal obligations of the European Union. 
Each of the four steps involved in arriving at a dumping 
margin is imbued with an extensive degree of latitude 
for the creative application of anti-dumping policy.
Although the European Union is required to establish 
export prices where possible on the basis of actual 
prices, in reality constructed export prices are the 
norm and have been used in some of the most important 
and controversial investigations in recent times.
1193 See text, supra pp.761-766.
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Such calculations, of course, involve extensive 
subjective value judgments and violations of the Code 
obligations are committed, for example, when the 
Commission deducts both direct and indirect expenses for 
export prices while only allowing direct costs in the
construction of normal v a l u e . T h e s e  asymmetric
deductions are designed to decrease the final export 
price and inflate the normal value resulting in the 
creation of artificial dumping margins. The same effect 
is achieved by building into the constructed export
price an arbitrary margin of profit for related sales 
companies.
Another abusive behaviour perpetrated when constructing 
export prices is the charging of duty as a cost when 
reconstructing export prices in refund applications."^ 
Quite clearly, this practice infringes Article VI of the 
General Agreement and Article 8(3) of the Anti-Dumping 
Code since the level of anti-dumping duties imposed will 
exceed the margin of dumping found to exist.
Nevertheless, the European Court has refused to accept 
this argument as a basis for annulling anti-dumping 
measures and has therefore approved a clear-cut 
violation of both agreements by adjudicating in favour 
of the European Union institutions.
In calculating normal values, again the Commission's 
methodology is incompatible with the terms of the Code. 
The use of constructed normal values is facilitated by 
the excessively rigorous criteria imposed on the use of 
actual values. Actual values can be ignored in the event 
of a finding of insufficient volumes of sales or 
inadequate sales made in the ordinary course of trade 
and such findings allows the substitution of constructed 
values which exposes the whole process to arbitrary
See text, supra pp.763-765.See text, supra pp.766-768.
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determinations. For instance, in constructing normal 
values, the Commission has included government subsidies 
in the computation, has refused to allow deductions 
attributable to income from financial investments 
(non-operating income) even although requires the 
deduction of non-operation expenses in the calculation 
of the costs of production and has over-estimated levels 
of profit."* Each of these practices inflates the 
margin of dumping.
Another illustration of abusive behaviour in the 
calculation of dumping margins is the practice of 
comparing normal values and export prices on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis and eliminating the 
effect of 'negative dumping* by disallowing negative 
margins where these would adversely affect the prospects 
of lowering the final overall margin of dumping."^ By 
calculating dumping margins in this manner, the benefits 
of negative dumping are not carried forward or back to 
the detriment of the foreign manufacturers which are the 
subject of the investigation.
The treatment of goods from non-market economy countries 
is also excessively arbitrary. In common with the United 
States, the European Union selects analogue countries to 
arrive at a comparable normal value for the goods. The 
selection of the most appropriate country is critical in 
this process and the basic principle of E.U. 
anti-dumping law is that this selection should be made 
on 'an appropriate and not unreasonable manner'. 
Nevertheless, there is little evidence that the 
selection of analogue countries is made on the basis of 
objective economic criteria such as the relevant levels 
of economic development or per capita GNP of the two 
countries."* In fact, even the Commission admits that
"* See text, supra pp.781-782.See text, supra pp.791-792."* See text, supra pp.796-802.
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administrative factors impinge on the process for 
selecting analogue countries. The degree of co-operation 
from producers in a potential analogue country, the 
existence of economic data that has already been 
analysed and aministrative convenience are hardly 
suitable substitutes for objective economic criteria. 
Even the European Court, normally an ardent supporter of 
the European Commission's policy in the field of 
anti-dumping, was unable to support the arbitrary 
practices of the Commission in this area and issued a 
rebuke for selecting grossly inappropriate surrogate 
countries.
The Commission has also developed its own concept of 
input dumping without waiting for legislative approval. 
The Commission will now adjust constructed normal values 
to take into account the fact that producers purchase 
raw materials at a price which is lower than their 
production c o s t s . A g a i n  this has the effect of 
inflating normal values and hence the margin of dumping 
determined in the final investigation.
The methodologies in the injury determination aspect of 
anti-dumping investigations are also open to criticism 
for lack of compliance with the rigours of the 
Anti-Dumping Code. This lack of compliance also stems 
from the inability of the international rules to 
influence the Commission officials conducting 
investigations. The Commission is instructed to take 
into account three determining factors for establishing 
material injury, namely (a) the volume of imports; (b) 
the price of the imports; and (c) the impact of the 
imports on the European industry. While the Commission 
is instructed to examine all of these indicators, it
See text, supra pp.800-801See text, supra p.780.
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rarely does so and this deviation from the express terms 
of the 1988 basic regulation has been sanction by the 
European C o u r t . N a t u r a l l y ,  if the Commission is 
permitted to select which criteria to consider, injury 
may be found in virtually any investigation. Further, it 
is not necessary for the Commission to conclude that all 
these factors are negative for an affirmative 
determination of material injury.
Even in the application of the express criteria for 
establishing injury, which for the most part follow 
those set out in Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Code, 
abuse has occurred in the administration of these 
principles. For example, in assessing actual and 
relative increases in the levels of imports, the 
European Commission has been arbitrary in selecting the 
relevant periods for assessing trends in volume. 
Assessment periods have ranged between five months and 
five years and in between these extremes other periods 
have been used without adequate justification giving 
rise to suspicions that the arbitrary nature of the 
selection process operates against the interests of 
foreign manufacturers and exporters.
The ease with which the European Commission can select 
the means of measuring increasing volumes of imports is 
also disconcerting. The choice whether this measurement 
is made in absolute terms, relative to Union production 
or Union consumption, although admittedly permissible 
under Article 3(2) of the Code, grants wide latitude to 
the Commission to find injury. The Commission has abused 
the right to select among these options by finding too 
low levels of increasing imports as justification for an 
affirmative finding of material injury even after being 
allowed to opt among these choices. A market share as
*201 See text, supra pp.845-846.*202 See text, supra pp. 846-848.
1062
low as 2.47% over a one year period has been held to 
justify an affirmative determination even although 
imports in this - particular case increased neither in 
absolute terms or relative to Union production.
In assessing the effects of imports on domestic prices, 
the European Commission relies almost exclusively on the 
concept of price undercutting (or price underselling), 
A finding of significant price undercutting usually 
leads to a positive determination of injury. The 
Commission's methodology towards determining price 
undercutting is not consistent with the Code because 
hypothetical prices for European producers are used as 
opposed to actual p r i c e s . T a r g e t  prices are created 
on the assumption that dumped goods have already 
depressed prices. Not content with artificially 
inflating domestic prices in this manner, the European 
Commission increases prices further by including in this 
figure an appropriate amounts as a minimum profit for 
European Union producers. In these circumstances, it is 
not surprising that the Commission frequently discovers 
the existence of price undercutting in its 
investigations.
The final economic indicator which may be analysed by 
the Commission in the assessment of injury is the impact 
of imports on domestic production. In this area, the 
analysis adopted by the Commission is both haphazard and 
inconsistent. In some investigations, production 
statistics are the most important factor while in 
others, market shares, levels of profit and levels of 
employment are more important. The relative importance 
of negative indicators for each of these indices is 
difficult to discern but the Commission has not been 
reluctant to hold an adverse finding in one of these
*203 See text, supra p.850.*2^  See text, supra pp.853-855.
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categories as a justification for proving material 
injury.
The approach to the process of defining the relevant 
European Union industry also suffers from short-comings• 
The reasoning and logic behind like product 
determinations is often obfuscated and it is difficult 
to discern which are the most important characteristics 
in the identification of like products. There is also 
evidence of abuse in the application of the related 
parties rule to artificially circumscribe the relevant 
domestic industry."^ It is also notoriously difficult 
for a foreign manufacturer to challenge the Commission's 
findings on this point because the European Court has, 
in the past, fully supported the exercise of discretion 
by the Commission (and Council) in determining the scope 
of the like product market.
Article 3(4) of the Anti-Dumping Code is explicit in its 
requirement that it 'must be demonstrated that the 
dumped imports are...causing injury' to a domestic 
industry. The need for an explicit causal connection is 
also stressed through the 1988 basic regulation itself. 
Nevertheless, the European Court has agreed with the 
Commission that it is permissible to attribute 
responsibility to an importer for injury caused by 
dumping even if the losses due to dumping are merely 
part of more extensive injury attributable to other 
factors."* In .addition, the dislocation between 
assessing dumping and injury which often occurs in 
investigations raises legitimate concerns regarding 
causation. If these two periods are not identical, can 
it be proved that the injury occurring during the 
investigation period was caused by the dumping? The 
Commission would answer this question in the affirmative
See text, supra pp.868-872."* See text, supra pp.872-873.
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but the compatibility of the methodology with the Code 
requirements is open to debate.
Considering the procedural aspects of European Union 
anti-dumping law, initial concerns are immediately 
raised by the fact that not all the material sources of 
procedural rights and duties are contained in the basic 
regulation. The .development of procedural rights and 
safeguards has been largely dependent on general 
principles of law which, although flexible, are 
difficult to identify with precision. This problem is 
particularly acute if the investigating authorities take 
advantage of these uncertainties to render arbitrary or 
capricious rulings which are supported by the European 
C o u r t . T h e  evidence suggests that European 
industries have benefited more from this situation than 
foreign manufacturers.
European industries have benefited, in the first place, 
from the extremely liberal standing requirements imposed 
on private parties lodging anti-dumping complaints."* 
The requirement of the Code that a complaint must be 
made on behalf of a domestic industry has been diluted 
to such an extent in European Union law and practice 
that often groups which are not truly representative of 
an industry are successful in lodging complaints. This 
has occurred through manipulation of the 'majority 
representation* rule and, in particular, by the 
Commission's active participation in ensuring that 
sufficient representation is obtained during the initial 
phases of a complaint. Other techniques are also 
employed by complainers to overcome this requirement 
including defining the relevant product as narrowly as 
possible, relying on the regional industry rule or 
excluding non-indigenous European producers from the
*2^  See text, supra pp.889-892.
1208 text} supra pp.892-900.
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scope of the relevant industry."* The techniques are 
deployed with the full collaboration of the European 
Commission and the result is a mockery of the Code 
disciplines restricting the standing of private parties.
The criteria applied by the Commission in the assessment 
of the admissibility of complaints is also open to 
challenge for inconsistency with Article 5 of the Code. 
Although the Code requires 'sufficient evidence* of 
dumping, injury and causation in a complaint, the 
evidential standards applied by the Commission allow 
complaints based on the most superficial of evidence. 
For example, a complaint need not show that all the 
undertakings accused of dumping have in fact committed 
such acts; the Commission will take up the task of 
ascertain whether or not this is so on behalf of the 
complainant.
Further, the Commission's recently adopted practice of 
permitting selective complaints conflicts with the 
peremptory principle of Article VI of the General 
Agreement, namely that anti-dumping investigations are 
conducted against products from contracting parties and 
not against individual private companies."" The 
Commission justifies this practice on the basis that it 
does not constitute an infringement of European 
Community law. This does not, however, justify the 
practice under international law and brings the European 
Union into direct conflict with its international 
obligations.
During investigations, many of the administrative 
practices of the Commission prejudice the interests of 
foreign manufacturers and exporters. For example, the
"* See text, supra pp.896-898,"" See text, supra pp.902-903."** See text, supra pp.903-904.
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application of the 'facts available* rule does not 
require the Commission to examine evidence other than 
that submitted in the complaint even if more accurate 
and reliable information can be relatively simply 
obtained. Also, the policy of penalising 
non-co-operating foreign manufacturers is also of 
dubious legitimacy. In at least one instance, the 
Commission maliciously imposed higher duties on a
non-co-operating producer even although the information 
available warranted a lower margin of d u m p i n g . " "  
Similarly, the Commission has recently adopted a
strategy of setting residual duties for non-co-operating 
companies at higher levels than for non-co-operating 
producers. The Commission is effectively using the 
pretext of non-co-operation to maintain a policy of
deliberately setting higher levels of duties than is
warranted after an investigation.
Article 5(1) of the Anti-Dumping Code requires that, 
except in special circumstances*, investigations are to 
be concluded within one year after their initiation. The 
requirement is repeated in the 1988 Basic Regulation, In 
reality, anti-dumping investigations frequently take 
much longer to complete and periods of between three and 
five years are not unheard of for investigations. The 
European Court has persistently refused to condemn the 
Commission for the excessive delays perpetrated in these 
investigations, instead holding that the one year period 
is merely a guideline and not a mandatory requirement of 
European Union law."" The fact that the practice 
contravenes the terms of the Anti-Dumping Code does not 
appear to concern the European Court.
Once an affirmative determination of dumping and injury, 
together with causation, has been made, the Anti-Dumping
"" See text, supra pp.909-911."" See text, supra pp.918-921.
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Code authorises the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
or, alternatively, the acceptance of price undertakings 
from foreign manufacturers. The policy of the Commission 
towards the acceptance of price undertakings is 
completely arbitrary. For example, the Commission has 
recently adopted a policy of refusing to accept 
undertakings from Japanese producers found to have been 
dumping due to the present state of the European Union's 
commercial relations with Japan."" Similarly, offers 
of undertakings have been rejected from Canadian 
producers on the ground that Canadian anti-dumping law 
does not permit the possibility of undertakings being 
accepted from European Union producers."" In addition, 
the Commission has refused in some case to explain why 
undertakings from manufacturers have been refused. In 
these circumstances, there is little doubt that the 
Commission's policy towards the acceptance of 
undertakings is ' influenced more by the existence of 
broader considerations such as the existence of negative 
trading balances than the need to maintain objective and 
impartial criteria for this process.
The Anti-Dumping Code does not provide for the 
possibility of definitive measures other than 
anti-dumping duties being imposed by signatories. 
Nevertheless, the European Union applies numerous 
miscellaneous forms of relief in addition to ad valorem 
anti-dumping duties. Fixed duties have been applied 
calculated relative of volumes, quantities and the 
values of imports as have voluntary export restraint 
agreements to terminate investigations."" None of 
these mechanisms is expressly authorised under the Code.
The European Union has also evolved novel forms of
"" See text, supra p.926."" See text, supra pp.926-927."" See text, supra pp.930-932.
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protective measures to fortify the basic anti-dumping 
mechanism established under the 1988 Basic Regulation. 
One unique type of measure is the anti-absorption 
procedure which allows the imposition of additional 
duties in the event that the Commission finds that
anti-dumping duties have been borne by foreign exporters 
or manufacturers."" This procedure infringes the terms 
of the Anti-Dumping Code on a number of grounds. First, 
complaints can be lodged by parties which are not 
representative of European Union industries. Second, the 
subsequent investigation is not compatible with
procedural safeguards contained in the Code for the 
conduct of such investigations. Third, the levels of 
duties imposed,- in some circumstances, exceed the
original dumping margins found to exist.
The second novel form of protective measure to fortify 
the main structure of the European Union's anti-dumping 
laws is, of course, the anti-circumvention measures in 
the 1988 Basic Regulation."" The compatibility of this 
legislation with the terms of the General Agreement has 
already been assessed at the GATT level and found
incompatible with Article III. Nevertheless, the 
European Union refused to repeal this legislation or to 
amend it in order to comply with the panel ' s
recommendations although no new investigations under 
this provision have been initiated since the panel's 
ruling was issued.
There are also a considerable number of minor
inconsistencies between the European Union's procedural 
regime and the terms of the General Agreement and the
Code, Of these, the most obvious include the
semi-institutionalised nature of many of the measures 
adopted caused by the bias in the review process, the
"" See text, supra pp.936-940."" See text, supra pp.940-946.
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asymmetry in refund procedures and the difficulties 
encountered by foreign exporters when seeking judicial 
review of anti-dumping m e a s u r e s . "i9 These 
inconsistencies merely compound the overall picture of 
the schism which exists between the European Union's 
anti-dumping laws and its international obligations 
under the General Agreement and the Anti-Dumping Code.
The fact that European Union anti-dumping policy is so 
inconsistent with the Union's international obligations 
provokes greater concern when it is remembered that over 
95% of measures of administered protection take this 
form. The use of anti-subsidy measures, safeguard 
measures and measures under the New Commercial Policy 
Instrument are the exception rather than the rule. At 
least in the case of anti-subsidy measures, their lack 
of use stems from the perspective of the Union towards 
the nature of these measures and the possible 
consequences of their use on a widespread basis.
While the European Union has not made aggressive use of 
anti-subsidy measures in the past, there is no guarantee 
that this policy will not change especially since the 
new Subsidies Code contains many of the rules which the 
European Union wished to see regulate subsidies at the 
international level. In any event, the small number of 
anti-dumping cases should not be mistaken for a 
benevolent attitude on the part of the European Union. 
The primary motivation for this policy was to secure 
international objectives."^ Now these have been 
atained, at least to a considerable degree, a more 
active role might await these measures.
From the analysis conducted of the existing anti-subsidy 
rules again the impression from a review of the European
"" See text, supra pp.949-962."2° See text, supra pp.806-812.
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Union's anti-subsidy laws is that of general vagueness. 
The Commission retains far too much discretion in the 
application and formulation of the anti-subsidy policy. 
This discretion is all the more distressing since the 
substantive rules remain at an unsophisticated level and 
their lack of use has resulted in an absence of 
refinement. For example, the specificity test applied by 
the European Union has not been fully developed and has 
been applied in a haphazard fashion. The endorsement of 
the test of de facto specificity does hint at the 
evolution of sophistication in this perspective."^ 
Nevertheless, the rules regulating quantification and 
allocation of benefits (over both time and units) are 
both primitive and unrefined.
However, even the present policy of the European Union 
towards anti-subsidy measures has caused distortion in 
the overall structure of the European Union's commercial 
defence systems. The greatest distortion must be the 
spill-over that refraining to use such measures has 
caused in the anti-dumping regime. Anti-dumping actions 
are raised when the proper recourse should be to 
anti-subsidy procedures. This is a dangerous development 
not least because anti-dumping measures are not the 
proper form of relief against foreign subsidisation 
practices. The application of anti-dumping measures in 
such circumstances is suspect.
The wisdom of the pursuit of the strategy of minimising 
the risks to the European Union's own freedom to 
introduce subsidy programmes at the international level 
by refraining from anti-subsidy measures must also be 
called into question. Not only has the European Union 
tied itself into absurd negotiating positions but a 
fundamental tautology has been introduced between the
1221 See text, supra pp.826-830
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European Union's own internal subsidisation policy and 
its international position."" Its state aid policy 
also operates on clearly distinct principles from those 
asserted in its international posture."" This implies 
that, while one set of rules is adequate for internal 
regulation, another completely different set of 
principles is adequate for the relationship between the 
European Union and third stated. Not only is confusion 
engendered but also charges of hypocrisy.
(2) Pinal Conclusion
As stated at the outset of this study, the purpose of 
this project was to establish that the institutional and 
legal framework for the regulation of international 
trading relationships, as established under the GATT, 
exercises only the most superficial normative influence 
on the present trade policies of both the United States 
and the European Union, having regard to both the
general direction of the trade policies of this state 
and this organisation and the particular rules of
international trade regulation selected for this study.
This is due to five main factors limiting the impact of 
the international rules on the behaviour of the United 
States and the European Union. These factors are;
(a) The limited normative efficacy of the international
trade legal order itself.
(b) The lack of international consensus which the
international substantive rules for the regulation of 
anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and subsidies 
themselves embody in relation to their content.
"22 See text, supra pp.813-817."2^  See text, supra pp.814-817.
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(c) The significant incompatibility of these 
international rules with the policy objectives and goals 
sought to be achieved by the United States and the 
European Union , as measured in terms of commercial 
policy.
(d) The inability of the substantive rules to permeate 
the decision-making processes inside the United States 
and the European Union and to prevail over non-legal 
factors and considerations.
(e) The weakness of such rules in terms of their 
ability to withstand dilution or avoidance when 
incorporated and applied at national level by national 
(or supranational) agencies.
Each of these factors combines to limit the normative 
influence of the international trade laws of the GATT 
system on the behaviour of the United States and the 
European Union. The ultimate consequence is that the 
system exercises only the most superficial normative 
influence on the present trade policies of both the 
United States and the European Union
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